Only constitutivism provides an internal standard of success which solves infinite regress.

Katsafanas Paul (Boston University) “Constitutivism about practical reasons” March 6th 2014 JW 12/31/14

Normative claims make demands on us: they tell us which actions to perform and which to avoid. But what justifies this authority? Put differently, if a skeptic asks why he should accept of the form “you have reason to φ,” what can we say to him? Constitutivism has an easy way of answering this question: insofar as you are committed to an activity with constitutive standards, you are committed to those standards. For example, a person who is playing chess has a good reason to govern her activities with the standard of achieving checkmate: if she doesn’t, she won’t be playing chess. To see why this is important, it helps to contrast standards generated by constitutive aims with other types of standards. Consider a normative claim such as “you should obey the posted speed limit.” Suppose someone asks why he should conform to this standard. Of course, there are answers to this question—we can invoke the financial penalties that the exceeding the speed limit may produce, the danger to the other drivers created by excessive speeds, respect for the law, and so on. But notice that these answers invoke external standards. The standards apply because obeying the speed limit is related to other activities, goals, and practices that the agent accepts or cares about. The standard of checkmate doesn’t need to rely on these external features: we can answer the question “why should I care about capturing your queen?” simply by referring to the activity’s constitutive aim. Thus, the chess player should care about capturing the queen because if she doesn’t govern herself by the standard of achieving checkmate, she won’t be playing chess. So this is the second intriguing feature of constitutive standards: they are internal to the activities that they regulate. Accordingly, we need not invoke external facts in order to legitimate their claim to authority.15

The constitutive aim of action is the will to power.

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I argue that action has two constitutive aims: (1) agential activity, which I analyze as requiring stable approval of one’s action given complete information about its etiology, and (2) encountering and overcoming resistance to one’s ends. My account begins with a defense of the idea that there is a distinction between actions that spring from our own activity and actions that are brought about in a more passive fashion. Consider the difference between deliberately spurning someone and being led, by unrecognized feelings of anxiety, to avoid someone; arguably, the former case displays a kind of agential activity that is absent in the latter case. This is just one example, but there are many cases of this form.8 Drawing on considerations about the nature of motivation and deliberation, I argue: 1. An agent is active in the production of her action iff (a) the agent approves of her action and (b) further knowledge of the motives figuring in the etiology of this action would not undermine her approval of her action. Employing a roughly Kantian argument about the nature of assuming our freedom from the practical standpoint, I argue that agents are committed to aiming at agential activity in every episode of reflective (or self-conscious) action, and part of what it is to for an action to be reflective is for it to have this aim. It follows that agential activity is the constitutive aim of reflective action. On its own, this aim generates very little normative content. After all, it says nothing about the basis of the agent’s approval of her action. However, I argue that if we investigate the structure of human motivation, we can uncover a second constitutive aim that provides more substance to the theory. Drawing on some insights from Nietzsche’s analyses of human motivation, I argue that each episode of action aims not only at achieving some end, but also at encountering and overcoming obstacles or resistances in the pursuit of this end. For example, I aim not merely at writing this paper, but at writing it in a way that engenders difficulties to overcome. Although initially counterintuitive, I show that this account is supported by empirical and philosophical considerations about the nature of human motivation. In particular, Nietzsche’s account of agency is based on the idea that our actions are motivated by a distinctive kind of psychological state: the drive. Drives admit an aim/object distinction, where the aim is a characteristic form of activity and the object is a chance occasion for expression. For example, the sex drive aims at sexual activity, and might take as its temporary object a particular person. As the drive’s objects are adventitious, there is there is no object the attainment of which completes or satisfies the drive. Rather than disposing us to acquire their objects, then, drives simply lead us to engage in their characteristic form of activity. Elsewhere, I argue that this fact about drives entails that all drive-motivated actions share a common, higher-order aim of encountering and overcoming resistance. For part of what it is to be motivated by a drive—to manifest a drive’s activity—is continuously to seek new objects on which to direct the drive’s activity. In seeking new objects, we seek new resistances. In virtue of being motivated by drives, then, we seek continuous encountering and overcoming of resistance, rather than the attainment of definite states. Nietzsche describes this fact about our aims by saying that we manifest “the will to power.”

Thus, the standard is consistency with the will to power. I contend a living wage is inconsistent.

First, the resolution forces people to pay a given amount-decreasing their ability to have power because they must give some of it to people who are lesser than them-they have to help weak people so they cannot exert power over them. Moreover this entrenches the weakness of the poor since they are framed in a weak way so they are prevented from becoming strong at all.

Second, the will to power rejects state action-it involves a state of anarchy where individuals reject the state from influencing their lives.

Jenkins Martin Jenkins “Aristocratic Radicalism or Anarchy? An examination of Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Will to Power” 2010

Mastery is by definition and action, a stasis. As a stasis, it is not a becoming or Overcoming. A more appropriate candidate for the overcoming nature of Will to Power is Growth as identified in third section. Life is Will to Power and Life imminently overcomes itself to grow. A corollary of this is life organizing itself in pyramidic structures. Here the strongest instantiation of Will to Power overcomes lesser ones and exploits them for its own interests by incorporating them. In this manner and trajectory, the strongest continues to grow. Politically and socially, this entails Aristocratic Radicalism. Again **a pyramidic social structure** apparently based on 'might is right' **will follow contrary to the egalitarianism of 'Modern Ideas'** which coincidentally or not, Nietzsche vehemently opposed. Furthermore, this lends itself to Fascistic and authoritarian interpretations of Nietzschean Philosophy; interpretations which had been argued against for by scholars intending to rehabilitate Nietzsche after the end of the Second World War. However, the Aristocratic Radicalist position is somewhat undermined by remaining faithful to the description of Will to Power as espoused by Nietzsche himself and examined in the final section. This description holds that it is constituted by overcoming. As such, a stasis -- whether in **the** Metaphysical Christian weltanshaaung or in fixed, hierarchical social structures of Aristocratic Radicalism -- will be at most unlikely or at least, subject to permanent challenges. For it must be remembered that **Will to Power is overcoming and therefore overcomes its previous instantiations**. **This** 'becoming' can justify situations antithetical to Aristocratic Radicalism. For William Connolly, it **can underpin agonistic liberalism where various instantiations of Will to Power contest others for democratic hegemony and where the existing political-social structures and values are overcome at various levels, by the creativity of growing life**. It can also underpin a post-humanist Anarchism. Basing itself on the insights of Gilles Deleuze, this philosophy maintains that **social structures, identities, values, themselves instantiations of a now reactive Will to Power, can be contested by alternative ones inspired by active instantiations of Will to Power**. This is, what Max Stirner would term a permanent process of insurrection against 'What is' and not the singular event of 'the Revolution'. It's success is not guaranteed by teleology and it is mostly specific. **It occurs at** what Deleuze and Michel Foucault would call **'the microlevel'. These specific instances can connect with others to create larger macro alliances, but these are contingent and not necessitated by historicism**. This is precisely the philosophy of Post-Humanistic Anarchism. **This continually and immanently challenges existing social structures, practices, identities and values with alternatives**. This is not to dismiss the possibilities of Aristocratic Radicalism. History and events demonstrate that it does and can occur. It is however, **within the possibilities of Life**, as **Will to Power**, to **overcome and contest** it.