### 1NC Deleuze K

#### If guns are so terrible, why does the aff choose to ban them *only* for people with criminal records? The 1AC invokes a static conception of being in assuming that people with records cannot be trusted—this marks people as deviant and ignores the possibility for becoming

**ARRIGO 09**

David Polizzi (Dept. of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Indiana State University) and Bruce Arrigo (Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of North Carolina, Charlotte). “Phenomenology, Postmodernism, and Philosophical Criminology: A Conversational Critique.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology. Vol 1. 2009. 113-145. http://www.jtpcrim.org/July%20Articles/Phenomenology-Postmodernism-And-Philosophical-Criminology-A-Conversational-Critique.pdf

(Arrigo explores the way in which capitalism through its relationship with the media creates and manipulates the desiring subject and by so doing reduces it to a function of that desire, the state’s desire. He then introduces what he has identified as the “criminology of the stranger” which seeks to free the subject from this endless cycle of objectification and toward the possibility for transformation. Within this context, transformation or **becoming** represents or **introduces us to a** different type of **subject** who is **not reducible to** a set of **socially derived categories. Once liberated from** the **objectifying** quality of these **categories, the possibility of becoming can be realized** insofar as it represents the ontologically unfinished character of being. Taken from a far less theoretical point of reference, the relationship between imposed social categories and the transformation of the subject is easily witnessed through the image of the criminal. In their work, Revolution in Penology, Arrigo and Milovanovic (2009) point out the way in which the process of imposed categorization continues to imprison the subject in an ever-evolving cycle of otherness that fundamentally denies being the possibility of transformation. Whether these categories evoke essentalized differences related to ethnicity, gender, or socioeconomic status, the result is still the same. **The individual** caught up **in the c**riminal **j**ustice **s**ystem **is** essentially **reduced to** those **categories imposed by the** system or by **state, and** becomes **socially defined by them. Once** constructed and **coded as criminal,** the **possibilities for being are** greatly **restricted**; however, such restrictions never completely eliminate or preclude the possibility for transformation and it Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 119 remains possible for the individual to employ a variety of strategies of resistance that can liberate the potential for transformation, the potential for becoming other.) Arrigo: The chapter "essentializes" the conspicuous consumption of media manufactured capitalism (by way of Baudrillard's insights), mindful of how such ravenousness fosters what Foucault identified as docility in which **the subject is panoptically reduced to a functionary of the state.** Moreover, the critique draws support by invoking Lacan and his position on the discourse of the master and Fromm's analysis on mechanisms of escape. My view is that the emphasis on "being" rather than "having" is more akin to Aristotle (by way of Fromm), and the emphasis on becoming is closer to Deleuze and Guattari. Chris (Williams) and I don't spell out these transitions other than to invoke the need for a philosophy of the subject or, if you will, a "criminology of the stranger." In my forthcoming book with Dragan Milovanovic titled, Revolution in Penology: Rethinking the Society of Captives, how such a transition would occur is much more fully specified. Here, Dragan and I invoke the work of Deleuze, Deleuze and Guattari (e.g., molecular forces; schizoanalysis, rhizomatics; anti-Oedipus), Nietzsche (e.g., overcoming; a will to power), Lacan (e.g., discourse of the hysteric/analyst), complex systems science (e.g., stranger attractors; dissipative structures; far-from-equilibrium conditions), Fromm (e.g., positive freedom; spontaneity) and Derrida (e.g., critique of the metaphysics of presence; reversal of hierarchies). Freire's dialogical pedagogy is also employed in parts. The concern for personal freedom and social responsibility to which you elude is quite important and I agree that Foucault (as you cite him) is instructive. I would further argue, consistent with postmodern or ultramodern sensibilities, that one's presuppositions must be provisional, positional, and relational. I take this to be compatible with Judith Butler's notion of "contingent universalities."Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 120 I like your position on Lacan, even though we differ here. But, of course, Lacan was a Freudian revisionist as you note. So, it follows that the former's observations address the "law-of-the-father" (the Symbolic Order) and not the Real Order. Of course, in his work on Feminine Sexuality (1985) Lacan did make a case for an ecriture feminine; that is, the variable contexts in which a woman's desire or pas toute (not-all) could be reclaimed. I think Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva were better in expressing how a reworking of language was but one dimension of this reframing toward an ecriture feminine. Consider, for instance, Irigaray’s (1985) This Sex Which Is Not One or Kristeva’s (1980) Desire in Language. I don't believe either author would argue that language is an ontological category for the reasons you specify. However, their respective critiques of Lacan seem to understate (misstate?) his view on the topic. Then, too, Deleuze (1983) – often in collaboration with Guattari – (1984, 1987) helped to demonstrate that desire is not "lack" (unless within a Freudian reworking). Instead, it is productive, transmutating, "becoming other;" or as they proclaimed, "a people yet to come.” Once again, language is but one facet of this metamorphosis. (Our conversation moves to a more specific exploration of the concepts of Being as discussed by Heidegger in Being in Time and the notion of becoming, as discussed by Deleuze in his text Nietzsche & Philosophy and Lacan’s notion of the Other. Arrigo applies his discussion of the Lacanian Other to his concept of the shadow. In part, through its speaking the subject, the Other sustains the shadow and the shadow holds us captive. Whereas I see a more fluid development of these ideas from phenomenology to critical theory, to postmodernism, Arrigo maintains that the movement from critical theory to postmodernism is a more accurate read of this ultramodern condition.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 121 This discussion has particular significance for criminology relative to the construction of racism, crime and the criminal other. The liberation of the shadow seems most related to the way in which **certain subject positions**, be these based on race, gender, or socio-economic class,construct the subject and **subjectivity and** by so doing, **restrict the possibility of becoming.** Deconstructing these covert forces that discipline and control social presence, allows subjectivity to free itself from this “diminished milieu” (Deleuze, 1983) or, at the very least, allows for this possibility.) Polizzi: But wouldn't you say that ultimately the notion of becoming, which comes from Nietzsche (actually, the pre-Socratics, at least in Western thought), is also situated in Heidegger's notion of being/becoming and isn't this same relationship to being/becoming also present in Merleau-Ponty as well and then brilliantly taken up by many writers in the Post-Modern movement? The notion of docility is also present in the work of Castoriadis, which I believe both pre-dates and overlaps the published writing of Foucault. Castoriadis (1988; 1997) is particularly critical of the role of the proletariat, and uses virtually the same language to describe the problem. I guess my issue with the discourse of the Other is that not only does it evoke the shadow of Heidegger's discussion of authenticy/inauthencity and Heidegger’s concept of the They-Self, but also seems to maintain that we can truly free ourselves from the Other. Though I completely agree with Lacan, at least relative to the internal logic of classical psychoanalysis that subjectivity must find a way to speak for itself and not be spoken through by the discourse of the Other, we are never completely free from this relationship. Perhaps this dovetails somewhat into Fromm's notion of personal freedom and social responsibility. (I have not really read that much of his work.) For personal freedom to be possible it must find a way to not only liberate itself from the desire of the Other or what the Other wants, but also re-establish a relationship with this Other, with the Symbolic Order, that does not deny the legitimacy of that freedom. (Lacan, 2007). Right, to have therefore I am, is not a very liberating foundation for human freedom. The conspicuous consumption of media manufactured capitalism, if I understand you correctly, is the discourse of the Other that not only speaks the subject, but limits any real possibility for personal freedom/social responsibility. My point was that Critical Theory in the end, really only offers more of the same and in the end, may simply invite the possibility for a different type of alienated subject. (Our