Neuroscientific evidence undermines the cognitivist account of moral truth and specifically Kantians like Korsgaard. **Schroeder 10** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

What, then, is left? **The cognitivist holds** the view **that moral motivation begins with** occurrent **belief**. In particular, it begins with beliefs **about what** actions **would be right.** The cognitivist holds that, at least in cases of morally worthy action, such beliefs lead to motivation to perform those actions, quite independently of any antecedent desires. The cognitivist is happy to call this motivational state ‘‘a desire,’’ but thinks of it as entirely dependent upon the moral belief that created it. The cognitivist position has recognizable afﬁnities to familiar positions in the philosophical literature (e.g. **Korsgaard**, 1994; McDowell, 1998: ch. 4; Smith, 1994). These philosophers, of course, hold that much more is going on in the mind of a morally worthy agent than the simple picture painted by our cognitivist. They generally **agree[s]**, however, **that moral**ly worthy **action is not dependent** up**on** antecedent **desires, but** stems in the ﬁrst instance from one’s **judgments.** On the cognitivist’s view, Jen’s desires are not irrelevant to her action, but they are not the initiating engines of her action either. Instead, her desires are mere data that she considers (perhaps) in coming to be motivated. Given what is available to her, perhaps she comes to believe that it would be right to give the homeless man money, and it never occurs to her to even consider her desires. This consideration of the rightness of giving money to the homeless man motivates Jen to give him some money, and she does. Because she is moved by the right sort of belief, her action has moral worth.

[…]

Of our four caricature theorists, it is obviously **our cognitivist** who **is most likely to have difﬁculties accommodating the neuroscientiﬁc evidence.** Although it was pointed out earlier that the theoretical possibility exists that moral cognition can lead directly to moral motivation independently of the reward system (and so independently of desire), this theoretical possibility proves to be problematic upon closer inspection. We begin with evidence from Parkinson disease. As will be familiar to many, Parkinson disease is a disorder that results in a number of effects, including tremor, difﬁculty in initiating movement, and (if taken to its limit) total paralysis. Parkinson disease is caused by the death of the dopamine-producing cells of the substantia nigra pars compacta (the SNpc in Figure 3.1), the very cells that make up the reward system’s output to the motor basal ganglia. Thus, on the interpretation of the reward system advocated earlier, **Parkinson disease is a disorder in which intrinsic desires slowly lose their** capacity to causally inﬂuence **motivation.** As it turns out, **Parkinson** disease impairs or **prevents action** regardless of **whether the action is moral**ly worthy **or not,** regardless of whether it is intuitively desired or intuitively done out of duty, regardless of **whether the individual** trying to act **gives a law to herself. Thus Parkinson** disease **appears to show that intrinsic desires are necessary to** the production of **motivation** in normal human beings, and this would seem to put serious pressure on the cognitivist’s position. The cognitivist might allow that intrinsic desires must exist in order for motivation to be possible, but hold that intrinsic desires normally play no signiﬁcant role in producing motivation. After all, Parkinson disease shows that intrinsic desires are necessary for motivation, but it does not clearly reveal the role played by intrinsic desires in producing motivation when the desires exist. If sustainable, this would be just a minor concession, and so it is well worth investigating. What might motivation of the cognitivist’s sort look like, if desires play no substantive role in it? It was suggested in the previous section that it might look like motivation that stems directly from activity in the higher cognitive centers—like motivation that stems from choosing a law for one’s action, in other words. And it turns out that motivation derived from higher cognitive centers independently of desire is possible—but also that the only known model of it is pathological. It is the sort of motivation found in Tourette syndrome. Tourette syndrome is a disorder characterized by tics: eye blinks, shoulder jerks, barks, obscenities, profanities, and so on. Something like 70–90% of sufferers report that they often voluntarily produce their tics, because the effort of not ticcing is unpleasant and often doomed to failure in any case. But a typical sufferer from Tourette syndrome will also report that tics are quite capable of forcing themselves out regardless of how fiercely they are resisted. Tourette syndrome appears to be caused by a dysfunction in the motor basal ganglia, in which the motor basal ganglia inhibit most motor commands initiated by perceptual and higher cognitive centers, but not quite all. Some motor commands initiated by perceptual or higher cognitive centers get through in spite of the inhibition, and in spite of the fact that reward signals (intrinsic desires) have not released these inhibitions. A tic is the result (Schroeder, 2005). Thus direct causation of **motivation by higher cognition** via this pathway, quite independently of desire, **is the sort of thing that results in a Tourettic tic, but a Tourettic tic is anything but** the paradigm of **morally worthy action. This seems a very unpromising parallel** to be drawn **for** a **cognitivist** picture of **motivation.** There are other ways to investigate the biological plausibility of our cognitivist’s position as well. **If reason alone were responsible for moral motivation,** one would expect that **injuries that spare reason would also spare moral motivation, but** there are clinical **case studies** that **suggest otherwise.** Damage to the ventromedial (VM) region of prefrontal cortex (located in the OFC in Figure 3.1), a form of brain damage studied extensively by Damasio and colleagues (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994), impairs cognitive input to the reward system, and so alters the output of the reward system to the motor basal ganglia. Such damage seems to render subjects incapable of acting on their better judgments in certain cases—a finding that we think ought to capture the imagination of any moral psychologist. In a well-known non-moral experimental task, subjects with this sort of injury were asked to draw cards from any of four decks of cards. Each card was marked with a number indicating a number of dollars won or lost, and subjects were asked to draw as they liked from the four decks, attempting to maximize their winnings. Normal control subjects tended to draw at first from two of the decks, which quickly revealed themselves to have high-paying cards when drawn from. But those same decks also had high-costing cards in them, and normal subjects soon enough learned to stay away from these decks and shift to the other two decks, where returns were lower but penalties less punitive (Bechara et al., 1997). **Subjects with** VM **prefrontal injuries**—with injuries to structures that are crucial input to the reward system—started their play just as normal subjects did, but strongly tended not to switch to the safer decks, instead staying with the high-paying, high-costing decks until they ran out of money. Fascinatingly, these same subjects sometimes **reported being aware of** what **the better strategy** would be, **but** they nonetheless **failed to follow it** (Bechara et al., 2000). **This** sort of finding **should** once again **give our cognitivist pause**, for it suggests that, at least in non-moral contexts, **reason alone does not** suffice to **guide action independently of reward information**; it is reasonable to speculate that reason may fail to produce motivation in moral cases as well. Damasio himself interprets these findings as specifically vindicating the role of felt emotional responses in decision-making, a more personalist than instrumentalist conclusion. However, the precise interpretation of the mechanism by which VM prefrontal cortical injury leads to its own peculiar effects is not yet well understood. We return to a discussion of these people with VM damage after exploring the consequences for the cognitivist thesis of another population of people with disorders of moral motivation: psychopaths. Psychopaths are people who seem cognitively normal, but evince little remorse or guilt for morally wrong actions. Psychopaths are identified by scoring high on a standard psychopathy checklist (Hare, 1991), and seem to be deficient in two respects: (1) emotional dysfunction, and (2) antisocial behavior. **Psychopaths** seem able to **comprehend** social and **moral rules, and** they typically **do not** seem to **have impaired reasoning** abilities. (Recent studies suggest that limbic system damage is correlated with psychopathy, and this is consistent with the fact that psychopaths show diminished affective response to cues of suffering in others, but it does not suggest any particularly cognitive impairment [Kiehl, 2006; but see Maibom, 2005].) As a population apparently **capable of** making **moral judgments but not** at all **motivated by them, psychopaths present a**n obvious **challenge to the cognitivist.** However, research suggests that psychopaths’ moral cognition is deficient in at least the following respect: they show a diminished capacity to distinguish moral from conventional violations (Blair, 1995, 1997). For instance, children with psychopathic tendencies are more likely to judge moral violations as authority-dependent (so the morality of hitting another child in a classroom will be held to depend on whether or not the teacher permits it, rather than held to be independent of such rules, as it is by normally developing children). This deficit has led some to argue that psychopaths have impaired moral concepts (Nichols, 2004: 113). Although they are able to say whether an action is right or wrong, permitted or prohibited, philosophers such as these suggest that psychopaths merely mouth the words, or make moral judgments in the ‘‘inverted commas’’ sense: judgments of what is called ‘‘moral’’ by others. The ability of psychopaths to stand as counter-examples to cognitivism rests upon some argument to the effect that psychopaths really do make moral judgments. If psychopaths indeed lack moral concepts or moral knowledge, then their failure to act morally or to appear to lack motivation is no challenge to cognitivism, for it can plausibly be argued that to make moral judgments at all, one must have moral concepts and possess some modicum of moral knowledge (Kennett & Fine, 2007). However, if the ability to make the moral/conventional distinction is not required for moral concepts or moral knowledge, then psychopaths appear to be candidate counter-examples to our cognitivist (see, e.g., Kelly et al., 2007). Although some arguments have been offered to suggest that psychopaths have requisite abilities to make moral judgments (Roskies, 2007), these arguments remain indecisive. On our view, **it remains unclear whether psychopaths are competent moral judges.**

