## AC

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

First, respect for human worth would justify util. **Cummiskey 90**

Cummiskey, David. Associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. “Kantian Consequentiaism.” Ethics 100 (April 1990), University of Chicago. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810>

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

Second, util is epistemologically necessary. Everyone values happiness whether they want to or not. Even a skeptic wouldn’t shoot themselves in the foot.

Third, personal identity is indeterminate because a brain could be split into two future people which proves only end states can be the object of evaluation.

And fourth, policy makers cant evaluate side constraints because they have to consider trade offs between multiple people.

**Plan**: The United States ought to require employers pay a living wage adjusted to local cost of living differences. I reserve the right to clarify.

**Contention 1** is Work Hours

Minimum wage hikes force employers to reduce hours—the Law of Demand predicts that with more certainty than unemployment

**Perry 14**

Mark Perry (concurrently a scholar at AEI and a professor of economics and finance at the University of Michigan's Flint campus). “The Law of Demand and the minimum wage: It applies to number of hours worked, not the level of employment.” American Enterprise Institute. September 14th, 2014. http://www.aei.org/publication/the-law-of-demand-and-the-minimum-wage-it-applies-to-number-of-hours-worked-not-the-level-of-employment/

Posts on CD about the minimum wage always generate a higher than average number of comments, and Friday’s CD post (“Do Demand Curves Slope Down or Not?”) was no exception – there have been 46 comments so far. Most of the minimum wage debate centers on the issue of whether minimum wage increases have any effects on employment levels. Specifically, does the empirical evidence point to any significantly negative effects on employment levels following minimum wage hikes, as clearly predicted by economy theory? Some empirical evidence like the much-cited 1994 study by Card and Krueger found “no indication that the rise in the minimum wage reduced employment” at fast-food restaurants in New Jersey following a minimum wage increase to $5.05 per hour compared to nearby fast-food restaurants in Pennsylvania where the minimum wage remained constant at $4.25. **Let me** attempt to **reconcile** the apparent **inconsistency between**: a) **economic theory**, which clearly predicts a negative relationship between the minimum wage and the quantity of unskilled workers demanded by employers, **and** b) some of the **empirical evidence that finds no negative employment effects** following minimum wage hikes. Here’s the key point: **The negative relationship** predicted by economic theory **is not**: a) **between** minimum **wage hikes and** the number of **unskilled workers employed, but** b) between minimum **wage hikes and** the number of **unskilled work hours** demanded by employers. The two charts above help to illustrate that difference: In the top chart, we see a negative relationship between an increase in the minimum wage and the number of hours of unskilled work demanded by employers in the 12-month period following the increase in the hourly price of unskilled labor (to capture the effects on future hiring). Like an increase in the cost of any other labor input or other input like food, energy, raw materials, machinery, equipment rental, or building rent, **employers facing** a 39% **increase in the cost of unskilled labor** (from $7.25 to $10.10 an hour) **would** have no other choice than to **reduce** the number of **unskilled work hours – it would** simply **be** a **necessary** strategy **for survival**. As I pointed out recently, a minimum wage increase to $10.10 per hour would be the equivalent to an annual tax of more than $6,000 per full-time worker earning the minimum wage. The various strategies employers might use to reduce their demand for unskilled work hours over the 12-month period following a 39% minimum wage hike might include: a) reducing the number of hours worked per week by entry-level unskilled workers, e.g. cutting their hours from 40 to 30 per week, or from 30 to 20, etc., b) reducing the number of unskilled workers currently employed through layoffs, c) reducing the number of unskilled workers that employers might have previously been planning on adding to staffing levels in the future, d) substituting skilled workers for the now relatively more expensive unskilled workers, and e) investing in technologies that would substitute automation, mechanization, robotics, and self-serve options for unskilled workers. **Although the effect** of a 39% minimum wage hike **on employment** levels **might be uncertain, the negative effect on** the number of **hours** of unskilled labor demanded by employers **would be** much **more certain** and predictable **according to the Law of Demand**. The bottom chart shows graphically how it would be possible that an increase in the minimum wage might not adversely affect the number of unskilled workers employed by looking at the relationship between the average weekly compensation for unskilled workers (and not the hourly monetary wage) and the number of unskilled workers.

Reductions in work hours reduce warming and unemployment; they also improve quality of life

**Schor 11**

Juliet Schor (professor of sociology at Boston College, won the Guggenheim Fellowship for Social Sciences). “COUNTER-INTUITION 101: WHY RECENT BAD ECONOMIC NEWS MEANS IT’S TIME FOR WORKING LESS.” June 2011. http://www.julietschor.org/2011/06/counter-intuition-101-why-recent-bad-economic-news-means-its-time-for-working-less/

So what's the alternative to slashing government programmes, budget, and more concentrated wealth at the top? The centerpiece of a new approach is to re-structure the labour market by reducing hours of work. That may seem counter-intuitive in a period when the mainstream message is that we are poorer than ever and have to work harder. But the historical record suggests it's a smart move that will create what economists call a triple dividend: three positive outcomes from one policy innovation. **The first benefit** of hours reductions **is** a **significant reduction in unemployment**. Maintaining balance in the labour market has always been through reduction in hours of work. **Without** the advances of **a shorter workweek**, vacation time, earlier retirement and later labour force entrance, the **economies of the OECD would never have attained the "golden age" of high employment** that prevailed **after the** 1930s **depression**. Between 1870 and 1970, hours of work fell roughly in half. These countries have re-balanced the labour market by re-distributing work to make its allocation fairer. **We need shorter hours because it is unrealistic to count on** growth in **GDP to absorb** all this current and future **"surplus" labour. Rich countries never grow that rapidly**. So the austerity economics that says work longer and retire later has it exactly wrong. But even if GDP growth could solve the unemployment problem, it shouldn't, because the cost in GHG emissions is prohibitive. North America and Europe have already blown their carbon budgets and until we re-structure energy systems, growth isn't reconcilable with responsible emissions levels. Here too **shorter hours** of work provide a dividend. They **are associated with lower** ecological and **carbon footprints. Countries that work more pollute more**. That both **because their scale of production is larger** (the GDP effect) **and** because **time-stressed** households and **societies do things in more carbon intensive ways** than societies in which time is more abundant. Longer hours of work lead people to travel, eat, and live faster-paced lives, which in turn require more energy. **The third benefit** of shorter hours **is** the **time itself**. As a growing movement of "downshifters" attests, **short hour lifestyles allow people to** build stronger social connections, **maintain** their **physical and mental health, and engage in activities that are creative and meaningful**. Time is especially valuable in rich countries where material needs can be met for everyone, and deprivation is caused by mal-distribution of income and wealth. So that's the triple dividend: reduce unemployment, cut carbon emissions, and give people quality of life. Austerity economics says we can't afford to work less. A serious reading of our economic history suggests we can't afford not to.

