## Theory Preempts

### Reasonability

Competing interps causes a race to the bottom where every round comes down to marginally different theory interps, so if there isn’t decisive in round abuse, disregard offensive theory shells.

### Pres/Permiss

#### Permissibility and presumption negate. Nine reasons.

1. Should means obligation, so lack of an obligation proves “should” statements false. That’s the top OED definition so it’s uniquely predictable.

<Oxford English Dict. “Should”. No date. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/should>

2. A statement is more likely false than true because any part can be false.

3. “Resolved” means “firmly determined to do something” so without a proactive reason to affirm, we wouldn’t be firmly determined and the resolution would be false.

Topical presumption comes first.

A. It’s logically distinct. Theoretical presumption only kicks in if you don’t know whether the topic’s true, but my definitions show that if there’s no offense, you know the topic’s false, so there’s no need to go to theory.

B. Your jurisdiction to evaluate the resolution is your procedural role as a judge because it’s a precondition for warrants on the flow mattering at all. This precedes any normative impacts on presumption like fairness or education because those warrants only matter given a role of a judge in which you have a duty to evaluate them on the line-by-line.

4. Aff has side bias.

a. infinite prep.

b. he speaks first and last.

c. This topic is uniquely aff biased. Most ethical theories go aff.

5. Presuming neg is key to fairness and real world education. **Colling 12**

<Richard Colling (Colling received a B.A., from the University of Houston . He is currently the Director of Forensics, Stony Point High School, and Partner & Co-Founder of The Forensics Files.) THE TRUTH-TESTING PARADIGM AS A STRAW MAN. The Forensics Files’s National Journal of Speech & Debate Vol. 1:1 (October 2012). http://site.theforensicsfiles.com/NJSD1-1.Final.pdf >

**A** ‘tabula rasa **default neg**ative lacking affirmative offense’ **paradigm is** also **real world because it is similar to** the way issues are ‘resolved’ in **court**s. **The prosecution has a burden to prove the accused guilty** in a criminal trial, or the plaintiff has a burden to prove their case in civil law. The defendant in either case, unless some type of affirmative defense is submitted, does not have this reciprocal burden. **Requiring a reciprocal burden would be** an **unfair** imposition upon the defendant because it would presume some level of guilt. The same would apply to the negative in a debate round **as it would presume the resolution true** on some level (**which** again also **defies the rules of logic.**) **The legalistic model is** as real world as the legislative model, as cases are considered daily by the courts. It could even be considered **more ‘real world’ considering the great frequency of court cases** resolved compared to legislation passed by Congress, **and more debaters end up lawyers than** the debaters that end up **legislators. The legalistic model seems a better fit for LD** as well considering the variety of issues and resolutions debated annually. Courts consider a large variety of issues on a daily basis. Certainly legislative bodies do as well, but while some LD value resolutions are focused on the value of policies, others are more focused on individual, ethical issues. Courts consider policies, at least the Constitutionality of policies, but they also must deal with the individualized concerns of the particular parties in each case. Legislative model paradigms are valuable and beneficial, but there is certainly no logical justification for why the legislative model should apply exclusively to LD, assuming it is applicable at all. So, in LD, negative offense should never be absolutely essential for a negative ballot because, in courts, the defendant, unless opting for an affirmative defense need not prove anything other than that the prosecutor or plaintiff did not prove their case.

6. No time skew because we both have 13 minutes. He can solve 1AR time skew by leveraging AC extensions or reading new offense, so it’s functionally 10 minutes, meaning if there’s timeskew, it goes neg.

7. Presume against debaters who don’t disclose because I have to overcome an infinite prep skew to get back to square one.

8. Presume for small schools because their massive squad and coaching staff means I’ll always be behind on prep. These standards also impact turn any 1AR theory shell because I need neg bias to even out the massive aff bias in this debate,

9. The topic says prioritize “over”, so if there’s no offense, the topic is false because both are equal.

### Incoherence

#### Incoherence of the topic negates.

#### 1. Morality isn’t an assumption of the resolution. Conditional statements have an “If/Then” format.

#### 2. “ought” sentences are by definition false in the absence of obligation.

#### 3. Denying assumptions proves a statement false according to Russell’s theory of definite descriptions.

Ludlow 7

Peter Ludlow (Prof of phil at northwestern). “Descriptions.” SEP. 26 July 2007. http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/archives/fall2008/entries/descriptions/

