## 1AC

### ROTB

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the simulated consequences of the topical aff policy. Prefer this

#### 1. The state is inevitable- speaking the language of power through policymaking is the only way to create social change in debate.

Coverstone 5 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 JW 11/18/15

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

#### 2. Fairness. Anything else moots 6 minutes of 1ac offense – restarts the 1ar. They get a 13-7 minute advantage which means we have worse discussion, even if the subject of discussion is slightly better.

#### Unfairness denies effective dialogue on kritikal issues.

Galloway 7 Ryan Galloway, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

#### AND: critique is useless without a concrete policy option that solves for your harms.

Bryant 12 Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College) “A Critique of the Academic Left” 2012 <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/> JW

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignor[es]ing how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express [critiques] them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.

#### Excessive focus on discourse and representations kills liberalism.

Chait 15 Jonathan Chait “How the language police are perverting liberalism.” NY Magazine January 275h 2015 <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html> JW

Or maybe not. The p.c. style of politics has one serious, possibly fatal drawback: It is exhausting. Claims of victimhood that are useful within the left-wing subculture may alienate much of America. The movement’s dour puritanism can move people to outrage, but it may [and] prove ill suited to the hopeful mood required of mass politics. Nor does it bode well for the movement’s longevity that many of its allies are worn out. “It seems to me now that the public face of social liberalism has ceased to seem positive, joyful, human, and freeing,” confessed the progressive writer Freddie deBoer. “There are so many ways to step on a land mine now, so many terms that have become forbidden, so many attitudes that will get you cast out if you even appear to hold them. I’m far from alone in feeling that it’s typically not worth it to engage, given the risks.” Goldberg wrote recently about people “who feel emotionally savaged by their involvement in [online feminism] — not because of sexist trolls, but because of the slashing righteousness of other feminists.” Former Feministing editor Samhita Mukhopadhyay told her, “Everyone is so scared to speak right now.” That the new political correctness has bludgeoned even many of its own supporters into despondent silence is a triumph, but one of limited use. Politics in a democracy is still based on getting people to agree with you, not making them afraid to disagree. The historical record of political movements that sought to expand freedom for the oppressed by eliminating it for their enemies is dismal. The historical record of American liberalism, which has extended social freedoms to blacks, Jews, gays, and women, is glorious. And that glory rests in its confidence in the ultimate power of reason, not coercion, to triumph.

### Framework

#### Phenomenal introspection is reliable and proves that util’s true.

Sinhababu Neil (National University of Singapore) “The epistemic argument for hedonism” [http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3 accessed 2-4-16](http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3%20accessed%202-4-16) JW

The Odyssey's treatment of these events demonstrates how dramatically ancient Greek moral intuitions differ from ours. It doesn't dwell on the brutality of Telemachus, who killed twelve women for the trivial reasons he states, making them suffer as they die. While gods and men seek vengeance for other great and small offenses in the Odyssey, no one finds this mass murder worth avenging. It's a minor event in the denouement to a happy ending in which Odysseus (who first proposes killing the women) returns home and Telemachus becomes a man. That the[y] Greeks could so easily regard these murders as part of a happy ending for heroes shows how deeply we disagree with them. It's as if we gave them a trolley problem with the 12 women on the side track and no one on the main track, and they judged it permissible for Telemachus to turn the trolley and kill them all. And this isn't some esoteric text of a despised or short-lived sect, but a central literary work of a long-lived and influential culture. Human history offers similarly striking examples of disagreement on a variety of topics. These include sexual morality; the treatment of animals; the treatment of other ethnicities, families, and social classes; the consumption of intoxicating substances; whether and how one may take vengeance; slavery; whether public celebrations are acceptable; and gender roles.12 Moral obligations to commit genocide were accepted not only by some 20th century Germans, but by much of the ancient world, including the culture that gave us the Old Testament. One can only view the human past and much of the present with horror at the depth of human moral error and the harm that has resulted. One might think to explain away much of this disagreement as the result of differing nonmoral beliefs. Those who disagree about nonmoral issues may disagree on the moral rightness of a particular action despite agreeing on the fundamental moral issues. For example, they may agree that healing the sick is right, but disagree about whether a particular medicine will heal or harm. This disagreement about whether to prescribe the medicine won't be fundamentally about morality, and won't support the argument from disagreement. I don't think the moral disagreements listed above are explained by differences in nonmoral belief. This isn't because sexists, racists, and bigots share the nonmoral views of those enlightened by feminism and other egalitarian doctrines – they don't. Rather, their differing views on nonmoral topics often are rationalizations of moral beliefs that fundamentally disagree with ours.13 Those whose fundamental moral judgments include commitments to the authority of men over women, or of one race over another, will easily accept descriptive psychological views that attribute less intelligence or rationality to women or the subjugated race.14 Moral disagreement supposedly arising from moral views in religious texts is similar. Given how rich and many-stranded most religious texts are, interpretive claims about their moral teachings often tell us more about the antecedent moral beliefs of the interpreter than about the text itself. This is why the same texts are interpreted to support so many different moral views. Similar phenomena occur with most moral beliefs. Environmentalists who value a lovely patch of wilderness will easily believe that its destruction will cause disaster, those who feel justified in eating meat will easily believe that the animals they eat don't suffer greatly, and libertarians who feel that redistributing wealth is unjust will easily believe that it raises unemployment. We shouldn't assume that differing moral beliefs on practical questions are caused by fundamental moral agreement combined with differing nonmoral beliefs. Often the differing nonmoral beliefs are caused by fundamental moral disagreement. As we have no precise way of quantifying the breadth of disagreement or determining its epistemic consequences, it's unclear exactly how much disagreement the argument requires. While this makes the argument difficult to evaluate, it shouldn't stop us from proceeding, as we have to use the unclear notion of widespread disagreement in ordinary epistemic practice. If 99.9% of botanists agree on some issue about plants, non-botanists should defer to their authority and believe as most of them do. But if disagreement between botanists is suitably widespread, non-botanists should remain agnostic. A more precise and systematic account of when disagreement is widespread enough to generate particular epistemic consequences would be very helpful. Until we have one, we must employ the unclear notion of widespread disagreement, or some similar notion, throughout epistemic practice. Against the background of widespread moral disagreement, there may still be universal or near-universal agreement on some moral questions. For example, perhaps all cultures agree that one should provide for one’s elderly parents, even though they generally disagree elsewhere. How do these narrow areas of moral agreement affect the argument? This all depends on whether the narrow agreement is reliably or unreliably caused. If narrow agreement results from a reliable process of belief-formation, it lets us avoid error, defeating the argument from disagreement. But widely accepted moral beliefs may result from widely prevailing unreliable processes leading everyone to the same errors. There's no special pressure to explain agreement in terms of reliable processes when disagreement is widespread. Explaining agreement in terms of reliable processes is preferable when we have some reason to think that the processes involved are generally reliable. Then we would want to understand cases of agreement in line with the general reliability of processes producing moral belief. But if disagreement is widespread, error is too. Since moral beliefs are so often false, invoking unreliable processes to explain them is better than invoking reliable ones. The next two sections discuss this in more detail. We have many plausible explanations of narrow agreement on which moral beliefs are unreliably caused. Evolutionary and sociological explanations of why particular moral beliefs are widely accepted often invoke unreliable mechanisms.15 On these explanations, we agree because some moral beliefs were so important for reproductive fitness that natural selection made them innate in us, or so important to the interests controlling moral education in each culture that they were inculcated in everyone. For example, parents' influence over their children's moral education would explain agreement that one should provide for one's elderly parents. Plausible normative ethical theories won't systematically connect these evolutionary and sociological explanations with moral facts. If disagreement and error are widespread, they'll provide useful ways to reconcile unusual cases of widespread agreement with the general unreliability of the processes producing moral belief. 1.3 If there is widespread error about a topic, we should retain only those beliefs about it formed through reliable processes Now I'll defend 3. First I'll show how the falsity of others' beliefs undermines one's own belief. Then I'll clarify the notion of a reliable process. I'll consider a modification to 3 that epistemic internalists might favor, and show that the argument accommodates it. I'll illustrate 3's plausibility by considering cases where it correctly guides our reasoning. Finally, I'll show how 3 is grounded in the intuitive response to grave moral error. First, a simple objection: “Why should I care whether other people have false beliefs? That's a fact about other people, and not about me. Even if most people are wrong about some topic, I may be one of the few right ones, even if there's no apparent reason to think that my way of forming beliefs is any more reliable.” While widespread error leaves open the possibility that one has true beliefs, it reduces the probability that my beliefs are true. Consider a parallel case. I have no direct evidence that I have an appendix, but I know that previous investigations have revealed appendixes in people. So induction suggests that I have an appendix. Similarly, I know on the basis of 1 and 2 that people's moral beliefs are, in general, rife with error. So even if I have no direct evidence of error in my moral beliefs, induction suggests that they are rife with error as well. 3 invokes the reliability of the processes that produce our beliefs. Assessing processes of belief-formation for reliability is an important part of our epistemic practices. If someone tells me that my belief is entirely produced by wishful thinking, I can't simply accept that and maintain the belief. Knowing that wishful thinking is unreliable, I must either deny that my belief is entirely caused by wishful thinking or abandon the belief. But if someone tells me that my belief is entirely the result of visual perception, I'll maintain it, assuming that it concerns sizable nearby objects or something else about which visual perception is reliable. While providing precise criteria for individuating processes of belief-formation is hard, as the literature on the generality problem for reliabilism attests, individuating them somehow is indispensable to our epistemic practices.16 Following Alvin Goldman's remark that “It is clear that our ordinary thought about process types slices them broadly” (346), I'll treat cognitive process types like wishful thinking and visual perception as appropriately broad.17 Trusting particular people and texts, meanwhile, are too narrow. Cognitive science may eventually help us better individuate cognitive process types for the purposes of reliability assessments and discover which processes produce which beliefs. Epistemic internalists might reject 3 as stated, claiming that it isn't widespread error that would justify giving up our beliefs, but our having reason to believe that there is widespread error. They might also claim that our justification for believing the outputs of some process depends not on its reliability, but on what we have reason to believe about its reliability. The argument will still go forward if 3 is modified to suit internalist tastes, changing its antecedent to “If we have reason to believe that there is widespread error about a topic” or changing its consequent to “we should retain only those beliefs about it that we have reason to believe were formed through reliable processes.” While 3's antecedent might itself seem unnecessary on the original formulation, it's required for 3 to remain plausible on the internalist modification. Requiring us to have reason to believe that any of our belief-formation processes are reliable before retaining their outputs might lead to skepticism. The antecedent limits the scope of the requirement to cases of widespread error, averting general skeptical conclusions. The argument will still attain its conclusion under these modifications. Successfully defending the premises of the argument and deriving widespread error (5) and unreliability (7) gives those of us who have heard the defense and derivation reason to believe 5 and 7. This allows us to derive 8. (Thus the pronoun 'we' in 3, 6, and 8.) 3 describes the right response to widespread error in many actual cases. Someone in the 12th century, especially upon hearing the disagreeing views of many cultures regarding the origins of the universe, would do well to recognize that error on this topic was widespread and retreat to agnosticism about it. Only when modern astrophysics extended reliable empirical methods to cosmology would it be rational to move forward from agnosticism and accept a particular account of how the universe began. Similarly, disagreement about which stocks will perform better than average is widespread among investors, suggesting that one's beliefs on the matter have a high likelihood of error. It's wise to remain agnostic about the stock market without an unusually reliable way of forming beliefs – for example, the sort of secret insider information that it's illegal to trade on. 3 permits us to hold onto our moral beliefs in individual cases of moral disagreement, suggesting skeptical conclusions only when moral disagreement is widespread. When we consider a single culture's abhorrent moral views, like the Greeks' acceptance of Telemachus and Odysseus' murders of the servant women, we don't think that maybe the Greeks were right to see nothing wrong and we should reconsider our outrage. Instead, we're horrified by their grave moral error. I think this is the right response. We're similarly horrified by the moral errors of Hindus who burned widows on their husbands' funeral pyres, American Southerners who supported slavery and segregation, our contemporaries who condemn homosexuality, and countless others. The sheer number of cases like this requires us to regard moral error as a pervasive feature of the human condition. Humans typically form moral beliefs through unreliable processes and have appendixes. We are humans, so this should reduce our confidence in our moral judgments. The prevalence of error in a world full of moral disagreement demonstrates how bad humans are at forming true moral beliefs, undermining our own moral beliefs. Knowing that unreliable processes so often lead humans to their moral beliefs, we'll require our moral beliefs to issue from reliable processes. 1.4 If there is widespread error about morality, there are no reliable processes for forming moral beliefs A reliable process for forming moral beliefs would avert skeptical conclusions. I'll consider several processes and argue that they don't help us escape moral skepticism. Ordinary moral intuition, whether it involves a special rational faculty or our emotional responses, is shown to be unreliable by the existence of widespread error. The argument from disagreement either prevents reflective equilibrium from generating moral conclusions or undermines it. Conceptual analysis is reliable, but delivers the wrong kind of knowledge to avert skepticism. If all our processes for forming moral beliefs are unreliable, moral skepticism looms. 4 is false only because of one process – phenomenal introspection, which lets us know of the goodness of pleasure, as the second half of this paper will discuss. Widespread error guarantees the unreliability of any process by which we form all or almost all of our moral beliefs. While widespread error allows some processes responsible for a small share of our moral beliefs to predominantly create true beliefs, it implies that any process generating a very large share of moral belief must be highly error-prone. Since the process produced so many of our moral beliefs, and so many of them are erroneous, it must be responsible for a large share of the error. If more of people's moral beliefs were true, things would be otherwise. Widespread truth would support the reliability of any process that produced most or all of our moral beliefs, since that process would be responsible for so much true belief. But given widespread error, ordinary moral intuition must be unreliable. This point provides a forceful response to Moorean opponents who insist that we can't give up the reliability of a process by which we form all or nearly all of our beliefs on an important topic, since this would permit counterintuitive skeptical conclusions. Even if this Moorean response helps against external world skeptics who employ counterfactual thought experiments involving brains in vats, it doesn't help against moral skeptics who use 1 and 2 to derive widespread actual error. Once we accept that widespread error actually obtains, a great deal of human moral knowledge has already vanished. Insisting on the reliability of the process then seems implausible and pointless. I'll briefly consider two conceptions of moral intuition – as a special rational faculty by which we grasp non-natural moral facts, and as a process by which our emotions lead us to form moral beliefs – and show how widespread error guarantees their unreliability. Some philosophers regard moral intuition as involving a special rational faculty that lets us know non-natural moral facts.18 They argue that knowledge on many topics including mathematics, logic, and modality involves this rational faculty, so moral knowledge might operate similarly. This suggests a way for them to defend the reliability of moral intuition in the face of widespread error: if intuition is reliable about these other things, its overall reliability across moral and nonmoral areas allows us to reliably form moral beliefs by using it. This defense won't work. When an epistemic process is manifestly unreliable on some topic, as widespread error shows any process responsible for most of our moral beliefs to be, the reliability of that process elsewhere won't save it on that topic. Even if testimony is reliable, this doesn't imply the reliability of compulsive gamblers' testimony about the next spin of the roulette wheel. Even if intuition remains reliable elsewhere, widespread disagreement still renders it unreliable in ethics. I see ordinary moral intuition as a process of emotional perception in which our feelings cause us to form moral beliefs.19 Just as visual experiences of color cause beliefs about the colors of surfaces, emotional experiences cause moral beliefs. Pleasant feelings like approval, admiration, or hope in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are right, virtuous or good. Unpleasant emotions like guilt, disgust, or horror in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are wrong, vicious, or bad. We might have regarded this as a reliable way to know about moral facts, just as visual perception is a reliable way to know about color, if not for widespread error. But because of widespread error, we can only see it as an unreliable process responsible for our dismal epistemic situation. Reflective equilibrium is the prevailing methodology in normative ethics today. It involves modifying our beliefs about particular cases and general principles to make them cohere. Whether or not nonmoral propositions like the premises of the argument from disagreement are admissible in reflective equilibrium, widespread error prevents reflective equilibrium from reliably generating a true moral theory, as I'll explain. If the premises of the argument from disagreement are admitted into reflective equilibrium, the argument can be reconstructed there, and reflective equilibrium will dictate that we give up all of our moral beliefs. To avoid this conclusion, the premises of the argument from disagreement would have to be revised away on moral grounds. These premises are a metaethical claim about the objectivity of morality which seems to be a conceptual truth, an anthropological claim about the existence of disagreement, a very general epistemic claim about when we should revise our beliefs, and a more empirically grounded epistemic claim about our processes of belief-formation and their reliability. While reflective equilibrium may move us to revise substantive moral beliefs in view of other substantive moral beliefs, claims of these other kinds are less amenable to such revision. Unless ambitious arguments for revising these nonmoral claims away succeed, we must follow the argument to its conclusion and accept that reflective equilibrium makes moral skeptics of us.20 If only moral principles and judgments are considered in reflective equilibrium, it won't make moral skeptics of us, but the argument from disagreement will undermine its conclusions. The argument forces us to give up the pre-existing moral beliefs against which we test various moral propositions in reflective equilibrium. While we may be justified in believing something because it coheres with our other beliefs, this justification goes away once we see that those beliefs should be abandoned. Coherence with beliefs that we know we should give up doesn't confer justification. Now I'll consider conceptual analysis. It can produce moral beliefs about conceptual truths – for example, that the moral supervenes on the nonmoral, and that morality is objective. It also may provide judgments about relations between different moral concepts – perhaps, that if the only moral difference between two actions is that one would produce morally better consequences than the other, doing what produces better consequences is right. I regard conceptual analysis as reliable, so that the argument from disagreement does not force us to give up the beliefs about morality it produces. Unfortunately, if analytic naturalism is false, as has been widely held in metaethics since G. E. Moore, conceptual analysis won't provide all the knowledge we need to build a normative ethical theory.21 Even when it relates moral concepts like goodness and rightness to each other, it doesn't tell us that anything is good or right to begin with. That's the knowledge we need to avoid moral skepticism. So far I've argued that our epistemic and anthropological situation, combined with plausible metaethical and epistemic principles, forces us to abandon our moral beliefs. But if a reliable process of moral belief-formation exists, 4 is false, and we can answer the moral skeptic. The rest of this paper discusses the only reliable process I know of. 2.1 Phenomenal introspection reveals pleasure's goodness Phenomenal introspection, a reliable way of forming true beliefs about our experiences, produces the belief that pleasure is good. Even as our other processes of moral belief-formation prove unreliable, it provides reliable access to pleasure's goodness, justifying the positive claims of hedonism. This section clarifies what phenomenal introspection and pleasure are and explains how phenomenal introspection provides reliable access to pleasure's value. Section 2.2 argues that pleasure's goodness is genuine moral value, rather than value of some other kind. In phenomenal introspection we consider our subjective experience, or phenomenology, and determine what it's like. Phenomenal introspection can be reliable while dreaming or hallucinating, as long as we can determine what the dreams or hallucinations are like. By itself, phenomenal introspection doesn't produce beliefs about things outside experience, or about relations between our experiences and non-experiential things. So it doesn't produce judgments about the rightness of actions or the goodness of non-experiential things. It can only tell us about the intrinsic properties of experience itself. Phenomenal introspection is generally reliable, even if mistakes about immediate experience are possible. Experience is rich in detail, so one could get some of the details wrong in belief. Under adverse conditions involving false expectations, misleading evidence about what one's experiences will be, or extreme emotional states that disrupt belief-formation, larger errors are possible. Paradigmatically reliable processes like vision share these failings. Vision sometimes produces false beliefs under adverse conditions, or when we're looking at complex things. Still, it's so reliable as to be indispensible in ordinary life. Regarding phenomenal introspection as unreliable is about as radical as skepticism about the reliability of vision. While contemporary psychologists reject introspection into one's motivations and other psychological causal processes as unreliable, phenomenal introspection fares better. Daniel Kahneman, for example, writes that “experienced utility is best measured by moment-based methods that assess the experience of the present.”22 Even those most skeptical about the reliability of phenomenal introspection, like Eric Schwitzgebel, concede that we can reliably introspect whether we are in serious pain.23 Then we should be able to introspectively determine what pain is like. So I'll assume the reliability of phenomenal introspection. One can form a variety of beliefs using phenomenal introspection. For example, one can believe that one is having sound experiences of particular noises and visual experiences of different shades of color. When looking at a lemon and considering the phenomenal states that are yellow experiences, one can form some beliefs about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're bright experiences. And when considering experiences of pleasure, one can make some judgments about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're good experiences. Just as one can look inward at one's experience of lemon yellow and recognize its brightness, one can look inward at one's experience of pleasure and recognize its goodness.24 When I consider a situation of increasing pleasure, I can form the belief that things are better than they were before, just as I form the belief that there's more brightness in my visual field as lemon yellow replaces black. And when I suddenly experience pain, I can form the belief that things are worse in my experience than they were before. Having pleasure consists in one's experience having a positive hedonic tone. Without descending into metaphor, it's hard to give a further account of what pleasure is like than to say that when one has it, one feels good. As Aaron Smuts writes in defending the view of pleasure as hedonic tone, “to 'feel good' is about as close to an experiential primitive as we get.” 25 Fred Feldman sees pleasure as fundamentally an attitude rather than a hedonic tone.26 But as long as hedonic tones are real components of experience, phenomenal introspection will reveal pleasure's goodness. Opponents of the hedonic tone account of pleasure usually concede that hedonic tones exist, as Feldman seems to in discussing “sensory pleasures,” which he thinks his view helps us understand. Even on his view of pleasure, phenomenal introspection can produce the belief that some hedonic tones are good while others are bad. There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences. There are sensory pleasures, like the pleasure of tasting delicious food, receiving a massage, or resting your tired limbs in a soft bed after a hard day. There are the pleasures of seeing that our desires are satisfied, like the pleasure of winning a game, getting a promotion, or seeing a friend succeed. These experiences differ in many ways, just as the experiences of looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day differ. It's easy to see the appeal of Feldman's view that pleasures “have just about nothing in common phenomenologically” (79). But just as our experiences in looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day have brightness in common, pleasant experiences all have “a certain common quality – feeling good,” as Roger Crisp argues (109).27 As the analogy with brightness suggests, hedonic tone is phenomenologically very thin, and usually mixed with a variety of other experiences.28 Pleasure of any kind feels good, and displeasure of any kind feels bad. These feelings may or may not have bodily location or be combined with other sensory states like warmth or pressure. “Pleasure” and “displeasure” mean these thin phenomenal states of feeling good and feeling bad. As Joseph Mendola writes, “the pleasantness of physical pleasure is a kind of hedonic value, a single homogenous sensory property, differing merely in intensity as well as in extent and duration, which is yet a kind of goodness” (442).29 What if Feldman is right and hedonic states feel good in fundamentally different ways? Then phenomenal introspection suggests a pluralist variety of hedonism. Each fundamental flavor of pleasure will have a fundamentally different kind of goodness, as phenomenal introspection more accurate than mine will reveal. This isn't my view, but I suggest it to those convinced that hedonic tones are fundamentally heterogenous. If phenomenal introspection reliably informs us that pleasure is good, how can anyone believe that their pleasures are bad? Other processes of moral belief-formation are responsible for these beliefs. Someone who feels disgust or guilt about sex may not only regard sex as immoral, but the pleasure it produces as bad. Even if phenomenal introspection on sexual pleasure disposes one to believe that it's good, stronger negative emotional responses to it may more strongly dispose one to believe that it's bad, following the emotional perception model suggested in section 1.4. Explaining disagreement about pleasure's value in terms of other processes lets hedonists maintain that phenomenal introspection univocally supports pleasure's goodness. As long as negative judgments of pleasure come from unreliable processes instead of phenomenal introspection, the argument from disagreement eliminates them. The parallel between yellow’s brightness and pleasure’s goodness demonstrates the objectivity of the value detected in phenomenal introspection. Just as anyone's yellow experiences objectively are bright experiences, anyone's pleasure objectively is a good experience.30 While one's phenomenology is often called one's “subjective experience”, facts about it are still objective. “Subjective” in “subjective experience” means “internal to the mind”, not “ontologically dependent on attitudes towards it.” My yellow-experiences objectively have brightness. Anyone who thought my yellow-experiences lacked brightness would be mistaken. Pleasure similarly is objectively good. It's true that anyone's pleasure is good. Anyone who denies this is mistaken. As Mendola writes, the value detected in phenomenal introspection is “a plausible candidate for objective value” (712). Even though phenomenal introspection only tells me about my own phenomenal states, I can know that others' pleasure is good. Of course, I can't phenomenally introspect their pleasures, just as I can't phenomenally introspect pleasures that I'll experience next year. But if I consider my experiences of lemon yellow and ask what it would be like if others had the same experiences, I must think that they would be having bright experiences. Similarly, if in a pleasant moment I consider what it's like for others to have exactly the experience I'm having, I must think that they're having good experiences. If they have exactly the same experiences I'm having, their experiences will have exactly the same intrinsic properties as mine. This is also how I know that if I have the same experience in the future, it'll have the same intrinsic properties. Even though the only pleasure I can introspect is mine now, I should believe that others' pleasures and my pleasures at other times are good, just as I should believe that yellow experienced by others and myself at other times is bright. My argument thus favors the kind of universal hedonism that supports utilitarianism, not egoistic hedonism.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing happiness. Prefer the standard:

#### 1. Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought-thus framework is functionally a topicality argument about how to define the terms of the resolution. Definitions should be subject to theoretical contestation in the same way other words should be. My framework interprets ought as maximizing happiness. Prefer this definition:

#### A. Ground- every impact functions under util whereas other ethics flow to one side exclusively, kills fairness since we both need arguments to win.