discussion moves to an exploration of the relationship between phenomenology and postmodernism. Included in this discussion are a variety of theoretical concepts which are not specifically defined. Thrownnnes, a concept introduced by Heidegger (1962), describes the social character of human being. Human being or experience for Heidegger, always finds itself situated or thrown within very specific cultural, historical linguistic or sociological contexts which help to define the possibilities for human being. For example, the possibilities for black experience are fundamentally restricted if “thrown” into a social context of anti-racism, which seeks to criminalize the social presence of blackness. (Polizzi, 2007) The Lacanian concept of the Other represents that aspect of the Lacanian Symbolic registrar that seeks to control desire through its ability to control subjectivity and individual desire. Entry into the symbolic is the entry into language and the confrontation with the desire of the Other. Within both of these concepts we can witness the way in which the possibility for personal experience and responsibility is confronted by a meaning generating process that seeks to control or configure the contours of human experience. In neither of these conceptualizations is there a complete foreclosing of human possibility; however, the potentiality for human expression does remain contingent to this undeniable and unavoidable meaning generating dynamic.) Arrigo: I regretfully confess ignorance on the work of Castoriadis. I need to rectify this as you have referenced his work a number of times in our email, phone, or inperson conversations. Thank you! I agree with the development of thought on being/becoming as you delineate it above. I also agree that we can never free ourselves entirely from the "Other" as in Heidegger's (1962) notion of "thrownness," or, if you will, as in Buber's notion of the I-Thou relationship. But why would we want to and, more philosophically, why should we? As you correctly point out, the question is the character of this thrownness, the character of the I-Thou relationship (Buber, 1970), the character of the "Other" (when placed in Lacanian psychoanalytic terms), or the character of Heidegger's (1962) dasein analytic as in a being-toward-care. And it is here that authenticity or alethia (interestingly, for Aristotle it is eudaimonia or excellence as in a flourishing of being; as in living a virtuous existence), that comes into play. Does the critical theory-to-postmodern movement merely substitute one form of alienation for another? Perhaps, however, I think the latter’s reading of the "ultramodern" condition is a bit more accurate than any other and, to this extent, makes for a compelling critique of the zeitgeist beyond what their philosophical predecessors identified. Of course, this is not to dismiss their predecessors as much as to assess the relative contribution such antecedent philosophy offers in an account of any existing issue. Still, the question is how to confront the crisis that sustains the "shadow" in society and in our lives today. This is a crisis in which the call to personal freedom and social responsibility must be re-conceptualized. From my perspective, this implicates a new theory of the subject or, if you will, a philosophy of the stranger. In part, I believe that Revolution in Penology endeavors Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Polizzi, D, Arrigo, B. 2009, Vol 1 (2), 113-145 124 to tackle this very vexing, but prescient, problem. We'll have to see what the reviewers/critics of the book have to say about this. (A question is raised concerning the philosophical implications toward a postmodern/ poststructural understanding of language. It is argued that such formulations cover over an implicit structuralist understanding of the role of language that, at its worst, reduces existence and subjectivity to that of a collection of epiphenomenal artifacts of this process. For example, the sign, “criminal,” can only construct a variety of signification that remains more or less consistent and contingent upon this beginning category, but this process does not and cannot construct the actual presence of the sign, the presence of this actual human being, only its diminished meaning. This section of the conversation is related in part to the earlier discussion of the shadow in criminology and the need for its transformation; existing categories imposed upon the subject work in concert with the signifying process erected by language, which results in the diminishment of human possibility. **To be constructed as** offender or even **former offender, still carries** with it the **crippling affects of imposed social meaning.**