Since Parmenides, **philosophers have worried about how one can use a nondenoting expression in a meaningful utterance**. If I use a name like ‘Pegasus’ or a description like ‘the present King of France’ don't these expressions have to refer to something in order for my utterance of the sentence to be meaningful? Clearly I can use these expressions in a meaningful way; consider sentences like ‘The present King of France does not exist’, ‘Pegasus does not exist’, ‘Smith believes that The present King of France is bald’ etc. The space of possible answers is fairly constrained here. For example, one can argue (ala Meinong (1904), Parsons (1980) and Zalta (1983, 1988)) that these expressions really do refer (albeit to nonexistent objects), one can argue that one is referring to a concept of some sort (for example the concept of Pegasus), or one can claim that one really isn't expressing a complete proposition in these cases, but that the sentence itself is nonetheless meaningful (Strawson 1950). **Russell saw a** different **solution**—one in which it was possible to express a proposition with definitive truth conditions, but one **without** the (in his view) **unsavory metaphysical commitments of nonexistent objects** or concepts. **The idea is very simple. Consider** a negative existential sentence like (6). (6) **The Present King of France does not exist** Because definite descriptions are devices of quantification on Russell's view they can enter into scope relations with other operators—in this case, for example, negation. Accordingly, there is a kind of ambiguity in (1), between the following two logical forms. (6a) not ([the x: x is the present King of France] exists(x)) (6b) [the x: x is the present King of France] not (exists(x)) **If one wants to avoid the ontological entanglements of nonexistent objects, then one is free to say that** (6b)**[it] is false** (since it involves quantifying over things that don't exist) but that (6a) is true (since it is not the case that there is a present King of France). **What is negated in (6a) is not a claim about some particular individual, but rather a general claim about the world—in effect a claim that the world contains exactly one individual that is presently the King of France and that whoever is presently the King of France exists.** The same holds when I use a definite description in a propositional attitude report. If I say ‘Smith believes that the present King of France is bald’ I am claiming that Smith believes a general proposition—not a proposition about some particular individual, but rather a proposition to the effect that someone or other satisfies the property of presently being the King of France and that whoever satisfies that property is bald. **The theory of descriptions allows me to report Smith's belief without my referring to any particular individual or even supposing that some individual is denoted by the description. We can even avoid talk of properties here if we wish**, for we might just as well have said that Smith has a belief to the effect that someone or other satisfies the predicate ‘present King of France’ and whoever satisfies that predicate also satisfies the predicate ‘bald’. Notice how much can be accomplished here with minimal technical resources. **By invoking the theory of descriptions we have avoided appeal to nonexistent objects**, and we have likewise avoided saying that Smith's belief is about the concept of the present King of France. If we choose, we can extend our metaphysical austerity further by opting for talk of predicates instead of properties. **The result is that we can freely employ negative existential sentences and we can freely report the beliefs of others**—even if those negative existentials and beliefs are reported by using expressions that fail to denote.

## Shell

A. Interpretation – The affirmative must defend the cognitive normative judgment that developing countries have more reason to prioritize environmental protection than resource extraction.

B. Violation – the aff interprets the topic as a subjective assertion of the speaker.

C. Standards

1. Ground. I literally have none. His interp forces me to prove that Ruchir does not subjectively believe in EP which is unfalsifiable. That independently means its impossible to prove his contention true, and you negate on presumption.

Implementation-focus is the core of the topic lit. **Olivera 2** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**The literature is proficient in describing** cases of **failures in implementing environmental policies in developing countries**, such as in India (Reich & Bowonder, 1992; Vyas & Reddy, 1998), China (Jan, 1995; Ross, 1992), Eastern European countries (Hardi, 1992; Klarer & Francis, 1997), and Latin America (Ames & Keck, 1997; Pichon, 1992). Common explanations for policy failure range from the classical Malthusian paradigm regarding rapid population growth to widespread corruption in political systems (Sham, 1994). Although these explanations may often be true, they do not suggest practical solutions to problems in implementing environmental policies in developing countries. **To be useful to policymakers, analyzes must identify** the main **factors that impede successful implementation and suggest how these obstacles could be overcome**. Toward that end, understanding the political economy in which the implementation process occurs is crucial. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) recognized, implementation––and we could say especially environmental policy––encompasses the governmental and nongovernmental sector as well as interorganizational links. **Thus, scholars have begun to analyze how organizations** work together to success- **fully implement environmental policy in developing countries** (Brinkerhoff, 1996; Lemos, 1998; Lopes, Bastos Filho, Biller, & Bale, 1996). This literature provides practical recommendations to policymakers.