Abstract philosophical theorizing represents a privileged White position. Appeals to universal capital-T truth are both unnecessary for pragmatic political action and a proactive cause of policy paralysis. **Kratochwil 8** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with** objects or “things” (**ontology**), **or** with **reason** and method (epistemology), **but with** “**acting”** ( prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings** placed **in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act** and must do so always **under time pressures** and **in the face of incomplete information**. Precisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, **what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear** ex ante, **because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and** the multiple **possibilities are rife with** incentives for (**dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts** informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of relying on** certainty and **universal validity** gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to **detail**, **rather than** to **generality**, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since **acting in the social world** often **involves acting “for” someone,** special **responsibilities arise** that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since **we owe** special **care to those entrusted to us**, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot** just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot ***refuse* to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient knowledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sciences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

Ignore skepticism and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action. This also creates a reciprocal 1 to 1 burden structure, so it’s key to fairness.

Focus on concrete problems and solutions is the only meaningful form of philosophy. Ivory tower philosophy theorizes itself into irrelevance. **Edet 03**[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Too much class time is occupied with questions like** ‘’What did Hegel mean by …?’’ and ‘**’What was your** third **criticism of util**itarianism**?’’** While such an approach may have paedeutic value its relevance is nonetheless questionable. The students must be encouraged to develop independent thinking ability and form opinions of their own. Pedagogical techniques, including small group discussions, debates, films and ‘’clever’’ essay examination need to be employed to illustrate the difference between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Also practical computer and information technology (IT) training needs to be made compulsory. The students may be asked to go on a compulsory period of attachment in a computer school and show evidence of successful completion of the training before resuming their philosophical studies.