#### The aff’s policing of deviance assumes the existence of a unified, ideal subject. Modern society relies on this concept to restrict individuals from pursuing different ways of being.

**Invisible Committee 9**

The Invisible Committee (a bunch of French commune dwellers). The Coming Insurrection. First Circle. 2009.

 “I AM WHAT I AM.” Never has domination found a more above-suspicion slogan. The maintenance of an “I” that’s in a permanent state of semi-disrepair, in a chronic state of semi-failure, is the best kept secret of the present order of things. The weak, depressed, self-critical, virtual “I” is essentially the indefinitely adaptable subject that requires a production based on innovation, the accelerated obsolescence of technologies, the constant upheaval of social norms, and generalized flexibility. At the same time the most voracious consumer, and, paradoxically, the most productive “I,” it will throw itself with the most energy and avidity into the slightest project, only to come back later to the embryonic state it started from. “WHAT AM I,” then? Washed since childhood in the waves: milk, smells, stories, sounds, emotions, nursery rhymes, substances, gestures, ideas, impressions, looks, songs, and foods. What am I? I’m totally tied to places, sufferings, ancestors, friends, loves, events, languages, memories, all kinds of things that obviously are not me. Everything that attaches me to the world, all the links that comprise me, all the forces that populate me – they don’t weave an identity, though I am encouraged to wield one, but an existence: singular, common, living, and from which emerges - in places, at certain moments - that being that says “I.” Our feeling of inconsistency is only the effect of this foolish belief in the permanence of the “I,” and the very slight concern we give to what makes us. It’s dizzying to see Reebok’s “I AM WHAT I AM” enthroned atop a Shanghai skyscraper. The West is advancing everywhere, with its favorite Trojan horse: the murderous antimony between the “I” and the world, the individual and the group, between attachment and freedom. Freedom isn’t the gesture of liberation from attachments, but the practical capacity to operate upon them, to move around in them, to establish or cut them off. The family only exists as a family, that is, as hell, for those who have renounced the project of altering its debilitating mechanisms, or don’t know how. The freedom to tear oneself out has always been the mere phantom of liberty. We won’t get free of what’s holding us back without losing at the same time that which our strength could be exercised on. “I AM WHAT I AM,” then, is not just a simple lie, a simple advertising campaign, but a military campaign, a war-cry directed against everything there is between people, against everything that circulates indistinctly, everything that ties them invisibly together, everything that puts an obstacle in the way of perfect desolation, against everything that makes it so we exist and the world doesn’t just look like one big highway everywhere, an amusement park or one of the new cities: pure boredom; passionless, but well-ordered; empty, frozen space where nothing moves besides the duly registered bodies, the automobile molecules and the ideal commodities. France couldn’t be the fatherland of anxiety-pills, the anti-depressant paradise, the Mecca of neurosis that it is if it weren’t for its simultaneously being the European champion of hourly productivity. Sickness, fatigue, depression, can be seen as the individual symptoms of a bigger disease that needs to be cured. They contribute to the maintenance of the existing order, to my docile adjustment to idiotic conventions and norms, my adjustment to my modernized crutches. They are the thin veil on my8 selection of opportune, compliant, productive penchants, and on those penchants that they’ll soon be amicably mourning. “You’ve got to be able to change, you know.” But taken as facts, my failures can also lead to the dismantlement of the hypothesis of the “I.” They then become acts of resistance in the war that’s going on. They become a rebellion and an energetic core holding out against everything that conspires to normalize us, to amputate us. It’s not our “I” that’s in a state of crisis, but the form in which we seek to impress ourselves upon the world. They want to make us into various manifestations of a well-delimited, well separated, classable “I,” able to have its various qualities checked off; – controllable – when in fact we are but creatures among the creatures, singularities among similar peers, living flesh weaving the flesh of the world. Contrary to what we have repeated to us since childhood, intelligence doesn’t mean knowing how to adapt... or if it is a kind of intelligence, it’s the intelligence of slaves. Our non-adaptation, our fatigue, are only problems from the point of view of what’s trying to subjugate us. They indicate, rather, a departure point, a junction point for unusual complicities. They let us see an otherwise more dilapidated but infinitely more shared landscape than all the hallucinatory landscapes that this society maintains for itself. We aren’t depressed; we’re on strike. For those who refuse to manage themselves, “depression” is not a state, but a passage, a good bye, a step to the side towards a political disaffiliation. And from then on there’s no possible reconciliation besides medications and the police. Indeed, that’s why this society has no fear of imposing Ritalin so much on its too-lively children or of fixing people into life-long dependency on pharmaceuticals, and claims to be able to detect “behavioral troubles” at three years of age: because the hypothesis of the “I” is cracking everywhere.

#### The aff’s used of the State strengthens a fixed legal order which leaves no room for creative expression of subjectivity

**Deuchars 11**

Deuchars, Robert. “Creating Lines of Flight and Activating Resistance: Deleuze and Guattari’s War

Machine.” AntePodium, Victoria University Wellington, 2011.