2. Real-World Policy Making Education

90% of policymaking is deciding on implementation. **Elmore 80**[[2]](#footnote-2)

The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by **policy** analysts that **decisions are not self-executing.** Analysis of policy choices matter very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood in answering **the** question, "What **percentage of** the **work** of achieving a desired governmental action is **done when the preferred** analytic **alternative has been identified**?" Allison estimated that in the normal case, it **was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation**.

Environmental policy discussions are key to critical thinking and decision-making skills. **Pereiro-Munoz et al 2** write[[3]](#footnote-3)

If **science** education **and environmental education have as a goal to develop critical thinking** and to promote decision making, it seems that the **acknowledgement of** a variety of **experts** and expertise **is of relevance** to both**. Otherwise citizens could be unable to challenge a common view that places econ**omical issues and technical features **over other** types of values or **concerns**. As McGinn and Roth (1999) argue, **citizens should be prepared to participate** in scientific practice, to be involved **in situations where science is**, if not created, at least **used.** The **assessment of environmental management is**, in our opinion, **one of these, and citizens do not need to possess all the technical knowledge to** be able to **examine** the positive and negative **impacts and** to **weigh** them up. The identification of instances of scientific practice in classroom discourse is difficult especially if this practice is viewed as a complex process, not as fixed ‘steps’. Several instances were identified when it could be said that students acted as a knowledge-producing community in spite of the fact that the students, particularly at the beginning of the sequence, expressed doubts about their capacities to assess a project written by experts and endorsed by a government office. Perhaps these doubts relate to the nature of the project, a ‘real life’ object that made its way into the classroom, into the ‘school life’. As Brown et al. (1989) point out, there is usually a difference between practitioners’ tasks and stereotyped school tasks and, it could be added, students are not used to being confronted with the complexity of ‘life-size’ problems. However, as the sequence proceeded, the **students assumed the role of experts**, exposing inconsistencies in the project, **offering alternatives and discussing** it with one of its authors. The issue of expertise is worthy of attention and it needs to be explored in different contexts where the relationships among technical expertise, values hierarchies and possible biases caused by the subject matter could be unravelled. **One of the objectives of environmental education is to empower people with** the capacity of **decision making**; for this purpose the acknowledging of multiple expertise is crucial.

3. Textuality

Textuality is a prima facie voter for the neg. It doesn’t matter how fair the aff is; if the case doesn’t affirm the topic, then he hasn’t met the aff burden. Also, textuality link turns other theory standards because it is the basis for claims to predictability and ground.

Aff violates the word “Resolved.” “Resolved” requires the aff to enact a law.

**Words and Phrases 64** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Definition of** the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

Aff violates EP.

**Blacks Law no date defines EP as**[[5]](#footnote-5)

What is ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION?

Read in: Spanish **Environmental guardianship based on policies and procedures.** Objectives are (1) the conserving of natural resources, (2) the preserving of the existing natural environment and, (3) where possible, repairing damage and reversing trends.

The aff violates RE. Extraction is “the act or process of getting something by pulling it out, forcing it out, etc. : **the act of extracting something**”, so he has to defend a change in actions, not subjective assertions.

(Merriam Webster. “Extraction.” No date. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extraction)

Ruchir isn’t a developing country. Merriam Webster defines country as “ political state or nation or its territory.”

(Merriam Webster. “Country.” No date. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/country)

The topic as a whole clearly mandates a policy. Prefer my ev because it’s the only card that evaluates the entire sentence rather than individual words.