The US’s lengthy work hours will get modeled globally—this causes warming

**Rosnick and Weisbrot 6**

David Rosnick (research associate, CEPR) and Mark Weisbrot (co-director, CEPR). “Are Shorter Work Hours   Good for the Environment?  A Comparison of U.S. and European   Energy Consumption.” Center for Economic and Policy Research. December 2006. http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/energy\_2006\_12.pdf

**Longer Work Hours Means More Energy Use Countries where people work fewer hours use** much **less energy than the U**nited **S**tates. If we assume constant energy efficiency (energy per unit of GDP) and a constant productivity (GDP per hour of work), then energy use per hour of work must be constant. Table 4 shows that, under this simplifying assumption, if workers in “Old Europe” had worked as many hours in 2003 as had workers in the United States, the EU-15 would have consumed 18 percent more energy. 6 [Table 3] Table 3 represents a simplified estimation of how energy consumption per country would increase if work hours increased. However, the relationship between energy consumption and work hours could be more complicated. For example, workers (or families) with less leisure time may dry their laundry by machine rather than drying it on a clothesline. They may not take the time to walk or bicycle to work, but rather drive. These behavioral changes in response to increased work hours would cause energy efficiency to decline as work hours increased. On the other hand, they may have their clothes professionally laundered, or take a cab. While these decisions would increase energy consumption, they would also increase hours worked in the economy, so the effect on this measure of energy efficiency is indeterminate. Finally, they may pay professionals to paint their homes rather than do it themselves. While this would consume the same amount of much energy, it would increase hours worked, thereby increasing this measure of energy efficiency. Of course, as people leave their homes to work, energy savings at home might balance the extra energy consumed at work. Any net effect of work hours on energy consumption is not easy to predict. We therefore try to estimate this relationship between energy efficiency (as measured per hours worked) and an increase in hours. The appendix explains how this is done. Based on this estimation, we can delineate a range of possible relationships between an increase in work hours and energy consumed. Table 4 takes the low estimate of this range: that **every one percent increase in work hours** per worker **results in** a 0**.32 percent increase in energy consumed per work hour**. In other words, energy use per work hour increases as work hours increase, but here we are using the lowest (most conservative) estimate of the amount by which it increases. 8 [Table 4 and Table 5] Collectively, these three scenarios cover a range of possible energy responses to changes in work hours. If, in 2003, other developed country workers worked as many hours as Americans, by these estimates they would have consumed anywhere from 12 to 41 percent more energy. Similarly, if Americans traded work for leisure, they could reduce their energy needs by 9 to 26 percent. Conclusion If Americans chose to take advantage of their high level of productivity by shortening the workweek or taking longer vacations rather than producing more, there would follow a number of benefits. Specifically, if the U.S. followed the EU-15 in terms of work hours, then: • Employed workers would find themselves with seven additional weeks of time off. • The United States would consume some 20 percent less energy. • If a 20 percent energy savings had been directly translated into lower carbon emissions, then the U.S. would have emitted 3 percent less carbon dioxide in 2002 than it did in 1990.9 This level of emissions is only 4 percent above the negotiated target of the Kyoto Protocol. On the flip side, **there is political pressure within European countries to adopt a more American labor model. If Europeans did** in fact **give up** their **shorter workweeks** and longer vacations**, they would consume** some additional **25 percent more energy**. Translated into carbon emissions, this would have enormous consequences for those countries that have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Over 1990 levels,10 the EU-15 emitted 8 percent more carbon dioxide in 2002, despite a clear commitment to reduce emissions to 8 percent below 1990 levels by 2008-12. Thus, the EU-15 must cut emissions by 14 percent from 2002 levels. However, if EU-15 workers had consumed 25 percent more energy and consequently emitted 25 percent more carbon dioxide in 2002, they would have had to cut emissions by more than one-third from that level to meet their commitment to Kyoto. According to the IPCC Third Assessment Report,11 the amount of global **warming is tied to the speed by which emissions are cut. If by 2050 the world is emitting** 10Gt (**10 billion metric tons**) of carbon, **we may be on a path to 2.5 degrees Celsius** of warming. On the other hand, if the level of emissions is **14Gt** of carbon dioxide **in 2050 may mean 4.5 degrees** of warming. **A worldwide choice of American work hours** over European levels **could result in 1 to 2 degrees Celsius of additional warming**, in addition to higher fuel prices. Finally, the debate over the European and American models, depending on the extent to which either side prevails, will have economic and environmental implications for a number of middle-income countries. These countries – especially the fast-growing economies of Asia – will most likely choose between these two models of labor market institutions and consumption. South Korea and Taiwan are already at European levels of GDP per capita. China (at $8,004 per person) is still far behind but is growing rapidly and is the second largest economy in the world in absolute size,12 and at current growth rates will pass the United States in less than a decade. **The American model is** still **portrayed throughout the international** business **press as the one to emulate. The environmental consequences of developing countries’ choices could be** very **serious.**

Warming causes extinction and adaptation can’t solve

**Snow and Hannam 14**

Cites Helen Berry, associate dean in the faculty of health at the University of Canberra, and co-authors Tony McMichael, of the Australian National University, and Colin Butler, of the University of Canberra. Deborah Snow and Peter Hannam (staff writers). “Climate change could make humans extinct, warns health expert.” Sydney Morning Herald. March 31st, 2014. http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/climate-change-could-make-humans-extinct-warns-health-expert-20140330-35rus.html

The Earth is warming so rapidly that unless humans can arrest the trend, we risk becoming ''extinct'' as a species, a leading Australian health academic has warned. Helen Berry, associate dean in the faculty of health at the University of Canberra, said while the Earth has been warmer and colder at different points in the planet's history, the rate of change has never been as fast as it is today. ''What is remarkable, and alarming, is the speed of the change since the 1970s, when we started burning a lot of fossil fuels in a massive way,'' she said. ''We can't possibly evolve to match this rate [of warming] and, unless we get control of it, it will mean our extinction eventually.'' Professor Berry is one of three leading academics who have contributed to the health chapter of a Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report due on Monday. She and co-authors Tony McMichael, of the Australian National University, and Colin Butler, of the University of Canberra, have outlined the health risks of rapid global warming in a companion piece for The Conversation, also published on Monday. The three warn that the adverse effects on population health and social stability have been ''missing from the discussion'' on climate change. '**'Human-driven climate change poses a great threat**, unprecedented in type and scale, **to wellbeing**, health **and perhaps** even to human **survival**,'' they write. They predict that **the greatest challenges will come** from undernutrition and impaired child development **from reduced food yields;** hospitalisations and deaths due to **intense heatwaves,** fires and other **weather-related disasters; and** the spread of infectious **diseases**. They warn **the ''largest impacts'' will be on poorer** and vulnerable **populations**, winding back recent hard-won gains of social development programs. Projecting to an average global warming of 4 degrees by 2100, they say ''**people won't be able to cope**, let alone work productively, **in the hottest parts of the year**''. They say that action on climate change would produce ''extremely large health benefits'', which would greatly outweigh the costs of curbing emission growth. A leaked draft of the IPCC report notes that a warming climate would lead to fewer cold weather-related deaths but the benefits would be ''greatly'' outweighed by the impacts of more frequent heat extremes. Under a high emissions scenario, some land regions will experience temperatures four to seven degrees higher than pre-industrial times, the report said. **While** some **adaptive measures are possible,** limits to humans' ability to regulate **heat will affect health and** potentially cut global **productivity** in the warmest months by 40 per cent by 2100. **Body temperatures** rising **above 38 degrees impair physical and cognitive functions**, while risks of organ damage, loss of consciousness and death increase sharply above 40.6 degrees, the draft report said. Farm **crops and livestock will also struggle** with thermal and water stress. Staple crops such as corn, rice, wheat and soybeans are assumed to face a temperature limit of 40-45 degrees, with temperature thresholds for key sowing stages near or below 35 degrees, the report said.

Global warming destroys coral reefs

**Hoegh-Guldberg, 2011:**

(Hoegh-Guldberg, Ove. "Coral Reef Ecosystems And Anthropogenic Climate Change." Regional Environmental Change 11.(2011): 215-227. GreenFILE. Web. 11 June 2012. Director Of The Global Change Institute At The University Of Queensland)

**The rise of greenhouse gases** in the earth’s atmosphere **is driven** **fundamental changes** to its oceans. As a result of these changes, **the average temperature of the tropical oceans has increased** by approximately 0.7\_C (IPCC 2007). **These changes** in sea temperature combine with the natural variability of ocean temperatures to **bring warmer than normal years** (e.g., due to ENSO and other sources of interannual climate variability) **to even higher levels**, such as those seen in tropical regions during 1997–1998 (Lough 2000) and following years. **These higher temperatures** (which were once part of natural variability) now **exceed the tolerance of reef-building corals** **undergo** a process referred to as ‘**coral bleaching’** (Fig. 1a–c). **Mass coral bleaching events**, affecting thousands of square kilometers of coral reefs worldwide, **have emphasized the major toll that even mild rates of climate change can have** on the earth’s ecosystems (Hoegh-Guldberg 1999; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007).