Deleuze and Guattari use the example of chess against the game go. Chess is clearly a game of state but go is fluid, implying perpetual movement and a game of exteriority. This is not to state, however, that go is without rules or is without form. All games follow rules. In chess there is a grid and the space of chess is “striated”. There is no exteriority to the grid of chess where each piece possesses intrinsic properties and limited powers. A pawn is always a pawn (except paradoxically unless it can avoid destruction and undergo a metamorphosis when it is promoted at the eighth level, becoming something other, usually a Queen). A Queen, however, cannot become a pawn. But all of the pieces in chess follow pre-written rules or axioms. Each piece can only move within the pre-ordained grid and there is no way to modify or escape the codes of chess. By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari stress that the war machine in this form has very little to do with war proper, but as in the game go, it follows a guerrilla logic and ‘it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the point of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival.’ Deleuze and Guattari note that ‘in the case of the striated, the line is between two points, while in the smooth, the point is between two lines.’ 25In the example here this is typified by the “smooth space” of go, as against the “striated space” of chess. 26Moreover, the war machine is a ‘form of thought so radical that it wages the violence of war on existing orders of knowledge [and] condition’s Deleuze’s politico-philosophical project in its entirety.’ 27 This is Julian Reid’s understanding of the potential for a type of postmodern left resistance to the globalising tendencies of capital, and which has been popularised by Hardt and Negri. However in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Reid does not valorise the vagueness of the “multitude”, which is so effectively undermined by Boron. As he notes in his critique of Empire: if we applied Hardt and Negri’s work to the prosaic reality of contemporary Latin America, we should ask ourselves if the paramilitaries and death squads that razed Chiapas…sewing terror and death, are included in the multitude; or the landowners who organise and finance a great part of the Robert Deuchars private repression exerted in those countries against peasants and aboriginal communities…Do humiliated and exploited peasants form part of the multitude too?28 So again we should be careful in what we think it is plausible to state about two things. Firstly, the war machine is not here to save us and neither is nomadism to be taken out of context. Although Boron is largely correct that the paramilitaries and the death squads are not part of the “multitude”, they most certainly constitute a certain type of war machine as noted above, namely those social formations that can potentially be at antagonistic to the state form but eventually become part of it or “take it over”. This should serve as further warning to scholars in International Relations who (quite rightly) are attracted to a form of leftism that escapes the codification found in the mirror of the state-form, i.e. the vanguardism of the Party, and secondly, the “multitude” as espoused by Hardt and Negri, a different celebratory type of vanguardism without substance, which is at best illusory and, as Boron goes on to say, is a concept that Hardt argues is to be understood poetically and not as fact. 29In other words there is not much empirical support for the “coming together” of such disparate “political communities”. However, when considered as a particular modality of thinking then the Deleuzean concept of the war machine can be taken non-metaphorically as a conceptual tool of politico-cultural resistance. It does have the potential to have real-world significance, but only if understood in the sense of all concepts Deleuze (and Guattari) espouse. In other words, war machines have at least a double function. They can, on the one hand, serve as affective and active agents of resistance, but by the same token can be captured by the state form. So, as Reid goes on to argue, although resistance and power are caught up in shifting arrangements of deterritorialisation and subsequent reterritorialisation (by capital), ‘it is not, therefore, a question of occupying a position of exteriority to power. Rather, the exterior is a limit towards which a body projects(emphasis added).’ 30 Mobility and resistance are central to this type of thinking and one can immediately see in the war machine, which is set in opposition to the apparatus of state capture, the distinctions Deleuze and Guattari make between “smooth” and “striated” space and go against chess. The apparatus of state capture will always attempt to “striate” space, whereas the war machine will always attempt to create “lines of flight” that make space “smooth”. Similarly chess, no matter how complicated, will never be a game of complexity. It follows axioms, whereas go follows a generalised complex model of continuous change. Despite its general rules, go becomes something other, always. In this sense go is similar to the point made at the beginning of A Thousand Plateaus in which Deleuze and Guattari highlight the essential feature of the war machine as follows: The problem of the war machine, or the firing squad: is a general necessary for n individuals to fire in unison? The solution without a General is to be found in an acentred multiplicity possessing a finite number of states with signals to indicate corresponding speeds, from a war rhizome or guerrilla logic point of view, without any tracing, without any copying of a central order. 31 The distinction drawn between the sedentary and the nomadic here can be generalised across practically all aspects of existence as well, from pre-modernity to modernity and in the postmodern condition, too. The word “nomadic” takes on different connotations from the pre-modern nomad and denotes adaptability, movement, shifting patterns of behaviour, “phase transitions” and a continuously shifting calculus between humans and nature. Deleuze and Guattari also introduce here the themes of spontaneous self-organisation, non-linearity and the adaptive nature of complex systems, some things that could also be read as quite sympathetic to a certain ill-defined strain of anarchist thought. Or maybe a certain form of romanticism left remaining as a hangover from Anti-Oedipus, perhaps?