**Babb 13** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

Fortunately, **this topic** at least **centers around a question with indisputable policy dimensions. It clearly isn't about individual ethics. The fact that topic framers opted for the word "should"** instead of "ought" **might** also **be interpreted as reason to eschew broader moral standards in favor of** clean-cut **util**itarian debate. Moreover, the topic involves multiple countries such that any single nation's laws or constitution can't serve as a normative guide for action. The generality of the topic's wording suggests a need for similarly universal and uncontroversial normative architecture, and there's nothing like utilitarianism to do the job. In general, **governments strive to provide for citizens**, maintain stability and otherwise make the best of what they have to work with. That's not to say corruption and inefficiencies don't get in the way when it comes to execution, but it's more accurate to describe policy-making as a utilitarian endeavor than it is to associate it with a more particular moral philosophy. **Even if there's a time and place for such philosophies**—and there almost certainly is—**this is a different domain**.¶ To be fair, there's certainly a good argument to be made on behalf of certain broadly humanitarian constraints. Even if we generally accept that states behave in utilitarian ways, we also tend to accept that the "good of the many" can't ignore timeless admonitions against the vilest of state actions. Indeed, you'd be hard-pressed to find many self-described utilitarians who'd admit that something like genocide could even be done in the name of utility. They'd argue that such practices would (and should) be condemned no matter what, even and especially on utilitarian grounds.¶ My biases aside, there are of course still arguments to be made about whether governments should behave in strictly utilitarian fashion and, if so, what exactly that means. The point here is merely to suggest that they're mostly utilitarian excepting (1) specific constitutional constraints that fly beneath this topic's radar and (2) nearly categorical humanitarian constraints that arguably figure into utilitarian calculations anyway.¶ Applied to the topic, utilitarianism also makes for a good standard because it appeals to plenty of ground on both sides of the debate. **The great majority of people are impacted by development and environment** alike. Determining which is ultimately more important for those people would make for a good debate. It's not the only normative debate to be sure, but it's a clean one in which both sides have access to sound and strategic positions. It also obviates the need for potentially messy discussions in which debaters attempt to apply ill-fitting ethical paradigms to state policy.

D. Voter – Education comes first because it’s the end goal of debate and the only portable skill. Substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it. Dropping the argument doesn’t solve because it’s too late to restart from the AC and have an educational debate. Also, the ballot has to set good norms for future rounds because debaters care first and foremost about winning, meaning voting on theory is the only way to deter bad arguments.

Prefer competing interpretations because reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention.

Debating policies is the best method for effecting change in energy policy.

**Hager 92** (, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92 (Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some **activists turned to the parliamentary arena** as a possible forum **for** an **energy dialogue**. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have **an institutional lever** with which **to pry apart** the **bureaucracy** and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen movement. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affecting local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored industrial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the **necessary change** would require a degree of political restructuring that **could only be accomplished through** their **direct participation in** parliamentary **politics**. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishmento f a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and **by producing a** modernization **plan** itself**, the** combined citizen **initiative** and AL **forced bureaucratic authorities to push** the utility for **improvements** . They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the **public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers** to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmentally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simultaneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protection of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggravate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at Systemkritik.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitimation dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more problematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda. Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of **the energy issue forced** citizen **activists to become both participants** in **and critics of the policy process**. In order to defeat the plant, **activists engaged in technical debate. They won** several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often **proving** to be **more informed than bureaucratic experts** themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, **grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics**.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The **attempts of** the **established** political **parties to coopt** "green" issues **have** also **met with limited success**. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

### No RVIs

[1-4. Omitted]

### Conditions

Even if aff RVIs are good, aff only gets RVIs if they concede the violation, the voter, and that theory is evaluated through competing interps. 3 reasons.

1. It’s key to reciprocity because I meets, reject the arg, and reasonability make RVIs a nib for the aff which gives the aff a 4 to 1 advantage on theory.

2. Only offense to a counter-interp can trigger an RVI. If the aff doesn’t win that my interp is worse for debate, then it makes no sense to vote aff to deter it.

3. If the aff is going all in on theory with an RVI, they already have a reciprocal source of offense, so I meets and reasonability aren’t key.

## Case

### AT Should = Subjective

1. Gut check. If you didn’t read the topic as “Ruchir believes the topic” that proves his interp is wrong because language is defined by common usage.

2. The difference between ought and should is one of degree rather than kind. “Should” is just a less forcible form of advisability.