The point made here is that **philosophy must be** ‘’problem focused’’ and attempt to be **“problem solving”** in socially important problems and establish its integrative function with other disciplines. By so doing philosophy will affirm its relevance, significance and value with the fresh insights and perspectives it reveals to these other disciplines. The philosopher’s skills and attitude which makes him far-sighted and extra perceptive will earn him recognition and respect. The non-philosophy major groomed in the inter-disciplinary approach and who has properly cultivated the critical skills and attitude of Philosophy will bring this to bear on his major disciplines and then ultimately come to the realization that habitually and persistently he must keep an open-mind and rethink the possibilities of his discipline, he might well come to accept as legitimate some new ways of relating to other disciplines –ways which would be consistent with and employ insights of the traditions of his major discipline but still would allow a more fruitful complementary existence. The philosophy major properly groomed in the interdisciplinary approach to studying philosophy and having adequately cultivated the necessary skills and attitude is pragmatic, dynamic, mobile and versatile. He it is who can “bake bread’’. It is to this calibre of trained philosophers that Ozumba states, ‘’can work any where’’ (Ozumba;2002:3). Ozumba’s work, *A Philosophy Handbook for Beginners: Value Application and Career Opportunities for Philosophers* is a ‘’must read’’ for Nigerian undergraduates of philosophy. Conclusion So far I have distinguished between ‘’Ivory tower’’ Philosophy and ‘’market place’’ Philosophy. **Ivory tower Philosophy** is academic Philosophy which **insists that Philosophy must** be done in the traditional professional manner with systematicity, analytic rigour, logical coherence, and technicality, mainly **address**ing problems and issues in **the classical traditions** of Philosophy**.** **“Market place” Philosophy**, on the other hand, though not discountenancing the need for rigorousness and systematicity, **maintains that academic Philosophy can** be done in the non-traditional manner and made to **address concrete existential problems** within our cultural circumstance **which encourages the** professional **philosopher to participate in public debate of issues of contemporary relevance.** I have also maintained that **“ivory tower” philosophy is the reason for** the **isolation**, alienation, marginalization **and perceived irrelevance of academic philosophy today.** I posit that professionalism in philosophy and its teaching should be reconceived and restructured. I propose that the interdisciplinary strategy for teaching philosophy should be promoted so as to establish the integrative function of philosophy and its integral connection with other disciplines and ultimately interdisciplinary integration. This approach, I maintain, should also stress the utilitarian aspects of the study of philosophy.

You can’t separate your philosophy from its historical context. Enlightenment philosophy is racist at its core. It relies on an erasure of material differences in identity. **Mills 02** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