#### 2 impacts.

#### a. Normalization is the tool of Eurocentric powers to alienate knowledge production that opposes oppression. This guarantees violence and turns standpoint epistemology

####  Djunatan 11[[1]](#footnote-1)

Deleuze and Guattari uncover the real intent of North Atlantic theoretical knowledge. They note: “However, it is difficult to believe that it is the rise ‘of philosophy and the mutually inclusive sciences’ that accounts for this privilege of a peculiarly European transcendental subject. Rather, the infinite movement of thought, what Husserl calls Telos, must enter into conjunction with the great relative movement of capital that is continually deterritorialized in order to secure the power of Europe over all other peoples and their reterritorialization on Europe.”580 The real face of **the transcendental subject**, the Same or the Man **is** the **reterritorialization of Europe’s privilege** of capital **and power** over all other subjects. In this sense any local knowledge systems, including the **African, Asian or Islamic systems of knowledge, are categorized as esoteric** or gnosis**, rather than** accountable and **accessible** theories of the world or epistemé.581 The establishment of **the transcendental subject**, the Man necessarily **results in** the **disappearance of** the experiential self which affects the contextual signification of the self. The uprooted **self-identity from its context** appears as the serious consequence of this dissolution of the empirical self. The effect is substantive. **There is no** other **standard** of individuality **except** the **Western accounts of the** conceptual **person**a or the Man**. The corollary** of this **is** either the hegemony of self-identification or the **exclusion** of the undesired representation from the arena of true identification **and realization of** the **power** and the capital representation **by** means of **violence.**

#### b. K turns the case. Empirics prove that categorization of individuals as criminals kills solvency and increases crime.

**TRAISON 06**

David Polizzi (Dept. of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Indiana State University) and Bruce Arrigo (Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of North Carolina, Charlotte). “Phenomenology, Postmodernism, and Philosophical Criminology: A Conversational Critique.” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology. Vol 1. 2009. 113-145. http://www.jtpcrim.org/July%20Articles/Phenomenology-Postmodernism-And-Philosophical-Criminology-A-Conversational-Critique.pdf

**Deemed by sedentary society as criminals, a large part of** the **hobo culture was** its constant **association with jails.** According to anthropologist James Spradley, it was precisely the indiscriminate imprisonment of tramps that contributed to their criminal nature. Writing about the experience of Seattle’s tramps in the 1960’s, Spradley argues that it was the **repeated incarceration of tramps** that **caused** an increase in **alcoholism** in hobos**,** and **not the other way around.** His is a description of **men** who consciously **choose to leave** home **for the road, only to turn alcoholic after** being caught in a continuous cycle of **being charged for drunk behavior**. One of the tramps in his account explains that often, he was imprisoned for being publicly drunk**, even if he had been sober.** “This time I wasn’t drunk...Just wrong place – wrong time…cannot convince me that being drunk is a crime. Being broke is,” wrote the tramp. Spradley posits that while tramps were charged for public drunkenness, **usually their only crime was** just **appearing poor.** Spradley explains that this **constant criminalization** actively **contributed to** the tramp’s **redefinition** of himself **as a criminal rather than a free spirit.** “Whereas new self identities may be acquired throughout the lifespan, dramatic changes in personality can only occur if these former identities are subjected to radical manipulation. The jailing of tramps is not the only factor in their loss of their former self-conceptions and the acquisition of a new lifestyle, but it is certainly one of the most important.” Further, Spradley argues that the continuous **criminalization** of tramps **did not contribute to their** sedentarization or **“rehab**ilitation**,” but** ratherfurther **perpetuated** a cycle of **criminal nomadism.**