Coral is key to a ton of marine species

**Hoegh-Guldberg, 2011:**

(Hoegh-Guldberg, Ove. "Coral Reef Ecosystems And Anthropogenic Climate Change." Regional Environmental Change 11.(2011): 215-227. GreenFILE. Web. 11 June 2012. Director Of The Global Change Institute At The University Of Queensland)

**The coral**-dominated communities **a critically important to** the biodiversity and productivity of tropical reef systems (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007), especially given the central role that reef-building corals have in providing the threedimensional topology that forms the habitat for **hundreds of thousands of species.** Our understanding of these changes is growing but remains restricted to a handful of organisms such as fish. In the latter case, **the decline of coral-dominated reef structures is associated with the loss of** approximately 25–**50% of fish species**. Species that depend on corals for recruitment, food, and shelter represent the most sensitive to the loss of coral communities, while others such as herbivores may actually increase in number over time (Graham et al. 2007; Pratchett et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 2008a, b). Our understanding of how other organisms such as invertebrates and marine algae will change as coral communities continue to decline is limited (Poloczanska et al. 2007; Przeslawski et al. 2008). However, **given the** tight ecological **relationships between corals and many other species, it is highly likely that the loss of corals will be accompanied by disappearance of many other species**. It is important to realize that the reefs that are currently coral dominated will not disappear as reef systems per se. Ultimately, however, they will be replaced by other organisms that may have different physiological and ecological characteristics, leading to rapid changes in the quantity and quality of species suitable for harvesting by coastal people. There is also the prospect that issues such as **poisoning from toxins** such as ciguatera **could increase significantly as benthic communities change from coraldominated systems to** ecosystems dominated by **cyanobacteria** and other types of organisms. In this regard, Hales and coworkers have reported a steady increase in the number of cases of ciguatera in the Pacific over the past several decades, a trend that appears to be associated with the loss of coral-dominated reef systems (Hales et al. 1999). Given that our understanding of these types of interactions is limited, **the potential for surprises** like that illustrated by the rise in ciguatera in tropical island communities **is considerable.**

Ocean biodiversity loss causes extinction

**Craig 3**

Robin Kundis Craig, Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana University School of Law, 2003 (“Taking Steps toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii,” McGeorge Law Review (34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155)

Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "**ocean ecosystems play a major role in** the **global geochemical cycling of** all the **elements that represent** the **basic building blocks of living organisms**, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, **human degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life**. Maintaining biodiversity is often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. **Current evidence shows that**, in general, **an ecosystem's ability to keep functioning** in the face of disturbance **is strongly dependent on its biodiversity**, "indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. [\*265] Most ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef system. n860 Thus, maintaining and restoring the **biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining** and restoring the **ecosystem services that they provide**. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much: **if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves**, and we will take most of the biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.

Immediate action is key

**Klein 15**

Naomi Klein (Canadian author, journalist and social activist. Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute and a former Miliband Fellow at the London School of Economics. In 2014 she received the International Studies Association’s IPE Outstanding Activist-Scholar award. She holds an honorary Doctor of Civil Laws from the University of King’s College, Nova Scotia). This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. Featured on The Guardian, Part 2 of the introduction. March 8th, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/08/how-will-everything-change-under-climate-change

That’s a big ask. But it gets bigger. Because of our endless procrastination, we also have to pull off this massive transformation without delay. The International Energy Agency (**IEA**) **warns that if we do not get** our **emissions under control by** a rather terrifying **2017, our fossil fuel economy will “lock-in” extremely dangerous warming**. “The energy-related infrastructure then in place will generate all the CO2 emissions allowed” in our carbon budget for limiting warming to 2C – “leaving no room for additional power plants, factories and other infrastructure unless they are zero-carbon, which would be extremely costly”. This assumes, probably accurately, that governments would be unwilling to force the closure of still profitable power plants and factories. **As** Fatih **Birol, the IEA’s chief economist, bluntly put it: “The door to reach two degrees** is about to close. In 2017 it **will be closed** forever.” In short, **we have reached** what some activists have started calling **“Decade Zero” of the climate crisis: we either change now or** we **lose our chance.** All this means that the usual free market assurances – A techno-fix is around the corner! Dirty development is just a phase on the way to a clean environment, look at 19th-century London! – simply don’t add up. We don’t have a century to spare for China and India to move past their Dickensian phases. Because of our lost decades, it is time to turn this around now. Is it possible? Absolutely. Is it possible without challenging the fundamental logic of deregulated capitalism? Not a chance.

**Contention 2** is Inequality

**Living wage solves bargaining power**

**Konczal 14**

Mike Konczal (fellow at the Roosevelt Institute). “7 Bipartisan Reasons to Raise the Minimum Wage.” Boston Review. March 3rd, 2014. http://www.bostonreview.net/us/mike-konczal-seven-reasons-raise-minimum-wage

When low-wage workers protest at fast food restaurants, low wages are not necessarily their sole concern. The working conditions may be equally important. Between a lack of sick days, random shift scheduling, and working without pay, there is a host of problems and humiliations from which workers seek redress. Civic republicanism presses against these practices. Philip Pettit, the philosopher most associated with this strain of thinking, defines its goal in terms of “freedom as non-domination,” freedom “as a condition under which a person is more or less immune to interference on an arbitrary basis.” In what sense can people be considered free if their means of survival places them at the mercy of an erratic schedule, thereby preventing the formation of civic and communal ties? Surveys of New York City’s low-wage workers find that 84 percent of them are not paid for their entire workday. When bosses can flout labor contracts and arbitrarily impose working conditions in this way, workers lack the kind of freedom that civic republicans celebrate. **By making the labor market tighter through lower turnover and vacancies,** a higher minimum wage creates bargaining power for workers and will help to eliminate these kinds of domination.

Counterplans can’t solve.

**NYT 14**

New York Times Editorial Board. “The Case for a Higher Minimum Wage.” February 8th, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/opinion/sunday/the-case-for-a-higher-minimum-wage.html

WHAT’S THE POINT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE? Most people think of the minimum wage as the lowest legal hourly pay. That’s true, but it is really much more than that. As defined in the name of the law that established it — the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 — the minimum wage is a fundamental labor standard designed to protect workers, just as child labor laws and overtime pay rules do. Labor standards, like environmental standards and investor protections, are essential to a functional economy. Properly set and enforced, these standards check exploitation, pollution and speculation. In the process, they promote broad and rising prosperity, as well as public confidence. The **minimum wage** is specifically intended to **take aim at the** inherent **imbalance in power between employers and low-wage workers** that can push wages down to poverty levels. **A**n appropriate **wage floor** set by Congress effectively **substitutes for** the **bargaining power that low-wage workers lack**. **When low-end wages rise, poverty and inequality are reduced**. But that doesn’t mean the minimum wage is a government program to provide welfare, as critics sometimes imply in an attempt to link it to unpopular policies. An hourly minimum of $10.10, for example, as Democrats have proposed, would reduce the number of people living in poverty by 4.6 million, according to widely accepted research, without requiring the government to tax, borrow or spend. IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE? No. **Other programs, including** food stamps, Medicaid and the **e**arned-**i**ncome **t**ax **c**redit, also **increase** the meager **resources** of low-wage workers, **but they do not provide bargaining power to claim a better wage.** In fact, they can drive wages down, because employers who pay poorly factor the government assistance into their wage scales. This is especially true of the earned-income tax credit, a taxpayer-provided wage subsidy that helps lift the income of working families above the poverty line. Conservatives often call for increases to the **E.I.T.C.** instead of a higher minimum wage, saying that a higher minimum acts as an unfair and unwise tax on low-wage employers. That’s a stretch, especially in light of rising corporate profits even as pay has dwindled. It also ignores how the tax credit **increases** the supply of **low-wage labor by encouraging more people to work, holding down** the **cost of labor for employers**. By one estimate, increasing the tax credit by 10 percent reduces the wages of high-school educated workers by 2 percent. There are good reasons to expand the tax credit for childless workers, as President Obama recently proposed. It is a successful antipoverty program and a capstone in the conservative agenda to emphasize work over welfare. But an expanded E.I.T.C. is no reason to stint on raising the minimum wage — just the opposite. **A higher minimum wage could** help **offset the wage-depressing effect of a bolstered E.I.T.C**., and would ensure that both taxpayers and employers do their part to make work pay.

