The rule nc

I value morality.

Universalizability is a constraint on ethics.

1. Moral statements must be truth-apt-Subjective moral expressions make moral deduction impossible because each expression would be a change from the last one. For example, If we said Bob only does morally right actions we would assume that he would not kill if there was a moral rule against kiling, but a non-cognitivist would have to say that his decision not to kill is based on an emotive response rather than an appeal to a system of morality. The impact is morality is universal because shifting accounts of morality are impossible

2. infinite regress-subjective moral statements can conflict making firm statements about morality impossible.

3. paradox-Subjectivity makes the objective statement that objectivity is false.

4. There’s no metaphysical difference between people so there’s no reason they should be treated differently. This means obligations towards people should always be the universally the same.

5. Motivational internalism makes arguing about morality impossible.

Shafer-Landau , Russ Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition , Vol. 97, No. 3 (Feb., 2000), pp. 267-291

If content is determined largely by associated motivation, as the internalist diagnosis suggests, then different motivation entails different content. This internalist strategy thus implies that a good deal of apparently genuine moral agreement and disagreement is nothing of the sort, given that such discussion is often carried on by interlocutors with differing motivations. On an internalist view, the motivated and unmotivated agents debating a given ethical topic must be talking past one another, though they want to, intend to, and by all accounts appear to be directly engaging with one another's views.

And

Universalizability prevents us from making desire based moral rules.

Hare, R.M. Objective Prescriptions. Philosophical Issues. 1993.

The two features of the logic of this potentially culturally invariant moral language are prescriptivity, about which I have said all I have time for, and another feature of moral prescriptions which Kant also noticed, namely what is called their universalizability. This is not exclusive to moral prescriptions; it is shared by some other kinds of prescription. But it at least distinguishes moral prescriptions from simple imperatives like 'Shut the door', which may be no more than expressions of desires. If moral judgements lacked this feature, we could again, [then] if we simply wanted something not to be done,[we would] say that it ought not to be done, that is, that it was wrong; and between us and anybody who said it was not wrong, or even that it ought to be done, there would be no way of deciding –[there is] no way we could argue with one another to determine which verdict on the act to accept. But moral judgements are different. It is, I think (though some people disagree) a fact of language that if I say that an act ought to be done, I am committed to saying that a similar act ought to be done in all circumstances resembling these, whoever is in whichever position in the situation. It is, on this view, logically inconsistent to say that, of two identically similar acts in identically similar circumstances, one is wrong and the other not. The circumstances are of course to be understood as including the desires of the people in them. Even those who disagree with me, and think that universalizability is not a logical truth, still, nearly all of them, think that it is true. It is this feature of moral judgements which prevents us making just whatever moral judgements we please. For if we make a moral judgement, we are committed to prescribing the same thing for all similar situations. But we could imagine ourselves in just the same situation, but at the receiving end, in the position of the victim of the act. For example, suppose we are thinking of torturing somebody for fun. If we say that we ought to do this, we are committed to saying that he ought to do the same to us if the roles were reversed. And we are unlikely to be willing to say this. I have elaborated this style of argument in other places (H 1963: ch. 6; 1981: chs. 5, 6), and there are complications and difficulties in it, which can however be overcome.

Thus the standard is maintaining universal punishment

And

Only punishment that looks at past actions can be universal.

Meyer, Dan. What Crimes Deserve Retribution: An Important Distinction for Retributivists. http://oregonstate.edu/cla/shpr/sites/default/files/nwpc/meyer_dan.pdf

There is a final aspect of wrongdoing that is relevant to a defense of punishment. Hampton says that moral injuries express not only the worthlessness of the victim, but also the relative superiority of the wrongdoer. Some moral injuries express the worthlessness of a standard: for example, a murderer might think that prohibitions against murder aren’t binding, while nonetheless desiring not to be murdered. His maxim contains a gross asymmetry and is not universalizable; his action is an expression of his superiority since he takes himself to be held to a standard that doesn’t apply to others. When moral injuries express the worthlessness of the victim, such as when a wrongdoer agrees that killing is wrong but not in this case since the victim isn’t human, the action also expresses the superiority of the wrongdoer. Now we are in a better position to understand the justification of punishment as a response to wrongdoing. According to Hampton, moral injury requires a response that will somehow return both the victim’s diminished status and the wrongdoer’s inflated status to their proper places. She thinks punishment is best suited for this task.

and deserving punishment based on past wrongdoing is retribution.

Scheid Don E. Kant's Retributivism Author(s): Reviewed work(s): Source: Ethics, Vol. 93, No. 2 (Jan., 1983), pp. 262-282 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380419 .

By "thoroughgoing retributivism" I shall mean any theory of punishment that embraces the Retributivist Principle and also adopts some retributivist (broad sense, i.e., non-crime-control) rationale as its general justifying aim. Some examples will help. One might claim (a) that the institution of punishment is its own justification, that the purpose of the institution is simply to implement the requirements of the Retributivist Principle. More often, however, the institution of punishment is seen as being instrumental in achieving an arrangement of things required by some principle of justice or deservedness, such as (b) that people who do bad things ought to suffer, or (c) that wicked people ought to suffer, or (d) that a proper balance of happiness and suffering must be maintained among people in proportion to their moral virtues and vices. Still another kind of generaljustifying aim is (e) that a certain equality of social advantages among citizens must be maintained, that a system of punishment is nec- essary to correct those extra advantages that criminals gain by breaking the law. Any one of these goals might serve as the general justifying aim in a theory of punishment, but none of these goals has anything to do with crime control.

And rehabilitation can’t be universalized

1. Each individual needs a different kind of rehab for their specific crime and reasons for committing the crime.

2. Rehab is forward looking but not every individual is “fixed” by rehab. Retribution is always applied and not changed regardless of the effect it has on the criminal since I defend thoroughgoing retributivism.

presumption

Presumption flows neg because

1. a statement is more likely false than true because proving one part of statement false proves the whole statement false.

2. Aff has a structural advantage because they get the first and last word so they get the last word on weighing

3. aff has the burden of proof because the resolution questions what we ought to do. If there is no offense the resolution hasn’t been proven true.

4. Assuming ought statements are true would create infinite obligations for what we ought to do which makes it impossible to determine which ought statement to act on. This means presuming aff precludes the possibility of any offense defeating the purpose of presumption.

5. Aff gets the last word in every debate so they have to extend some risk of offense. Don’t punish me if the 2ar doesn’t extend offense.

Util auto affirms underview

Even if I concede the aff you still negate as long as the nc is true because it just means that universal punishment is a side constraint on consequences. The nc says that it is impossible to will universal maxims of crime which means the action of the crime is what deserves retributive punishment not the individual who committed the crime, so it also excludes all arguments about why we should be forward-looking for reasons that pertain to the criminal as opposed to the crime.