#### The alternative is to act as the war machine—this is not about literal war, but rather the nomadic potential of exceeding state-imposed identity construction

**Deleuze and Guattari 87**[[2]](#footnote-2)

One of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns, or to utilize smooth spaces as a means of communication in the service of striated space. **It is a vital concern of every State** not only **to vanquish nomadism** but to control migrations and, more generally, to establish a zone of rights over an entire "exterior," over all of the flows traversing the ecumenon. If it can help it, the State does not dissociate itself from a process of capture of flows of all kinds, populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital, etc. There is still a need for fixed paths in well-defined directions, which restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and measure in detail the relative movements of subjects and objects. That is why Paul Virilio's thesis is important, when he shows that "the political power of the State is polis, police, that is, management of the public ways," and that "the gates of the city, its levies and duties, are barriers, filters against the fluidity of the masses, against the penetration power of migratory packs," people, animals, and goods.63 Gravity, gravitas, such is the essence of the State. It is not at all that **the State** knows nothing of speed; but it **requires that movement**, even the fastest, **cease to be the absolute state** of a moving body **occupying a smooth space, to become** the relative characteristic of a "moved body" going from one point to another in a **striated space.** In this sense, the State never ceases to decompose, recompose, and transform movement, or to regulate speed. The State as town surveyor, converter, or highway interchange: the role of the engineer from this point of view. Speed and absolute movement are not without their laws, but they are the laws of the nomos, of the smooth space that deploys it, of the war machine that populates it. If **the nomads formed the war machine**, it was **by inventing absolute speed**, by being "synonymous" with speed. And **each time there is** an operation against the State— **insubordination, rioting,** guerrilla warfare, **or revolution** as act—it can be said that a war machine has revived, that a new **nomadic potential has appeared,** accompanied by the reconstitution of a smooth space or a manner of **being in space as though it were smooth** (Virilio discusses the importance of the riot or revolutionary theme of "holding the street"). It is in this sense that the response of the State against all that threatens to move beyond it is to striate space. The State does not appropriate the war machine without giving even it the form of relative movement: this was the case with the model of the fortress as a regulator of movement, which was precisely the obstacle the nomads came up against, the stumbling block and parry by which absolute vortical movement was broken. Conversely, when a State does not succeed in striating its interior or neighboring space, the flows traversing that State necessarily adopt the stance of a war machine directed against it, deployed in a hostile or rebellious smooth space (even if other States are able to slip their striations in). This was the adventure of China: toward the end of the fourteenth century, and in spite of its very high level of technology in ships and navigation, it turned its back on its huge maritime space, saw its commercial flows turn against it and ally themselves with piracy, and was unable to react except by a politics of immobility, of the massive restriction of commerce, which only reinforced the connection between commerce and the war machine.641227: TREATISE ON NOMADOLOGY—THE WAR MACHINE D 387 The situation is much more complicated than we have let on. **The sea is** perhaps **principal among smooth spaces**, the hydraulic model par excellence**. But the sea is also**, of all smooth spaces, **the first one attempts were made to striate**, to transform into a dependency of the land, **with** its **fixed routes,** constant directions, relative movements, a whole counterhydraulic of **channels and conduits.** One of the reasons for the hegemony of the West was the power of its State apparatuses to striate the sea by combining the technologies of the North and the Mediterranean and by annexing the Atlantic. But this undertaking had the most unexpected result: the multiplication of relative movements, the intensification of relative speeds in striated space, ended up reconstituting a smooth space or absolute movement. As Virilio emphasizes, **the sea became the place** of the fleet in being, **where one no longer goes from one point to another, but** rather **holds space beginning from any point**: instead of striating space, one occupies it with a vector of deterritorialization **in perpetual motion.** This modern strategy was communicated from the sea to the air, as the new smooth space, but also to the entire Earth considered as desert or sea. **As converter and capturer, the State** does not just relativize movement, itreimparts absolute movement. It does not just go from the smooth to the striated, it reconstitutes smooth space; it **reimparts smooth in the wake of the striated.** It is true that this new **nomadism accompanies a worldwide war machine whose organization exceeds** the **State apparatuses** and passes into energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes. We say this as a reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on the interactions they are part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise or establishment (for example, the way in which total war and popular war, and even guerrilla warfare, borrow one another's methods).65