Bargaining power is key to solve income inequality

**Gupta 15**

Sarita Gupta (executive director of Jobs with Justice). “Protect and Expand Workers’ Ability to Bargain.” Moyers and Company. January 20th, 2015. http://billmoyers.com/2015/01/20/protect-expand-workers-ability-bargain/

**Greedy corporations** have been on a decades-long bender to **take advantage of working people — depressing wages, benefits and job standards, which has led to record inequality** and poverty. At Jobs With Justice, we believe that **fighting poverty requires expanding** and protecting **the ability of workers to bargain with their employers** to demand higher wages, better working conditions and better living standards. As the nature of work changes, we look at collective bargaining through the union workplace campaign lens, but also through nontraditional forms, including legislative, policy, rulemaking and industry-wide interventions that put more money in workers’ pockets and improve standards and conditions for workers. **Only through bargaining do workers have** the **power to directly confront** the **corporate actors behind poverty and inequality**. Video From Jobs With Justice San Francisco: Fight for $15 and Just Hours Protest One example of this effort is our Retail Workers Bill of Rights campaign – led by Jobs With Justice San Francisco. Retail jobs are well understood to be some of the fastest growing and most poorly paid jobs in our economy, and an increasing number of people employed in this industry aren’t able to get the hours they need to earn enough to support their families. Working with the city’s Board of Supervisors, we pushed legislation to offer workers access to fairer, more predictable schedules. And in response to growing outrage over the turbulence families are experiencing due to a rise in inflexible and erratic schedules, community and labor advocates in a half dozen cities are planning to move similar reforms in 2015. Beyond winning better scheduling practices from employers, these campaigns – and others like them – have the potential to set workers up for more transformational fights, making bolder demands that increase onramps to collective bargaining and ultimately confront corporate power and fight poverty and inequality. Sign up now to join the fight for fair schedules and expanded bargaining for workers.

Income inequality causes famine, risking societal collapse

**Motesharrei et al 14**

Safa Motesharrei and Eugenia Kalnay (University of Maryland researchers) and Jorge Rivas (University of Minnesota researcher). “Human and nature dynamics (HANDY): Modeling inequality and use of resources in the collapse or sustainability of societies.” Science Direct. May 2014. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800914000615

The scenarios most closely reflecting the reality of our world today are found in the third group of experiments (see the scenarios for an unequal society in Section 5.3), where we introduced economic stratification. Under such conditions, we find that collapse is difficult to avoid, which helps to explain why **economic stratification is** one of the elements **recurrently found in** past **collapsed societies**. Importantly, in the first of these unequal society scenarios, 5.3.1, the solution appears to be on a sustainable path for quite a long time, but even using an optimal depletion rate (δ\*) and starting with a very small number of Elites, the **Elites eventually consume too much, resulting in** a **famine among Commoners that** eventually **causes** the **collapse of society**. It is important to note that this Type-L **collapse is due to** an **inequality-induced famine that causes** a **loss of workers**, rather than a collapse of Nature. Despite appearing initially to be the same as the sustainable optimal solution obtained in the absence of Elites, economic stratification changes the final result: Elites' consumption keeps growing until the society collapses. The Mayan collapse – in which population never recovered even though nature did recover – is an example of a Type-L collapse, whereas the collapses in the Easter Island and the Fertile Crescent – where nature was depleted – are examples of a Type-N collapse. In scenario 5.3.2, with a larger depletion rate, the decline of the Commoners occurs faster, while the Elites are still thriving, but eventually the Commoners collapse completely, followed by the Elites. It is important to note that in both of these scenarios, the **Elites – due to their wealth – do not suffer** the **detrimental effects of** the **environmental collapse until** much **later than** the **Commoners. This** buffer of wealth **allows Elites to continue “business as usual” despite** the **impending catastrophe**. It is likely that this is an important mechanism that would help explain how historical collapses were allowed to occur by elites who appear to be oblivious to the catastrophic trajectory (most clearly apparent in the Roman and Mayan cases). This buffer effect is further reinforced by the long, apparently sustainable trajectory prior to the beginning of the collapse. While some members of society might raise the alarm that the system is moving towards an impending collapse and therefore advocate structural changes to society in order to avoid it, **Elites and their supporters**, who opposed making these changes, **could point to the** long **sustainable trajectory “so far” in support of doing nothing**. The final two scenarios in this set of experiments, 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, are designed to indicate the kinds of policies needed to avoid this catastrophic outcome. They show that, in the context of economic stratification, **inequality must be greatly reduced** and population growth must be maintained below critical levels in order **to avoid** a **societal collapse** (Daly, 2008).

The US is key to global food supplies. Food crises cause war and instability.

**Klare 12**

Michael T. Klare is a Five Colleges professor of Peace and World Security Studies, whose department is located at Hampshire College, defense correspondent of The Nation magazine, and author of Resource Wars and Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America's Growing Petroleum Dependency (Metropolitan). Klare also teaches at Amherst College, Smith College, Mount Holyoke College, and the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Klare also serves on the boards of directors of Human Rights Watch, and the Arms Control Association. He is a regular contributor to many publications including The Nation, TomDispatch, Mother Jones, and is a frequent columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus. He also was the narrator of the movie, Blood and Oil which was produced by the Media Education Foundation, Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, As Food Prices Rise, Dangers of Social Unrest Seem Imminent, August 9, 2012.

The Great Drought of 2012 has yet to come to an end, but we already know that its consequences will be severe. With more than one-half of America’s counties designated as drought disaster areas, the 2012 **harvest of** corn, soybeans, and other **food** staples **is guaranteed to fall** far **short of predictions. This**, in turn, **will boost food prices** domestically and abroad, **causing** increased misery for farmers and low-income Americans and far greater **hardship for** poor people in **countries that rely on imported U.S. grain**s. This, however, is just the beginning of the likely consequences: If history is any guide, **rising** food **prices** of this sort **will** also **lead to widespread** social unrest and violent **conflict**. **Food**—affordable food—**is essential to human survival** and well-being. **Take that away,** and **people become** anxious, **desperate**, and angry. In the United States, food represents only about 13 percent of the average household budget, a relatively small share, so a boost in food prices in 2013 will probably not prove overly taxing for most middle—and upper-income families. It could, however, produce considerable hardship for poor and unemployed Americans with limited resources. “You are talking about a real bite out of family budgets,” commented Ernie Gross, an agricultural economist at Omaha’s Creighton University. This could add to the discontent already evident in depressed and high-unemployment areas, perhaps prompting an intensified backlash against incumbent politicians and other forms of dissent and unrest. It is in the international arena, however, that the Great Drought is likely to have its most devastating effects. Because so **many** nations **depend on** grain **imports from the U.S.** to supplement their own harvests, and because intense drought and floods are damaging crops elsewhere as well, food supplies are expected to shrink and prices to rise across the planet. “**What happens to the U.S. supply has immense impact around the world,”** **says** Robert **Thompson, a food expert** at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. As the crops most affected by the drought, corn and soybeans, disappear from world markets, he noted, the price of all grains, including wheat, is likely to soar, causing immense hardship to those who already have trouble affording enough food to feed their families. The Hunger Games, 2007-2011 What happens next is, of course, impossible to predict, but if the recent past is any guide, it could turn ugly. In 2007-2008, when rice, corn, and wheat experienced prices hikes of 100 percent