#### B. Topic lit- most articles are written through the lens of util because they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Key to fairness and education- the lit is where we do research and determines how we engage in the round.

#### Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity-no debater ought to have an advantage otherwise you’re picking the better cheater. Education is a voter since it’s why schools fund debate and also provides portable skills for the real world. This is a framework warrant, not a reason to drop the debater.

#### 2. No intent foresight distinction – by willing any action with knowledge that it could cause X harm, we necessarily intend X to happen because we could always decide not to act. Thus, means-based frameworks devolve to the aff.

#### 3. Actor specificity. Policymaking must be consequentialist since collective action results in conflicts that only util can resolve. Side constraints paralyze state action since policy makers have to consider tradeoffs between multiple people. States lack intentionality since they're composed of multiple individuals—there is no act-omission distinction for them since they create permissions and prohibitions in terms of policies so authorizing action could never be considered an omission since the state assumes culpability in regulating the public domain.

#### 4. Reductionism: personal identity doesn’t exist.

Olson Eric T. (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield) “Personal Identity” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Oct 28, 2010 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#PsyApp> JW

Whatever psychological continuity may amount to, a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach is that you could be psychologically continuous with two past or future people at once. **If your cerebrum**—the upper part of the brain largely responsible for mental features—**were transplanted, the recipient would be** psychologically continuous with **you** by anyone's lights (even if there would also be important psychological differences). The Psychological Approach implies that she would be you. If we destroyed one of your cerebral hemispheres, the resulting being would also be psychologically continuous with you. (Hemispherectomy—even the removal of the left hemisphere, which controls speech—is considered a drastic but acceptable treatment for otherwise-inoperable brain tumors: see Rigterink 1980.) What **if we** did both at once, **destroy**ing **one hemisphere and transplant**ing **the other**? Then too, **the one who got the transplant**ed hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and according to the Psychological Approach **would be you.** But now **suppose** that **both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head.** (We needn't pretend, as some authors do, that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) **The two recipients**—call them Lefty and Righty—**will each be** psychologically continuous with **you.** The Psychological Approach as I have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. **But that cannot be**: Lefty and Righty are two, and **one thing cannot be** numerically identical with **two things.** Suppose Lefty is hungry at a time when Righty isn't. If you are Lefty, you are hungry at that time. If you are Righty, you aren't. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: **a contradiction.**

#### This means consequentialism – moral theories can’t focus on individuals since there’s nothing that unifies them across time. Only states of affairs can have value.

#### 5. Determinism is true: our bodies are controlled by biological principles only – there’s no room for free will.

Drescher Gary L. (Visiting Fellow at the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, PhD in Computer Science from MIT) “Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics” Bradford Books May 5th 2006

One prominent notion is that we have both a ghostlike component (our consciousness or soul) and a mechanical component (everything else, including our body). The mechanical component is governed by the usual physical laws. The ghostlike component, unconstrained by those laws, can be said to be extraphysical. That is, the ghostlike component is something in addition to the kinds of things that exist in the physical realm, something ontologically extra.1 This so-called dualist view was advanced by Descartes in the 1600s. Dualism is a tempting compromise, but an awkward one, for reasons that are well known. The problem is that the mechanical principles that govern each particle of our bodies (and of the things around us) already specify how each of those particles behaves, which in turn specifies how each of us behaves as a whole. But in that case, there is no room for the ghostlike component to have any influence—if it did so, it would have to make some of the particles sometimes violate the principles that all particles are always observed to obey whenever we check carefully. (Descartes was admirably precise about the locus of this supposed intervention—he proposed that the interface between the ghostlike component and the physical world occurs within the brain in the pineal gland.)2 Thus, we have the mind– body problem: how can we reconcile the nature of the mind with the mechanical nature of the body? Some see quantum-mechanical uncertainty as the wiggle room that could let a ghostlike consciousness nudge some of the particles in our body without violating the rules of physics. But in fact—even apart from the newer, deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics discussed in chapter 4—any such nudging would at least constitute a change in the probability distribution for some of the particles in our body, and even that would break the (probabilistic) rules that particles always seem to obey. Granted, it could be the case that particles somewhere in our brains behave differently than particles ever do when we watch them carefully, violating otherwise exceptionless rules (be they deterministic or probabilistic rules). But since the rules are otherwise exceptionless (as far as we can tell), there should be a strong presumption that there’s no exception in our brains either—especially in view of the longstanding retreat of other beliefs about the alleged physically exceptional behavior of conscious or living organisms. The doctrine of vitalism, for instance, supposed that there is some distinctive ‘‘life force’’ that animates living things, enabling them to grow and move. But the more we learned of biochemistry—DNA and RNA, ATP energy cycles, neurotransmitters, and the like—the more we understood that the growth and movement of living things is explicable in terms of the same molecular building blocks, following the same exceptionless rules, as when those building blocks exist outside of animate objects. And the more we learn about computation and neuroscience, the more we discover how cognitive processes that were once supposed to require an ethereal spirit—perception, motor control, memory, spatial reasoning, even key aspects of more general reasoning (e.g., deduction, induction, planning)—can be implemented by basic switching elements (e.g., neurons or transistors) that need not themselves be conscious, or even animate. By monitoring brain activity, we can see different regions of the brain performing computations when different sorts of cognitive functions are performed (language, singing, spatial imaging, etc.). And when certain brain regions are damaged by injury or illness, the corresponding cognitive abilities degrade or vanish. To be sure, we are still far from understanding human cognition as a whole. But the trend in our knowledge does not lend comfort to the expectation that any particles in our brain will, at long last, ever be found to deviate sometimes from the same rules that such particles otherwise always obey.

#### Only consequentialism is consistent with determinism.

Greene and Cohen Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen (Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, Princeton University) “For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything” November 26th 2004 Phil.Trans.R.Soc.Lond.B (2004)359,1775–1785 <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693457/pdf/15590618.pdf> JW

The forward-looking–consequentialist approach to punishment works with all three responses to the problem of free will, including hard determinism. This is because consequentialists are not concerned with whether anyone is really innocent or guilty in some ultimate sense that might depend on people’s having free will, but only with the likely effects of punishment. (Of course, one might wonder what it means for a hard determinist to justify any sort of choice. We will return to this issue in x 8.) The retributivist approach, by contrast, is plausibly regarded as requiring free will and the rejection of hard determinism. Retributivists want to know whether the defendant truly deserves to be punished. Assuming one can deserve to be punished only for actions that are freely willed, hard determinism implies that no one really deserves to be punished. Thus, hard determinism combined with retributivism requires the elimination of all punishment, which does not seem reasonable. This leaves retributivists with two options: compatibilism and libertarianism. Libertarianism, for reasons given above, and despite its intuitive appeal, is scientifically suspect. At the very least, the law should not depend on it. It seems, then, that retributivism requires compatibilism. Accordingly, the standard legal account of punishment is compatibilist.

#### 6. Morality must be universalizable.

Pettit Phillip “Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 50 No. 199 pp. 175-190 April 2000 JW

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalized, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context, or whatever.7 So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non- particular or universal kind. Thus if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C – these may include the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like – then we assume that something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C- type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalizability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific, so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.

#### Only consequentialism can be universalized.

Pettit 2 Phillip “Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 50 No. 199 pp. 175-190 April 2000 JW

There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalizability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. Suppose that I accept consequentialist doctrine and believe of an agent A that in A’s particular circumstances C, A ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really is right by my consequentialist lights, then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O the right option for me in those circumstances, so they will make it the right option for any other agent in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalizability. I can happily universalize my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalizability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I shall only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble in the water. Universalizability would not force me to think that it is right that everyone swim to the help of a child in such a situation; there might be many people around, and, were they all to swim, then they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that it is right that anyone swim to the help of the child: no one is exempt from this person-by-person non-collective prescription (even if all do face a collective requirement to decide who in particular is going to do the swimming).8 So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalizability. But how is the universalizability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to non- consequentialist theory, the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern P: this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent – again, let us suppose, myself – that I ought to choose O in these circumstances C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me – in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern P – so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. III. A PROBLEM FOR NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST UNIVERSALIZATION Suppose I do say, in the straightforward way, that pattern P requires not just that I do O in C, but also, for any agent whatsoever, that that agent should do O in C as well. Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response, so I now want to argue, is going to lead me, as a non- consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that an action is right involves approving of the deed and gives one a normative reason to prefer it. Imagine someone who said that he thought his doing something or other, or indeed another person’s doing something or other, was the right choice and who thereby communicated that he approved of it. Would it not raise a question as to whether he knew what he was saying if he went on to add that he did not think that there was any good reason for him to prefer that the action should take place rather than not? If the judgement of rightness is to play its distinctive role in ad- judicating or ranking actions – if it is to connect with approval in the stan- dard way – then, whether or not it actually motivates the person judging, it must be taken to provide him with a normative reason to prefer that the action should take place. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, I commit myself – again because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness – to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, however, is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible that, perversely, the best way for me to satisfy the preference that, for any arbitrary agent X, that agent do O in C-type circumstances, is to choose non-O myself in those circumstances.9 Choosing non-O myself means that there is one person – me – in respect of whom the general preference is not satisfied, but in the perverse circumstances it will mean that there are more agents or actions in respect of whom it is satisfied than there would be did I choose O. Perverse circumstances of this kind are not just abstract possibilities, for what an agent does can easily affect the incentives or opportunities of others in a way that generates perversity. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself and threaten resistance to their violence; the best way to get people to help their children may be to proselytize and not pay due attention to one’s own. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself.

### Inherency

#### Iran intends to build multiple new nuclear power plants.

MEM 8/16 Middle East Monitor “Iran intends to build two new nuclear power stations” August 15th 2016 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160815-iran-intends-to-build-two-new-nuclear-power-stations/ JW

Representative of the Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs in the Iranian Parliament Sayed Hussain Naqvi revealed his country’s intention to build two new nuclear power stations in cooperation with Russia. News channel Russia Today quoted Naqvi on Sunday saying that Iran’s parliament declared the need for Iran to get 20,000 megawatts of electric power, which requires the construction of ten nuclear power plants. The Iranian official added that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has prepared a plan for the construction of these plants, but because it is not possible to build the ten power plants at the same time, the current plan is to start with building two stations. In November 2014, Tehran and Moscow signed a number of documents regarding the expansion of cooperation between the two sides in the field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

### Plan Text

#### Resolved: the Islamic Republic of Iran ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.

### Prolif Adv.

#### Even after the deal, Iran has thousands of centrifuges which can be used for building nuclear weapons.

Tirone 16 Jonathan “Iran’s Nuclear Program” Bloomberg Quick Take February 4th 2016 <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/irans-uranium-enrichment> JW

Under the deal, Iran maintains the ability to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. It will retain about about 5,000 centrifuges capable of separating the uranium-235 isotope from uranium ore. For 15 years, it agreed to refine the metal to no more than 3.7 percent enrichment, the level needed to fuel nuclear power plants, and pledged to limit its enriched-uranium stockpile to 300 kilograms, 3 percent of its stores in May 2015. The International Atomic Energy Agency had already verified that Iran eliminated its stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium, which can be used to make medical isotopes and to power research reactors but could also be purified to weapons-grade at short notice. Keeping an enrichment capability was important to Iran, presumably for reasons of national pride. Like other enriching countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Japan and South Africa, the technology gives Iran the ability to pursue nuclear weapons should it choose to break its commitments. The U.S. estimates that the agreement extends the time it would take Iran to produce enough fissile material for a bomb from a few months to a year.

#### Iran’s cheating on the deal and attempting to build nukes using their nuclear reactors – new reports prove.

Rafizadeh 8/4 Majid (Iranian-American political scientist and Harvard University scholar, is president of the International American Council. Rafizadeh serves on the board of Harvard International Review at Harvard University. He is also a member of the Gulf project at Columbia University. Rafizadeh served as a senior fellow at Nonviolence International Organization based in Washington DC. He has been a recipient of several scholarships and fellowship including from Oxford University, Annenberg University, University of California Santa Barbara, and Fulbright Teaching program. Dr. Rafizadeh has obtained several degrees including Doctorate (Ph.D) in Government and International Affairs, Masters in Global and International Studies, Masters in Journalism and Communication, Masters in Linguistic and teaching, and Bachelors in Linguistic and languages ( English, Arabic, Persian). He served as ambassador, conducted research at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and taught at University of California Santa Barbara through Fulbright Teaching Scholarship) “Iran Is Cheating on the Nuclear Deal, Now What?” Gatestone Institute August 4th 2016 <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8543/iran-nuclear-cheating> JW

One year into the nuclear deal, two credible and timely intelligence reports reveal that Iran has no intention of honoring the terms of the deal, which, anyway, it never signed. Germany's domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, revealed in its annual report that the Iranian government has pursued a "clandestine" path to obtain illicit nuclear technology and equipment from German companies "at what is, even by international standards, a quantitatively high level." The intelligence report also stated that "it is safe to expect that Iran will continue its intensive procurement activities in Germany using clandestine methods to achieve its objectives." Even German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized Iran and emphasized the significance of these findings, in a statement to the German Parliament. Although Germany did not state exactly what Iran was trying to buy, another detailed report by the Institute for Science and International Security appear to shed light on that topic. The report stated: "The Institute for Science and International Security has learned that Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) recently made an attempt to purchase tons of controlled carbon fiber from a country. This attempt occurred after Implementation Day of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The attempt to acquire carbon fiber was denied by the supplier and its government. Nonetheless, the AEOI had enough carbon fiber to replace existing advanced centrifuge rotors and had no need for additional quantities over the next several years, let alone for tons of carbon fiber. This attempt thus raises concerns over whether Iran intends to abide by its JCPOA commitments. In particular, Iran may seek to stockpile the carbon fiber so as to be able to build advanced centrifuge rotors far beyond its current needs under the JCPOA, providing an advantage that would allow it to quickly build an advanced centrifuge enrichment plant if it chose to leave or disregard the JCPOA during the next few years. The carbon fiber procurement attempt is also another example of efforts by the P5+1 to keep secret problematic Iranian actions." The report, which was written by Andrea Stricker and David Albright (former United Nations IAEA nuclear inspector ), explains that the Iranian government is required to request permission from a UN Security Council panel for "purchases of nuclear direct-use goods." Another critical issue is the revelation about a secret agreement, obtained by the Associated Press, which discloses that Iran's nuclear deal would not only lift constraints on Iran's nuclear program after the nuclear deal, but it will also do so long before the deal expires. According to the secret agreement, the deal would pave the way for Iranian leaders to advance their nuclear capabilities at a higher level and even be capable of reducing nuclear weapons breakout capability from one year to six months, long before the nuclear agreement ends. The Obama Administration has not made this document public yet. A diplomat, who works on Iran's nuclear program and who asked for anonymity, shared the secret document with the Associated Press: "The diplomat who shared the document with the AP described it as an add-on agreement to the nuclear deal. But while formally separate from that accord, he said that it was in effect an integral part of the deal and had been approved both by Iran and the US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany, the six powers that negotiated the deal with Tehran." This document suggests that Iran can install thousands of centrifuges, five times more than what it currently possesses, as well enrich uranium at much higher pace, also long before the agreement expires. According to the Associated Press: "Centrifuges churn out uranium to levels that can range from use as reactor fuel and for medical and research purposes to much higher levels for the core of a nuclear warhead. From year 11 to 13, says the document, Iran can install centrifuges up to five times as efficient as the 5,060 machines it is now restricted to using. "Those new models will number less than those being used now, ranging between 2,500 and 3,500, depending on their efficiency, according to the document. But because they are more effective, they will allow Iran to enrich at more than twice the rate it is doing now." The Associated Press adds: "The document also allows Iran to greatly expand its work with centrifuges that are even more advanced, including large-scale testing in preparation for the deal's expiry 15 years after its implementation on Jan. 18. ... The document is the only secret text linked to last year's agreement between Iran and six foreign powers. It says that after a period between 11 to 13 years, Iran can replace its 5,060 inefficient centrifuges with up to 3,500 advanced machines. Since those are five times as efficient, the time Iran would need to make a weapon would drop from a year to six months." More importantly, this document and the rest of the nuclear agreement still do not explain what are the rules on Iran's nuclear proliferation after the 13 years are over. The only interpretation would be that since there is no restriction indicated, Iran will be then be free to do what it desires when it comes to its nuclear program, including installing advanced centrifuges, enriching uranium, and obtaining a nuclear bomb. Iran protested the disclosure of these documents. Last week, the spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Behrouz Kamalvandi, said that "the parts [of the document] published were confidential and were supposed to remain so. ... Our assumption is that it has been leaked by the (International Atomic Energy) Agency." AEOI head Ali Akbar Salehi pressed on the secrecy of these documents "We do not intend to make this plan known to the public and (IAEA)'s action is a breach of promise." This also shows that President Obama wanted the Congress to sign a deal that was not fully disclosed. Another problem with the nuclear agreement is the procedure that was put in place in case Iran violated the deal. On paper, the nuclear agreement indicates that sanctions would be re-imposed on Iran. President Obama repeatedly stated that the sanctions could be quickly and easily re-imposed if Iran violated the terms of the agreement. However, it's not really that simple. Once the four rounds of sanctions have been lifted, it would require the approval of all five members of the UN Security Council each to re-impose one round of sanctions. It goes without saying that getting the approval of China and Russia would not be as easy as Mr. Obama made it sound. What has been President Obama's reaction to these crucial intelligence reports? Silence. The administration continues to disregard and dodge questions regarding this issue. When asked about the German intelligence report and the Institute for Science and International Security report, a State Department spokesman said, "we have absolutely no indication that Iran has procured any materials in violation of the JCPOA." The more the White House ignores Iran's violations of the nuclear accord, the more Iran will be emboldened to violate international laws and the terms of the nuclear agreement.

#### The Iran deal made America abandon non-prolif policy.

Abrams 15 Elliott (senior fellow for Mideast studies at the Council on Foreign Relations) “Iran Got a Far Better Deal Than It Had Any Right to Expect” National Review July 15th 2015 <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/421223/iran-got-far-better-deal-it-had-any-right-expect-elliott-abrams> JW

How far we have come. Initially U.S. policy aimed at a sort of zero option: Iran zeroes out its nuclear program, and we zero out sanctions. Satloff summarizes where we went next: Then, the United States conceded to Iran the right to have its own nuclear reactors but not to develop indigenous capacity to enrich nuclear fuel, which doubles as the core element of nuclear weapons. Then, the United States conceded to Iran the right to enrich but under strict limitations. Then, the United States conceded to Iran that the strict limitations on enrichment would expire at a certain point in the future. Iran has been arguing for years that it has the right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States has always said “no way” — until now. The George W. Bush administration insisted that before our allies Jordan and the UAE could sign a civil nuclear-cooperation agreement with us, they had to agree they would not enrich uranium — not spin one centrifuge. Now we allow Iran 6,000 centrifuges, and indeed the JCPOA legitimizes Iran as a nuclear state. Decades of American nonproliferation policy are dead. RELATED: Obama’s Jihadist Stimulus Package What has Iran gained in this agreement? The New York Times’s Thomas Erdbrink tweeted the speech of Iran’s President Rouhani: Our objective was to have the nuclear program and have sanctions lifted. At first they wanted us to have 100 centrifuges now we will have 6,000. They wanted restrictions of 25 years now its 8. First they said we could only have IR1 centrifuges, now we can have IR6, 7, and 8, advanced centrifuges. Heavy water plant at Arak had to be dismantled but now it will remain with heavy water under conditions. Fordo had to be closed now we will have 1000 centrifuges there. There are of course other ways to measure. Iran has four Americans being held hostage, and apparently it keeps all four; indeed Kerry rejected the idea that he should have tried to insist on their freedom before signing a deal. Iran has always argued that its nuclear program was legal, and we said it was illegal; now we give that up. Iran has not had to disclose previous work on nuclear warheads to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran will get an immense cash haul, perhaps $150 billion, plus the profits from future oil sales, gas development, and trade and investment. And worst of all, the arms embargo ends in five years, and the embargo on helping Iran build ballistic missiles in eight. RELATED: Obama’s Iran Deal Provides for Congressional Review — by Iran’s Congress So the third thing we learn from reading the JCPOA is the neat sequencing. At five years, Iran begins rearming without any limits; at eight years, it begins modernizing and enlarging its ballistic missiles; after ten years, the nuclear limits start falling away. That is, Iran can then develop warheads and it will have the missiles on which to put them. And its years of conventional military buildup will make any U.S. or Israeli military strike against the Iranian nuclear-weapons program much harder and more dangerous.

#### The deal ensures Iran will get nukes – it’s just a matter of time.

Robbins 15 Jeff (served as Chief Counsel to the Democratic Senators on the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Twice appointed as a United States Delegate to the United Nations Human Rights Commission under President Clinton, he is an attorney in Boston) “It’s Simple: Under This Deal, Iran Will Have Nuclear Weapons in Little Over a Decade” July 29th 2015 Observer <http://observer.com/2015/07/its-simple-under-this-deal-iran-will-have-nuclear-weapons-in-little-over-a-decade/> JW

The core problems with the Iran deal are profound, but are waved aside by Klein as the “unreliable” concoctions of “Benjamin Netanyahu and his neo-conservative friends.” Under the deal, a powerful sanctions program which has finally given us leverage over Iran—sanctions which candidate Obama opposed and President Obama resisted—would be abandoned within a matter of months. Despite the Administration’s repeated representations that sanctions would be removed in “phases,” up to $150 billion in frozen funds are to be handed over and trade restrictions eliminated almost immediately—eviscerating the incentives for Iran to comply with agreements that extend 10, 15 or 25 years out into the future. There is every reason to believe that this $150 billion bonanza will be used by Iran to expand activities already responsible for the deaths of thousands in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen—and Israel. Because restrictions on Iran’s acquisition of conventional and ballistic weapons will be eliminated in five and eight years respectively, there is every reason to believe this bonanza will be used by Iran to acquire them—and there is absolutely no reason to believe it won’t. That leaves the little matter of Iran’s authorized acquisition of nuclear weapons in just over a decade. The White House team has devised this line, and it is sticking to it: “Every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut-off.” This, unfortunately, is nonsense. Assuming that Iran does a screeching reversal from a history of cheating on agreements, it will for practical purposes be free to complete a sprint to nuclear weapons, as President Obama himself admitted, with “breakout times [that] have shrunk almost to zero.” With the economic and diplomatic leverage presently in place jettisoned, the West will be powerless to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons—unless the United States is prepared to use the military option to keep Iran from obtaining them that this White House has made crystal clear will never be used. The Iranians know the United States is unprepared to use such force, and with the tens of billions in funds and unlocked oil revenues handed over to Iran to acquire weapons that can be used to strike at America and its allies, it knows that the United States will be even less willing to act militarily at “break-out time” than it is now. Put simply, under this deal, Iran will have nuclear weapons in little over a decade, and our children will live their lives under an Iranian nuclear Sword of Damocles. This is the hard fact for which the White House has no answer.