"Person," then is really a technical term, a term of art, referring to a status whose attainment requires more than simple humanity. Mehta argues that liberalism presupposes a political anthropology: "**[T]he exclusionary basis of liberalism does**, I believe, **derive from its theoretical core,** and the litany of exclusionary historical instances is an elaboration of this core.... **behind** the **capacities ascribed to all human beings exists a thicker set of social credentials** that constitutes the real bases of political inclusion." 16 And **these social credentials are** generally **out of the reach of** non-Europeans, **nonwhites**, who are **covered by** a different set of categories, **the category of the "savage" and** the **"barbarian**.**"** No less than "men" or "person," then, **these** need to be seen as **[are]** technical theoretical **terms adverting to a** peculiar ontological/**moral**/political **status which legitimates their possessors’ exclusion from the rights and freedoms enjoyed by whites.** It is not at all a matter of "contradictions," internal inconsistencies, but of a consistent exclusivist white egalitarianism which is now, in contradiction to the actual historical record, being denied and retroactively projected backward as colorless. The concept of a "sub-person," then, formally registers this actual division in modern Western political theory, and by its overt presence, and the set of implications and ramifications its introduction establishes, illuminates an architecture that I would claim is already there in these theories but currently obfuscated by the illusory inclusiveness of "persons" read backwardly as raceneutral. Sub-persons are humanoid entities who, because of deficiencies linked with race, lack the moral status requisite for enjoyment of the bundle of rights and freedoms appropriate for persons. Writings that currently seem irrelevant, remarks which seem like throwaway lines, comments which seem puzzlingly inconsistent with (what we have been taught is) the "theory," are no longer marginalized but integrated into a theoretical whole. Putting this simply, the contrast between the orthodox "anomaly" view of racism, and the "symbiosis" view I am advocating, can be represented as follows. Let T be the (egalitarian) moral/political theory of the modern white Western philosopher in question; p stand for person; and sp for sub-person. Mainstream commentary is basically saying that: For philosopher P: 13. Catherine Wilson, "Introduction--Social Inequality: Rousseau in Retrospect," in Wilson, ed., Civilization and Oppression, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 25 (Calgary, Alta.: University of Calgary Press, 1999), pp. 18, 22, T asserts egalitarianism for all p, where p is race-neutral. Racist statements are then an exception, and not part of T. And what, by contrast, I am recommending as an interpretive framework, is: For philosopher P: T asserts egalitarianism for all p, where whiteness is a necessary condition for p T asserts non-egalitarianism for sp, where nonwhiteness is (approximately) a sufficient condition for sp. 17 Racist statements are then part of T, not an exception. On both views, racism can be admitted—the charge is not that mainstream views cannot concede racism. The crucial question is how they frame it, whether as anomaly/contradiction, etc. or as an integral/symbiotic part of the theory. It will be appreciated, then, that this semantic innovation, so simple to describe, would, if adopted, quite radically transform our view of modern Western moral/political philosophy. We would have to start thinking of these theorists, and their theories, quite differently from how they are presented in the standard textbook. This does not rule out, of course, a sanitized retrieval and reappropriation of their theories. But it would have to be explicitly acknowledged that that is what we are doing, that we are not reading them as they intended. So it is not that liberalism and egalitarianism, abstract L and E, were historically meant to extend to everybody. Rather, we would need to talk about racialized liberalism and racialized egalitarianism, RL and RE. Racism would then emerge, as it should, as a normative system in its own right— indeed, as the actual normative system obtaining for most of the modern period. And just as the hierarchical ideologies of the ancient and medieval world were multiply-tiered, with different standings (of class) for different sets of human beings, we would be forced to acknowledge that (actual, historical) **liberalism** also **is** a **two-tiered** ideology**,** with a **different status assigned to**, and correspondingly differentiated norms prescribed for, **whites and nonwhites.** The orthodox narrative of modernity would have to be rewritten; the orthodox cartography of the political would have to be redrawn. Apart from being—unlike the present narrative—true to the actual historical record, and so demanding implementation on those grounds alone, this transformation would have the great virtue of uniting the conceptual spaces and periodization times of the white political and the nonwhite political. **Textbooks authorize** an account of **the history of Western political philosophy** which moves smoothly from Plato to Rawls **without dealing with race, as if,** in the modern period, **Western theorists were proclaiming their egalitarian views as fully applicable to everybody.** The West is constructed in such a way that racism and white racial domination have been no part of the history of the West, and the normative superiority of whites to nonwhites, justified by these theorists, has been no part of that history. A mystified account of political philosophy complements a mystified account of recent world history, in which **the central role of** imperialism and **racial domination has been** either **sanitized** or written **out of the record altogether, so** that the distinctive features of **the political struggles of nonwhites** (abolitionist, anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, antisegregationist) **vanish into a white darkness.** 10 My claim is, then, that if we read these theorists and take their references to "men" or "persons" in a race-neutral way, we will in fact be misrepresenting them and distorting their theoretical intentions. Since this is exactly what has been done by generations of commentators, and continues to be routinely done today, it means that in crucial respects we have a fictive picture of the content and significance of modern Western moral and political philosophy. The deployment of my "revisionist" vocabulary—in scare quotes, since I am claiming that this is just a formalization of what these philosophers actually thought—then makes explicit what they were really arguing for. II. Kant’s Racial Views and Their Implications These points have been general. **Let us now turn specifically to Kant.** In a sense, Kant is perfect for my thesis (had he not existed, critical race theorists would have had to invent him), because of the combination of his absolute centrality (with the aforementioned rise to hegemony of "deontological liberalism") to contemporary moral and political theory, and the detailed explicitness of his writings on race. Within my revisionist framework, far from its being a terrible irony, or a shocking contradiction, that the theorist sometimes honored with the status of the father of modern moral theory is now also being credited as the father, or one of the fathers (maybe, given his apparently nonexistent sex life, it should be the godfather?), of modern racism, it is wonderfully appropriate, a perfect vindication of my claims. For in my framework of "symbiosis" rather than "anomaly," it is only fitting that the philosopher who provides the richest account of "personhood" for the Age of Egalitarianism should also provide the richest account of "sub-personhood" for what is also the Age of Global White Supremacy. Once the conventional framework is inverted, and the conceptual barriers breached, so that we start conceptualizing racism as an alternative normative system, which has in fact been the real normative system, then what would originally have seemed oxymoronic suddenly becomes pleonastic. If "personhood" is raced, then of course there will be a different set of rules for persons and sub-persons. What else would one, in consistency, expect? Kant's reputational commitment to moral egalitarianism is presumably so celebrated as to need no extensive gloss. As Roger Sullivan writes, "Kant's is an ethics of the people, of moral egalitarianism.... Respect is an attitude due equally to every person, simply because each is a person, a rational being capable of moral self-determination." 18 We see here the ambiguity I have tried to expose in the term "person." If "person" is already tacitly morally normed, then as a statement of Kant's views (or anybody's), this is tautologous ("Respect is an attitude due equally to every human who deserves equal respect"); but if "person" just means "human," it becomes far more questionable, and, I would in fact say, as a statement of Kant's own views, simply false. Feminists have long argued that the use of generic, gender-neutral language in discussing Western philosophers' moral/political views is misleading, and I would claim that this argument goes through even more forcefully and dramatically for race, since people of color do not even have the necessarily (as against contingently) functional status within the white household that white women have, so they can die off (not an abstract possibility by any means, as we will see below), without disrupting (indeed perhaps facilitating?!) the functioning of the white polity. Unlike the case of some other philosophers, such as Locke, **Kant's racial views are explicit**, needing no inferential reconstruction. Moreover, it is not a matter of a few incidental remarks but a full-blown and elaborate theory. Emmanuel Eze's important essay of a few years ago brought to a North American philosophical audience the shocking news—shocking only to philosophers, since it had long been known by historians and anthropologists— that **Kant was one of the central figures in the birth of scientific racism.** 19 In fact, Robert Bernasconi suggests that "if any one person should be recognized as the author of the first theory of race worthy of the name, it should be the German philosopher Immanuel Kant," discounting the claims of more familiar candidates such as Carolus Linnaeus, George-Louis Buffon, and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. 20 **Kant's** lectures and **writings on anthropology** and physical geography (usually ignored by philosophers) **provide a detailed account of a racialized human nature classified into** four categories—white Europeans, yellow Asians, black Africans, red Amerindians—who are related to one another in **a hierarchy of superiors and inferiors.** (See handout for details.)