 or more, sharply **higher prices**—especially for bread—**sparked** “food **riots**” **in** more than two dozen countries, including **Bangladesh**, **Cameroon, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Senegal, and Yemen**. In Haiti, the rioting became so violent and public confidence in the government’s ability to address the problem dropped so precipitously that the Haitian Senate voted to oust the country’s prime minister, Jacques-Édouard Alexis. In other countries, angry protestors clashed with army and police forces, leaving scores dead. Those price increases of 2007-2008 were largely attributed to the soaring cost of oil, which made food production more expensive. (Oil’s use is widespread in farming operations, irrigation, food delivery, and pesticide manufacture.) At the same time, increasing amounts of cropland worldwide were being diverted from food crops to the cultivation of plants used in making biofuels. The next price spike in 2010-11 was, however, closely associated with climate change. An intense drought gripped much of eastern Russia during the summer of 2010, reducing the wheat harvest in that breadbasket region by one-fifth and prompting Moscow to ban all wheat exports. **Drought** also **hurt China’s** grain **harvest**, while intense flooding destroyed much of Australia’s wheat crop. Together with other extreme-weather-related effects, these disasters sent wheat prices soaring by more than 50 percent and the price of most food staples by 32 percent. Once again, a surge in food prices resulted in widespread social unrest, this time concentrated in North Africa and the Middle East. The earliest protests arose over the cost of staples in Algeria and then Tunisia, where—no coincidence—the precipitating event was a young food vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, setting himself on fire to protest government harassment. Anger over rising food and fuel prices combined with long-simmering resentments about government repression and corruption sparked what became known as the Arab Spring. The rising cost of basic staples, especially a loaf of bread, was also a cause of unrest in Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. Other factors, notably anger at entrenched autocratic regimes, may have proved more powerful in those places, but as the author of Tropic of Chaos, Christian Parenti, wrote, “The initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread.” As for the current drought, **analysts are** already **warning of instability in Africa**, where corn is a major staple, **and** of increased popular **unrest in China**, where food prices are expected to rise at a time of growing hardship for that country’s vast pool of low-income, migratory workers and poor peasants. Higher food prices in the U.S. and China could also lead to reduced consumer spending on other goods, further contributing to the slowdown in the global economy and producing yet more worldwide misery, with unpredictable social consequences. The Hunger Games, 2012-? If this was just one bad harvest, occurring in only one country, the world would undoubtedly absorb the ensuing hardship and expect to bounce back in the years to come. Unfortunately, it’s becoming evident that the Great Drought of 2012 is not a one-off event in a single heartland nation, but rather an inevitable consequence of global warming which is only going to intensify. As a result, we can expect not just more bad years of extreme heat, but worse years, hotter and more often, and not just in the United States, but globally for the indefinite future. Until recently, most scientists were reluctant to blame particular storms or droughts on global warming. Now, however, a growing number of scientists believe that such links can be demonstrated in certain cases. In one recent study focused on extreme weather events in 2011, for instance, climate specialists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Great Britain’s National Weather Service concluded that human-induced climate change has made intense heat waves of the kind experienced in Texas in 2011 more likely than ever before. Published in the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, it reported that global warming had ensured that the incidence of that Texas heat wave was 20 times more likely than it would have been in 1960; similarly, abnormally warm temperatures like those experienced in Britain last November were said to be 62 times as likely because of global warming. It is still too early to apply the methodology used by these scientists to calculating the effect of global warming on the heat waves of 2012, which are proving to be far more severe, but we can assume the level of correlation will be high. And what can we expect in the future, as the warming gains momentum? When we think about climate change (if we think about it at all), we envision rising temperatures, prolonged droughts, freakish storms, hellish wildfires, and rising sea levels. Among other things, this will result in damaged infrastructure and diminished food supplies. These are, of course, manifestations of warming in the physical world, not the social world we all inhabit and rely on for so many aspects of our daily well-being and survival. The purely physical effects of climate change will, no doubt, prove catastrophic. But the social effects including, somewhere down the line, food riots, mass starvation, state collapse, mass migrations, and conflicts of every sort, up to and including full-scale war, could prove even more disruptive and deadly. In her immensely successful young-adult novel, The Hunger Games (and the movie that followed), Suzanne Collins riveted millions with a portrait of a dystopian, resource-scarce, post-apocalyptic future where once-rebellious “districts” in an impoverished North America must supply two teenagers each year for a series of televised gladiatorial games that end in death for all but one of the youthful contestants. These “hunger games” are intended as recompense for the damage inflicted on the victorious capitol of Panem by the rebellious districts during an insurrection. Without specifically mentioning global warming, Collins makes it clear that climate change was significantly responsible for the hunger that shadows the North American continent in this future era. Hence, as the gladiatorial contestants are about to be selected, the mayor of District 12’s principal city describes “the disasters, the droughts, the storms, the fires, the encroaching seas that swallowed up so much of the land [and] the brutal war for what little sustenance remained.” In this, Collins was prescient, even if her specific vision of the violence on which such a world might be organized is fantasy. While we may never see her version of those hunger games, do not doubt that some version of them will come into existence—that, in fact, **hunger wars** of many sorts **will fill our future**. These could include any combination or permutation of the deadly riots that led to the 2008 collapse of Haiti’s government, the pitched battles between massed protesters and security forces that engulfed parts of Cairo as the Arab Spring developed, the ethnic struggles over disputed croplands and water sources that have made Darfur a recurring headline of horror in our world, or the inequitable distribution of agricultural land that continues to fuel the insurgency of the Maoist-inspired Naxalites of India. Combine such conflicts with another likelihood: that persistent drought and hunger will force millions of people to abandon their traditional lands and flee to the squalor of shantytowns and expanding slums surrounding large cities, sparking hostility from those already living there. One such eruption, with grisly results, occurred in Johannesburg’s shantytowns in 2008 when desperately poor and hungry migrants from Malawi and Zimbabwe were set upon, beaten, and in some cases burned to death by poor South Africans. One terrified Zimbabwean, cowering in a police station from the raging mobs, said she fled her country because “there is no work and no food.” And count on something else: **millions** more in the coming decades, pressed by disasters ranging from drought and flood to rising sea levels, **will try to migrate** to other countries, **provoking** even greater **hostility**. And that hardly begins to exhaust the possibilities that lie in our hunger-games future. At this point, the focus is understandably on the immediate consequences of the still ongoing Great Drought: dying crops, shrunken harvests, and rising food prices. But keep an eye out for the social and political effects that undoubtedly won’t begin to show up here or globally until later this year or 2013. **Better than any academic study**, **these** will **offer us a hint of what we can expect** in the coming decades **from** a hunger-games world of rising temperatures, persistent droughts, recurring food shortages, and **billions of famished**, **desperate people**.

Food wars go nuclear

**Cribb 14**

Julian, “Human extinction: it is possible?” Sydney Morning Herald, Published: April 2, 2014, p. <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/human-extinction-it-is-possible-20140402-zqpln.html>

However our own behaviour is liable to be a far more immediate determinant of human survival or extinction. Above two degrees – which we have already locked in – the world’s **food harvest is going to become increasingly unreliable**, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned this week. **That means** mid-century **famines in** places like **India, China, the Middle East and Africa**. But what scientists cannot predict is how humans living in the tropics and subtropics will respond to this form of stress. So let us turn to the strategic and military think tanks, who like to explore such scenarios, instead. The Age of Consequences study by the US Centre for Strategic and International Studies says that under a 2.6 degree rise “nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The **internal cohesion** of nations **will be under** great **stress**…as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world… has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities. **Armed conflict** between nations **over resources**… **is likely and nuclear war is possible**. The social consequences range from increased religious fervour to outright chaos.” Of five degrees – which the world is on course for by 2100 if present carbon emissions continue – it simply says the consequences are "inconceivable". **Eighteen nations** currently **have nuclear weapons** technology or access to it, **raising the stakes on nuclear conflict** to the highest level since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, with more than 4 billion people living in the world’s most vulnerable regions, scope for refugee tsunamis and pandemic disease is also large. It is on the basis of scenarios such as these that scientists like Peter Schellnhuber – **science advisor to German President** Angela Merkel – and Canadian author Gwynne Dyer have **warned of the** potential **loss of most of the human population in the conflicts, famines and pandemics** spinning out of climate impacts. Whether that adds up to extinction or not rather depends on how many of the world’s 20,000 nukes are let off in the process. These issues all involve assumptions about human, national and religious behaviour and are thus beyond the remit of scientific bodies like the IPCC, which can only hint at what they truly think will happen. So you are not getting the full picture from them.