#### Iran prolif causes nuke war – miscalc and rapid escalation.

Goldberg 12 Jeffrey (Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the Atlantic.) “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon: Jeffrey Goldberg” January 23rd 2012 Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg> JW

Jan. 24 (Bloomberg) -- One of the arguments often made in favor of bombing Iran to cripple its nuclear program is this: The mullahs in Tehran are madmen who believe it is their consecrated duty to destroy the perfidious Zionist entity (which is to say, Israel) and so are building nuclear weapons to launch at Tel Aviv at the first favorable moment. It’s beyond a doubt that the Iranian regime would like to bring about the destruction of Israel. However, the mullahs are also cynics and men determined, more than anything, to maintain their hold on absolute power. Which is why it’s unlikely that they would immediately use their new weapons against Israel. An outright attack on Israel - - a country possessing as many as 200 nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems -- would lead to the obliteration of Tehran, the deaths of millions, and the destruction of Iran’s military and industrial capabilities. The mullahs know this. But here’s the problem: It may not matter. The threat of a deliberate nuclear attack pales in comparison with the chance that a nuclear-armed Iran could accidentally trigger a cataclysmic exchange with Israel. WARP-SPEED ESCALATION The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation. Here’s one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand. Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollah’s political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of August’ on steroids.” Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance? Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear strategy, told me that in a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards, making an accidental exchange more likely. “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch-readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice,” he said. “Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack.” Then comes the problem of misinterpreted data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.” ‘COGNITIVE BIAS’ Blair notes that in a crisis it isn’t irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said. Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is far-fetched -- make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t have any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.” The answer to this predicament is to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,” Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.” Ross argues that the Obama administration’s approach -- the imposition of steadily more debilitating sanctions -- may yet work. There’s a chance, albeit slim, that he may be right: New sanctions are just beginning to bite and, combined with an intensified cyberwar and sabotage efforts, they might prove costly enough to deter Tehran. But opponents of military action make a mistake in arguing that a nuclear Iran is a containable problem. It is not.

### Israel Strike Adv.

#### Israel will strike Iran because of their nuclear facilities – they see it as necessary to their survival.

Bosma 15 John “Thinking About the Unthinkable: An Israel-Iran Nuclear War” August 23rd 2015 American Thinker <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/08/thinking_about_the_unthinkable_an_israeliran_nuclear_war_.html> JW

But it also augurs the possibility of a nuclear war coming far sooner than one could have imagined under conventional wisdom worst-case scenarios. Following the US's betrayal of Israel and its de facto detente with Iran, we cannot expect Israel to copy longstanding US doctrines of no-first-nuclear-use and preferences for conventional-weapons-only war plans. After all, both were premised (especially after the USSR's 1991 collapse) on decades of US nuclear and conventional supremacy. If there ever were an unassailable case for a small, frighteningly vulnerable nation to pre-emptively use nuclear weapons to shock, economically paralyze, and decapitate am enemy sworn to its destruction, Israel has arrived at that circumstance. Why? Because Israel has no choice, given the radical new alignment against it that now includes the US, given reported Obama threats in 2014 to shoot down Israeli attack planes, his disclosure of Israel's nuclear secrets and its Central Asian strike-force recovery bases, and above all his agreement to help Iran protect its enrichment facilities from terrorists and cyberwarfare – i.e., from the very special-operations and cyber forces that Israel would use in desperate attempts to halt Iran's bomb. Thus Israel is being forced, more rapidly and irreversibly than we appreciate, into a bet-the-nation decision where it has only one forceful, game-changing choice -- early nuclear pre-emption – to wrest back control of its survival and to dictate the aftermath of such a survival strike. Would this involve many nuclear weapons? No – probably fewer than 10-15, although their yields must be sufficiently large to maximize ground shock. Would it produce Iranian civilian casualties? Yes but not as many as one might suppose, as it would avoid cities. Most casualties would be radiological, like Chernobyl, rather than thermal and blast casualties. Would it spur a larger catalytic nuclear war? No. Would it subsequently impel Russia, China and new proliferators to normalize nuclear weapons in their own war planning? Or would the massive global panic over the first nuclear use in anger in 70 years, one that would draw saturation media coverage, panic their publics into urgent demands for ballistic missile self-defense systems? Probably the latter. The Iranian elite's ideology and controlling political psychology is inherently preferential towards nukes and direct population targeting as a way to implement Shi'ite messianism and end-times extremism. Iran is a newly nuclear apocalyptic Shi'ite regime that ranks as the most blatantly genocidal government since the Khmer Rouge's Sorbonne-educated leaders took over Cambodia in April, 1975. Senior Iranian officials have periodically tied nuclear war to the return of the Twelfth Imam or Mahdi, which Iran's previous president anticipated within several years. This reflects not just the triumphalist enthusiasm of a new arriviste nuclear power that just won more at the table than it dared to dream. It also reflects a self-amplifying, autarchic end-days theology that is immune to both reality testing and to Western liberal/progressive tenets about prim and proper nuclear behavior. Admittedly, Iranian leaders have lately resorted to envisioning Israel's collapse in more restrained terms through Palestinian demographic takeover of the Israeli state and asymmetric warfare. Still there remains a lurid history of Iranian officials urging the elimination of Israel and its people, of allocating their nukes to Israeli territory to maximize Jewish fatalities, of Iranian officials leading crowds in chants of “Death to Israel!” Iran's government also released a video game allowing players to target various kinds of Iranian ballistic missiles against Israeli cities – this as part of intensive propaganda drumming up hatred of Jews. A more recent video game envisions a massive Iranian ground army marching to liberate Jerusalem. In all, Iran's official stoking of genocidal Jew hatred is far beyond what Hitler’s government dared to advocate before the 1939 outbreak of World War 2. The deliberate American silence over Iran's genocidal intentionality sends an unmistakable signal to Israel that the US no longer recognizes a primordial, civilizational moral obligation to protect it from the most explicit threats imaginable. It is truly on its own, with the US in an all-but-overt alliance with its worst enemy. The shock to Israel's leaders of this abrupt American lurch into tacitly accepting this Iranian intentionality cannot be understated. Iran is violating the core tenets of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, a US initiative after the Tokyo and Nuremberg war-crimes trials to codify genocide as a crime against humanity. Now the US is silent. But this shift is also recent. Every US government prior to President Obama would have foresworn nuclear talks with such a psychopathic regime or would have walked out in a rage upon such utterances. Yet Iran's genocidal threats have had no discernible effect on Obama's canine eagerness for a deal. It's as if 75 years ago a US president had cheerfully engaged in peace talks with Hitler and his SS entourage despite learning the details of the Nazis' secret Wannsee Conference where Hitler signed off on the Final Solution for the Jews. But whereas Hitler had the sense in that era to keep that conclave secret, Iran's Wannsee intentionality toward Israel and world Jewry has for years been flamboyantly rude-and-crude and in-your-face. That this Iranian advocacy of a second Holocaust drew no objection from the US negotiators of this deal should make moral pariahs out of every one of them – including our president and Secretary of State.

#### Netanyahu is ready to strike and bomb nuclear facilities.

DePetris 15 Daniel (analyst at Wikistrat, Inc., a geostrategic consulting firm, and a freelance researcher. He has also written for CNN.com, Small Wars Journal and The Diplomat) “Israel's Master Plan to Crush Iran's Nuclear Program” The National Interest July 22nd 2015 <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/israels-master-plan-crush-irans-nuclear-program-13392?page=3> JW

Although there may finally be a comprehensive, verifiable agreement that the United States and its negotiating partners are comfortable with, Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to keep all his options open. President Obama has consistently said that “all options remain on the table” to prevent Tehran from obtaining a nuclear weapon—diplomatic-speak for the use of military force. Yet Netanyahu has been far more blunt and straightforward, going so far as to order Israeli military planners in 2010 to begin preparing for a unilateral air campaign against Iran’s nuclear-enrichment facilities. It’s conceivable, if not entirely possible given Netanyahu’s strong disagreement with the Obama administration on how to manage the Iranian nuclear portfolio, that Netanyahu will give a similar order in the future. What would a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities look like? This question has been pondered by numerous analysts ever since Iran’s first enrichment facility was outed in 2002, and the consequences of such an attack have been explored in depth from Washington to London to Moscow. But, notwithstanding the JCPOA, an operation from the air is still very much a high-risk but potentially high-reward last option for the Israelis.

#### \_ scenarios:

#### \_. Tehran destruction – Israel attack on Tehran causes millions of deaths, mass instability and outweighs every other nuclear threat – best models prove. This answers your impact defense

Turse 13 Nick “What Would Happen if Israel Nuked Iran” Mother Jones May 13th 2013 <http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/nuclear-strike-tehran-israel> JW

Iranian cities—owing to geography, climate, building construction, and population densities—are particularly vulnerable to nuclear attack, according to a new study, "Nuclear War Between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale," published in the journal Conflict & Health by researchers from the University of Georgia and Harvard University. It is the first publicly released scientific assessment of what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might actually mean for people in the region. Its scenarios are staggering. An Israeli attack on the Iranian capital of Tehran using five 500-kiloton weapons would, the study estimates, kill seven million people—86% of the population—and leave close to 800,000 wounded. A strike with five 250-kiloton weapons would kill an estimated 5.6 million and injure 1.6 million, according to predictions made using an advanced software package designed to calculate mass casualties from a nuclear detonation. Estimates of the civilian toll in other Iranian cities are even more horrendous. A nuclear assault on the city of Arak, the site of a heavy water plant central to Iran's nuclear program, would potentially kill 93% of its 424,000 residents. Three 100-kiloton nuclear weapons hitting the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas would slaughter an estimated 94% of its 468,000 citizens, leaving just 1% of the population uninjured. A multi-weapon strike on Kermanshah, a Kurdish city with a population of 752,000, would result in an almost unfathomable 99.9% casualty rate. Cham Dallas, the director of the Institute for Health Management and Mass Destruction Defense at the University of Georgia and lead author of the study, says that the projections are the most catastrophic he's seen in more than 30 years analyzing weapons of mass destruction and their potential effects. "The fatality rates are the highest of any nuke simulation I've ever done," he told me by phone from the nuclear disaster zone in Fukushima, Japan, where he was doing research. "It's the perfect storm for high fatality rates." Israel has never confirmed or denied possessing nuclear weapons, but is widely known to have up to several hundred nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Iran has no nuclear weapons and its leaders claim that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes only. Published reports suggest that American intelligence agencies and Israel's intelligence service are in agreement: Iran suspended its nuclear weapons development program in 2003. Dallas and his colleagues nonetheless ran simulations for potential Iranian nuclear strikes on the Israeli cities of Beer Sheva, Haifa, and Tel Aviv using much smaller 15-kiloton weapons, similar in strength to those dropped by the United States on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Their analyses suggest that, in Beer Shiva, half of the population of 209,000 would be killed and one-sixth injured. Haifa would see similar casualty ratios, including 40,000 trauma victims. A strike on Tel Aviv with two 15-kiloton weapons would potentially slaughter 17% of the population—nearly 230,000 people. Close to 150,000 residents would likely be injured. These forecasts, like those for Iranian cities, are difficult even for experts to assess. "Obviously, accurate predictions of casualty and fatality estimates are next to impossible to obtain," says Dr. Glen Reeves, a longtime consultant on the medical effects of radiation for the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, who was not involved in the research. "I think their estimates are probably high but not impossibly so." According to Paul Carroll of the Ploughshares Fund, a San Francisco-based foundation that advocates for nuclear disarmament, "the results would be catastrophic" if major Iranian cities were attacked with modern nuclear weapons. "I don't see 75% [fatality rates as] being out of the question," says Carroll, after factoring in the longer-term effects of radiation sickness, burns, and a devastated medical infrastructure. According to Dallas and his colleagues, the marked disparity between estimated fatalities in Israel and Iran can be explained by a number of factors. As a start, Israel is presumed to have extremely powerful nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery capabilities including long-range Jericho missiles, land-based cruise missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and advanced aircraft with precision targeting technology. The nature of Iranian cities also makes them exceptionally vulnerable to nuclear attack, according to the Conflict & Health study. Tehran, for instance, is home to 50% of Iran's industry, 30% of its public sector workers, and 50 colleges and universities. As a result, 12 million people live in or near the capital, most of them clustered in its core. Like most Iranian cities, Tehran has little urban sprawl, meaning residents tend to live and work in areas that would be subject to maximum devastation and would suffer high percentages of fatalities due to trauma as well as thermal burns caused by the flash of heat from an explosion. Iran's topography, specifically mountains around cities, would obstruct the dissipation of the blast and heat from a nuclear explosion, intensifying the effects. Climatic conditions, especially high concentrations of airborne dust, would likely exacerbate thermal and radiation casualties as well as wound infections. Nuclear Horror: Then and Now The first nuclear attack on a civilian population center, the US strike on Hiroshima, left that city "uniformly and extensively devastated," according to a study carried out in the wake of the attacks by the US Strategic Bombing Survey. "Practically the entire densely or moderately built-up portion of the city was leveled by blast and swept by fire... The surprise, the collapse of many buildings, and the conflagration contributed to an unprecedented casualty rate." At the time, local health authorities reported that 60% of immediate deaths were due to flash or flame burns and medical investigators estimated that 15%-20% of the deaths were caused by radiation. Witnesses "stated that people who were in the open directly under the explosion of the bomb were so severely burned that the skin was charred dark brown or black and that they died within a few minutes or hours," according to the 1946 report. "Among the survivors, the burned areas of the skin showed evidence of burns almost immediately after the explosion. At first there was marked redness, and other evidence of thermal burns appeared within the next few minutes or hours." Many victims kept their arms outstretched because it was too painful to allow them to hang at their sides and rub against their bodies. One survivor recalled seeing victims "with both arms so severely burned that all the skin was hanging from their arms down to their nails, and others having faces swollen like bread, losing their eyesight. It was like ghosts walking in procession… Some jumped into a river because of their serious burns. The river was filled with the wounded and blood." The number of fatalities at Hiroshima has been estimated at 140,000. A nuclear attack on Nagasaki three days later is thought to have killed 70,000. Today, according to Dallas, 15-kiloton nuclear weapons of the type used on Japan are referred to by experts as "firecracker nukes" due to their relative weakness. In addition to killing more than 5.5 million people, a strike on Tehran involving five 250-kiloton weapons—each of them 16 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima—would result in an estimated 803,000 third-degree burn victims, with close to 300,000 others suffering second degree burns, and 750,000 to 880,000 people severely exposed to radiation. "Those people with thermal burns over most of their bodies we can't help," says Dallas. "Most of these people are not going to survive… there is no saving them. They'll be in intense agony." As you move out further from the site of the blast, he says, "it actually gets worse. As the damage decreases, the pain increases, because you're not numb." In a best case scenario, there would be 1,000 critically injured victims for every surviving doctor but "it will probably be worse," according to Dallas. Whatever remains of Tehran's healthcare system will be inundated with an estimated 1.5 million trauma sufferers. In a feat of understatement, the researchers report that survivors "presenting with combined injuries including either thermal burns or radiation poisoning are unlikely to have favorable outcomes." Iranian government officials did not respond to a request for information about how Tehran would cope in the event of a nuclear attack. When asked if the US military could provide humanitarian aid to Iran after such a strike, a spokesman for Central Command, whose area of responsibility includes the Middle East, was circumspect. "US Central Command plans for a wide range of contingencies to be prepared to provide options to the Secretary of Defense and the President," he told this reporter. But Frederick Burkle, a senior fellow at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Harvard University's School of Public Health, as well as a coauthor of the just-published article, is emphatic that the US military could not cope with the scale of the problem. "I must also say that no country or international body is prepared to offer the assistance that would be needed," he told me. Dallas and his team spent five years working on their study. Their predictions were generated using a declassified version of a software package developed for the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as well as other complementary software applications. According to Glen Reeves, the software used fails to account for many of the vagaries and irregularities of an urban environment. These, he says, would mitigate some of the harmful effects. Examples would be buildings or cars providing protection from flash burns. He notes, however, that built-up areas can also exacerbate the number of deaths and injuries. Blast effects far weaker than what would be necessary to injure the lungs can, for instance, topple a house. "Your office building can collapse… before your eardrums pop!" notes Reeves. The new study provides the only available scientific predictions to date about what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might actually mean. Dallas, who was previously the director of the Center for Mass Destruction Defense at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is quick to point out that the study received no US government funding or oversight. "No one wanted this research to happen," he adds. Rattling Sabers and Nuclear Denial Frederick Burkle points out that, today, discussions about nuclear weapons in the Middle East almost exclusively center on whether or not Iran will produce an atomic bomb instead of "focusing on ensuring that there are options for them to embrace an alternate sense of security." He warns that the repercussions may be grave. "The longer this goes on the more we empower that singular thinking both within Iran and Israel." Even if Iran were someday to build several small nuclear weapons, their utility would be limited. After all, analysts note that Israel would be capable of launching a post-attack response which would simply devastate Iran. Right now, Israel is the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East. Yet a preemptive Israeli nuclear strike against Iran also seems an unlikely prospect to most experts. "Currently, there is little chance of a true nuclear war between the two nations," according to Paul Carroll of the Ploughshares Fund. Israel, he points out, would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless its very survival were at stake. "However, Israel's rhetoric about red lines and the threat of a nuclear Iran are something we need to worry about," he told me recently by email. "A military strike to defeat Iran's nuclear capacity would A) not work B) ensure that Iran WOULD then pursue a bomb (something they have not clearly decided to do yet) and C) risk a regional war." Cham Dallas sees the threat in even starker terms. "The Iranians and the Israelis are both committed to conflict," he told me. He isn't alone in voicing concern. "What will we do if Israel threatens Tehran with nuclear obliteration?... A nuclear battle in the Middle East, one-sided or not, would be the most destabilizing military event since Pearl Harbor," wrote Pulitzer Prize-winning national security reporter Tim Weiner in a recent op-ed for Bloomberg News. "Our military commanders know a thousand ways in which a war could start between Israel and Iran… No one has ever fought a nuclear war, however. No one knows how to end one." The Middle East is hardly the only site of potential nuclear catastrophe. Today, according to the Ploughshares Fund, there are an estimated 17,300 nuclear weapons in the world. Russia reportedly has the most with 8,500; North Korea, the fewest with less than 10. Donald Cook, the administrator for defense programs at the US National Nuclear Security Administration, recently confirmed that the United States possesses around 4,700 nuclear warheads. Other nuclear powers include rivals India and Pakistan, which stood on the brink of nuclear war in 2002. (Just this year, Indian government officials warned residents of Kashmir, the divided territory claimed by both nations, to prepare for a possible nuclear war.) Recently, India and nuclear-armed neighbor China, which went to war with each other in the 1960s, again found themselves on the verge of a crisis due to a border dispute in a remote area of the Himalayas. In a world awash in nuclear weapons, saber-rattling, brinkmanship, erratic behavior, miscalculations, technological errors, or errors in judgment could lead to a nuclear detonation and suffering on an almost unimaginable scale, perhaps nowhere more so than in Iran. "Not only would the immediate impacts be devastating, but the lingering effects and our ability to deal with them would be far more difficult than a 9/11 or earthquake/tsunami event," notes Paul Carroll. Radiation could turn areas of a country into no-go zones; healthcare infrastructure would be crippled or totally destroyed; and depending on climatic conditions and the prevailing winds, whole regions might have their agriculture poisoned. "One large bomb could do this, let alone a handful, say, in a South Asian conflict," he told me. "I do believe that the longer we have these weapons and the more there are, the greater the chances that we will experience either an intentional attack (state-based or terrorist) or an accident," Carroll wrote in his email. "In many ways, we've been lucky since 1945. There have been some very close calls. But our luck won't hold forever." Cham Dallas says there is an urgent need to grapple with the prospect of nuclear attacks, not later, but now. "There are going to be other big public health issues in the twenty-first century, but in the first third, this is it. It's a freight train coming down the tracks," he told me. "People don't want to face this. They're in denial."

#### \_. Middle East Conflict – Iran retaliates by ordering Hezbollah and Hamas to attack Israel.

DePetris 15 Daniel (analyst at Wikistrat, Inc., a geostrategic consulting firm, and a freelance researcher. He has also written for CNN.com, Small Wars Journal and The Diplomat) “Iran's Master Plan to Retaliate If Israel Strikes” The National Interest August 3rd 2015 <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-master-plan-retaliate-if-israel-attacks-13476> JW

According to a 2013 profile in The New Yorker on Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp-Quds Force, Iran contributed $100 million to Lebanese Hezbollah every year from 2000-2006. Hundreds of millions of additional dollars have been given to the organization since that time — a consistent pool of resources that has permitted Hezbollah to stockpile a conservative estimate of 50,000 missiles in southern Lebanon in preparation for another war with Israel. Tens of millions more have been transferred to Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades since the two began a reconciliation after a falling out over support for the Assad regime. “Apart from using Iranian aid to rebuild the [Hamas] tunnel network,” writes Con Coughlin of the Telegraph, “the Palestinian brigades are also replenishing their depleted stocks of medium-range missiles…” Because Iran doesn’t share a land border with Israel, you can expect Tehran to extend its material and arms support to both of these organizations after an Israeli air campaign against its nuclear program (Iran would have more resources to do so, given the sanctions relief that it is receiving for implementing the JCPOA). Through improved technology and successful defense research with the United States, Israel has been able to render many of Hamas’ rockets ineffective. Yet even with Israel’s sophisticated anti-missile defense system, it would be difficult to counteract a coordinated attack from Hezbollah in the north and Hamas in the west simultaneously. Iran, meanwhile, would still be afforded some small degree of plausible deniability.

#### That draws in the US to a bloody ground conflict.

Innocent and Eilam 12 Malou Innocent (foreign policy analyst at the Cato institute) and Ehud Eilam (formerly served in the Israeli Ministry of Defense and specializes in the Middle East and Israeli military doctrine) “Why U.S. Would Get Sucked into War if Israel Strikes Iran” CNN August 1st 2012 http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/01/why-u-s-would-get-sucked-into-war-if-israel-strikes-iran/ JW

Iraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has claimed that Hezbollah — the Lebanon-based, Iranian-backed, politico-military terrorist organization – was responsible for the suicide bombing in Bulgaria that killed five Israeli tourists. Amid ongoing U.S. and Israeli threats to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, the bombing raises a critical concern about any potential conflict: a very capable Hezbollah, together with Iran, would likely strike back hard — and not only in the Middle East — drawing the United States into another prolonged and bloody conflict in the Muslim world that it doesn’t need. Such a scenario should make those advocating war with Iran take pause.¶ War-weary Lebanese don’t want their country turning into another battleground against Israel. Hezbollah would also risk alienating its predominately Shiite political constituency. But the ideological and financial ties between top leaders in Tehran and Hezbollah could trump such considerations, especially in the event of an Israeli or Israeli-U.S. attack on fellow Muslims in Iran.¶ Iranian leaders — in danger of losing a vital ally in Syria — may not risk another surrogate’s fall in a confrontation with Israel. But that’s far from a sure thing. Current and former U.S. officials recently told the Washington Post that should Israel strike Iran, Hezbollah’s global network would launch more terrorist attacks. A multi-front conflict could ensue that would rope in America. If Israel starts a war with Iran it is unable to finish, Israel could leave the heavy lifting to the United States while it defends its own borders against Hezbollah.¶ As President Barack Obama proclaimed earlier this year, “We’ve got Israel’s back.” On the one hand, America’s historic — and expanding — cooperation with the Jewish state signifies an enduring commitment to Israel’s security. On the other hand, the unpredictable nature of any potential conflict speaks to the importance of U.S. diplomacy with Hezbollah’s patron, Iran.¶ Iran’s Revolutionary Guards is accused of training Hezbollah since it emerged in the early 1980s. The group eventually came into its own, launching sophisticated guerilla attacks against Israeli military units. Today, the U.S. Department of Defense estimates that Hezbollah receives $100 to $200 million annually from Tehran, as well as training, weapons, and other assistance.¶ Based on the historical record, it’s unlikely that Hezbollah would remain on the sidelines. In 1996’s Operation Grapes of Wrath, the group contested Israel’s massive air and ground firepower with hundreds of rocket attacks into Israel proper. In the summer of 2006, following Hezbollah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched air and ground attacks over Lebanon, and Hezbollah used real-time signals intelligence to ambush Israeli commandos, and fired more than 4,000 rockets into northern Israel, one of the most serious assaults on the Jewish state. Neither Israel nor Hezbollah scored a decisive victory. A stalemate between the Levant’s American and Iranian clients could play out again.¶ As Hezbollah has evolved from guerilla incursions to conventional campaigns, the group has exposed Israel’s conventional weaknesses, but also provided Israel an opportunity to correct its mistakes. Hezbollah could face massive Israeli ground and air assaults. Nevertheless, leaders in Washington and Tel Aviv also have a troubling history of underestimating their adversaries.¶ Indeed, rigorous accounting of Hezbollah’s current military tactics and capabilities is lacking. Last year, Hezbollah successfully unraveled the CIA’s spy network in Lebanon, identifying and capturing American spies who had infiltrated Hezbollah’s ranks. Little is known about the group since the 2006 war. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, has suggested Syria colludes with Iran to arm Hezbollah with more potent weapons. The IDF’s assessment is that Hezbollah possesses long-range, surface-to-air missiles and Russian-made air-defense systems. Additionally, it’s estimated that the group has a firebase of over 10,000 fighters and between 60,000 to 80,000 missiles and rockets.¶ Hezbollah would certainly face torrential Israeli ground and air offensives. But the possibility that any conflict could result in a pyrrhic deadlock is worrying, not only for Israel, but also for America.¶ Over the past year, American leaders have ratcheted up tensions with Tehran while doing little to reassure Israelis reluctant to rely on America. Beating the drums of war could spell doom as a form of psychological pressure. If Israel attacks Iran and Hezbollah missiles rain down on Israeli streets, America may be pulled into conflict with a capable and resilient guerilla foe that it knows very little about.