Political philosophy specifically must be grounded in historical realities.

**Rhonheimer 05** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy. **Political philosophy** belongs to ethics, which **is practical, for it both reflects on practical knowledge and aims at action. Therefore,** it is not only normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of **political institutions** and action **must be understood** as embedded **in concrete** cultural and, therefore, **historical contexts** and as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A normative political philosophy which would abstract from the conditions of realizability would be trying to establish norms for realizing the “idea of the good” or of “the just” (as Plato, in fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such **a purely metaphysical view**, however, **is doomed to failure.** As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political. 14 Briefly: political philosophy is not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which deals with partly contingent matters and aims at action. **Moreover,** unlike moral norms in general—natural law included,—which rule the actions of a person—“my acting” and pursuing the good—, the logic of **the political is** characterized by acts like **framing institutions** and establishing legal rules **by which** not only personal actions but the actions of **a multitude of persons are regulated** by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. **Political actions are, thus,** both actions **of the whole of the body politic** and referring to the whole of the community of citizens. 15 Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which some persons are by nature rulers while others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the “domestic” and the “political” kind of rule: unlike domestic rule, which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same good and, therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially “despotic,” **political rule is exercised over free persons who represent a plurality of interests** and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of consent among those who are ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers.

Racism is a historical reality underlying the federal ban on Pell Grants for prisoners. **Nielsen 12**[[6]](#footnote-6)

Drawing upon and extending Emile Durkheim’s communicative theory of penality, Joshua Page shows how popular narratives—including **racialized narratives**—disseminated via mass media and employed by politicians to further their own political interests **were key** factors **in** a “**legislative** penal **drama**” **whose purported happy ending was to deny Pell Grant funding to prisoners. In this** unfolding **drama, we find villains and heroes. Chief among the villains are** those **criminals whose social identity is** more or less **equated with** poor, **black males**—those **already incarcerated, as well as those** deemed **“on their way” by** virtue of **their skin color and** their **residing in a socially vilified space (for example, a ghetto).** Conversely, **the heroes are hard-working, white middle-class families,** otherwise **known as deserving citizens.** These two categories—the legitimate, deserving (white) citizen and the illegitimate, undeserving (black) criminal—are inextricably linked. To define one is to say what the other is not and vice versa.

As the drama plays out, the division between the two poles becomes increasingly rigid. **The criminal is understood as** being **so utterly unlike the citizen that the former no longer deserves** full citizenship or **basic rights** and liberties (even after serving his time). Given this dualistic framework, **federal funding for** the **postsecondary education of inmates can only be seen** as outrageous, **an affront to the hardworking citizen struggling to send his son or daughter to college.** Thus, an overly simplistic zero-sum game is pictured in which federal dollars granted to inmates for postsecondary education translates into dollars taken from qualified citizens on the other side of the prison walls. As Page observes, by framing Pell Grant funding in facile either/or terms and presenting the issue as battle between honorable, working class families and dishonorable, undeserving criminals, lawmakers not only “presented a clear-cut choice to their colleagues” but also obfuscated the social, political, penological, and economic consequences of denying Pell grants and thus funding for postsecondary correctional education (PSCE) to prisoners.[[2]](http://percaritatem.com/2012/12/26/the-unfolding-penal-drama-or-how-pell-grant-funding-for-postsecondary-correctional-education-for-was-lost/#_ftn2)

Thus the **plan**: The USFG ought to allow prisoners in the United States criminal justice system to receive Pell Grants. Funding through normal means. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until he checks in CX. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

Aff gets RVIs on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

Providing Pell Grants to prisoners challenges racism. It’s key to the social advancement of people of color. **Taylor 8**[[7]](#footnote-7)