**Contention 3** is Soft Power

Minimum wage increase is key to soft power. Soft power solves failed states and WMD terrorism

**Winkates 7**

(Jim Winkates Research Professor of International Affairs Air War College) “SOFT POWER CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY” Presented at the International Studies Association Annual MeetingChicago ILMarch 2, 2007 ArjunT

External perceptions of policy legitimacy directly enhance a nation’s soft power. **Because of domestic** and foreign **policy choices made by the U.S. government and** even **private business, America starts out disadvantaged in terms of perceived illegitimacy.** The cutting difference is not the “rightness” or “wrongness” of the policy choices; rather it is that **U.S. public** and private **decision** selections **are** often **at variance with the** larger **international community.** National policy on capital punishment and gun ownership, for example, put America in a minority of governments on those issues. 15 With only 3% of world population, the U.S. uses nearly 25% of global petroleum supplies and we appear more self-indulgent in refusing to limit production of gas-guzzling vehicles. The U.S. has rejected the scientific validity of global warming, choosing not to sign the Kyoto environmental treaty. **America has been** very **slow in raising** the federal **minimum wage** as inflation has eroded previous income gains. The federal and state governments virtually ignore 43 million citizens who have no medical insurance whatever. Local governments and school systems often sidestep teaching evolution in schools. **The corporate world turns a blind eye** to extraordinary compensation and retirement packages for chief executive officers, compounded by the near-total loss of many company retirement accounts amid systemic greed, fraud, and embezzlement. The hard edges of capitalism, as practiced in U.S. business circles, diminish employer/employee loyalty and do not provide the “safety nets” common in other advanced industrial cultures to cushion layoffs, insure against major medical problems, and subsidize child care. In the foreign policy arena, the titanic defense of Israel and its settlement policy, the widely perceived indifference to Palestinian suffering, resort to “extraordinary rendition” of suspected terrorists, the persistent and public disparagement of the United Nations, and the preference for unilateral responses to perceived threats take a toll. There is a price to pay in external perceptions of arrogance, selfishness, and inequity that undergird soft power. A key, unstated assumption for the successful reliance on soft power is the resort to multilateral and institutional responses to problem solving. In the current national discussion on foreign policy, the framework of choice is labored by notions of how much unilateralism (US only) versus resort to more multilateralism (allies, coalitions, the UN), what historic US values and interests are at stake, and whether the perceived challenge or threat is more or less amenable to measures short of force and sanction. The unprecedented 9/11 attack on the US has polarized domestic debate over which policy instruments can best respond to anticipated near-term challenges to the proper ethical conduct and efficiency of the world’s lone superpower. The choice of how much hard or soft power to employ commands much time and energy of elected officials, strategic analysts, and indeed among the attentive citizenry. Always lurking in the background of public sentiment is the nostalgic preference for “just leave us alone” and solve your own problems. The optimal policy choice is not between hard and soft power, but rather how much of each to use , how best to employ those instruments, and when and with whom to engage . A concrete template is the set of responses outlined by James A. Thomson, President and CEO of RAND. He argued that in the long term the U.S. must fight the war on terrorism on at least nine fronts: counterproliferation, international cooperation, diplomacy, intelligence, image, police, development assistance; emergency planning, and lastly military power. Excluding the last element, the other eight foci call for the exercise of soft power. 16 His list of policy avenues came within a few months of 9/11. A s Nye further points out, “As for the sword, the United States will continue to need it from time to time in the struggle against terrorism . . . . Maintaining our **hard power is essential** to security, **But** we will not succeed by the sword alone.” 17 A cursory **recounting** of the **use of the U. S. military instrument in the past twenty-five years** (Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Panama, Iraq [twice], Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti [twice], Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sudan, Philippines, and Liberia) **reveals that overt reliance on military forces** in every case **has proven inadequate to achieve** order and **stability.** Just as Senator J. William Fulbright, longest serving chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned of “the arrogance of power” during America’s Vietnam War, Nye cautioned of the dangers of “triumphalism” even before the euphoria that accompanied the initial US entry into Iraq in March 2003. 18 As he subsequently concluded, Winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and **soft power is essential to winning the peace.** Yet the way we went to war in Iraq proved to be as costly for our soft power as it was a stunning victory for our hard power. 19 Soft power uses neither threat/use of force nor reward/penalty of money to get others to want what we want in the broadest sense – peace, order, sustained economic development, preservation of human rights, international cooperation, and a world order that allows for diversity of political, economic, and cultural choices that can be accommodated without imposing one’s will on others. If hard power commands, coerces, and induces through the use of force, sanctions, payments, and bribes, soft power uses attraction, co-option, and agenda setting through promotion of institutional values, culture, and policies. Some middle size and smaller states have achieved considerable acceptance globally as niche actors using their soft power to lead by example. Canada (32 million people), for example, has carved out an attractive reputation as a multi-cultural nation that accommodates wide diversity at home and as a leader in international peacekeeping abroad. Three small Scandinavian countries (Norway, 4.5 million; Sweden, 9 million, and Denmark, 5.4 million) have earned plaudits for their consistently high annual per capita contributions in foreign economic aid and development assistance. These countries have acquired and maintained solid reputations over time for their national values and consistency of practice, both of which find considerable appeal in the global community. Nye points out that the **soft power of a country derives from** three sources: culture (attractive to others); **political values (if it lives up to them at home** and abroad**)**; and foreign policies (if they are seen as legitimate and possessing of moral authority). 20 He acknowledges the conventional distinction between high culture (literature, art, and education) and popular culture (mass entertainment). The key to soft power success turns on the attractiveness of these elite and popular cultural values to others. 21 Universal versus parochial cultures and themes have more intrinsic appeal. Many foreign publics, even in countries at odds with US policies, have greatly admired US technology, music, movies, and television. Similarly, US universities and colleges have long been magnets for more than half a million international students who study on American campuses annually. 22 The Asian region remains the largest sending sector, accounting for 58% of all U.S. international enrollments. Six of the top ten sending countries are Asian (India, China, Korea, and Japan are the top four sources for international students). 23 No Middle Eastern state ranks in the top ten sending countries. In a recent public lecture, however, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, noted that his country sends about 10,000 students annually to study in U.S. educational institutions. 24 U.S. student visas from the Middle East region understandably have been most reduced since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Perhaps the most obvious yet underrated element of soft power is the significant advantage offered by the English language in a rapidly globalizing world. One long-time U.S. employee in the English language training field puts it this way: In recognition of the predominance of the English language, desperate parents around the globe are making huge financial sacrifices to provide English language instruction for their children . . . . demand for access to English language training gives the United States enormous leverage . . . . we have something the whole world desperately craves . . . . [Furthermore] English language proficiency is crucial to scientists, businessmen, merchants, doctors, scholars, and other professionals who want to stay abreast of the latest developments in their professions. 25 Language carries culture, values, norms, and ways of thought. The English language has become the world’s lingua franca and offers a pre-eminent vehicle for extending global outreach. US political values of democracy, minority rights, and free expression have acquired near universal appeal. In early 2004 the US Department of State created a new senior post responsible for all US public diplomacy ( the primary thrust is to “tell America’s story abroad”). Margaret Tutwiler in her first public testimony as officer in charge of the new program acknowledged that America’s standing abroad had badly deteriorated, and that “it will take us many years” to restore it. 26 Where those cherished ideals fall short, especially overseas, such as in the cases of prisoner abuses in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, Cuba, US esteem pays a heavy price. **Governments can attract or repel international constituencies by their behavior**, living up to announced ideals and standards or by failing to do so. Soft power is accrued only over long time intervals, so that observers can judge the measure of a country over time and through successive challenges and change of governments. **World** public **opinion can be forgiving** over specific failures if the pattern of attractive performance is mostly sustained over time. So, soft power is hard to accrue and not easily lost. It is also increasingly obvious that **the US will need to** husband and **grow its soft power to maximize** the **coop**eration with others **to thwart** the long-term challenge of the **global terror**ist threat. The Changing Nature of Global Threats New post-Cold War threats illustrate that the **new enemies are** very largely not sovereign states nor their armies, but increasingly **failed states, terrorists**, local warlords, petty tyrants, ad hoc militias, **drug traffickers,** organized and transnational crime syndicates, **and** even **cyber outlaws**. Unlike the traditional and conventional warfare threats of earlier decades, these **new challenges** often **defy borders, and are characteristically dynamic**, diverse, fluid, networked, and often unpredictable. **Most cannot be subdued**, or even controlled , **by a single state , not even the remaining superpower**. The more prominent **characteristics of** contemporary **terrorism point to its transnational** (not country specific) **nature**, reflecting loosely organized networks with spin offs and look-a-likes, increasingly inspired by deep religious convictions (mostly but not exclusively Islamist), often millenarian in philosophy (hastening end-of-the-world judgment), aimed to kill as many victims as possible, **with some groups seeking w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, **and** with **victims** very **indiscriminately targeted** (often including their own co-religionists and countrymen). This threat profile poses a very different genre than earlier 20 th century adversaries