#### Israel strike escalates – causes global war.

Snyder 15 Michael “WHY ISRAEL IS GOING TO BOMB IRAN” Info Wars July 12th 2015 <http://www.infowars.com/why-israel-is-going-to-bomb-iran/> JW

Thanks to Barack Obama, it is only a matter of time before Israel feels forced to conduct a massive military strike against Iran’s nuclear program. When that happens, Iran will strike back, and hundreds if not thousands of missiles will rain down on Israel. This exchange will likely spark a major regional war in the Middle East, and that could end up plunging the entire planet into chaos. If Barack Obama was attempting to prevent such a scenario from playing out, he failed miserably. Personally, I think that the deal that was just made with Iran is absolutely horrible. Perhaps you disagree. Perhaps you believe that it is the greatest piece of diplomacy of all time. But it doesn’t really matter what any of us think. If this deal was going to work, it had to be strong enough to convince Israel that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has been completely stopped. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sworn that he will never, ever let Iran get a nuclear weapon, and he has pledged to use military force if necessary. So what Barack Obama needed was a deal that would calm Israeli nerves while satisfying the Iranians at the same time. Such a deal may have theoretically been impossible, but that is what it was going to take to prevent war. Instead, Obama has made a deal which has utterly horrified the Israeli government. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even called it “a license to kill“. So now the odds that war will happen have gone way up, but Barack Obama is too busy congratulating himself to notice. And it isn’t just the Israeli government that has responded very negatively to this deal. One recent survey found that a staggering 74 percent of Israelis do not believe that this deal will prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. A different survey discovered that 47 percent of Israelis would now support a military strike against Iran and only 35 percent of Israelis are currently against one. Of course the Israeli government would very much prefer not to have to bomb Iran. Before resorting to military action, the Israeli government will certainly try to encourage the U.S. Congress to derail this deal. And we should probably expect to see more covert action against Iran’s nuclear program. But in the end, those methods will almost certainly not be enough. At that point, the Israeli government will have a decision to make, and I think that the following exchange between Netanyahu and Steve Forbes gives us some insight into what Israeli officials are thinking right now… \*\*\*\*\* BENJAMIN NETANYAHU: I think if the deal goes through we’re in danger of war, and it might be the worst kind of war we can imagine. Because this deal will open the way for Iran not to get a bomb but many bombs. Within a decade it will be free to enrich uranium on an unlimited basis. And it will be able to make the fissile core for dozens of bombs–indeed, hundreds of bombs–which it can then put on the hundreds of ICBMs it already has. Under this deal Iran is going to get $100 billion to $300 billion, which it will be able to use to fund its terrorism and its aggression in the region–its aim being to destroy Israel. Given Iran’s history of aggression, I’d say that this double bonanza of a guaranteed pathway to a nuclear arsenal and a jackpot of money to continue its aggression actually makes the danger of war, even nuclear war, a lot greater. SF: You make a very important point. Even if Iran sticks to the deal, which is highly problematical, in a decade it will be a major global nuclear power, and it will have ballistic missiles. BN: Iran is producing them, and guess what? Within a few years they will be able to reach the Eastern seaboard of the United States. And then every point in the United States. But this deal will also enable Iran to tip those missiles with nuclear weapons, with atomic bombs. And I think it’s a huge mistake to allow the foremost sponsor of terrorism in the world, Iran, to have nuclear weapons, as well as the capacity to give such weapons to its terrorist surrogates. This is a big, big mistake. Not only endangering Israel and the entire Middle East but the entire world, specifically the United States. The mullahs, the dictators in Tehran, they call us the little Satan; they call America the big Satan. You are their ultimate target, and you should not give such a terrorist regime the weapons of mass destruction. Because I think the greatest danger facing our world is the marriage of militant Islam with nuclear weapons. Here you have a militant Islamic state, Iran, arming itself with nuclear weapons and receiving a huge cash bonanza in the bargain. That’s a mistake. \*\*\*\*\* Let there be no misunderstanding – as long as Benjamin Netanyahu is in power the Israeli government will never, ever allow Iran to build nuclear weapons. This deal that Barack Obama just made with Iran guarantees the Iranians a path to a nuclear weapon, but the Obama administration is apparently hoping that regime change will happen before that time if they are able to kick the can down the road far enough. But the big mistake that almost everyone in the western world is making when analyzing this deal is that they are assuming that the Iranians will actually keep their promises. Just like the U.S. government, the Iranians have a very long track record of blatantly lying. And they were caught lying even in the midst of these recent negotiations. The National Council of Resistance of Iran produced evidence that the Iranians were enriching uranium intended for nuclear weapons at a site known as “Lavizan-3” just outside of Tehran. But even after this information came out, the Iranians and the Obama administration just continued with their negotiations as if this facility did not exist. This is how utterly incompetent the Obama administration is. The Iranians were hiding things and blatantly lying to us before the negotiations were even completed. And the truth is that it is possible that Iran might already have developed nuclear weapons. Let us hope that this is not the case, but if reports about Lavizan-3 are accurate, the Iranian nuclear program may be far more advanced than any of us have been led to believe. Sadly, most people in the western world end up believing what they want to believeabout Iran instead of what the facts on the ground actually tell us. Not too long from now, I believe that we will see some sort of “trigger event” which will motivate the Israeli government to finally conduct a massive military strike against the Iranian nuclear program. Israel has a history of conducting these kinds of assaults, and the Israeli military has been preparing for just such an attack for a very long time. The following comes from a recent article by Joel C. Rosenberg… Israel has used surprise military force twice to neutralize foreign nuclear programs. In 1981, the Israeli Air Force attacked and destroyed Iraq’s nuclear facilities. Then in 2007, the Israelis attacked and destroyed a Syrian nuclear facility being built with the help of the North Koreans. An attack on Iran’s facilities would be far more complex, and the possible retaliatory blowback could be horrendous. But yet, the Israelis certainly have the capability to do what they need to do, and they’ve been preparing for years for that moment. Given Israel’s historic track record, it is possible Israeli leaders will come to the point of feeling they have no choice but to launch attacks on Iran. And just because Iran has made a “deal” with us, the American people should not assume that we have now become “friends” with the Iranian government. In fact, the president of Iran recently led a march through the streets of Tehran during which the crowds were chanting “death to America”… “Even over the weekend, as Iran continued to receive more and more concessions at the negotiating table, Iranian President Rouhani led a march of hatred in the streets of Tehran in which the masses cried, ‘Death to America! Death to Israel!‘” Netanyahu said, describing Iran’s recent “Al Quds (Jerusalem) Day” in an address to the Knesset Monday. What a horrible thing to want. Even though I am very pro-Israel, I would never wish death to Iran. The Iranian people work hard, they take care of their families, and most of them want peace. Unfortunately, Iran is run by a cadre of radical Islamic nutjobs that are obsessed with wiping the nation of Israel off the face of the planet. For a long time, Israel and Iran have been on a collision course, and now time is running out. War is coming to the Middle East, and it is going to be absolutely horrifying. So who will ultimately be victorious in this coming war? Please feel free to share what you think by posting a comment below…

#### \_. Oil shocks – Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz in response to a strike – that shuts down huge portions of the global oil trade.

Ebel 10 Robert (senior adviser in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he offers his views on world oil and energy issues, with particular emphasis on the former Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. He was project director for a number of nuclear-related reports, including the Global Nuclear Materials Management project, and for the three-volume report, e Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st Century, cochaired by Senator Sam Nunn and Dr. James Schlesinger. At CSIS he is also codirector of the Caspian Sea Oil Study Group and of the Oil Markets Study Group.) “Geopolitics of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Program: But Oil and Gas Still Matter” Center for Strategic & International Studies March 2010 <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/100312_Ebel_IranNuclear_web.pdf> JW

Contemplation of any military act against Iran must always consider that retribution, in the form of closure of the Strait of Hormuz or attempts to do so, would be taken. The importance of the strait to world oil flows is unquestioned. Oil flows through the strait account for roughly 40 percent of all globally traded oil supply. Iran recognizes that dependence, as does every oil-importing country. Looking ahead, the International Energy Agency predicts that oil supplies moving through the strait will reach between 30 to 34 million b/d by 2020. But dependence works both ways. Just as importers depend on unrestricted oil movements through the strait, the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf are dependent on the strait to an even higher degree. As much as 90 percent of the oil exported from the Gulf passes through the strait. At times national interests may prevail, as they did during the Iran-Iraq war. Both nations attacked tankers heading for their respective ports. The navigable channels are quite narrow and thus lend themselves to mining and perhaps to military attack from the shore. Interruption of tanker traffic could occur, but only temporarily. World opinion would be quick to support clearing the strait for safe tanker passage and punishing Iran for such actions.

#### Iran can easily close the Strait of Hormuz if they try – causes US recession and oil shocks.

Huessy 6/8 Peter (president of his own defense consulting firm, GeoStrategic Analysis, and senior defense consultant at the Air Force Association) “The Strait of Hormuz in Danger” Defense News June 8th 2016 <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2016/06/08/strait-hormuz-danger-navy/85599208/> JW

Every day, two-thirds of all oil consumed world-wide passes through seven ocean choke points. The most vital of these, the Strait of Hormuz, is the gateway to the Persian Gulf’s oil shipment ports, and is bordered by Iran, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. General Hossein Salami, deputy commander of Iran’s powerful Revolutionary Guard, recently said Iranian forces will close the Strait of Hormuz if the United States “threatens” Iran. In the past, similar threats by Iran have largely been dismissed. Why? Because America and its allies believe the presence of a strong U.S. navy in the region makes such threats empty. But should the threat now be taken seriously? Unfortunately, the U.S. Navy’s ability to keep the Strait open is weaker than in the recent past, and Iranian military capabilities are measurably stronger. It is not as if we had no warning of the problem. In a Pentagon wargame in 2002 to test U.S. ability to keep the Strait open, the U.S. Navy failed spectacularly. A carrier and ten cruisers were “sunk” as a retired U.S. Marine general carried the day for the Red Team, simulating Iranian unconventional tactics to great effect. Despite the recent surge in U.S. oil production, there would still be serious economic impacts on the United States from a cut-off of oil transiting the Strait of Hormuz. If the Strait was blocked for an extended period, oil prices would spike and the US economy would likely be thrown into recession.The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s primary maritime energy choke point. Through that narrow waterway passes more than 17 million barrels of oil – more than a third of all maritime-traded oil -- each day. And ocean-going oil accounts for nearly two-thirds of all oil used daily in the world, between 93-96 million barrels, of which the U.S. uses 19.3 million barrels. History is instructive. Every major oil-price hike for the past four decades, including those in 1973, 1979, 1991, 2001, and 2008, was shortly followed by a rise in American unemployment and an economic recession. Five years ago, Admiral Habibollah Sayari, then the Iranian navy commander, said closing the strait was "as easy as drinking a glass of water." At that time, most military analysts were unimpressed. Max Boot and Bradley Russell with the Council on Foreign Relations, shrugged off the threat, retorting, “Actually it would be about as easy as drinking an entire bucket of water in one gulp.” They added that “Iran tried this trick before and failed miserably,” referring to April 18, 1988, when President Reagan ordered the U.S. Navy to end Iranian naval harassment in the Gulf. Operation Praying Mantis was launched, the Navy’s biggest surface combat action since World War II, and Iranian attacks on Persian Gulf shipping ceased. Fast forward to 2016. Could Iran now successfully close the Strait of Hormuz? New factors suggest the answer to that question is “Yes.” As noted earlier, a wargame, “Millennium Challenge 2002,” proved the U.S. would have great difficulty in keeping the Strait open. And since that fiasco, the U.S. fleet’s weapons, tactics and strategy have only been marginally improved. The fleet has shrunk to 272 combatant ships even in the face of analysis that a robust maritime security strategy can only be implemented with a fleet of at least 350 ships. For example, just five of our 10 carrier battlegroups are now operational and only two are regularly available. According to the Navy Times, “The tense waters of Asia-Pacific or the Middle East could go for weeks or months without a U.S. aircraft carrier patrolling there.” On the other hand, Iran has improved its military assets over what they had on hand in 2002, including vast numbers of sophisticated missiles that can reach U.S. and Arab bases far from the Gulf. And there is more to worry about than the Strait of Hormuz. Iran-backed Houthis are destabilizing Yemen. If Yemen were to become a puppet state it would give Iran control of the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, through which 7.3 million barrels of oil pass daily.

#### Oil shocks cause extinction.

Lendman 7 Stephen Lendman, Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization. “Resource Wars - Can We Survive Them?” Rense.com, 6-6-7, pg. http://www.rense.com/general76/resrouce.htm

With the world's energy supplies finite, the US heavily dependent on imports, and "peak oil" near or approaching, "security" for America means assuring a sustainable supply of what we can't do without. It includes waging wars to get it, protect it, and defend the maritime trade routes over which it travels. That means energy's partnered with predatory New World Order globalization, militarism, wars, ecological recklessness, and now an extremist US administration willing to risk Armageddon for world dominance. Central to its plan is first controlling essential resources everywhere, at any cost, starting with oil and where most of it is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The New "Great Game" and Perils From It The new "Great Game's" begun, but this time the stakes are greater than ever as explained above. The old one lasted nearly 100 years pitting the British empire against Tsarist Russia when the issue wasn't oil. This time, it's the US with help from Israel, Britain, the West, and satellite states like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan challenging Russia and China with today's weapons and technology on both sides making earlier ones look like toys. At stake is more than oil. It's planet earth with survival of all life on it issue number one twice over. Resources and wars for them means militarism is increasing, peace declining, and the planet's ability to sustain life front and center, if anyone's paying attention. They'd better be because beyond the point of no return, there's no second chance the way Einstein explained after the atom was split. His famous quote on future wars was : "I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones." Under a worst case scenario, it's more dire than that. There may be nothing left but resilient beetles and bacteria in the wake of a nuclear holocaust meaning even a new stone age is way in the future, if at all. The threat is real and once nearly happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. We later learned a miracle saved us at the 40th anniversary October, 2002 summit meeting in Havana attended by the US and Russia along with host country Cuba. For the first time, we were told how close we came to nuclear Armageddon. Devastation was avoided only because Soviet submarine captain Vasily Arkhipov countermanded his order to fire nuclear-tipped torpedos when Russian submarines were attacked by US destroyers near Kennedy's "quarantine" line. Had he done it, only our imagination can speculate what might have followed and whether planet earth, or at least a big part of it, would have survived.

#### US is key to global economy; growth solves multiple existential threats.

Haass 13 Richard (President of the Council on Foreign Relations) “The World Without America” April 30th 2013 <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/repairing-the-roots-of-american-power-by-richard-n--haass>

Let me posit a radical idea: The most critical threat facing the United States now and for the foreseeable future is not a rising China, a reckless North Korea, a nuclear Iran, modern terrorism, or climate change. Although all of these constitute potential or actual threats, the biggest challenges facing the US are its burgeoning debt, crumbling infrastructure, second-rate primary and secondary schools, outdated immigration system, and slow economic growth – in short, the domestic foundations of American power. Readers in other countries may be tempted to react to this judgment with a dose of schadenfreude, finding more than a little satisfaction in America’s difficulties. Such a response should not be surprising. The US and those representing it have been guilty of hubris (the US may often be the indispensable nation, but it would be better if others pointed this out), and examples of inconsistency between America’s practices and its principles understandably provoke charges of hypocrisy. When America does not adhere to the principles that it preaches to others, it breeds resentment. But, like most temptations, the urge to gloat at America’s imperfections and struggles ought to be resisted. People around the globe should be careful what they wish for. America’s failure to deal with its internal challenges would come at a steep price. Indeed, the rest of the world’s stake in American success is nearly as large as that of the US itself. Part of the reason is economic. The US economy still accounts for about one-quarter of global output. If US growth accelerates, America’s capacity to consume other countries’ goods and services will increase, thereby boosting growth around the world. At a time when Europe is drifting and Asia is slowing, only the US (or, more broadly, North America) has the potential to drive global economic recovery. The US remains a unique source of innovation. Most of the world’s citizens communicate with mobile devices based on technology developed in Silicon Valley; likewise, the Internet was made in America. More recently, new technologies developed in the US greatly increase the ability to extract oil and natural gas from underground formations. This technology is now making its way around the globe, allowing other societies to increase their energy production and decrease both their reliance on costly imports and their carbon emissions. The US is also an invaluable source of ideas. Its world-class universities educate a significant percentage of future world leaders. More fundamentally, the US has long been a leading example of what market economies and democratic politics can accomplish. People and governments around the world are far more likely to become more open if the American model is perceived to be succeeding. Finally, the world faces many serious challenges, ranging from the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, fight climate change, and maintain a functioning world economic order that promotes trade and investment to regulating practices in cyberspace, improving global health, and preventing armed conflicts. These problems will not simply go away or sort themselves out. While Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may ensure the success of free markets, it is powerless in the world of geopolitics. Order requires the visible hand of leadership to formulate and realize global responses to global challenges. Don’t get me wrong: None of this is meant to suggest that the US can deal effectively with the world’s problems on its own. Unilateralism rarely works. It is not just that the US lacks the means; the very nature of contemporary global problems suggests that only collective responses stand a good chance of succeeding. But multilateralism is much easier to advocate than to design and implement. Right now there is only one candidate for this role: the US. No other country has the necessary combination of capability and outlook. This brings me back to the argument that the US must put its house in order – economically, physically, socially, and politically – if it is to have the resources needed to promote order in the world. Everyone should hope that it does: The alternative to a world led by the US is not a world led by China, Europe, Russia, Japan, India, or any other country, but rather a world that is not led at all. Such a world would almost certainly be characterized by chronic crisis and conflict. That would be bad not just for Americans, but for the vast majority of the planet’s inhabitants.

### Underview

#### 1. Prefer a comparing worlds paradigm—the neg must prove proactive desirability of a competitive advocacy. Truth-testing gives the neg an infinite amount of NIBs-they can prove morality doesn’t exist, it’s inaccessible, or read multiple side constraint theories. If they have to prove desirability then they share assumptions with the aff which levels out the playing field, so it’s key to fairness. This takes out textuality standards on T because they presume my burden is to prove the resolution is true

#### 2. Aff gets 1AR theory- otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this. 1AR theory is drop the debater- the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance- you must be punished.

#### 3. Vote aff if I win a counter interp to T

A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible unless I can collapse to the top layer.

#### 4. If the neg wins T, reevaluate my offense underneath their interp by dropping the aff advocacy, not the aff offense.

A. Substantive education – 1AR restart means we still get to discuss the topic and learn as opposed to devoting the whole round to theory.

B. Stratskew – there are multiple bidirectional interps that every aff will violate, a frontlined neg will always win the T debate if they can pick whatever the aff doesn’t do and go hard for the 2NR as a voter.

# 1AR Case Debate

## Extensions

### Iranian Prolif

#### Even after the deal, Iran is allowed to use 5,000 centrifuges which have the capability of being used to make nuclear weapons – that’s Tirone 16.

#### Iran’s cheating on the deal and attempting to make nukes – that’s Rafizadeh 8/4. Prefer this evidence:

#### A] Multiple reports indicate Iran’s cheating which prove single instances aren’t outliers but a repeated pattern.

#### B] The info is from Germany’s intelligence agency, not a specific author who is subject to biases – means its most likely to be true.

#### C] The Robbins 15 card says Iran has a long history of cheating on agreements which means its more likely they would conform to past foreign policy strategies, not go new.

#### Even if I lose that Iran’s cheating, they’ll still get nuclear weapons.

#### A] The Rafizadeh evidence says that the deal has installed new requirements which allow development of enriched uranium before expiration, which means they don’t have to cheat to make nukes.

#### B] Negotiating the deal required us to abandon our message of non-proliferation by conceding them the right to enrich – when it expires we’ll be powerless. That’s Abrams 15.

#### C] The breakout time has shrunk to almost zero which means once the deal expires there’s no chance the west can intervene. At the very worst they’ll have a nuke in 10 years. That’s Robbins.

#### Iranian prolif causes nuclear war – that’s Goldberg 12. Heightens instability and increases the likelihood of preemption from Israel or Iran. This outweighs:

#### A. Probability – Israel and Iran have zero communications channels. US and Russia barely escaped nuke war and we had impeccable communication. That means miscalc is bound to happen.

#### B. Cognitive bias enhances the risk – leaders are more likely to jump the gun because they perceive incomplete intelligence as a threat. That means traditional impact calc doesn’t apply because the actors aren’t able to solve.

#### C. Magnitude – escalation means other countries get drawn in which affects the entire globe as opposed to localized problems.

### \*Preemption Scenario

#### Israel will launch a preemptive nuclear strike on Iran. That’s Bosma 15 – two arguments:

#### A. The deal leaves them with no choice – the US traditionally would aid them in an Iranian attack but a provision of the deal was that we protect Iran, that means we can’t intervene to solve.

#### B. Israel perceives Iran as an existential threat due to senior officials promoting the ideology of nuclear war as holy.

#### Nuclear preemptive strike on Tehran would cause millions of deaths. That’s Turse 13. This outweighs:

#### A. Magnitude – the expert that ran this test predicted it to be the most fatal nuclear attack ever conceived of.

#### B. Probability – the data is based on declassified Defense Department software and was developed for five years ensuring maximal accuracy.

#### C. Iranian cities are more likely to suffer because of weak building construction, topography, and high urbanization. A single attack would wipe out 86% of the population.

### Israel Will Strike

#### Netanyahu will strike nuclear facilities. That’s DePetris 15. He’s talked about it in the past extensively and is already prepared – small geopolitical changes would cause an attack with no reason to hold back.

### M/E Conflict Scenario

#### Iran retaliates by ordering Hezbollah and Hamas to attack Israel – both groups have stockpiles of weapons donated by Iran. That’s DePetris 15.

#### Extend Innocent and Eilam 12 – US gets drawn in to help fight against the terrorist groups while Israel protects its borders – causes a regional ground conflict that’s prolonged because Hezbollah is a guerilla foe.

#### Escalates to global war: that’s Snyder 15. Small trigger events will motivate Israel to strike and every major power will have a stake in the issue, causing world war three.

### Oil Shocks Scenario

#### Iran will retaliate by closing the Strait of Hormuz because they understand everyone’s dependence on its oil. That’s Ebel 10.

#### Extend Huessy 6/8. That causes major oil shocks and throws the US into a recession. 40% of all globally traded oil goes through the strait.

#### Oil shocks cause extinction; that’s Lendman 7. In order to maintain its security, the US will wage wars to get more oil, causing a nuclear Armageddon over resources.

#### Extend Haas 13. US economic growth is key to powering the global economy through recession. Without a strong economy, WMDs, climate change, disease, and armed conflicts are inevitable because there will be no stable world leadership.

## Prolif Adv.

### Nuclear Iran Bad

#### Nuclear Iran causes regional arms race – global nuke war and nuclear terrorism.

Kroenig 12 Matthew (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FIELD CHAIR, Department of Government at Georgetown) “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option” Foreign Affairs January/February 2012 Issue <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2012-01-01/time-attack-iran> JW

Some states in the region are doubting U.S. resolve to stop the program and are shifting their allegiances to Tehran. Others have begun to discuss launching their own nuclear initiatives to counter a possible Iranian bomb. For those nations and the United States itself, the threat will only continue to grow as Tehran moves closer to its goal. A nuclear-armed Iran would immediately limit U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East. With atomic power behind it, Iran could threaten any U.S. political or military initiative in the Middle East with nuclear war, forcing Washington to think twice before acting in the region. Iran’s regional rivals, such as Saudi Arabia, would likely decide to acquire their own nuclear arsenals, sparking an arms race. To constrain its geopolitical rivals, Iran could choose to spur proliferation by transferring nuclear technology to its allies -- other countries and terrorist groups alike. Having the bomb would give Iran greater cover for conventional aggression and coercive diplomacy, and the battles between its terrorist proxies and Israel, for example, could escalate. And Iran and Israel lack nearly all the safeguards that helped the United States and the Soviet Union avoid a nuclear exchange during the Cold War -- secure second-strike capabilities, clear lines of communication, long flight times for ballistic missiles from one country to the other, and experience managing nuclear arsenals. To be sure, a nuclear-armed Iran would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. But the volatile nuclear balance between Iran and Israel could easily spiral out of control as a crisis unfolds, resulting in a nuclear exchange between the two countries that could draw the United States in, as well.