According to USA Today editorial: Like it or not, college has become the new high school. This reality is why forward thinking educators and government officials are **looking for ways to ensure more** high school **graduates** go on to **get** associate, if not **bachelor**, **degrees**. That’s especially **[is] important for** poor and **minority students at risk of falling even further behind and becoming part of a permanent underclass."** On average state invest as much as ($24,000) supporting their students’ public school earned baccalaureates as they spend annually ($25,000) incarcerating their prisoners. The standard return on the states’ higher education investments are approximately $2 million in economic stimulus and $375,000 in state tax revenues during each graduate’s working lifetime. This return on investment in the prisoner-student becomes further manifest when factoring in all the socio-economic savings from significantly reduced criminal behaviors, coupled with the increased state and federal tax revenues, and the productive and consumptive economic stimulus generated by the more highly educated worker. Consider this positive economic outcome as opposed to the all-too-common disruptive anti-social actions and demand for revenue-draining social services that recidivistic offenders can create. With the primary goal of education and treatment programs to reduce crime, in one of the first assessments of prison college programs nearly thirty-five years ago this holistic benefit was summarized as: "Simply, and aside from humanitarian concerns – it is cheaper in the no-so-long run to pay (adequately) for effective anti-recidivism measures, than to finance law enforcement, justice administration, and penal services and apparatus." Or as J. Michael Quinlan, the former director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons during the Reagan and Bush Administrations so bluntly put it, "I recognize," the director explains, "that the cost of college is really very insignificant (i.e., 10% of a year of annual cost of incarceration alone) when you compare the cost and damage done by crime." \*In 1930, the rate of African-American incarcerations was three times that of Anglo-Americans. By 1990, that ratio had increased to five times the number of blacks to whites. In 1996, there were eight African-Americans to every Anglo-American incarcerated in proportion to the racial composition of the nation. At the end of the millennium, one-in-three black men aged 20-29 were under some form of correctional supervision. One of the effects of this focused criminal justice effort is that **by their thirties,** almost **twice as many black men will** have been **cycle**d **through the penal system as have received baccalaureates.** Charles Sullivan, the executive director of the public advocacy group Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE), claimed during the **exclusionary legislation** debate that it **"smacks of racism since the majority of the penal population is composed of minorities." and thus** Sullivan reasoned **minority groups had been clearly disproportionably affected by banning prisoners from** the **Pell Grant programs.** With more black males in prison than on college campuses, Sullivan wondered, as absurd as the concept was about having to go to prison to receive a college education, were we then going to close off that avenue as well? The answer is apparently yes. Across the country, the enrollment demographics of prison-college programs supported Sullivan’s contention. The composition of incarcerated collegiate student bodies generally mirrored the makeup of the penal populations. Thus once creating the most generally racially integrated university settings in the nation. Moreover, the racial composition that paid short-and-long term social dividends. Besides experiencing significantly reduced recidivism, these prisoner-students were some of the best behaved and also served as some of the few positive role models in a milieu normally bereft of such. Robert Powell, the assistant academic affairs officer at Shaw University observed in 1991, "**if you want to educate black men**, if you want **to reclaim that talent** out there, **you have to go into the prison.**" Ironically, Shaw University created its own prisoner-student fee-waiver scholarship program that was later negated by the state prison system, because it was in conflict with its’ policies prohibiting such inmate-exclusive funding programs.

The Plan is key to addressing the root cause of racism. Racism occurs when deficiencies in people of color are asserted to exist and social inequalities are created to make this alleged deficiency seem like reality. Promoting the talents and social advancement of people of color challenges their secondary status. **Rosado 98**[[8]](#footnote-8)

Racism emerged in the 16th century as a result of European expansionism and has persisted to the present as a socially constructed system of values to justify the evil of human exploitation for socioeconomic advantage. **Racism is** the **outward manifestation of** an inward system of **values deliberately designed to structure privilege** by means of an objective, differential, and unequal treatment of people, for the purpose of social advantage over scarce resources. This values system justifies power of position **by placing a negative meaning** and value **on perceived or actual biological**/**[and] cultural differences.** The key element in understanding racism is to focus on the undergirding values and beliefs system out of which racist action emerges. This deep-level values system gives biological differences, such as skin color, texture of the hair, physical features; or cultural differences, such as language, religion, ethnicity, or accent, a negative value and meaning. This negative meaning then legitimizes treating the other as inferior to oneself or one's group. The result is an objective (visible, measurable, tangible), differential (there is an obvious difference between groups), and unequal treatment (the difference in treatment is not the same), where one groups gets consistently short-changed. The working definition for both racism and sexism is the same. Both refer to evil perpetrated against others. The only difference is that in racism color is the excuse for oppression, while in sexism it is gender. But racism has nothing to do with color, just like sexism has nothing to do with sex or gender. **Biological differences are not the problem; they are merely the excuse for oppression.** No person of color has ever suffered discrimination because of the color of their skin. If color were the problem then the solution would be a change of skin color, an action which persons of color have often attempted, because of the wrong assumption that the problem was the color of their skin. Yet, the problem is not skin color, but value systems that perpetrate evil against others and then justify that evil by focusing on outward differences. These outward differences, such as color, gender, language, religion, are just that, differences. In and of themselves they contain no positive or negative value; there are merely biological or cultural necessities. Thus, there is nothing wrong with the color black, brown or yellow. **It is not skin color that forms** the basis for **discrimination, but the negative meaning** and value **given to the color of skin, which** meaning **is not inherent in the color nor the skin but in the culture.**1 Roger Bastide (1967) grasped this very well when he declared: "Color is neutral; it is the mind that gives it meaning." Neither are women discriminated against because of their gender. If gender were the problem then the solution would also be to have a sex-change operation. But the problem is not gender but value systems which benefit men at the expense of women and then justify the evil perpetrated by putting the blame on gender. Women are discriminated against because of the negative meaning and value given to their gender. It is not our gender or skin color that we have to change, but value systems of oppression that benefit some groups at the expense of others. **This whole process** is what William Ryan (1976) calls "blaming the victim" It is an ideological process that **justifies inequality by finding defects in the victims of inequality.** The logical outcome of analyzing social problems in terms of the deficiencies of the victim is a simple formula for action: Change the victim, rather than one's value system.