Terrorism is the most likely existential threat

**Rhodes 9**

RICHARD RHODES He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and currently he is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Rhodes is the author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. It was the first of four volumes he has written on the history of the nuclear age. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (1995), Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (2007), and The Twilight of the Bombs (forthcoming in autumn 2010) are the others. Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety 14 DECEMBER 2009

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005.

This group of **85 experts judged that** the **possibility of** a **WMD attack** against a city or other target somewhere in the world **is real and increasing over time**. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. **There was strong**, though not universal, **agreement that** a **nuclear attack is more likely** to be carried out **by a terrorist organization than by a government.** The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other **nations will face an existential threat** from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: **A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike** on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely **initiat[ing]**e **a new round of nuclear armament** and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

Failed states cause multiple scenarios for extinction

**Myers and Choi 6**

 12/12/2006, “Terrorism, Failed States, and Enlightened National Interest”, Young-Jin Choi is the permanent representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, and Joanne Myers is Director of the Carnegie Council's Public Affairs Programs

The question arises now: Can we turn a blind eye to those failed states? The interdependence works both ways. It works between strong nations through means of trade, but also it works between strong and weak nations, the have's and have-not's. It works both ways. In other words, if we do not tend to them, they will come to us. The **failed states,** if unattended, **will become hotbeds of** international **terror**ism**,** nuclear **prolif**eration**, environmental degradation,** communicable **disease**s**, and overpopulation**—all the transnational problems. And **those problems do not recognize borders. They will come to us** in the end. We cannot turn a blind eye to those failed states for our own interests, not for theirs. Not the traditional war and peace problem, but these transnational issues will become our major concern in the future, the 21st century. So the question is how to deal with them. Are we prepared to deal with newly emerging transnational issues? If you remember the headlines of newspapers for the last two decades, there is hardly any mention about traditional war and peace problems. No major wars broke out among nations. But the headlines are filled with transnational problems: failed states, international terrorism, and proliferation of nuclear weapons. So transnational issues will preoccupy human beings for the foreseeable future and we have to find a way to deal with them in the 21st century. In dealing with the transnational issues, there is one thing that is absolutely clear. That is, no nation, however powerful, can win the war against international terrorism alone; no nation, however determined, can prevent nuclear proliferation alone; no nation, however advanced scientifically, can avert the outbreak of communicable diseases alone; and no nation, however isolated geographically, can prevent the global warming alone or other environmental degradation. So we have to work together. We are bound to work together. There is no other way out. The problem is we do not take into account this dramatically changed new international order or the environment of the 21st century. In the current situation, how nations deal with those important traditional issues is really discouraging. We are divided through the fault-line of have's and have-not's—in a way, the North/South divide. This divide is the self-defeating dynamic of all the transnational issues. For example, on nuclear proliferation, the have's want to focus only on nonproliferation. On the other hand, the have-not's want to focus only on disarmament. The upshot is that for the last five years there has been not a single agreement in the international affairs in terms of disarmament or nonproliferation. The disarmament conferences in Geneva stopped working for the last five years. In 2005 the Nonproliferation Review Committee produced not even a single sentence that was agreed upon. Nothing works on this front. The same with all the other transnational issues. The North/South divide seems increasingly to replace the East/West divide of the Cold War period, and this will be the dominant dynamic of the 21st century governing international relations—North/South divide, have's and have-not's—this is the serious situation we are facing now. Within this North/South divide, each nation is resorting to traditional national interests. But suppose that within this shrunken global village each nation seeks to prevail on their own national interests. What will happen to **our planet**? It **will become uninhabitable**. Each country wants to have nuclear weapons. Each country does not care what happens with global warming. Each country does not care what happens with overpopulation and communicable diseases. So national interest does not work anymore. It works only in an open world, when we had unknown territories to expand, to conquer, and to explore. But in this closed world of a global village, a small village, national interest does not work. We have a precedent. With the advent of industrialization in the 18th century, people didn't care about other people. Children under the age of four who were not rich had to work in factories. The scavengers, the piecers, are the names we still remember. Four-year-old children were scavengers, were piecers, in the factories. And women were not an exception. But as citizens within a nation or national border became interdependent, more and more closely knit, they began to realize that they are truly interdependent. Whenever these bad things are happening to other people, one cannot truly prosper, one cannot be truly happy. That is why industrialized countries began to discover the value of enlightened self-interest. We pay a high rate of taxes in the name of enlightened self-interest. We take care of those failing or failed citizens inside our borders. The ill, the poor, the old, children, the unemployed or unemployable, we take care of them. There is an element of altruism, but also basically we are doing it for our own interest. So it is self-interest which saved us from this difficult situation. This is the analogy we have to introduce to international relations now, because in a closed world nations have become interdependent, the same way that citizens have become interdependent inside a border. No nation can be truly happy, secure, or stable when there are many failed states out there. This is not because we want to be altruistic, but this is because we want to ensure more fully our own national interest. So, in a way, enlightened national interest is a better form of national self-interest, and this is the way we have to go. Some may say that this is ethics, this is altruism, and by definition is against national interest. No. Enlightened national interest encompasses traditional national interest and wants to do more than the national interest. So those terms are not in opposition, but enlightened national interest is encompassing the national interest. This is the larger concept which will better ensure our survival in this interdependent world. But again, the situation is not encouraging. During the Cold War period, all the developed countries tried to reach the target of 0.7 percent of ODA, Official Development Assistance. Many countries were approaching that target. But, after the demise of the Cold War, what we are witnessing is that instead of moving toward that target, countries are back-stepping from that target. So most countries contribute less than they did in terms of assisting failed states. This is another discouraging sign. This is a sign that we have not fully taken into account the dramatic change, the historic paradigm shift, from raid to trade. This is a very serious matter we have to take into account somehow. The major transnational issues are really, really serious. **The problem these transnational issues are posing is that,** for the first time in history, **they are irreversible**. Global warming, once it happens, cannot be turned back. **Nuclear apocalypse, once it happens, cannot be undone**. This is a new situation in our history. It never happened in the past. Any wars of conquest, expansion, massacre, could be healed. Not global warming, not nuclear apocalypse.

Theory pre-empts:

1. **Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

2. The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

# 1AR

## AT Spec

Counter-interpretation: the aff does not need to specify beyond a particular country.

I meet.

1. It’s infinitely regressive. There’s always more I could spec, which means he’ll always have a link to frivolous theory, which outweighs and turns his offense because it has zero topic relevance.

2. US Spec solves. It gives a specific lit base. He has tons of counterplans: UBI, wage subsidies, EITC, and unions. Any more overburdens the aff because the 1AR is too short to start over against hyper-specific counterplans that steal most of the aff.