## Israel Adv.

### Str8 of Hormuz

#### Strait closure is a serious threat to the global economy.

Durden 12 Tyler “What Closing The Straits Of Hormuz Will Mean In 3 Simple Charts” Zero Hedge March 14th 2012 <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/what-closing-straits-hormuz-will-mean-3-simple-charts> JW

While WTI hovers around $105.5 (slightly underperforming USD strength), Brent has notably outperformed with the Brent-WTI spread now edging towards $20 (from under $15 two weeks ago). Given the increasing tension, we thought it useful to get a grasp of just what an oil-supply shock means. BNP points out that in all but one of the historical oil price shocks of the last 40 years, equities have notably underperformed oil (understandably) but the higher the oil price rise, the higher the chance of negative absolute returns for stocks. We also note that oil prices tend to rise in anticipation of the crisis and then explode (so arguing that we are discounting an event is proved moot) and the impact (in lost supply) from closing the Straits of Hormuz is an order of magnitude larger than the next five largest events. Regionally, positioning favors the middle-eastern oil producers obviously with Asian EM nations set to suffer dramatically worse than DMs. According to the IEA, 24% of the Global oil consumption passes through that strait. If tensions in Iran increases and this possibility becomes a reality then that would lead to a big tail event. A further spike of 20% in the oil price will be a serious threat to the global economy and we believe in that scenario the equity prices will quickly decouple from the oil prices as we show above in retrospect to the previous oil price shocks. And how to position regionally: Oil Consumption Minus Production As % of GDP... Crucially the stage is not yet completely set for demand crushing oil spike although current levels will already be sufficient to drive sector rotation.

### Israel will Strike

#### The nuclear deal will cause more anti-Israeli terrorism which will spur a strike.

Mandel 15 Eric (Dr. Eric Mandel is the founder and Director of MEPIN™, the Middle East Political and Information Network™. MEPIN is a private Middle East research analysis read by members of Congress, their foreign policy advisors, members of the Knesset, journalists, and organizational leaders. Dr. Mandel regularly briefs members of Congress and their staffs about the current geo-political situation in the Middle East, and meets with members of the Israeli leadership and their advisors. He is the Northeast Co-Chair of StandWithUs, an international organization dedicated to educating the public about Israel, while fighting the BDS movement (Boycott, Divest and Sanction) against Israel) “If Iran cheats can Israel still strike?” The Jerusalem Post September 15th 2015 <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/If-Iran-cheats-can-Israel-still-strike-416230> JW

Despite the recent revelation by former defense minister Ehud Barak that both he and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu favored an Iranian strike, but were stymied by Yuval Steinitz, Moshe Ya’alon, Meir Dagan and Gabi Ashkenazi, an Israeli pre-emptive attack against Iranian nuclear facilities is theoretically still a reality. (The rationale, of course, is that the Iranian leadership repeatedly calls for Israel to be “annihilated” or “wiped off the map.”) Whether this is wise or unwise in the post-Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action world is another story. According to Norman Podhoretz writing in The Wall Street Journal: “With hardly an exception, all of Israel believes that the Iranians are deadly serious... to wipe the Jewish state off the map... once Iran acquires the means to make good on this genocidal commitment, each side will be faced with only two choices: ...rely on the fear of a retaliatory strike... or... launch a pre-emptive strike of its own.” In light of this overwhelming Israeli sentiment, here are four questions: • If Israel decides, for self-preservation, to strike Iran after a deal is in place, what happens to the US-Israel relationship? • Would Israel choose not to strike to preserve that relationship, which in the eyes of many is of existential importance to Israel? • Are you confident that Iran won’t give Hezbollah a nuclear device? If not, are you confident Hezbollah would not put it on a missile headed for Tel Aviv? • Would the world be safer if Israel did strike, upending conventional wisdom? Just as the pre-emptive Israeli strikes on the Iraqi reactor in 1981 and (allegedly) the Syrian reactor in 2009 made the world a less dangerous place, a strike against Iran, even post-agreement, has the potential for many unintended consequences, not all of them necessarily bad. Imagine the apocalyptic scenarios we could be facing today if the Syrian reactor had not been struck in 2009. A nuclear weapon might now be in the hands of the Syrian regime or Islamic State – both of which have already used chemical weapons. When the US president tells Israeli supporters that he has Israel’s back, they should look at how he turned his back on the Kurds. This may all be moot as it assumes Israel still has the capability to deliver a meaningful strike, setting the Iranian nuclear program back many years. But the recent Russian announcement that it will sell the advanced S-300 anti-missile system to Iran in defiance of existing sanctions may close Israel’s window of opportunity. Those Russian missiles could actually force Israel to strike sooner rather than later. President Obama believes American interests are best served by the nuclear deal. Yet the American people and an overwhelming majority of Israelis, from the Right to Left, think the nuclear deal is dangerous. This is because the agreement spared Iran the need to choose between its nuclear program and economic prosperity. Iran received both in the deal. Four more questions to ponder: • Could Israel, against the wishes of every nation on the planet, pre-emptively attack Iran to save itself? • What would follow an Israeli strike? • Will international terrorism rise; will the Iranian proxy Hezbollah and Iranian ally Hamas coordinate a conventional attack against Israel? • Would Iranian hegemonic ambitions be dampened or accelerated? With the conclusion of the deal, Iranian proxies and allies may feel freer to ramp up terrorism against Jews in Europe and South America again, testing Israel and the American response. There is no doubt that the administration would condemn such actions, but then rationalize that no military response should be allowed to threaten the greater benefits of the deal. Netanyahu and the Israeli public may not be so forgiving if Hezbollah emerges from underground tunnels in the north, Hamas joins them via tunnels dug with Iranian largesse, missiles fly from the south or north to the heartland, or Jewish civilians are killed on a tourist bus in Prague, London, or Nairobi.

#### Israel strike’s a real possibility – Netanyahu’s humiliated by the deal and it’s been seriously considered in the past.

Pianin 15 Eric (Washington Editor and D.C. bureau chief of The Fiscal Times. A veteran journalist who spent over 25 years as an editor and reporter for The Washington Post, he has covered D.C. government, congressional budget and tax issues, environmental policy, homeland security and national politics. He served as The Post’s domestic policy editor and congressional editor and spent two years as a national political editor for washingtonpost.com. A native of Detroit, Pianin graduated from Michigan State University and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and previously worked for The Louisville Times, The Minneapolis Star and The Minneapolis Tribune) “After Obama’s Nuke Deal, What Happens If Israel Attacks Iran?” The Fiscal Times July 16th 2016 <http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/07/16/After-Obama-s-Nuke-Deal-What-Happens-If-Israel-Attacks-Iran> JW

On Wednesday, according to a report by Agence France Presse, Netanyahu reiterated his contention that the deal is a “stunning, historic mistake.” He had lobbied actively against the deal while it was being negotiated, including a controversial appearance on the floor of the U.S. Congress earlier this year, to the Obama administration’s annoyance. He also made it very clear that he still sees unilateral military action against Iran as an option, warning darkly that Israel would do whatever was needed to protect itself from the threat of nuclear annihilation at the hands of Iran. Related: The 8 Most Important Things to Know About the Iran Nuclear Deal At one time the Obama administration and Israel had seriously discussed joint air strikes against Iran to destroy uranium enrichment programs being conducted in heavily reinforced underground bunkers and other facilities, but Obama and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton changed directions and urged patience while the U.S. and its allies pursued a diplomatic solution to preventing Iran from getting its hands on the bomb. Gordon Adams, a military expert and historian at American University, said in an interview that if Netanyahu and the Israelis decide to seek a military solution to blocking Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon, they will have to go it alone. “The Israelis put themselves at high risk attacking now under the conditions of this agreement,” he said in an interview. “And the reason they put themselves at high risk is that the White House is now locked into the agreement and the virtues of the agreement as opposed to using military force.” Related: Iran’s Frozen Assets – Where Are they, Exactly? “If Israel decides, screw you all, we’re taking out the Iranian nuclear capability, my judgment is that in round one, they do it all alone,” he said. “They have no backdoor guarantee from the U.S. that the U.S. will support it.” Moreover, as the former Obama administration official noted in an interview on Wednesday, Israel would need powerful U.S. bunker-buster bombs to penetrate Iran’s highly fortified underground nuclear facilities, such as the Fordow site that is built into a mountain and was designed to withstand most aerial attacks. Although precisely how the U.S. would respond to a unilateral assault by Israel on Iran is sheer supposition at this point, Adams described one scenario: The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations would go to the Security Council and seek a resolution to halt the attacks. At the same time, the administration would inform Israel that it will not deliver on future military supplies to Israel. And it would take additional action to try to further isolate Israel as punishment. “Going from a semi-pariah to full-pariah status is the likely first outcome of an Israeli attack,” Adams said. Related: Oil Prices Slide as Traders Eye Iran Supply Glut For Netanyahu, the deal represents one of the most humiliating defeats during his long political career, following as it does his prolonged and aggressive lobbying effort against it. In Israel, a strong current of thought found Netanyahu’s reaction to the deal overblown. It might not be perfect, the sense was, but perfection was probably never attainable.

#### Netanyahu is deadly serious about striking Iran – they are willing to stand alone.

SkyNews 7/6 “Israel 'Will Not Let Iran Get Nuclear Bomb'” Sky News July 6th 2016 http://news.sky.com/story/israel-will-not-let-iran-get-nuclear-bomb-10432760 JW

Israel is ready to act "alone" to stop Iran getting a nuclear bomb, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned. He said the only way to peacefully stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons is to combine tough sanctions with a credible military threat. Mr Netanyahu argued Israel's future is threatened by a "nuclear-armed" Iran seeking its destruction. He told the UN General Assembly: "Israel will not allow Iran to get nuclear weapons. If Israel is forced to stand alone, Israel will stand alone. Don't let up the pressure (on Iran)." He added that the only deal that could be made with Iran's President Hassan Rouhani, was one that "fully dismantles Iran's nuclear weapons program." Seifi, a representative of the Iranian delegation, delivers a response after an address by Israel's PM Netanyahu to the United Nations General Assembly in New York Iran's Khodadad Seifi branded the Mr Netanyahu's remarks "inflammatory" He was dismissive of President Rouhani's diplomatic overtures to the West, and his strong denials that the Tehran government was seeking a nuclear weapon. Mr Netanyahu said: "Rouhani is a wolf in sheep's clothing. A wolf who thinks he can pull the wool over the eyes of the international community. "But like everyone else, I wish we could believe Rouhani's words, but we must focus on Iran's actions." He said Iran’s "vast and feverish" effort to acquire nuclear arms has continued since President Rouhani’s election. "Iran wants to be in a position to rush forward to build nuclear bombs before the international community can detect it and much less prevent it," he claimed.

### Yes War

#### Strikes cause Middle East war.

Marcus 12 Jonathan (BBC Diplomatic Correspondent) “Analysis: How would Iran respond to an Israeli attack?” BBC News March 7th 2012 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17261265> JW

Mr Fitzpatrick believes Iran is more likely to respond against Israel "asymmetrically, and through proxies". Its ally, the Shia Islamist group Hezbollah, has more than 10,000 rocket launchers in southern Lebanon, many of them supplied by Iran. "These are mostly 25km-range (16-mile) Katyushas, but also Fahr-3 (45km; 28 miles), Fajr-5 (75km; 47 miles), Zelzal-2 (200km; 124 miles) and potentially Fateh-110 (200km) plus about 10 Scud-D missiles that can pack a 750kg (1,653lb) payload and hit all of Israel." He says that the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, could also attack Israel with shorter-range rockets. The great danger here is of a more extensive conflict breaking out either between Israel and Hezbollah, or Israel and Hamas. With so much instability in the Middle East - not least because of the Syria crisis - there is a very real risk of an Israeli strike sparking a much broader regional conflagration.

### Afghanistan Add-On

#### [this isn’t ready] \_. Afghanistan – Iran retaliation causes Afghanistan insecurity – causes another US war.

DePetris 15 Daniel (analyst at Wikistrat, Inc., a geostrategic consulting firm, and a freelance researcher. He has also written for CNN.com, Small Wars Journal and The Diplomat) “Iran's Master Plan to Retaliate If Israel Strikes” The National Interest August 3rd 2015 <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-master-plan-retaliate-if-israel-attacks-13476> JW

5. Make Afghanistan a living hell If you think Afghanistan is chaotic today, it can get a lot bloodier if the IRGC-Quds Force increases its covert support to insurgent groups fighting the Afghan national security forces. Whereas Iran and the Taliban were once bitter enemies in the late 1990s (Iran was all but ready to launch military action against the Taliban in 1998 after nine Iranian diplomats were slaughtered by the movement), the two have turned into allies of convenience—if only because both consider the United States to be a major irritant in the region. Thanks to Chelsea Manning’s disclosure of hundreds of thousands of “war logs” to the anti-secrecy group Wikileaks, we know how extensive that cooperation has been in the past: Taliban fighters training across the border in eastern Iran; Iranian agents providing money and weapons to anti-government insurgent groups; millions of dollars in bribes given to senior Afghan government officials, among other cases. Defense Secretary Robert Gates lambasted Iran in 2010 for “playing a double game” in Afghanistan—supporting the Afghan government with cash, while at the very same time building contacts among the various Afghan insurgent factions. At a time when the United States is closing out its fourteen-year engagement in Afghanistan, the last thing that Washington wants is an Iraq-style disintegration of that country’s security situation. Yet this is exactly what Tehran could foment in order to retaliate against an Israeli attack. Such a decision would also have the effect of jeopardizing another multi-year U.S. military engagement in a country where Americans have fought and died.

Afghanistan instability spills over, destabilizes Pakistan, causes nuclear terrorism and Russia US war. Miller[[1]](#footnote-1) ‘12

It was, of course, al-Qaeda’s attack on the US homeland that triggered the intervention in Afghanistan, but wars, once started, always involve broader considerations than those present at the firing of the first shot. The war in **Afghanistan** now **affects** all of America’s interests across South Asia: **Pakistan’s stability and** the security of **its nuclear weapons**, **NATO’s credibility**, **relations with Iran and Russia, transnational drug-trafficking networks**, and more. America leaves the job in Afghanistan unfinished at its peril. The chorus of voices in the Washington policy establishment calling for withdrawal is growing louder. In response to this pressure, President Obama has pledged to withdraw the surge of thirty thousand US troops by September 2012—faster than US military commanders have recommended—and fully transition leadership for the country’s security to the Afghans in 2013. These decisions mirror the anxieties of the electorate: fifty-six percent of Americans surveyed recently by the Pew Research Center said that the US should remove its troops as soon as possible. But it is not too late for Obama (who, after all, campaigned in 2008 on the importance of Afghanistan, portraying it as “the good war” in comparison to Iraq) to reformulate US strategy and goals in South Asia and explain to the American people and the world why an ongoing commitment to stabilizing Afghanistan and the region, however unpopular, is nonetheless necessary he Afghanistan Study Group, a collection of scholars and former policymakers critical of the current intervention, argued in 2010 that al-Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan and is unlikely to return, even if Afghanistan reverts to chaos or Taliban rule. It argued that three things would have to happen for al-Qaeda to reestablish a safe haven and threaten the United States: “1) the Taliban must seize control of a substantial portion of the country, 2) Al Qaeda must relocate there in strength, and 3) it must build facilities in this new ‘safe haven’ that will allow it to plan and train more effectively than it can today.” Because all three are unlikely to happen, the Study Group argued, al-Qaeda almost certainly will not reestablish a presence in Afghanistan in a way that threatens US security. In fact, none of those three steps are necessary for **al-Qaeda** to regain its safe haven and threaten America. The group **could return** to Afghanistan even if the Taliban do not take back control of the country. It could—and probably would—find safe haven there if Afghanistan relapsed into chaos or civil war. Militant groups, including al-Qaeda offshoots, have gravitated toward other failed states, like Somalia and Yemen, but Afghanistan remains especially tempting, given the network’s familiarity with the terrain and local connections. Nor does al-Qaeda, which was never numerically overwhelming, need to return to Afghanistan “in strength” to be a threat. Terrorist operations, including the attacks of 2001, are typically planned and carried out by very few people. Al-Qaeda’s resilience, therefore, means that stabilizing Afghanistan is, in fact, necessary even for the most basic US war aims. The international community should not withdraw until there is an Afghan government and Afghan security forces with the will and capacity to deny safe haven without international help. Setting aside the possibility of al-Qaeda’s reemergence, the United States has other important interests in the region as well—notably preventing **the Taliban** from gaining enough power to **destabilize** neighboring **Pakistan**, which, for all its recent defiance, is officially a longstanding American ally. (It signed two mutual defense treaties with the United States in the 1950s, and President Bush designated it a major non-NATO ally in 2004.) **State failure** in Pakistan brokered by the Taliban **could** **mean** regional chaos and a possible **loss of control of its nuclear weapons**. Preventing such a catastrophe is clearly a vital national interest of the United States and cannot be accomplished with a few drones. Alarmingly, Pakistan is edging toward civil war. A collection of militant Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehrik-e Nafaz-e Shariat-e Mohammadi (TNSM), among others, are fighting an insurgency that has escalated dramatically since 2007 across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan. According to the Brookings Institution’s Pakistan Index, insurgents, militants, and terrorists now regularly launch more than one hundred and fifty attacks per month on Pakistani government, military, and infrastructure targets. In a so far feckless and ineffectual response, Pakistan has deployed nearly one hundred thousand regular army soldiers to its western provinces. At least three thousand soldiers have been killed in combat since 2007, as militants have been able to seize control of whole towns and districts. Tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and militants—the distinction between them in these areas is not always clear—have been killed in daily terror and counterterror operations. The two **insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked**. Defeating the Afghan Taliban would give the United States and Pakistan momentum in the fight against the Pakistani Taliban. A **Taliban takeover** in Afghanistan, on the other hand, **will give new strength to the Pakistani insurgency**, which would gain an ally in Kabul, safe haven to train and arm and from which to launch attacks into Pakistan, and a huge morale boost in seeing their compatriots win power in a neighboring country. Pakistan’s collapse or fall to the Taliban is (at present) unlikely, but the implications of that scenario are so dire that they cannot be ignored. **Even short of** a **collapse**, **increasing** chaos and **instability** in Pakistan **could give cover for terrorists to** increase the intensity and scope of their operations, perhaps even to achieve the cherished goal of **steal**ing **a nuclear weapon**.

lthough our war there has at times seemed remote, Afghanistan itself occupies crucial geography. Situated between Iran and Pakistan, bordering China, and within reach of Russia and India, it sits on a crossroads of Asia’s great powers. This is why it has, since the nineteenth century, been home to the so-called Great Game—in which the US should continue to be a player.Two other players, Russia and Iran, are aggressive powers seeking to establish hegemony over their neighbors. Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons, has an elite military organization (the Quds Force) seeking to export its Islamic Revolution, and uses the terror group Hezbollah as a proxy to bully neighboring countries and threaten Israel. Russia under Vladimir Putin is seeking to reestablish its sphere of influence over its near abroad, in pursuit of which it (probably) cyber-attacked Estonia in 2007, invaded Georgia in 2008, and has continued efforts to subvert Ukraine. Iran owned much of Afghan territory centuries ago, and continues to share a similar language, culture, and religion with much of the country. It maintains extensive ties with the Taliban, Afghan warlords, and opposition politicians who might replace the corrupt but Western-oriented Karzai government. Building a stable government in Kabul will be a small step in the larger campaign to limit Tehran’s influence.Russia remains heavily involved in the Central Asian republics. It has worked to oust the United States from the air base at Manas, Kyrgyzstan. It remains interested in the huge energy reserves in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Russia may be wary of significant involvement in Afghanistan proper, unwilling to repeat the Soviet Union’s epic blunder there. But a US withdrawal from Afghanistan followed by Kabul’s collapse would likely embolden Russia to assert its influence more aggressively elsewhere in Central Asia or Eastern Europe, especially in the Ukraine.A US departure from Afghanistan will also continue to resonate for years to come in the strength and purpose of NATO. Every American president since Harry Truman has affirmed the centrality of the Atlantic Alliance to US national security. The war in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Alliance’s first out-of-area operation in its sixty-year history, was going poorly until the US troop surge. Even with the limited success that followed, allies have complained that the burden in Afghanistan has been distributed unevenly. Some, like the British, Canadians, and Poles, are fighting a shooting war in Kandahar and Helmand, while others, like the Lithuanians and Germans, are doing peacekeeping in Ghor and Kunduz. The poor command and control—split between four regional centers—left decisionmaking slow and poorly coordinated for much of the war. ISAF’s strategy was only clarified in 2008 and 2009, when Generals David McKiernan and Stanley McChrystal finally developed a more coherent campaign plan with counterinsurgency-appropriate rules of engagement.**A bad end in Afghanistan could** **have dire consequences for the Atlantic Alliance**, **leaving** the organization’s future, and especially **its credibility as a deterrent to Russia, in question**. It would not be irrational for a Russian observer of the war in Afghanistan to conclude that **if NATO cannot** make tough **decisions**, field effective fighting forces, or distribute burdens evenly**, it cannot defend Europe**. The United States and Europe must prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result to its operations in Afghanistan—one that both persuades Russia that NATO is still a fighting alliance and preserves the organization as a pillar of US national security.

India an Pakistan are on the brink of war- US withdrawal post 2014 will cause a flood of insurgents in Kashmir. Daniel and Miglani[[2]](#footnote-2) ‘13

(Reuters) - **Pakistan-based militants are preparing to take on India** across the subcontinent **once** Western **troops leave**[**Afghanistan**](http://www.reuters.com/places/afghanistan?lc=int_mb_1001)**next year**, several sources say, **raising the risk of a** dramatic **spike in tensions between** nuclear-armed rivals **India and**[**Pakistan**](http://www.reuters.com/places/pakistan?lc=int_mb_1001).Intelligence sources in[India](http://in.reuters.com/?lc=int_mb_1001)believe that a botched suicide bombing of an Indian consulate in[Afghanistan](http://www.reuters.com/places/afghanistan?lc=int_mb_1001), which was followed within days last week by **a l**ethal **cross-border ambush** on Indian soldiers in disputed Kashmir, **suggest** that **the new campaign** by Islamic militants **may already be underway**.Members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant outfit in[Pakistan](http://www.reuters.com/places/pakistan?lc=int_mb_1001), the group blamed for the 2008 commando-style raid on Mumbai that killed 166 people, told Reuters they were preparing to take the fight to India once again, this time across the region.And a U.S. counter-terrorism official, referring to the attack in Afghanistan, said "LeT has long pursued Indian targets, so it would be natural for the group to plot against them in its own backyard".**Given the** quiet **backing** - or at least blind eye - that many **militant groups enjoy from Pakistan's** shadowy **intelligence services**, **tensions from a new militant campaign****are bound to spill over.** Adding to the volatility, the two nations' armies are trading mortar and gunfire across the heavily militarized frontier that divides Kashmir, and accusing each other of killing troops.Hindu-majority India and Islamic Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947 and came close to a fourth in 1999. The tension now brewing may not escalate into open hostilities, but it could thwart efforts to forge a lasting peace and open trade between two countries that make up a quarter of the world's population. "With the Americans leaving Afghanistan, the restraint on the Pakistani security/jihadi establishment is going too," said a former top official at India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the external intelligence arm."We are concerned about 2014 in either scenario. If the jihadis (Islamist militants) claim success in Afghanistan, they could turn their attention to us. Equally, if they fail, they will attack in wrath."But **Pakistan**, which has a border with India to the east and with Afghanistan to the west, has concerns of its own. It **sees India's expansive diplomacy in Afghanistan as a ploy** to disrupt it from the rear as it battles its own deadly Islamist militancy and separatist forces. **Vying for influence in** a **post-2014 Afghanistan, it worries about India's assistance** to the Afghan army, heightening a sense of encirclement."I'm shocked by these allegations. Pakistan has its own insurgency to deal with. It has no appetite for confrontations abroad," said a Pakistani foreign ministry official referring to the Indian charges of stirring trouble in Afghanistan and on the Kashmir border."If anything, we are looking at our mistakes from the past very critically. These accusations are baseless. India needs to act with more maturity and avoid this sort of propaganda."Both U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry spoke during visits to India recently of the need for New Delhi and Islamabad to resume their stalled peace process as the region heads into a period of uncertainty.FULL-SCALE JIHADAt the core of that uncertainty is the pullback of militants from Afghanistan as U.S. forces head home. Hafiz Sayeed, founder of the LeT, has left no doubt that India's side of Kashmir will become a target, telling an Indian weekly recently: "Full-scale armed Jihad (holy war) will begin soon in Kashmir after American forces withdraw from Afghanistan." The retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 brought a wave of guerrillas into Kashmir to fight India's rule there.This time **the additional risk will be the rivalry between India and Pakistan over Afghanistan itself,** one that threatens to become as toxic as the 60-year dispute in Kashmir. The LeT has said it is fighting Indian forces in Afghanistan as well.