William I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas (1928), who are numbered among the founders of American sociology, enunciated a most important concept, "the definition of the situation"-the Thomas Theorem-also known as "the self-fulfilling prophecy." "If a situation is defined as real, it is real in its consequences." Thus how one defines a situation depends on how one perceives it. For example, the congestion in an elevator or crowded subway is called "intimacy" at a party. This theorem has far-reaching implications for an understanding of race relations as well as the role of women in society, for "all social reality is defined, [and] power comes from the ability to control the definition of situations" (Collins 1988). For example, if women are regarded as emotional, concerned only with domestic matters and immediate concerns, and incapable of achieving leadership positions because of a lack of leadership skills, the consequence is that they are not given adequate occupational opportunities. They end up being relegated to secondary roles, thereby making true in reality the definition enunciated. It also holds true in race relations. **If African Americans and Latinos are defined as lazy,** incompetent, **unintelligent, [and] culturally deficient** and lacking leadership skills, **they** too **will be relegated to a secondary status in society and not given the opportunity to advance**, resulting in consequences which are real **thereby justifying the original definition of their situation.**

**The meaning that people** therefore **give to their reality, whether or not true, causes people to behave in a manner that makes the original meaning actually come true.** Thus, a protrusion in my coat pocket, perceived to be a gun, enables me to order another person around just as effectively as if I really had a gun, provided of course that they believe I do.

Spills over to racism outside of the criminal justice system – generational cycle.

**Rosenberg 12**[[9]](#footnote-9)

Today, one in 100 adults is behind bars in America, and nearly 95 percent of them will eventually be released and return home. With a national recidivism rate of 67.5 percent, postsecondary education can help to ensure that they can be productive members of society instead of costly, dangerous, and unemployable social failures. Research shows that correctional education—especially at the postsecondary level— can increase post-release wages and reduce recidivism. While Pell grants may not cover the total cost of tuition, the funding provides an incentive for education institutions and organizations to serve the increasing prison population. **It’s past time to reinstate Pell grants for prisoners.** America’s focus on punishment at the expense of rehabilitation means increasing incarceration rates and costs. Over the past two decades, state correctional costs have quadrupled and now exceed $50 billion per year, consuming 1 in every 15 general fund dollars. Over the same time period, state spending on prisons has increased six times as much as higher education spending. In California, the situation is even worse. In his 2010 State of the State address, Governor Schwarzenegger warned that, “Thirty years ago, 10 percent of the general fund went to higher education and only 3 percent went to prisons. Today, almost 11 percent goes to prisons and only 7.5 percent goes to higher education. Spending 45 percent more on prisons than universities is no way to proceed into the future.” Unsurprisingly, the [incarceration epidemic](http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik?currentPage=all) does not affect all races equally. Young black men without a high school diploma are “[more likely to be in a cell than in a workplace](http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf?n=5996).” When kids drop out of school, it becomes much more difficult to find a steady job with a decent salary. Without the credentials for skilled employment, they are more likely to end up on the school-to-prison pipeline. The numbers are terrifying: [One in 12](http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf?n=5996) African American men and 1 in 36 Hispanic men are in prison or jail, while only 1 in 87 white men are serving time. As Adam Gopnik [writes](http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik?currentPage=all), “In truth, **there are more black men in the grip of the criminal-justice system**—in prison, on probation, or on parole—**than were in slavery.**” **Like slavery, incarceration has long-term implications for former prisoners’ families** and futures**.** [One in every 28 children](http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf?n=5996) in America has a parent in prison, up from one in 125 just 25 years ago. **Since**[**half of all male inmates**](http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf?n=5996)**were** the **primary financial support for their child, imprisonment has long-term consequences for** generations. These reverberating consequences are particularly damaging for **the African American community, where**[**1 in 9 children**](http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Economic_Mobility/Collateral%20Costs%20FINAL.pdf?n=5996)**have an incarcerated parent.**“Imprisonment does more than reflect the divides of race and class,” [writes](http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2007040600) Jason DeParle, a New York Times reporter. “It deepens these divides—walling off the disadvantaged, especially unskilled black men, from the promise of American life.”

Racism in the US is modeled globally. The Plan is key to reversing global racism. **Robinson 2k**[[10]](#footnote-10)

To many, the story may initially seem out of place because it is foreign. This is hardly the case. **The U**nited **S**tates **is so** unprecedentedly **powerful that** it can best be understood (even in its domestic race relations) when observed from without. **Those who run America** and benefit materially from its global hegemony **regard the world as one place. So, then, must those** around the globe who are **subject to America’s overwhelming** social and economic **influence. American racism is not merely a domestic** social **contaminant but a principal American export** as well. **The very notion of the nation-state has become little more than a convenient legal fiction** or hiding place for anonymous and rapacious interests.

Our racist culture must be challenged to prevent extinction. **Barndt 91**[[11]](#footnote-11)

To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; **the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison will inevitably destroy us as well.** But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. **We are not condemned to an inexorable fate**, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. **Brick by brick, stone by stone,** the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural **racism can be destroyed.** You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger of self-destruction seems to be drawing ever more near. **The result**s **of centuries of** national and **worldwide conquest and colonization,** of **military buildups and violent aggression,** of overconsumption **and environmental destruction may** be **reach**ing **the point of no return.** **A small** and predominantly **white minority** of global population **derives its power** and privilege **from suffering**s **of** the vast majority of **peoples of color. For the sake of the world** and ourselves, **we dare not allow it to continue.**

Representations of imminent nuclear war are premised upon a racialized nationalist framing of the world. Endorsement of this genocidal logic is self-defeating and reinscribes imperial violence. **Williams 11** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