3. Spec kills clash and education because I could break a new mechanism to get out of generic neg prep.

4. Not predictable; theres no resolutional basis for spec since the topic’s general principle.

5. It’s the TOC. Stop whining and cut ccards.

## AT DGAs CP (Collective Bargaining)

**IMF Rolls Back The CP; Their Author**

**SCHULTEN 12**

 Thorsten Schulten, Doctor of philosophy at Institute of Economic and Social Research, “The significance of extension procedures for collective bargaining systems in Europe”,

The DGA instrument is extraordinarily important for the development of collective bargaining systems in Europe as a whole. For decades now, in many European countries, it has ensured high and stable collective agreement coverage, thus supporting the strong use of collective agreements as a central institution for the regulation of employment conditions – something that is characteristic of Europe in comparison with other regions of the world. **Against the** backdrop of the **current crisis**, however, st**ructural changes are being made to national collective bargaining systems in many European countries, under pressure from the** so-called troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund **(IMF). These changes are fundamentally calling the functioning and the instrument of the DGA into question** (Busch et al. 2013; Schulten/Müller 2013). Once again, the conceptual pioneer of such a policy was the OECD which, in the name of the flexibility and adaptability of individual enterprises, is openly calling for the abolition of DGAs. **The first country to bow to the IMF pressure was Romania, which in 2011 abolished its previous erga omnes scheme for sectoral collective agreements** (Ciutacu 2011). Currently, **Portugal has committed itself, in its agreements with the troika, to reforming its DGA arrangements**. In October 2012, the Portuguese government adopted a decree, according to which an extension of collective agreements is only possible if the employer covered by the agreement represents at least 50% of the employees of certain sector (Schulten/Müller 2013).In **the cases of Greece, Italy and Spain, the existing arrangements for DGAs or their functional equivalents have been maintained, but a politically driven decentralization of collective bargaining and partial abolition of the favourability principle are increasingly undermining the functional logic of DGAs. Overall, this comes down to a comprehensive loss of function for the DGAs, and it is precisely in the Southern European countries, which up to now have had strong DGA-backed area collective agreements, that this will lead to major instability in collective bargaining systems** and a clear drop in agreement coverage (Busch et al. 2013; Schulten/Müller 2013). Beyond the situation in Southern Europe, marked as it is by the current crisis, countervailing developments can be observed in a few other countries, leading to a revaluation of DGAs. That goes in particular for Norway and Switzerland, and also for Germany as regards collectively bargained minimum wages. The catalyst for this was the extension of the free movement of labour as part of the EU’s eastward expansion, and the aim was to counter any wage dumping that might occur through the exploitation of migrant labour (Eldring/Schulten 2012). This aspect could also come to the fore in other countries in future, the more so as, according to the latest ruling from the European Court, only legal and generally applicable collective agreements can be accepted as legitimate limitations on basic European freedoms (Kocher 2010).

**Alt Causes To Low Bargaining Power, And The Plan Solves. Their Card Recut**

**ILO 08**

International Labour Organization, CREDENTIALS, “Minimum wages and collective bargaining: Towards policy coherence”, Published by the International Labour Office, 2008,

This section focuses on the appropriate articulation and design of minimum wages and collective bargaining policies. As we have seen, in many countries **collective bargaining is facing diffi cult challenges, which may be linked to globalization, new forms of employment or the growth of subcontracting**. In other countries, collective bargaining has been presented as a source of rigidity and the common recommendation has been to replace higher level collective bargaining with bargaining at the enterprise level. In many of these cases, to protect the most vulnerable workers in the labour market, governments seem to have turned towards minimum wages policies as a substitute for collective bargaining. **In the absence of strong collective bargaining, governments somehow** **seem compelled to intervene in wage determination through minimum wages**. This has sometimes led to very complicated systems of industry, sectoral and occupational minimum wages. The reliance on overly complex systems of minimum wages rather than collective bargaining is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, the role of collective bargaining goes much beyond protecting vulnerable workers – it actually benefi ts a broader spectrum of workers than do minimum wages. Collective bargaining also goes beyond wage negotiations to include other aspects of working conditions, such as hours of work and quality of employment. Second, minimum wages that set wage rates for many categories of workers in different industries can end up discouraging collective bargaining instead of stimulating it. While some negotiations between social partners over minimum wages have contributed to stimulating collective bargaining, in the majority of cases complex minimum wages were found to “crowd out” collective bargaining. **This negative experience points towards the importance of careful and coherent policy design.** In the following paragraphs we therefore review some good practices related to the design of a complementary and coherent set of minimum wages and collective bargaining policies.

**Doesn’t Solve Collective Bargaining; Their Author**

**SCHULTEN 12**

 Thorsten Schulten, Doctor of philosophy at Institute of Economic and Social Research, “The significance of extension procedures for collective bargaining systems in Europe”,

**As regards the relationship between DGAs and union organizing power, no clear link can be established.** True, **there are no DGAs in Denmark and Sweden, two of the three countries with the highest union density.** But the same cannot be said of Finland, where in fact union density has clearly risen since the introduction of DGAs in the 1970s (Ahlberg/Bruun 2009). **Also, some countries with widespread DGA use have, by European standards, rather middling union density, whereas many countries have both low union density and infrequent DGA use. Finally, there is the unusual situation in France, which does have very high collective agreement coverage underpinned by comprehensive DGA use,** but where at the same time union density is extremely low. All in all, however, a European comparison does not provide any clear evidence that DGAs are a root cause of weaker trade union organizing power.

**His Last Card Proves Correlation Not Causation. Also, Coverage Isn’t Key To Bargaining Power. Here’s The Next Paragraph**

**ILO 08**

International Labour Organization, CREDENTIALS, “Minimum wages and collective bargaining: Towards policy coherence”, Published by the International Labour Office, 2008,

**While coverage is an important determinant of wage outcomes, the level at which collective bargaining takes place and the degree of coordination between the different possible levels also affect wage outcomes.** Unfortunately, owing to the lack of relevant data we have not been able to capture these effects in our own analysis. Other research studies have confi rmed a strong relationship between centralized and/or coordinated bargaining and lower wage disparity, including a narrower gender pay gap. 70 Conversely, decentralization of collective bargaining has been shown to be leading to higher wage disparity in a number of cases, including in Australia and Chile. 71 **But some observers have emphasized that the relationship between bargaining systems and labour market performance is not as straightforward as is often assumed and therefore should not be generalized. 72 A more refi ned analysis is necessary to provide a better understanding of the effects of decentralization on country differences in wage outcomes.**

**Only Applies To Europe**

**SCHULTEN 12**

 Thorsten Schulten, Doctor of philosophy at Institute of Economic and Social Research, “The significance of extension procedures for collective bargaining systems in Europe”,

**The** very varied **distribution of DGAs in Europe mostly corresponds to the established classification of European industrial relations systems**. For example, taking the approach of Jelle Visser, who distinguishes a total of five different industrial relations systems across Europe (European Commission 2009, p. 51), the following DGA rankings can be made. **DGAs and their functional equivalents are most widespread in the Southern European industrial relations system** (France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal), which in every case except Italy is marked by strong State influence. On the other hand, no single pattern can be distinguished within the continental European industrial relations systems, where countries with high DGA/functional equivalent use (Austria, Benelux, Slovenia) are juxtaposed with low-use countries (Germany, Switzerland). **In the East European industrial relations model, as reconstructed post-1990, the legal possibility of having DGAs does exist everywhere, but except in the Czech Republic,** Slovakia and until recently Romania, virtually no use is made of it in practice. **Finally, there are the liberal Anglo-Saxon and the corporatist-oriented Nordic industrial relations systems which, despite all the differences between them, are both based on strongly autonomous collective bargaining systems. Here, DGAs either do not exist or are an exceptional arrangement restricted to a few sectors.** However, Finland is an interesting exception. Although it is strongly rooted in the Nordic industrial relations tradition, DGA use has also been very widespread there since the 1970s (Ahlberg/Bruun 2009; Hellstein 2011).