Decreased Afghans stability causes Indo-Pak war- forces both nations to protect vital strategic interests. Overdorf[[3]](#footnote-3) ‘13

NEW DELHI, India — As 2014 approaches, the Obama administration is busy trying to keep its promise of extracting most US troops from Afghanistan. So far, **the U**nited **S**tates **looks set to bungle** the **negotiations,** ceding ground to the Taliban **to facilitate a quick [US] exit**.**That could push** hostilities into a new phase, in which neighboring adversaries **India and Pakistan** would **[to] vie for influence** over the mountainous, landlocked nation. In a worst-case scenario, experts say, if the US were to truly botch the delicate deal-making, the **rivalry** between the two South Asian nuclear powers **could** fuel ongoing violence — or even **devolve into** a proxy **war**.From New Delhi’s perspective, the options are hardly appealing. India could increase its involvement in Afghanistan and risk getting sucked into a bloody quagmire, or watch its fragile neighbor become a vassal state of Pakistan. India and Pakistan’s jostling in Kabul dates back to the Cold War and before. When war broke out after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan supported rival anti-communist factions. India sided with rebels opposed to Islamic extremism; Pakistan backed the group that eventually became the Taliban. **Since** the Bush administration’s **2001** invasion, however, **the US has pressured India to limit its Afghanistan role**, to prevent Pakistan from withdrawing support for the war and cutting vital US supply lines. With the US now ready to bring its soldiers home, India and Pakistan are again wrangling for control. Both foresee disaster if the other were to gain the upper hand.**Islamabad fears** that **India would use Afghanistan to aid insurgents in Pakistan’s** nearby **Baluchistan province**, where rebellion has simmered since the 1970s. **Pakistan** also regards control over Kabul as vital to its military doctrine of “strategic depth” — under which **[hopes]** **Afghanistan would serve as a refuge where its leaders could lead a counterattack in the event of an Indian invasion**.For its part, **India fears** that **resurgent** Islamic **militancy in Afghanistan will stoke** **violence** **in** Indian-administered **Kashmir**, by providing a safe haven and training ground for militants like Lashkar-e-Taiba, perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

Afghanistan is the lynchpin in Sino-Indian and Pakistani relations. Sheraz[[4]](#footnote-4) ‘14

Afghanistan’s one hope was that, eventually, foreign powers would leave it alone and the Afghans would then be forced to make peace among themselves. With the discovery of mineral deposits worth hundreds of billions of dollars, that hope has been extinguished and there is a genuine risk of Afghanistan slipping into greater instability. As the Western powers are considering phasing out of Afghanistan, big new players like China, India, Iran, Russia and Pakistan are having their presence felt. The nature of their presence is different: unexpectedly large demand for raw materials, energy commerce, quest for strategic depth and geo- politics. At the present, a future in Afghanistan without a con- tinuation of foreign interference does not look likely and assigning the buffer zone, a three trillion dollar value, has certainly increased the stakes.Of critical importance is the role of **India and China** **in** any future scenario of Afghanistan mining. Both nations have played the role of Good Samaritan in **Afghanistan** but their **stakes have changed** recently. A Chinese consortium has procured the Aynak copper project and an Indian consortium has been awarded the Hajigak iron ore deposit, securing the minerals for national strategic reasons. What will be the role of these two aspiring super powers in any future scenario of Afghanistan mining, especially the issues of access and evacuation of mineral resources? **China and India do not see eye to eye** on a number of issues. Longstanding **border disputes plague the relationship** and both have different views of Pakistan and its future role in Afghanistan.**Another** critically **important question is** that of t**he** future **role of Pakistan**. Looked upon suspiciously by various stakeholders in Afghanistan; unable to dismantle the infrastructure that has pro- vided funding, training and arms for the Taliban; providing a route for smuggling of illegal minerals from Afghanistan. **Add to this** **the** spread of **radicalism** coupled **with** a lingering **socio-economic crisis** in Pakistan **and we have an** **explosive mix**, which renders the future of the region

Afghan iron is the largest threat to Indo-Pak relations- India is committed to developing a new mine and transporting the ore through Pakistan- Pakistan won’t tolerate increased Indian influence in Kabul. Najafizada and Rupert[[5]](#footnote-5) ‘12

An Indian security guard, cradling a Kalashnikov assault rifle, shadowed two Indian engineers as they inspected the concrete shell of the parliament building they are constructing -- in the Afghan capital of Kabul.Erecting the new seat of government is part of a push by India to seek both profit and a greater strategic role in the nearby country, where Taliban guerrillas battle the government with support from within Pakistan, India’s arch-rival.**India**, having spent $1.5 billion over a decade on Afghan roads, power lines, schools and the parliament, now **is proposing** what may become **Afghanistan’s biggest foreign investment: $11 billion to build an iron mine**, steel mill and railroad.“India is showing its commitment to an unprecedented ambition and role in Afghanistan,” said C. Raja Mohan, a senior fellow at the independent Center for Policy Research in New Delhi. “Stabilizing the northwest of the subcontinent, Afghanistan and Pakistan, is absolutely India’s top foreign- policy priority, because most of our threats come from there.” India’s planned Afghan iron mine would help companies such as Jindal Steel & Power Ltd. (JSP) and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (RINL) by giving them shares in an estimated 1.8 billion tons of ore, for which global prices have more than doubled in the past three years. Afghanistan may see its geographic and economic isolation reduced as India follows China in promising money to build the country’s first major railroads. India Backs Karzai As Afghan anger over the shooting of 16 civilians by an American soldier last month increases calls for an accelerated U.S. exit**, India is seeking to position itself as a rival to China** in investment **in Afghanistan** and as an anti-Taliban force to help the government of President Hamid Karzai. “Instability and radicalism in Afghanistan pose a threat to our common security,” Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna said in a December speech at a conference in Bonn on Afghanistan’s future.“The Indian and Chinese investments will contribute to Afghanistan’s stability” as the U.S. withdraws its main combat forces between now and 2014, said Ali Jalali, a professor at the U.S. National Defense University in Washington and a former Afghan interior minister.“They not only will bring jobs and infrastructure, but these two powerful governments will have a greater direct interest in seeing that all actors in Afghanistan behave moderately,” Jalali said in an interview in New Delhi.Hajigak Iron Mine**India’s expanded role in Afghanistan is anchored in its plan to mine iron ore from** mountain ridges at **Hajigak**, 100 kilometers (60 miles) northwest of Kabul. India’s government backed a group of seven Indian state-owned and private companies that won three of four blocks.The Indian group, the Afghan Iron & Steel Consortium, or AFISCO, has offered to build a steel plant and railroad, and in December asked for $7.8 billion in government loans and guarantees, two people with direct knowledge said then.“They have sought certain assurances regarding the financing,” Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai said at a March 21 press conference in New Delhi. “When they made their bid they were confident that they would have the ability to do it,” he said. “This matter is still under discussion.”AFISCO’s biggest owner, state-controlled Steel Authority of India Ltd., or SAIL, hasn’t said when iron production might begin, although the **New Delhi**-based company **says full developmen**t of the mine and railroad **may take eight to 12 years**. Hajigak would be SAIL’s first expansion beyond India. Ore SuppliesThe Afghan deposit would offer needed future ore supplies for other AFISCO partners, such as JSW Steel Ltd. (JSTL), where profits fell in the quarter ending in December after an Indian court banned mining in Karnataka state.**India’s mines ministry has assembled a** second **group** of state companies, including SAIL, National Aluminium Co. Ltd. (NACL) of Bhubaneswar and Kolkata-based Hindustan Copper Ltd. (HCP), **to bid on licenses to mine copper or gold** offered by the Afghan government, according to Mines Secretary Vishwapati Trivedi. That bid may be combined with a separate offer being assembled by private Indian companies, he said in a March 21 interview in New Delhi. The parliament rising on the outskirts of Kabul is further evidence of the broad engagement envisioned by **Singh and Karzai**, who holds two degrees from Himachal Pradesh University in northern India. In October, the two leaders **signed** **a strategic partnership that will** increase the numbers of Afghan students at Indian universities and may **let India train Afghan** army **troops**.Pakistan’s Reservation**For Pakistan’s military**, which dominates national security policy after having ruled the country for more than half the time since independence in 1947, **India’s growing role** in Afghanistan **appears as a threat**, said Imtiaz Gul, executive director of the independent Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad.“We have always this perception that India will use Afghanistan against us,” he said in a phone interview.Since the 1980s, **Pakistan has backed Afghan guerrilla groups** such as the Taliban’s Haqqani network in attacking Afghan governments, including Karzai’s, Gul said March 26. The goal, he said, was **to keep Afghanistan from aligning** too closely **with India** and from reviving old Afghan sovereignty claims over ethnic Pashtun parts of western Pakistan.Pakistani officials, including Interior Minister Rehman Malik, have said for years that Indian spies in Afghanistan foment insurgency by ethnic Baluch and Pashtun guerrillas near the Afghan border. “We have proof to show that,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit in an interview in Islamabad Feb. 9. “We don’t want to say more than that in public,” he said.No ‘Solid Evidence’Gul and other independent analysts, including Rustam Shah Mohmand, a former Pakistani ambassador in Kabul, say there is no evidence for Pakistan’s claim of Indian subversion. “We say these things because of our India-centric policy,” Mohmand said by phone Feb. 24 from the northwestern city of Peshawar. “But we don’t have any solid evidence to prove that.” Taliban or allied Islamic militant fighters killed at least 58 Indians and Afghans in two suicide bombings of India’s embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009. India accused Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, of assisting the first attack, which Pakistan denied. Other Taliban attacks have killed Indian doctors and aid workers in Kabul and construction workers building a highway in southwestern Afghanistan.Defending TrainsKarzai’s government has deployed dedicated troops to protect a Chinese-owned copper mine at Aynak, south of Kabul, Afghanistan’s biggest mining investment now underway. While no Taliban attacks have been recorded there and Afghanistan promises similar protection for India’s iron mine, the railroads envisioned to carry ores would be more difficult to defend against guerrilla attacks.**India’s** AFISCO **intends to** overcome **Pakistani** **suspicions** enough **to transport** the **iron ore back to India** **through Pakistan**, said Sandeep Jajodia, managing director at Monnet Ispat (MISP), a New Delhi-based steel company that is a member of the group. While **Pakistan bars Indian exports across its territory** to Afghanistan, it lets Afghan companies ship to Indian markets and this year relaxed strictures on its own imports of Indian goods.“Shipping the ore via Pakistan is a logical possibility, but it’s a call we will have to take much later, considering how trade relations between India and Pakistan develop,” Jajodia said in a March 27 interview.**India** also **is considering** construction of a rail line from Afghanistan to **Iran’s port of Chahbahar, which would give it a transport route** that **Pakistan can’t control.**There’s more at stake for **India** than a predictable neighborhood. Its **drive for Afghan iron and copper ore is key** **in Singh’s plan to create 100 million jobs** by raising industrial production to 25 percent of GDP **by 2025**, said Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, a retired Indian ambassador who serves on a government task force reviewing India’s national security needs.“**An essential part of our** **long-term national security** is expanding industry,” Parthasarathy said in an interview in New Delhi. “The pacing of this will depend on stability as the Americans manage their end game. But when the time comes we’ll have streams of Indian construction crews, technicians and plant going in.”

Indo-Pak conflict goes nuclear- Indian air superiority forces Pakistan’s hand. Sharma[[6]](#footnote-6) 11

The US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, argued strongly with her Government to sell Pakistan more F-16 fighter jets to, ironically, prevent a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Patterson, in a 2009 cable, pointed out that **Pakistan is likely to use Nuclear weapons against India in** a matter a few **days if the two countries go to war** with each other again, because Pakistan would start losing the war by then."**To overcome overwhelming Indian military superiority, Pakistan developed** both **its nuclear** and missile **program** and its air power," she wrote two years ago, according to Wikileaks.She pointed out that **India had** nearly **double the number of jets** (736 to 370 jets) that Pakistan has and **many** of them **have the ability to fire missiles at targets that cannot be seen** directly in front or are beyond the visual range. **Pakistani jets,** she points out**, can only fire at targets in sight** and urged the US to help Pakistan overcome the power imbalance.She pointed out that a Pakistan which is evenly or nearly evenly matched with India is less likely to attack India with Nuclear weapons than one which felt it stands no chance."F-16 aircraft, armed with AMRAAM [beyond visual-range missiles], essentially buy time to delay Pakistan considering the nuclear option in a conflict with India. Given India's overwhelming military superiority, this would only be a few days**,** but these days would allow critical time to mediate and prevent nuclear conflict," she said.The Ambassador's comments make it clear that despite political statements on "no first use" of Nuclear weapons, the Americans expect the Pakistanis to use Nuclear weapons against India in case of a war, albeit a few days after the war starts.Patterson pointed out that, as of 2009,Pakistan didn't stand much of a chance of winning a war against India unless it used Nukes."**Pakistan's shortfalls in training and tactics multiply India's edge.** Pakistan also plans to buy/jointly produce 150 inferior JF-17 fighters from China, but it is unclear how they will pay for them. Meanwhile, India plans to acquire 126 multi-purpose fighters (F-18 or equivalent) **that will give India significant new technologies and further expand its air superiority over Pakistan**," she worried.In another cable, she also pointed out that India will not be threatened by the F-16s as it is in the process of buying even more advanced jets."The escalation of Indo-Pak tensions following the Mumbai attacks demonstrated to the Pakistanis that the threat from India still exists. The Pakistani F-16 program, however, will be no match for India's proposed purchase of F-18 or equivalent aircraft," she

The best scientific models indicate even a limited nuclear exchange would cause an agricultural disaster killing billions- my evidence is hyper specific to this scenario. Toon[[7]](#footnote-7) et al 08

Figure 3a indicates changes in global average precipitation and temperature as a function of soot emission, as calculated with the help of a modern version of a major US climate model.6,8 A relatively modest **5 Tg of soot**, which could be **generated in an exchange between India and Pakistan, would** be sufficient to **produce the lowest temperatures** Earth has experienced **in the past 1000 years**—lower than during the post-medieval Little Ice Age or in 1816, the so-called year without a summer. **With 75 Tg of soot**, less than half of what we project in a hypothetical SORT war, **temperatures would correspond to the last full Ice Age**, and **precipitation would decline by** more than **25% globally**. Calculations in the 1980s had already predicted the cooling from a 150-Tg soot injection to be quite large.3 Our new results, however, show that **soot would rise to** **much higher altitudes** than previously believed—indeed, to well above the tops of the models used in the 1980s. As a result**, the time required** for the soot mass **to be reduced** by a factor of *e* **is** about **five years** in our simulations, **as opposed to about** **one** year as assumed in the 1980s. That **increased** **lifetime causes** a more dramatic and **longer-lasting climate response.**The temperature changes represented in figure 3a would have a profound effect on mid- and high-latitude agriculture**. Precipitation changes**, on the other hand, **would** have their greatest **impact** in **the tropics**.6 Even **a** 5-Tg soot injection would lead to **a 40%** precipitation **decrease in** the **Asia**n monsoon region. **South America and Africa** would see a large diminution of rainfall from convection in the rising branch of the Hadley circulation, the major global meridional wind system connecting the tropics and subtropics. Changes in the Hadley circulation’s dynamics can, in general, affect climate on a global scale.

Complementary to temperature change is radiative forcing, the change in energy flux. Figure 3b shows how nuclear **soot changes the radiative forcing at Earth’s surface[the change in the energy flux]** and compares its effect to those of two well-known phenomena: warming associated with greenhouse gases and the 1991 Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption, the largest in the 20th century. Since the Industrial Revolution, greenhouse gases have increased the energy flux by 2.5 W/m2. The transient forcing from the Pinatubo eruption peaked at about −4 W/m2 (the minus sign means the flux decreased). One implication of the figure is that **even a regional war** between India and Pakistan **can force the climate** to a far **greater** degree **than** the **greenhouse gases** that many fear will alter the climate in the foreseeable future. Of course, **the durations** of the forcings **are different**: The radiative forcing **by nuclear-weapons-generated soot might persist for a decade,** but **that from greenhouse gases is expected to last for a century or more, allowing time for the climate system to respond to the forcing.** Accordingly, while the **Ice Age–like temperatures** in figure 3a **could lead to an expansion of sea ice and terrestrial snowpack, they** probably **would not be persistent enough to cause the buildup of global ice sheets. Agriculture responds to length of growing season**, temperature during the growing season, light levels, precipitation, and other factors. The 1980s saw systematic studies of the agricultural changes expected from a nuclear war, but no such studies have been conducted using modern climate models. Figure 4 presents our calculations of the decrease in length of the growing season—the time between freezing temperatures—for the second summer after the release of soot in a nuclear attack.6,8 Even **a 5-Tg soot** injection **reduces the growing season length toward the shortest average range** observed in the midwestern US corn-growing states. Earlier studies concluded that for a full-scale nuclear conflict, “What can be said with assurance . . . is that the **Earth’s human population has a much greater vulnerability to** the indirect effects of nuclear war [including **damage to the world’s agricultural**, transportation, energy, medical, political, and social **infrastructure**], especially mediated **through** impacts on **food productivity and food availability**, than to the direct effects of nuclear war itself.” As a result, “**The indirect effects** could **result in** **the loss** of one to **several *billions* of humans**.Because the soot associated with a nuclear exchange is injected into the upper atmosphere, the stratosphere is heated and stratospheric circulation is perturbed. For the 5-Tg injection associated with a regional conflict, stratospheric temperatures would remain elevated by 30 °C after four years.6–8 The resulting temperature and circulation anomalies would reduce ozone columns by 20% globally, by 25–45% at middle latitudes, and by 50–70% at northern high latitudes for perhaps as much as five years, with substantial losses persisting for an additional five years.7 The calculations of the 1980s generally did not consider such effects or the mechanisms that cause them. Rather, they focused on the direct injection of nitrogen oxides by the fireballs of large-yield weapons that are no longer deployed. Global-scale models have only recently become capable of performing the sophisticated atmospheric chemical calculations needed to delineate detailed ozone-depletion mechanisms. Indeed, simulations of ozone loss following a SORT conflict have not yet been conducted.

# Substance Frontlines

## AT: Nuclear Imperialism K

### 1AR Block

#### 1. This K is wrong. Its logic causes a nuclear arms race which results in more imperialism, Pakistan disproves the link, and environmental imperialism turns and outweighs.

Fiyouzat 7 Reza “Iran’s Nuclear Program” Counterpunch September 29th 2007 <http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/09/29/iran-s-nuclear-program/> JW

Second, this argument has an undertone of wishful thinking, imagining that a nuclear weapon-capable Iran is the only guarantee of a ‘détente’ that leaves the Iranian people free from imperialist harassment. In effect, this argument wishes for and indirectly advocates for a new nuclear arms race, as this is presented to be the only deterrent capable of stopping an imperialist invasion; consequently, this argument calls for an increasing amount of the social resources of Third World nations to be sucked up by a mad proposition. This logic also cannot explain the case of Pakistan, a nuclear weapons-capable nation, which is a virtual slave to the designs of the imperialists. Pakistan, currently run by a sycophantic regime inseparable from imperialists, is not safe from the insults thrown it by the U.S. ruling elites and their representatives, every so often reminding the Pakistani regime of how much of a slave they are in the eyes of the U.S. ruling classes (I am referring to Barak Obama’s prescription for invading Pakistan should the need arise to ‘fight terrorism’ there). Third, this argument is anti-environmentalist, and goes against the stance normally taken by the western left with regards to the need for a ban on nuclear industry as a whole, on environmental grounds. The fact that Iran’s nuclear energy is to be provided by a nuclear plant constructed over a period of thirty-some-years, in haphazard fashion, by different companies and countries at different points, in Bushehr, which is located on tectonically active plates, should alarm all anti-nuclear writers and activists wherever they may be. Any leftist, who, in standing with people’s health and well-being, must by tradition strive to present a materialist outlook and analysis, yet fails to take this geological fact into account, is not only an ignorant leftist but is an irresponsible advocate. Fourth, given that most western leftists have little problem foreseeing the very probable harms of the nuclear industry in their own backyard, one can only conclude that racism may have something to do with their line of thinking when they ask us to tolerate all the ills of an industry that has hardly been an accident-free, healthy and safe alternative for providing energy in the west. This thinking must pre-suppose either that our environment is not worth keeping clean or that Iranians have not ‘developed’ enough to be worried about a clean environment. Like all good, obedient subjects, we are merely pawns in the mental schemes of what these leftists (much like their rightist counterparts) wish to happen in our world. The argument is indicative of a defeatist mentality that can only wish for a better world in its own backyard yet at the same time, ironically, cannot even imagine a different world possible for us lesser peoples in the Third World. Instead of leading a spirited tactical (yet strategically-oriented) fight against the nuclear industry in the U.S. and against the use of depleted uranium in munitions used in Iraq and Afghanistan \_\_ an act by the U.S. armed forces and weapons manufacturers that constitutes a crime against humanity, a war crime, is actionable in an international tribunal, and which should be used to call for legal mass mutinies by the armed forces serving in Iraq \_\_ in short, instead of strategically joining other international forces calling for a Nuclear-Free World, these ‘leftists’ would instead have us read the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty very carefully, wherein we can find the particular clause pinpointing the right of signatory nations to master the enrichment cycle! We are forced to ask in bewilderment: Since when have such trivialities bothered the imperialists? Since when have imperialist invasions been based on conscionable, altruistic reasons to do with legalities? The Left currently has little impact on the actually existing political reality, so the only things we can bring to the political table are ideas: questions, critiques, persuasive explanations, occasional inspirations, maybe some good suggestions, and if we are spirited enough, some fun and delight; and in all these, we most definitely must stick to our principles. Now, since we are in the realm of ideas, why be so stingy? Where has your imagination gone? Why be so morose? Why not wish for environmentally healthy, socially just, empowered Third World societies capable of putting up a real fight against the imperialists, in full international solidarity with each other and with the working peoples of the First World? Fifth, and finally, those arguing in support of Iranian regime’s nuclear program are not only capitulating to an imperialist-dictated frame of debate, they aid and abet a theocratic regime so reactionary that it stones human beings, while buried waist-deep, to death; for the ‘crime’ of loving another human being. If you want to defend the people of Iran (which is what we have been doing), do so based on principles and not based on some realpolitik knee-jerk, bankrupt Cold War mentality that ends you up in bed with reactionaries.