**Asperic 6** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

"Ought to" has the same intention as "should", that is to suggest something, but "ought to" says that you think that a person should pay more attention to your suggestion to give more importance to it. "**Ought** to" **is more specific than "should", more forcible.** **Their meaning both point to the same direction, the** basic **difference is in the degree of expressiveness.** "**ought** to" **is far closer to** "**there is nothing else**/better to do but/except to" **than "should"** (However there are several usages of "ought to" that are not the same as "should', I am talking here only about the part where they are similar in meaning.) So, yes, we could say that there are situations when "ought to" and "should" mean almost the same, but the intention of a speaker or writer is different: to indicate a solution or to give a suggestion, respectively. The difference between "ought to" and "should", when they mean "giving a suggestion", is better understood when you examine expressions and examples. **For example if I like a cake very much** and I want to suggest someone to try it **I would say: "You ought to try this cake."** In this case if we use **"You should try this cake"**, it **says not much about how strong I liked it.** **If someone is leaving the house after the diner, a polite way to invite him again is "You ought to visit** us **again."** In this case if we use **"You should visit** us **again"**, it **does not give that strong expectation**. With "you ought to visit us again" you compliment to the person that has visited you far more than with "you should visit us again". **"ought to" is sometimes a synonym to "cannot avoid". "should" is almost never a synonym to "cannot avoid".**

Your authors agree.

**Cappelle and De Sutter:**

 Bert Cappelle and Gert De Sutter, Should vs. Ought to, University College Ghent / Ghent University

**Our corpus contained few instances in which the speaker expresses an ‘objective’ opinion** (as in (1a) above)—**and** besides, **whether an opinion counts as truly objective is always hard to verify**—or in which the speaker just plainly states which requirements ‘objectively’ have to be fulfilled for some other situation (as in (1b) above). At any rate, **we did not find corroboration that *ought to* occurs more frequently than *should* in such cases.** However, **if *ought to* were really more objective than *should*, then it should be avoided in contexts containing hedges like *i think* or *if you ask me*, but sentences like the following do occur, seem perfectly natural and have been shown in this study to be indeed more frequent than similar sentences with *should*** (cf. the seventh result stated in section 4).

1. Jose Antonio Puppim de Olivera (Assistant Director and Senior Research Fellow at the United Nations University Institute of Advanced Studies (UNU-IAS) where he coordinates the Sustainable Urban Futures programme. Previously, he was lecturer and course co-director of MSc in Environment and Sustainable Development at University College London (UK) and was associate professor at the Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration (EBAPE) of the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV). He is editor of the journal Public Administration and Development (PAD, Wiley-Blackwell). Jose holds a Ph.D. in Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, USA), a Master of Environmental Science from Hokkaido University (Japan) and a degree in Engineering from the Aeronautics Technological Institute (ITA), Brazil. Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration). “Implementation Environmental Policies in Developing Countries Through Decentralization: The Case of Protected Areas in Bahia, Brazil.” ScienceDirect. 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Prof. Public Affairs at University of Washington, 1980 PolySci Quarterly 79-80, p. 605, [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Jiménez-Aleixandre, professor of education – University of Santiago de Compostela, and Pereiro-Muñoz High School Castelao, Vigo (Spain), ‘2 (Maria-Pilar and Cristina, “Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management,” International Journal of Science Education Vol. 24, No. 11, p. 1171–1190) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Black’s Law Dictionary. “What is Environmental Protection.” No date. http://thelawdictionary.org/environmental-protection/ [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Stephen Babb (has well over a decade's worth of involvement with LD debate, experiencing success as a competitor and coach alike. When debating for TMI in San Antonio, he was the Texas State Champion and twice finished in the top 10 at NFL Nationals. He was invited to the Greenhill and MBA Round Robins and twice broke at both Greenhill and Emory. More recently, he directed the Archer program and has worked with a number of schools including Harvard-Westlake, Brentwood, Grapevine and Highland Park. Babb has also served as a summer instructor at a number of institutes including VBI, UNT, NDF, UT and Stanford. He's worked with elite debaters in every setting and judged thousands of debates. After spending two years blogging about the NBA for Bleacher Report, Babb continues to dabble in writing when he isn't doing debate things), “Topic Analysis by Stephen Babb”, Environment v Resource Extraction, Victory Briefs. 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Asperic (anonymous English Forums account). Reply to “‘Ought to’ vs. ‘Should.’?” 8 August 2006. http://www.englishforums.com/English/OughtToVsShould/drjxm/post.htm [↑](#footnote-ref-7)