### 2NR

#### The state can’t solve problems when the root cause of those problems is normalization

**Guattari 2k**[[3]](#footnote-3)

The Earth is undergoing a period of intense techno-scientific transformations. If no remedy is found, the **ecological disequilbrium** this has generated **will** ultimately **threaten** the continuation of **life on the planet**’s surface**.** Alongside these upheavals, **human modes of life,** both individual and collective, **are** progressively deteriorating. Kinship networks tend to be reduced to a bare minimum; domestic life is being poisoned by the gangrene of mass-media consumption; family and married life are frequently **‘ossified’ by** a sort of **standardization** of behaviour; and neighbourhood relations are generally reduced to their meanest expression . . . It is the relationship between subjectivity and its exteriority – be it social, animal, vegetable or Cosmic – that is compromised in this way, in a sort of general movement of implosion and regressive infantalization. Otherness tends to lose all its asperity. Tourism, for example, usually amounts to no more than a journey on the spot, with the same redundancies of images and behavior. **Political groupings** and executive authorities appear to be totally incapable of understanding the full implications of these issues. Despite having recently initiated a partial realization of the most obvious dangers that threaten the natural environment of our societies, they are generally content tosimply **tackle** industrial **pollution** and then **from a purely technocratic perspective**, whereas only an ethico-political articulation – which I call ecosophy— between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations, and human subjectivity) would be likely to clarify these questions. Henceforth it is the ways of living on this planet that are in question, in the context of the acceleration of **techno-scientific mutations** and of considerable demographic growth. Through the continuous development of machinic labour, multiplied by the information revolution, productive forces can **make** available an increasing amount of time for potential human activity. But to what end? Unemployment, oppressive **marginalization,** loneliness, boredom, **anxiety and neurosis**? Or culture, creation, development, the reinvention of the environment and the enrichment of modes of life and sensibility? In both the Third World and the developed world, whole sections of the collective subjectivity are floundering or simply huddle around archaisms; as is the case, for example, with the dreadful rise of religious fundamentalism. The only true response to the ecological crisis is on a global scale, provided that is brings about an authentic political, **social** and cultural **revolution**, **reshaping** the objectives of the **production** of both material and immaterial assets. Therefore this revolution must not be exclusively concerned with visible relations of force on a grand scale, but **will** also **take into account molecular** domains of sensibility, intelligence and **desire.** A finalization of social labour, regulated in a univocal way by a **profit** economy **and** by **power** relations, would only **lead**, at present, **to dramatic dead-ends.** This is obvious from the absurd and burdensome economic supervisions of the Third World, which lead some of its regions into an absolute and irreversible pauperization. It is equally evident in countries like France, where the proliferation of nuclear power stations threatens, over a large part of Europe, the possible consequences of Chernobyl-style accidents. One need hardly mention the almost delirious **stockpiling of** thousands of **nuclear warheads**, which, at the slightest technical or human error, **could** automatically **lead to** collective **extermination.** In all of these examples it is the same **dominant** modes of **valorizing** human **activities** that **are implicated.** That is to say 1. Those of the imperium [Latin: ‘authority’] of a global market that destroys specific value system and puts on the same plane of equivalence: material assets, cultural assets, wildlife areas, etc. 2. Those that place all social and international relations under the control of police and military machines. Trapped in this double pincer movement, the nation **States** see their traditional role of mediation behind reduced more and more, and they **are** frequently **put in** the combined **service of** the authorities of **the global market**place **and** of **military-industrial complex**es.

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2. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. University of Minnesota Press. 1987. http://projectlamar.com/media/A-Thousand-Plateaus.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Felix Guattari (French dude, also Deleuze’s brother from another mother). “The Three Ecologies.” English Edition. 2000. http://monoskop.org/images/4/44/Guattari\_Felix\_The\_Three\_Ecologies.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-3)