#### 2. TURN-rejecting Iranian nuclear weapons is key to empowering Iranian citizens to resist imperialism.

Fiyouzat 7 Reza “Iran’s Nuclear Program” Counterpunch September 29th 2007 <http://www.counterpunch.org/2007/09/29/iran-s-nuclear-program/> JW

Our argument To push aside diversions, let me state that those of us Iranian socialists, who oppose a nuclear energy program in Iran, speak from a clear and unambiguous anti-imperialist stance. Wars, and very specifically imperialist wars, are universally launched by the ruling classes, and are done so only for the benefit of the ruling classes, while all the harm and injuries to the flesh, mind and the spirit, and all the economic costs are borne by the working peoples of the warring states. Wars are therefore to be universally opposed and condemned. Further, we declare that the true reason for the current threats of (or actual) military attacks on Iran by the U.S. forces have as their political objective the subduing of an independently minded Iranian government in pursuit of its own strategic goals, which do not necessarily coincide with the strategic interests of the people of Iran. Our opposition to imperialism and imperialist wars is based on our standing with the health and well-being of the people, their interests, their security and their freedom from harassment, and does not require us to side with any regime, be it the Islamic Republic’s regime, or Saddam’s, the Taliban or any other local bully. Further, we believe that Third World/South/What-have-you people, whose political and civil rights have been disappeared and been victimized and oppressed by their states, are in turn more likely to be victimized by the imperialists. A halt to all nuclear activities in Iran is a very reasonable proposition, due to the dangerous confluence of the following three factors, simultaneously and structurally (down to geologically) operative at the location of the nuclear power plant-to-be: 1. Nuclear energy production, per se, has inevitable harmful by-products, including an extremely poisonous radioactive waste that cannot be got rid of. Ever. A threat that, through leakage and its resulting contamination, can lead to environmental contamination capable of lasting not just decades, but thousands of years, accompanied by genetic mutations leading to fatal deformities, 2. Geology, which dictates that the location of Bushehr’s nuclear plant will be subject to numerous earthquakes in its lifetime; earthquakes of varying magnitudes, historically as strong as magnitude 7.6 (with the likelihood of even stronger ones), and 3. Iranian government’s incompetence and endemic corruption, which dictate a complete and total lack of transparency and lack of people’s right of oversight over the government’s handling of all procedures involved in the production of nuclear energy. Some will point out that incompetence and lack of transparency are regular currency in the U.S. and the European countries as well. I agree and haste to add: That is exactly why you had the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl nuclear accidents. We don’t want to have the same disasters, having only hundredths of the socially available capabilities to recover from such monstrous eventuality. Others may paint a picture of us espousing Orientalist misgivings, pointing to our argument as an indication of our lack of faith in the competence and intelligence of Iranians as a whole. We assure you that as Iranians we believe in our own intellectual brilliance and are quite aware of our capabilities. As a good friend likes to remind, U.S. and other western engineering corporations are happily gobbling up the best of our minds, enriching themselves greatly in the process; NASA enjoys the capabilities of Iranian chief engineers and technicians daily; and our ancient know-how in trade has given you the e-Bay! We are arguing that the current regime is incompetent therefore (or is it, because?) maximally secretive, and dangerous to our people. And there will be no recourse to justice in Iran should any nuclear accidents happen, nor will there be meaningful relief. But, this is not the entire point. Besides being a very inefficient and capital-sucking way of producing energy (see Wasserman’s Nuclear Surge, the nuclear industry is, again, a gigantic producer of a particular form of waste that never goes away and is extremely toxic. There really is no safe way of getting rid of this kind of garbage. At this moment in our history we do not have this toxic madness besetting our environment with ravages without cures. Such is not a ‘cost’ we consider ‘worth it’ (whatever ‘it’ is supposed to be). We would like to keep our environment clean and our people as healthy as our resources allow. Iran has access to a vast and endless alternative source of power: solar energy. The right engineers can do the rightful calculations, but I am sure cultivating solar panel farms can easily match (if not surpass) the energy needs that a horribly wasteful and waste-producing nuclear industry can never match. The Maoist concept of ‘major versus minor conflicts’ simplifies matters greatly, which must be practical for lazy thinkers, especially in difficult times. But it is an erroneous concept since the major (or the ‘primary’) conflicts between the imperialist powers and the peoples of the Third World, as well as the major conflict between imperialists and their own people, are fed and reinforced daily by the minor (‘secondary’) conflicts between Third World peoples and their local bullies. Neither of these conflicts can be dismissed by wishful thinking, ‘resolved’ one at the expense of the other. As much as it is true that the freer we are from imperialist harassment the better we can fight our local bullies, it is equally true that the freer we are from local bullies the better we can defend ourselves against the imperialists. To emphasize a point that Cuba with all her troubles and shortcomings has been proving, the only defense against imperialism, in the first, second … and the final analysis, is empowered people, both in the belly of the beast (and subordinate associates) as well as all around the subjugated world. A nuclear-free Iran not only removes a clear excuse for the imperialist posturing against Iran, in the long run it guarantees a life there free from toxic threats to the livelihoods of millions of people inhabiting the area in the vicinity of Bushehr’s larger region, which includes not only Iranians, but people in all the Arab countries on the southern coast of the Gulf, plus its entire ecosystem; a life free from the potentiality of millions of cases of cancer, birth deformities, and the complete destruction of entire ways of life among the local peoples inhabiting the shores of the Persian-Arabian Gulf and the adjacent regions, and all points downstream.

#### 3. Permutation, do both. The aff rejects nuclear imperialism – it says Israel’s decision to nuke Iran would cause massive destruction and death which criticizes a traditional world power. The aff doesn’t say that Iran is evil or will cause war, it says that there’s a higher chance of miscalc and preemption between Israel and Iran – no one is the aggressor.

#### 4. Weigh the aff against the K—captures the benefits of both models of debate, you should lose if you don’t prove the reps of the aff are worse than the benefits of the aff since you haven’t won my speech act is bad. Extinction’s worse than bad reps since it precludes the possibility to have good speech

5. No link. The plan text specifically doesn’t have imperialist language – it’s only the advantages. Proves the K only links to the discourse of the cards. Two implications:

#### A. Not a reason to drop me—the judge has the option to vote aff for any reason, just like I can kick out of one advantage but win another one, you can choose to vote for parts of the AC that don’t link to the K.

#### B. Justifies K’s that link to only one word in one card, makes debate vacuous and not about substantive issues, also crushes discussion about the overall legitimacy of our speech acts.

#### 4. Acting to stop prolif is a moral imperative – pragmatic action is necessary and overwhelms problematic discourse

Ford 11 [Chris Ford, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1/10/11, Havea and Have-Nots: "Unfairness in nuclear Weapons possession," www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658]

First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “Have nots” have surely always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them. It seems pretty unusual, however, for non-possessors to articulate such understandable envy and resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon. One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.” The argument that nuclear weapons are “special,” however, is a two-edged sword. Perhaps they are indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “unfair” to compel sharing or disarmament. Such an argument, however, sits only awkwardly – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time. (If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless, however, it may be appropriately hard to abolish them.) More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique” in that it is this very specialness that seems to rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, nuclear weapons have introduced **existential questions** about the future of human civilization which **utterly swamp** the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition**.** No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity**,** making nuclear weapons – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.III. Implications Let me be clear about this. The moral critique of nuclear weapons possession may yet speak to the issue of whether anyone should have them. (This is not the place for a discussion of the feasibility of the remedies proposed by the disarmament community, but let us at least acknowledge the existence of a real moral issue.) But this matter has nothing to do with “unfairness” per se – and to the extent that it purports to, one should give it little credence. If indeed nuclear weapons do menace the survival of humanity, it is essentially irrelevant whether their possession is “unfairly” distributed – and it is certainly no solution to make the global balance of weaponry more “fair” by allowing more countries to have them. (Disarmament advocates hope to address the fairness problem by eliminating nuclear weapons, of course, but this is just icing. Disarmament is almost never articulated as being driven primarily by fairness; the critical part of that argument is instead consequentialist, stressing the dangers that any nuclear weapons are said to present.) As a moral critique, in other words, the fair/unfair dichotomy fails to speak intelligibly to the world’s nuclear dilemma. It isn’t really about “fairness” at all. Given the entanglement of nuclear weapons issues with quasi-existential questions potentially affecting the survival of millions or perhaps even billions of people, moreover, it stands to reason that an “unfair” outcome that nonetheless staves off such horrors is a **perfectly good solution**. On this scale, one might say, non-catastrophe entirely trumps accusations of “unfairness.” Questions of stability are far more important than issues of asymmetric distribution. This, of course, has powerful implications for nonproliferation policy, because pointing out the hollowness of the “unfairness” argument as applied to nuclear weapons suggests the moral sustainability of nonproliferation even if complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved and the world continues to be characterized by inequalities in weapons possession. We forget this at our collective peril. Don’t get me wrong. “Unfairness” arguments will presumably continue to have a political impact upon the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation, either as a consequence of genuine resentment or as a cynical rationalization for the destabilizing pursuit of dangerous capabilities. (Indeed, one might even go so far as to suspect that the emergence of the “unfairness” critique in modern diplomatic discourse is in some sense partly the result of how morally compelling nonproliferation is, in this context, irrespective of the “fairness” of “have/have not” outcomes. Precisely because the moral case for nonproliferation-driven inequality is so obvious and so compelling if such imbalance serves the interests of strategic stability, perhaps it was necessary to develop a new rationale of “fairness” to help make proliferation aspirations seem more legitimate. Skraelings, one imagines, did not need an elaborate philosophy of “fairness” in order to justify trying to steal iron weapons; the desirability of such tools was simply obvious, and any effort to obtain them unsurprising and not in itself condemnable.) But even in this democratic and egalitarian age, merely to incant the mantra of “unfairness” – or to inveigh against the existence of “haves” when there also exist “have nots” – is not the same thing as having a compelling moral argument. Indeed, I would submit that we lose our moral bearings if we allow “unfairness” arguments to distract us from what is really important here: substantive outcomes in the global security environment. “Unfairness,” in other words, is an overrated critique, and “fairness” is an overrated destination. At least where nuclear weapons are concerned, there are more important considerations in play. Let us not forget this.

### AT: Threat Inflation

#### Threats real – threat inflation would get my authors fired

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My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### The K just proves that my impacts are wrong – not that I should lose. Prefer a model which makes threat construction a reason to reject the advantage, not the debater since otherwise people could read any amount of impact defense and claim it as a reason to vote neg

#### 7. Alt can’t solve – securitization is a single act in a socially engrained discourse.

**Ghughunishvili 10**

(Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>)

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where **a single speech does not create** the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that **a single speech will not** be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

### AT: Endless War

#### No risk of endless war

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7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2k Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. **Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war.** For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from **the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war,** but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

### State Good

#### Legal debates are good:

#### The state is inevitable- speaking the language of power through policymaking is the only way to create social change in debate.

Coverstone 5 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 JW 11/18/15

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

#### Legal debates are key to short-term survival of oppressed populations. Whether the law is good or bad, legal education is crucial to empowerment.

Arkles et al 10 (Gabriel Arkles, Pooja Gehi and Elana Redfield, The Role of Lawyers in Trans Liberation: Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, Seattle Journal for Social Justice, 8 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 579, Spring / Summer, 2010, LN)

While agenda-setting by lawyers can lead to the replication of patterns of elitism and the reinforcement of systems of oppression, we do believe that legal work is a necessary and critical way to support movements for social justice. We must recognize the limitations of the legal system and learn to use that to the advantage of the oppressed. If lawyers are going to support work that dismantles oppressive structures, we must radically rethink the roles we can play in building and supporting these movements and acknowledge that our own individual interests or even livelihood may conflict with doing radical and transformative work. n162 A. Community Organizing for Social Justice When we use the term community organizing or organizing, we refer to the activities of organizations engaging in base-building and leadership development of communities directly impacted by one or more social [\*612] problems and conducting direct action issue campaigns intended to make positive change related to the problem(s). In this article, we discuss community organizing in the context of progressive social change, but community-organizing strategies can also be used for conservative ends. Community organizing is a powerful means to make social change. A basic premise of organizing is that inappropriate imbalances of power in society are a central component of social injustice. In order to have social justice, power relationships must shift. In Organizing for Social Change: Midwest Academy Manual for Activists (hereinafter, "the Manual"), n163 the authors list three principles of community organizing: n164 (1) winning real, immediate, concrete improvements in people's lives; (2) giving people a sense of their own power; and (3) altering the relations of power. n165 Before any of these principles can be achieved it is necessary to have leadership by the people impacted by social problems. n166 As Rinku Sen points out: [E]ven allies working in solidarity with affected groups cannot rival the clarity and power of the people who have the most to gain and the least to lose . . . organizations composed of people whose lives will change when a new policy is instituted tend to set goals that are harder to reach, to compromise less, and to stick out a fight longer. n167 She also notes that, "[I]f we are to make policy proposals that are grounded in reality and would make a difference either in peoples' lives or in the debate, then we have to be in touch with the people who are at the center of such policies. n168 We believe community organizing has the potential to make fundamental social change that law reform strategies or "movements" led by lawyers cannot achieve on their own. However, community organizing is not always just and effective. Community-organizing groups are not immune to any number of problems that can impact other organizations, including internal oppressive dynamics. In fact, some strains of white, male-dominated [\*613] community organizing have been widely criticized as perpetuating racism and sexism. n169 Nonetheless, models of community organizing, particularly as revised by women of color and other leaders from marginalized groups, have much greater potential to address fundamental imbalances of power than law reform strategies. They also have a remarkable record of successes. Tools from community organizers can help show where other strategies can fit into a framework for social change. The authors of the Manual, for example, describe various strategies for addressing social issues and illustrate how each of them may, at least to some extent, be effective. n170 They then plot out various forms of making social change on a continuum in terms of their positioning with regard to existing social power relationships. n171 They place direct services at the end of the spectrum that is most accepting of existing power relationships and community organizing at the end of the spectrum that most challenges existing power relationships. n172 Advocacy organizations are listed in the middle, closer to community organizing than direct services. n173 The Four Pillars of Social Justice Infrastructure model, a tool of the Miami Workers Center, is somewhat more nuanced than the Manual. n174 According to this model, four "pillars" are the key to transformative social justice. n175 They are (1) the pillar of service, which addresses community needs and stabilizes community members' lives; (2) the pillar of policy, which changes policies and institutions and achieves concrete gains with benchmarks for progress; (3) the pillar of consciousness, which alters public opinion and shifts political parameters through media advocacy and popular education; and (4) the pillar of power, which achieves autonomous community power through base-building and leadership development. n176 According to the Miami Workers Center, all of these pillars are essential in making social change, but the pillar of power is most crucial in the struggle to win true liberation for all oppressed communities. n177 [\*614] In their estimation, our movements suffer when the pillar of power is forgotten and/or not supported by the other pillars, or when the pillars are seen as separate and independent, rather than as interconnected, indispensable aspects of the whole infrastructure that is necessary to build a just society. n178 Organizations with whom we work are generally dedicated solely to providing services, changing policies, or providing public education. Unfortunately, each of these endeavors exists separate from one another and perhaps most notably, separate from community organizing. In SRLP's vision of change, this separation is part of maintaining structural capitalism that seeks to maintain imbalances of power in our society. Without incorporating the pillar of power, service provision, policy change, and public education can never move towards real social justice. n179 B. Lawyering for Empowerment In the past few decades, a number of alternative theories have emerged that help lawyers find a place in social movements that do not replicate oppression. n180 Some of the most well-known iterations of this theme are "empowerment lawyering," "rebellious lawyering," and "community lawyering." n181 These perspectives share skepticism of the efficacy of impact litigation and traditional direct services for improving the conditions faced by poor clients and communities of color, because they do not and cannot effectively address the roots of these forms of oppression. n182 Rather, these alternative visions of lawyering center on the empowerment of community members and organizations, the elimination of the potential for dependency on lawyers and the legal system, and the collaboration between lawyers and directly impacted communities in priority setting. n183 Of the many models of alternative lawyering with the goal of social justice, we will focus on the idea of "lawyering for empowerment," generally. The goal of empowerment lawyering is to enable a group of people to gain control of the forces that affect their lives. n184 Therefore, the goal of empowerment lawyering for low-income transgender people of [\*615] color is to support these communities in confronting the economic and social policies that limit their life chances. Rather than merely representing poor people in court and increasing access to services, the role of the community or empowerment lawyer involves: organizing, community education, media outreach, petition drives, public demonstrations, lobbying, and shaming campaigns . . . [I]ndividuals and members of community-based organizations actively work alongside organizers and lawyers in the day-to-day strategic planning of their case or campaign. Proposed solutions--litigation or non-litigation based--are informed by the clients' knowledge and experience of the issue. n185 A classic example of the complex role of empowerment within the legal agenda setting is the question of whether to take cases that have low chances of success. The traditional approach would suggest not taking the case, or settling for limited outcomes that may not meet the client's expectations. However, when our goals shift to empowerment, our strategies change as well. If we understand that the legal system is incapable of providing a truly favorable outcome for low-income transgender clients and transgender clients of color, then winning and losing cases takes on different meanings. For example, a transgender client may choose to bring a lawsuit against prison staff who sexually assaulted her, despite limited chance of success because of the "blue wall of silence," her perceived limited credibility as a prisoner, barriers to recovery from the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and restrictions on supervisory liability in § 1983 cases. Even realizing the litigation outcome will probably be unfavorable to her, she may still develop leadership skills by rallying a broader community of people impacted by similar issues. Additionally, she may use the knowledge and energy gained through the lawsuit to change policy. If our goal is to familiarize our client with the law, to provide an opportunity for the client [\*616] and/or community organizers to educate the public about the issues, to help our client assess the limitations of the legal system on their own, or to play a role in a larger organizing strategy, then taking cases with little chance of achieving a legal remedy can be a useful strategy. Lawyering for empowerment means not relying solely on legal expertise for decisionmaking. It means recognizing the limitations of the legal system, and using our knowledge and expertise to help disenfranchised communities take leadership. If community organizing is the path to social justice and "organizing is about people taking a role in determining their own future and improving the quality of life not only for themselves but for everyone," then "the primary goal [of empowerment lawyering] is building up the community." n186 C. Sharing Information and Building Leadership A key to meaningful participation in social justice movements is access to information. Lawyers are in an especially good position to help transfer knowledge, skills, and information to disenfranchised communities--the legal system is maintained by and predicated on arcane knowledge that lacks relevance in most contexts but takes on supreme significance in courts, politics, and regulatory agencies. It is a system intentionally obscure to the uninitiated; therefore the lawyer has the opportunity to expose the workings of the system to those who seek to destroy it, dismantle it, reconfigure it, and re-envision it. As Quigley points out, the ignorance of the client enriches the lawyer's power position, and thus the transfer of the power from the lawyer to the client necessitates a sharing of information. n187 Rather than simply performing the tasks that laws require, a lawyer has the option to teach and to collaborate with clients so that they can bring power and voice back to their communities and perhaps fight against the system, become politicized, and take leadership. "This demands that the lawyer undo the secret wrappings of the legal system and share the essence of legal advocacy--doing so lessens the mystical power of the lawyer, and, in practice, enriches the advocate in the sharing and developing of rightful power." n188 Lawyers have many opportunities to share knowledge and skills as a form of leadership development. This sharing can be accomplished, for example, through highly collaborative legal representation, through community clinics, through skill-shares, or through policy or campaign meetings where the lawyer explains what they know about the existing structures and fills in gaps and questions raised by activists about the workings of legal systems. D. Helping to Meet Survival Needs SRLP sees our work as building legal services and policy change that directly supports the pillar of power. n189 Maintaining an awareness of the limitations and pitfalls of traditional legal services, we strive to provide services in a larger context and with an approach that can help support libratory work. n190 For this reason we provide direct legal services but also work toward leadership development in our communities and a deep level of support for our community-organizing allies. Our approach in this regard is to make sure our community members access and obtain all of the benefits to which they are entitled under the law, and to protect our community members as much as possible from the criminalization, discrimination, and harassment they face when attempting to live their lives. While we do not believe that the root causes keeping our clients in poverty and poor health can be addressed in this way, we also believe that our clients experience the most severe impact from state policies and practices and need and that they deserve support to survive them. n191 Until our communities are truly empowered and our systems are fundamentally changed to increase life chances and health for transgender people who are low-income and people of color, our communities are going to continue to have to navigate government agencies and organizations to survive.

### Perms

#### Perm: do the plan as something for the K to rally against. The only way to change peoples minds to be consistent with the alt is if they can see clear examples of violent reps.

#### Perm: do the plan and the alt in all other instances. Either the alt is strong enough to solve or it doesn’t solve which means

### Action Key

#### Action’s key. Prior questions will never be settled.

Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience**, it is** particularly **important** for feminists **that we proceed with analysis of** both **the material** (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. **Important** ethical/**political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered**. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an **alt**ernative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

### AT: Reps First

#### Weigh the reps of the aff against the K—I’m the only one endorsing a positive action towards disadvantaged groups which is a reason why my discourse is valuable and the perm’s key. This outweighs—my reps prove something’s good in the context of tradeoffs whereas the links are abstract.

#### Excessive focus on reps kills social change.

Chait 15 Jonathan Chait “How the language police are perverting liberalism.” NY Magazine January 275h 2015 <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html> JW

Or maybe not. The p.c. style of politics has one serious, possibly fatal drawback: It is exhausting. Claims of victimhood that are useful within the left-wing subculture may alienate much of America. The movement’s dour puritanism can move people to outrage, but it may [and] prove ill suited to the hopeful mood required of mass politics. Nor does it bode well for the movement’s longevity that many of its allies are worn out. “It seems to me now that the public face of social liberalism has ceased to seem positive, joyful, human, and freeing,” confessed the progressive writer Freddie deBoer. “There are so many ways to step on a land mine now, so many terms that have become forbidden, so many attitudes that will get you cast out if you even appear to hold them. I’m far from alone in feeling that it’s typically not worth it to engage, given the risks.” Goldberg wrote recently about people “who feel emotionally savaged by their involvement in [online feminism] — not because of sexist trolls, but because of the slashing righteousness of other feminists.” Former Feministing editor Samhita Mukhopadhyay told her, “Everyone is so scared to speak right now.” That the new political correctness has bludgeoned even many of its own supporters into despondent silence is a triumph, but one of limited use. Politics in a democracy is still based on getting people to agree with you, not making them afraid to disagree. The historical record of political movements that sought to expand freedom for the oppressed by eliminating it for their enemies is dismal. The historical record of American liberalism, which has extended social freedoms to blacks, Jews, gays, and women, is glorious. And that glory rests in its confidence in the ultimate power of reason, not coercion, to triumph.

#### Reps first focus is bad-making every piece of discourse a possible voter discourages argumentation about politically contentious issues because the cost of messing up is a loss. This causes less advocacies for marginalized groups because people will shy away from controversy and suggesting new ideas.

### AT: Method/Epist/Onto

#### My methodology and epistemology is good and self-reflexive- the alt fails and the perm solves best

Caprioli 4(Mary Caprioli, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, International Studies Review, June 2004 pp.256-8

The purported language difference between feminist and IR scholars appears to be methodological. In general, feminist IR scholars 2 are skeptical of empiricist methodologies and "have never been satisfied with the boundary constraints of conventional IR" (Tickner 2001:2). As noted above, conventional international relations is defined on the basis of methodology as a commitment "to empiricism and data-based methods of testing" (Tickner 2001:149). Ironically, some feminist IR scholars place boundary constraints on feminist IR scholarship by limiting its definition to a critical-interpretive methodology (see Carpenter 2003:ftn. 1). Rather than pushing methodological boundaries to expand the field and to promote inclusiveness, conventional IR feminists appear to discriminate against quantitative research. If conventional feminists are willing to embrace multicultural approaches to feminism, why restrict research tools? There would seem to be a lack of consistency between rhetoric and practice. Especially at the global level, there need not be only one way to achieve feminist goals. Hence, conventional feminist IR scholars might benefit from participating in mainstream IR scholars' evolving embrace of methodological pluralism and epistemological opportunism (Bueno de Mesquita 2002; Chan 2002; Fearon and Wendt 2002). One must assume that feminist IR scholars support the pursuit of research that broadens our understanding of international relations. Such a research agenda must include both evidence and logic (Bueno de Mesquita 2002; Chan 2002). Theorizing, case study evidence (specific details), and external validity (generality) are all necessary components of research—only through a combination of all three modes of inquiry can we begin to gain confidence in our understanding. "And still we debate what seems to have been obvious to our predecessors: to gain understanding, we need to integrate careful empirical analysis with the equally careful application of the power of reason" (Bueno de Mesquita 2002:2). Different types of scholarship "make different contributions that can be mutually beneficial, as when historical studies isolate immediate causes that act as catalysts for the general tendencies identified in aggregate analyses" (Chan 2002:754). Without logic and theory, the general tendencies identified through quantitative analysis are incomplete. "In the absence of guidance from such logic, the data exercises degenerate into mindless fishing expeditions and are vulnerable to spurious interpretations" (Chan 2002:750). Most scholars concerned with gender certainly owe a debt to Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987), Cynthia Enloe (1989), and Ann Tickner (1992). These IR feminists shattered the publishing boundary for feminist IR scholarship and tackled the difficult task of deconstructing IR theory, including its founding myths, thereby creating the logic to guide feminist quantitative research. It is only through exposure to feminist literature that one can begin to scientifically question the sexist assumptions inherent in the dominant paradigms of international relations. Feminist theory is rife with testable hypotheses that can only strengthen feminist IR scholarship by identifying false leads and logical errors or by identifying general tendencies that deserve further inquiry. Without the solid body of feminist literature that exists, quantitative feminist IR scholarship would be meaningless. The existing feminist literature based on critical-interpretive epistemologies forms the rationale for quantitative testing. No one methodology is superior to the others. So, why create a dichotomy if none exists? **All methodologies contribute to our knowledge**, and, **when put together** like pieces of a puzzle, **they offer a clearer picture**. **The idea is to build a bridge of knowledge, not parallel walls that are equally inadequate** in their understanding of one another and in explaining international relations. Further **undermining the false dichotomization** between positivist and interpretivist methodologies **is the lack of proof that quantitative methodologies cannot challenge established paradigms** **or, more important**, **that a critical-interpretive epistemology is unbiased or more likely to uncover some truth** that is supposedly obscured by quantitative inquiry. Part of the rationale for the perpetuation of the dichotomy between methodologies and for the critique of quantitative methodology as a valid type of feminist inquiry involves confusing theory and practice. On a theoretical level, quantitative research is idealized as value-free and objective, which of course it is not—particularly when applied to the social sciences. Feminists opposed to quantitative methodologies imagine that other scholars necessarily assume such scholarship to be objective (see Brown 1988). **Few social scientists using quantitative methodologies,** however**, would suggest that this methodology is value-free, which is why so much emphasis is placed on defining measures**. This procedure leaves room for debate and provides space for feminist inquiry. For example, feminists might wish to study the effect of varying definitions of democracy and of security on the democratic peace thesis, ultimately combining methodologies to provide a more thorough understanding of the social matrix underlying state behavior.