In this study, nuclear **representations** are defined as depictions **of** the following subjects: (1) the invention and use of the first atomic bombs; (2) nuclear weapons testing stockpiling of the Cold War superpowers; and (3) **nuclear war** (often referred to as World War Three) and life after such a cataclysm. Nuclear technology **has been the subject of narratives of racial and national belonging and exclusion** undoubtedly **because its emergence (and deployment against Japan) was read** by some commentators **as an act of genocidal racist violence**, and by some as the apex of Western civilization’s scientific achievement. These opposing perspectives are interpretative poles that have been central to nuclear representations. By posing white moral and technological superiority against the destructive technology it supposedly invented, cultural producers have cited nuclear weapons as evidence against white Anglo-Saxon supremacism. From this point of view, the scientific achievement of splitting the atom does not reveal white superiority; instead, the enormity of nuclear weapons reminds one that **the technology first created by the white world imperils the whole Earth**. Through a range of media, from novels to poetry, short stories to film, comics to oratory, the **terms that modern European imperialism depended upon – ‘civilization, ‘race’, and ‘nation’, in particular** – often **recur in nuclear representations**. Some of these representations, emerging when Europe’s empires were relinquishing direct control of their colonies, share the uncertainty that beset the colonial powers following the uneven and often violent decolonizing preocess. The historical congruence of nuclear representations and decolonization intimates the importance of this context to future visions of World war Three: tropes of genocide, technological and scientific modernity, and the (re)population of the planet are relevant to this apocalyptic subgenre of SF as well as being recurrent elements in colonial history. Several of the **nuclear representations** discussed **reproduce the justifications of the modern imperial project**. But an alternative tradition makes these justifications visible and demonstrates their corrosive, lingering presence in contemporary culture through the depiction of nuclear technology and its possible consequences. Significantly, **the idea that nuclear weapons are used to buttress a racial order that privileges whiteness** – an idea that prohibits non-white peoples from accessing such technology – **remains a potent current running from 1945 until the present day.**

Engaging the state is key. Policy proposals are key to challenging institutional racism.

**Margalit and Sunstein 01**[[13]](#footnote-13)

**The disadvantaged**, or at least those inclined to act within that group, would like the law to solve their free-rider problem. They **will** also **want the law to recognize the normative weight of their claim**, to reduce inequality to some degree, and to fuel the view that the inequality of the status quo, or the equality-denying practice to which they object, is a form of injustice. If the law carries moral authority, successful legal reform is liable to turn their struggle from a mere assertion of interest to a push for change that is perceived as just. Under the right conditions, legal support can increase the likelihood that the threat to upset existing arrangements will appear something other than a spiteful and irrational move against self-interest. **If the law is on their side, then their struggle will** likely **be ennobled: legal sanction can make their action appear not for personal gain but in order to vindicate principle.** Consider the frequent plea of Martin Luther King, Jr.: "All we are saying to America is, be true to what you said on paper." [41](http://muse.jhu.edu.shs-13.scarsdaleschools.k12.ny.us:2048/journals/philosophy_and_public_affairs/v030/30.4ullmann_margalit.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT41) But what might law do? The most obvious possibility is to outlaw a practice that contributes to inequality, not only providing sanctions against those who engage in that practice, but also emboldening those who act against that practice. Consider **civil rights laws banning** private **discrimination in employment**. The effects of these laws **go** well **beyond** their (comparatively rare) **legal enforcement**, whether public or private**.** If promotions and transfers are not allowed to reflect racial discrimination, **people** are more likely to **object to discriminatory practices, merely because of the legal prohibition.**[42](http://muse.jhu.edu.shs-13.scarsdaleschools.k12.ny.us:2048/journals/philosophy_and_public_affairs/v030/30.4ullmann_margalit.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT42) These objections in turn have effects on behavior. By publicly advertising and affirming the rightness of the new convention, the law can increase the perception that an existing practice is unjust, add momentum to private indignation, and provide a focal point around which players can rally and affirm their commitment to change.

**Plan focus is good** for education because:

(a) Plans increase depth of education because we can focus on one specific issue each round instead of touching briefly on each aspect of the topic.

Depth is better than breadth. If we go in-depth on a *different* issue each round, then we’ll get a breadth of info any way, but if we spread ourselves thin discussing a breadth of issues each round, we’ll never have an in-depth discussion of the topic.

(b) Plans are key to incentivize continued research. If the same stock arguments are going to apply every round, there’s no incentive to do new work.

(c) Education for prisoners is uniquely key to topic education. It is the core of the topic. **Chlup 5**[[14]](#footnote-14)

The amount and type of education offered in corrections seem to change depending on the approach and philosophy to corrections that are dominant at the time. Historic links between prison reform and corrections education show that **when a punitive approach** (“lock them up and throw away the key”) **is ascendant, education**al programming **is de-emphasized. Instead inmates** may **spend** 17 **hours a day locked in their cells**, with one hour a day outside for exercise (Prison Activist Resource Center, retrieved May 16, 2004). At present, this approach is followed by several correctional institutions. **This** model **differs from a rehabilitative approach** in **which** sentencing is viewed as the punishment and time spent in correctional institutions **focuses on** rehabilitation, counseling, overcoming addictions, **acquiring vocational skills, and academic learning.** Earlier reformatory models sought to take a Progressive Era, rehabilitative approach (Gehring, 1995).

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat United States policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 08** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

Err Aff on theory. Negs won 8% more prelims at Colleyville two weeks ago according to Joy of Tournaments. Give me leeway to compensate for side bias.

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