#### Their epistemic/ontological arguments don’t disprove the aff—pragmatic reasoning is good and the alt cripples action.

Kratochwil 8 IR Prof @ Columbia, 8 [Friedrich Kratochwil is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, Pragmatism in International Relations “Ten points to ponder about pragmatism” p11-25]

Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with** objects or “things” (**ontology**), **or** with **reason** and method (epistemology), **but with** “**acting”** ( prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings** placed **in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act** and must do so always **under time pressures** and **in the face of incomplete information**. Precisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, **what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear** ex ante, **because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and** the multiple **possibilities are rife with** incentives for (**dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts** informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of relying on** certainty and **universal validity** gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to **detail**, **rather than** to **generality**, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since **acting in the social world** often **involves acting “for” someone,** special **responsibilities arise** that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since **we owe** special **care to those entrusted to us**, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot** just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot ***refuse* to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient knowledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sciences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

#### Our knowledge claims are accurate- epistemology and ontology shouldn’t come first

**Owen ‘2** (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that **it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise** issues of **ontology and epistemology over explanatory** and/or interpretive **power as if the latter** two **were merely a** simple **function of the former**. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a **philosophical weakness**—but this **does not undermine the point that,** for a certain class of problems, **rational choice theory may provide the best account available** to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one** theoretical **approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Method focus causes paralysis.

Jackson 11, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, ’11 (Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. **Hirschman** (1970b, 338) **noted this very danger**, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the **focus on** producing internally **consistent** packages of **assumptions instead of** actually examining **complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus **we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress**, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a **firmer scientific footing** by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but **only after the fundamentals have been** soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

### AT: Ontology 1st

#### Ontology focus is useless and quells action.

Shirky 5 Clay Shirky, teacher of NYU's graduate Interactive Telecommunications Program, 03/15/05 <http://www.itconversations.com/shows/detail470.html> I hold a joint appointment at NYU, as an Associate Arts Professor at the Interactive Telecommunications Program (ITP) and as a Distinguished Writer in Residence in the Journalism Department. I am also a Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society, and was the Edward R. Murrow Visiting Lecturer at Harvard's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy in 2010

There are many ways to organize data: labels, lists, categories, taxonomies, **ontologies.** Of these, ontology -- assertions about essence and relations among a group of items -- seems to be the highest-order method of organization. Indeed, the predicted value of the Semantic Web assumes that ontological successes such as the Library of Congress's classification scheme are easily replicable. Those successes are not easily replicable. Ontology, far from being an ideal high-order tool, is a **300-year-old hack**, now nearing the end of its useful life. **The problem ontology solves is not how to organize ideas but how to organize things** -- the Library of Congress's classification scheme exists not because concepts require consistent hierarchical placement, **but because books do**. The LC scheme, when examined closely, is riddled with inconsistencies, bias, and gaps. Top level geographic categories, for example, include "The Balkan Penninsula" and "Asia." The primary medical categories don't include oncology, defaulting to the older and now discredited notion that cancers were more related to specific organs than to common processes. And the list of such oddities goes on. The reason the LC scheme is accumulating these errors faster than they can correct them is the physical fact of the book, which makes a card catalog scheme necessary, and constant re-shelving impossible. Likewise, it enforces **cookie-cutter categorization** that doesn't reflect the polyphony of its contents--there is a literature of creativity, for example, made up of books about art, science, engineering, and so on, and yet those books are not categorized (which is to say shelved) together, because the LC scheme doesn't recognize creativity as an organizing principle. For a reader interested in creativity, the LC **ontology destroys value rather than creating it.** As we have learned from the Web, when data is decoupled from physical presence, it is fluid enough to be grouped differently by different readers, and on different days. The Web's main virtue, in handling data, is to transmute organization from an a priori, content-based judgment to one that can be ad hoc, context-based, socially embedded, and constantly altered. The Web frees us from needing to argue about whether The Book of 5 Rings "is" a business book or a primer on war -- it is plainly both, and not only are we freed from making that judgment firmly or in advance, we are freed from needing to make it explicit at all. This talk begins by exploring the rise of ontological classification. In the period after the invention of the printing press but before the invention of the search engine, intellectual production was vested in books, objects that were numerous but opaque. When you have more than a few hundred books, categorization becomes a forced move, even if the categories are somewhat arbitrary, because without categories, you can no longer locate individual books.

### AT: Reject Colonialism 1st

#### 1. Making debate oriented towards a single goal is bad – instrumentalizes education and ensures we only learn about one thing. Aff method solves best because we can discuss policy impacts in ranges of literally everything.

#### 2. No reason why it’s a voter – we can still critique colonialism in the aff, no reason why it needs to be a reason to vote neg.

# T Frontlines

## AT: Plans Bad

### Counter Interps

#### Counter interp: the aff may *only* read a plan that prohibits the production of nuclear power in Iran. Solves the limits standard—there’s only one aff to prep against.

#### Second counter interp: the aff may read a plan that prohibits the production of nuclear power in a specific country if they have evidence that says nuclear power in that country is bad, and the plan is disclosed on the wiki before the tournament. I meet. Net benefits:

#### 1. Policymaking – spec lets us focus the debate on a single implementable policy. There’s no international agent that prohibits nuclear power in every single country. Without spec, we’re not talking about real policies and what we learn is useless.

#### 2. Resolvability – since energy policies are context specific and different for each country, it’s impossible to have generalized debates about the effects of a whole res plan. Independent voter and outweighs – we can’t even have a debate if the round’s irresolvable.

#### 3. Stratskew – whole res means the neg can PIC out of any country, kills fairness since you can scoop the entirety of the aff. Also, moots your standards – if people read PICs then you’ll have to do prep on specific countries in both worlds.

#### 4. Stable advocacy—without spec the aff can shift out of disads by saying specific harms don’t link to general principle—kills fairness since if arguments can be shifted the neg has no shot of winning. This turns predictability and outweighs because the aff can make unpredictable shifts in the 1AR.

### Reasonability

#### Use reasonability on T with a brightline of the aff prohibiting use of nuclear power and cards in the literature. You still have link and impact turn ground and generics check which means you could have engaged, I’m in the direction of the topic. Key to substantive education because there’s less unnecessary theory which trades off with topical debate. It’s not arbitrary since I have a justified brightline.

### AT: Textuality

#### 1. “Countries” is an existential bare plural- plans are topical.

Overing 16 Bob (debate coach) “Plans are Good: September-October 2016 Edition” Premier Debate Today October 13th 2016 <http://premierdebatetoday.com/2016/10/13/plans-are-good-september-october-2016-edition-by-bob-overing/> JW

Here I will make a linguistic assertion of the kind that seems to win circuit LD debates. To my ear, “Countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power” sounds like a claim about a particular set of actual countries (the existential reading, allowing plans) rather than a hypothetical set or general idea of countries (the generic reading, barring plans). Nebel (2014) provides two tests that verify my linguistic intuition that countries is existential, not generic. First, a “competent speaker of English” would endorse an inference from a plan involving two countries to the resolution, e.g. If the U.S. and Canada ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power, then countries ought to. Second, a competent speaker of English would endorse an inference from the fact that no countries exist to “it is not the case that ‘Countries ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.’” Unlike with the “Just governments” resolution, both are legitimate inferences here, so countries is existential. If my linguistic intuitions aren’t persuasive, consider the distinction Nebel cites from Carlson (1977) about predicates. Carlson s**ays** that a plural like dogs is generic when the predicate is property-like in applying to dogs as a kind, e.g. “Dogs run.” But a plural like dogs is existential when the predicate is stage-like in applying to individual, spatially-bound dogs, e.g. “Dogs are running” (p. 451). Another way to put it is that the former predicate applies to all dog-stages, but the latter does not [3]. The question for our purposes is whether the predicate “ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power” is property- or stage-like when we ascribe it to countries. I think it’s stage-like because depending on when and where you ask the question, it may or may not be correct to apply the predicate. Property-like predicates we can ascribe to countries include “have governments” and “occupy territories” or even “ought not to war.” These predicates lead to a generic reading of countries because they can be ascribed to all country-stages. “Ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power” leads to an existential reading because it can only be ascribed to some country-stages. Consider that countries as a kind of thing existed long before the first production of nuclear power; thus, a predicate involving nuclear power could not possibly be property-like unless countries is constantly gaining new properties or had the property even before the actual production of nuclear power. Neither option is attractive.

#### 2. Grammar doesn’t come first- there are multiple “correct” interps of the topic so you have to weigh fairness and education. Otherwise, affs about prohibiting nuclear weapons would be topical through semantics.

#### 3. Textuality good is just an internal link to predictability and ground but I’ll win defense to those claims.

### AT: T-Rule

#### 1. Adhering to the strict resolution text doesn’t produce good debates—topics are written by traditional old lay coaches so modification is key to nat circuit competition.

#### 2. The “topicality” rule is nonsense – you could also treat my standards like that. The “policymaking” and “stratskew” rules will also produce good debates.

#### 3. Textuality assumes truth testing but you’ve comparing worlds is best for reciprocity by avoiding multiple neg NIBs that harm reciprocity – my burden isn’t to prove the res true, just to present a good advocacy. I’m not bound to the res.

### AT: Jurisdiction

#### 1. Empirically denied – judges vote on non-topical affs all the time and don’t get their contracts rescinded.

#### 2. The tournament rules don’t stipulate this is what we have to debate about, they just list it as a resolution with no external requirements.

### AT: Ground

#### 1. Side bias impact turns—more aff ground’s good since it compensates for short 1AR and neg reactivity that make it harder to affirm.

#### 2. Generics solve: NCs, Ks, and impact turns still answer the aff.

#### 3. T-the fact that the plan isn’t happening now proves you have qualitative ground.

#### 4. Lots of great ground against this aff – nuclear imperialism, Iran bomb good, relations disads. You’re just too lazy to do prep.

### AT: Limits

#### 1. Wiki solves. It’s been online for two weeks – you could have done prep.

#### 2. Generics solve - NCs, Ks, and impact turns still answer the aff.

#### 3. Lit solves – there are only 31 countries with nuclear power according to Wikipedia and even less of those will have viable lit ground.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear\_power\_by\_country

#### 4. T-the whole res is unpredictable based on the topic lit. No solvency advocates talk about international rejection of nuke power – they refer to it on a country by country basis.

#### 5. T- you overlimit because there’s only one aff under your interp. Even if my interp is slightly too large, yours is way too small.

### AT: Breadth

#### 1. T-plans are key to breadth—they let us explore different areas of the topic instead of focusing on the same aff every round.

#### 2. Not everyone reads plans—other rounds solve.

#### 3. Depth is more important—spreading ourselves thin on many issues can be done with articles—only nuanced debates with specific evidence comparison about one policy are educational.

### RVI

#### Give the aff an RVI on counter interps to T:

#### A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

#### B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible.

### Reject the Arg

#### Reject the argument on T—if they win I’ll defend whole res. A. Substantive education—theory layer goes away and we get to debate the aff advantages which still apply—outweighs since education is the only reason people join the debate. B. Aff strat—dropping the debater makes affirming impossible because there’s always some interp that the aff violates.

## AT: T-Plural

### I Meets

#### 1. I meet. Country is defined as “a nation with its own government[[8]](#footnote-8), occupying a particular territory:” and durable fiat means that multiple governments will implement the plan and carry out implementation over time as new leaders are replaced and elected.

#### 2. I meet. Reductionism is true – that’s Olson from the aff. That means the government in each instance is different from the past instance so I implement the plan in infinite countries.

### C/I

#### Counter interp: Merriam Wesbter defines country as

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/country

an indefinite usually extended expanse of land

#### I meet this definition, there are hundreds of expnases of land per country.

Net benefit: Merriam Webster’s the most accurate.

Merriam Webster no date <http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/>

For more than 150 years, in print and now online, Merriam-Webster has been America's leading and most-trusted provider of language information. Each month, our Web sites offer guidance to more than 40 million visitors. In print, our publications include Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (among the best-selling books in American history) and newly published dictionaries for English-language learners. All Merriam-Webster products and services are backed by the largest team of professional dictionary editors and writers in America, and one of the largest in the world.

#### Second counter interp: the aff can either defend whole res, or specify a single specific country in the plan text. I meet. Prefer:

#### 1. Limits – if affs can specify a couple of countries then there are literally millions of plans because you can defend any combination of actors. If I defend only one, then there’s a limited caselist. Limits are key to fairness and education because they ensure negs can engage with affs and have prep.

#### 2. Policymaking – countries never act in unison in energy policies because they have different infrastructures and legislation. Your interp forces debates about advocacies that are made up which kills education since we’re not learning about anything real.

### Reasonability

#### Use reasonability on T with a brightline of the aff prohibiting use of nuclear power and cards in the literature. You still have link and impact turn ground and generics check which means you could have engaged, I’m in the direction of the topic. Key to substantive education because there’s less unnecessary theory which trades off with topical debate. It’s not arbitrary since I have a justified brightline.

### AT: Textuality

#### 1. Multiple grammatically correct interps of the topics means you have to weigh fairness and education first – nuke power could also mean states with nuclear weapons which is a very semantically plausible interp.

#### 2. The only reason text is good is because of predictability, but that assumes you’re winning a limits standard.

#### 3. Adhering to the strict resolution text doesn’t produce good debates—topics are written by traditional old lay coaches so modification is key to nat circuit competition.

#### 4. The “topicality” rule is nonsense – you could also treat my standards like that. The “policymaking” and “stratskew” rules will also produce good debates.

#### 5. Textuality assumes truth testing but you’ve conceded comparing worlds from the aff – my burden isn’t to prove the res true, just to present a good advocacy.

### AT: Jurisdiction

#### 1. Empirically denied – judges vote on non-topical affs all the time and don’t get their contracts rescinded.

#### 2. The tournament rules don’t stipulate this is what we have to debate about, they just list it as a resolution with no external requirements.

### AT: Pragmatic Standards

#### You don’t solve any of your standards – under your interp people will just read 2 or 3 countries because it is technically plural.

### RVI

#### Give the aff an RVI on counter interps to T:

#### A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

#### B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible.

### Reject the Arg

#### Reject the argument on T—if they win I’ll defend whole res. A. Substantive education—theory layer goes away and we get to debate the aff advantages which still apply—outweighs since education is the only reason people join the debate. B. Aff strat—dropping the debater makes affirming impossible because there’s always some interp that the aff violates.

# Prolif Good/Bad

## More Impacts

### Credibility

#### A successful Iran deal is the vital internal link to credibility- *effectiveness* in diplomatic outcomes matters way more to their impacts than general legitimacy

Miller 12 – 3/1/2012 (Aaron David, distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, on the U.S. Advisory Council of Israel Policy Forum, is Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and has been an advisor to six Secretaries of State, Why Does America Keep Making the Same Mistakes?, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/01/why\_does\_america\_keep\_making\_the\_same\_mistakes?page=full)

2. "Trying and failing is better than not trying at all." I'll never forget how impressed and inspired I was by those words (President Clinton's) after we briefed him in the run-up to the July 2000 Camp David summit. Pushed by an Israeli prime minister with grandiose ambitions and to whom we wouldn't say no, and enabled by the rest of us who thought it was worth a try, we plunged ahead with no strategy and without much regard to the costs of failure. The old college try may be an appropriate slogan for an NCAA football team; it isn't a substitute for the foreign policy of the most powerful nation on Earth. Failure costs and accumulates because, unlike success -- the world's most compelling ideology -- it doesn't generate power and constituents. Today, Americans are not taken seriously in Middle East peacemaking because of our repeated failures and our preference for process over results. As a consequence, our street cred on this issue is near zero. These days, everyone one from Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says no to America without cost or consequence. And failing in the Middle East or in any area emboldens others -- Russians, Chinese -- to take us less seriously too.

#### Successful Iran deal is key to US credibility- outweighs every other internal link

New Zealand Herald 11/13/2013 (Obama seeks time from Congress for Iran diplomacy, lexis)

Responding to Rouhani"s promise of flexibility, Obama has staked significant international credibility on securing a diplomatic agreement. His telephone chat with Rouhani in September was the first direct conversation between U.S. and Iranian leaders in more than three decades. The unprecedented outreach has angered U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. And lawmakers are deeply skeptical.¶ "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," White House press secretary Jay Carney told reporters Tuesday. "The American people justifiably and understandably prefer a peaceful solution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and this agreement, if it"s achieved, has the potential to do that. The American people do not want a march to war."¶ The administration sees itself on the cusp of a historic breakthrough, so much so that Obama hastily dispatched Kerry to Switzerland last week for the highest-level nuclear negotiations to date. The talks broke down as Iran demanded formal recognition of what it says is its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and as France sought stricter limits on Iran"s ability to make nuclear fuel and on its heavy water reactor to produce plutonium, according to diplomats.

### Prolif Bad

#### Iran prolif causes extinction – defense doesn’t apply

Kroenig and McNally ’13— Matthew, assistant professor and international relations field chair in the department of government at Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Robert, served as Senior Director for International Energy at the U.S. National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President at the U.S. National Economic Council, March 2013 (Matthew and Robert, “Iranian Nukes and Global Oil,” The American Interest, Vol. 8, No. 4.)

But the impact of sanctions on future Iranian production pales in comparison to the other geo-economic implications of nuclear weapons in Iran. A nuclear Iran will likely increase the frequency and scope of geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf and the broader Middle East. While policy analysts continue to debate how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, most agree a nuclear-armed Iran would have grave repercussions for the region. In March 2012 President Obama stated that U.S. policy was to prevent—not contain—a nuclear-armed Iran, and he explained why: “The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. It is almost certain that other players in the region would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now you have the prospect of a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region in the world, one that is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful of retaliation.”10 President Obama’s fears are well-founded. Iran harbors ambitious geopolitical goals. After national survival, Iran’s primary objective is to become the most dominant state in the Middle East. In terms of international relations theory, Iran is a revisionist power. Its master national-historical narrative holds that Iran is a glorious nation with a storied past, and that it has been cheated out of its rightful place as a leading nation: Like pre-World War I Germany and China today, it is determined to reclaim its place in the sun. Currently, Iran restrains its hegemonic ambitions because it is wary of U.S. or Israeli military responses—particularly the former. But if Iran obtained nuclear weapons, its adversaries would be forced to treat it with deference if not kid gloves, even in the face of provocative acts. Iran would achieve a degree of “inverted deterrence” against stronger states by inherently raising the stakes of any military conflict against it to the nuclear level.11 As such, nuclear weapons would provide Iran with a cover under which to implement its regional ambitions with diminished fear of a U.S. military reprisal. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up its support for terrorist and proxy groups attacking Israeli, Saudi and U.S. interests in the greater Middle East and around the world; increase the harassment of and attacks against naval and commercial vessels in and near the Persian Gulf; and be more aggressive in its coercive diplomacy, possibly brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to intimidate adversaries and harmless, weaker neighbors alike. In short, a nuclear-armed Iran would exacerbate current conflicts in the Middle East, and this likely bears jarring consequences for global oil prices. Because of the heightened threat to global oil supply that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose, market participants would certainly add a large “risk premium” to oil prices. Oil prices reflect perceived risk in addition to information on actual events or conditions in the market. Recent history shows that even without nuclear weapons, Iran-related events in the Middle East have affected oil prices on fears they could spark a regional war. Traders bid up oil prices in January 2006 when the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council. In subsequent months, news reports about heated Iranian rhetoric and military exercises helped to drive crude prices up further. The surprise outbreak of the Israel-Hizballah war in 2006, not entirely unrelated to concerns about Iran, triggered a $4 per barrel spike on contagion fears. The Iran risk premium subsided after 2007, but a roughly $10–$15 per barrel (10 percent) risk premium returned in early 2012 after the United States and the European Union put in place unusually tough sanctions and hawkish rhetoric on both sides heated up. A survey of nearly two dozen traders and analysts conducted by the Rapidan Group found that a protracted conventional conflict between the United States and Iran that resulted in a three-week closure of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $25 per barrel rise in oil prices, despite the use of strategic petroleum reserves.12 Were Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, the risk premium would greatly exceed the $4–$15 per barrel (roughly 4–15 percent at current prices) already caused by a non-nuclear Iran.13 We expect a belligerent, nuclear-armed Iran would likely embed a risk premium of at least $20–$30 per barrel and spikes of $30–$100 per barrel in the event of actual conflict. Such price increases would be extremely harmful to economic growth and employment. The challenges a nuclear-armed Iran would pose for the oil market are exacerbated by a prospective diminished U.S. ability to act as guarantor of stability in the Gulf. U.S. military presence and intervention has been critical to resolving past threats or geopolitical crises in the region. It has also calmed oil markets in the past. Examples include escorting oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War, the destruction of much of Iran’s surface fleet in response to Iran’s mining the Gulf in 1988 and leading a coalition to repel Saddam Hussein’s short-lived invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Currently, the United States can use and threaten to use force against Iran without fear that Iran will retaliate with nuclear weapons. When Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in the past, for example, the United States has announced that it would reopen the Strait if Iran went through with it, confident that the U.S. military could quickly prevail in any conventional conflict with Iran while running very little risk of retaliation. If Iran had nuclear weapons, however, U.S. military options would be constrained by inverted deterrence. U.S. threats to use force to reopen the Strait could be countered by Iranian threats to use devastatingly deadly force against U.S. allies, bases or forces in the region. Such threats might not be entirely credible since the U.S. military would control any imaginable escalation ladder up to and including the nuclear threshold, but it wouldn’t be entirely incredible, either, given the risk of accident or inadvertent nuclear use in a high-stakes crisis. If, further, Iran develops ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States—and the annual report of the U.S. Department of Defense estimates this could happen as soon as 2015—Iran could also threaten nuclear strikes against the U.S. homeland in retaliation for the use of conventional forces in the region. Any U.S. President would have to think long and hard about using force against Iran if it entailed a risk of nuclear war, even a nuclear war that the United States would win. Most worrisome, an unstable, poly-nuclear Middle East will mean that nuclear weapons will be ever-present factors in most, if not all, future regional conflicts. As President Obama noted in the remarks excerpted above, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other states might follow suit. Nuclear weapons in these states would further complicate the nuclear balance in the region and potentially extend the boundaries of any nuclear exchange. Even if Iran’s leaders are less reckless and suicidal than their rhetoric would suggest, international politics, crises and miscalculation do not end when countries acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers still challenge nuclear-armed adversaries. As the early decades of the Cold War remind us, nuclear-armed states do sometimes resort to nuclear brinkmanship that can lead to high-stakes nuclear standoffs. We were lucky to survive the Cold War without suffering a massive nuclear exchange; President Kennedy estimated that the probability of nuclear war in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone was as high as 50 percent.14 The reference to the early days of the Cold War is not merely decorative here. Nearly all of the conditions that helped us avoid nuclear war during the latter half of the Cold War are absent from the Iran-Israel-U.S. nuclear balance. Then, there were only two players, both with secure, second-strike capabilities and strategic depth; relatively long flight times for ballistic missiles between states, enabling all sides to eschew launch-on-warning postures; clear lines of communication between capitals; and more. In a high-stakes nuclear crisis with Iran and its adversaries, there is a real risk that things could spiral out of control and result in nuclear war**.**

### A2: Impact Defense

#### Iranian nuclearization makes nuclear war inevitable in the Middle East- even small conflicts could escalate to all out war.

Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox,"in which the supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe.During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. A recent statistical analysis by the political scientist Michael Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend tobe more crisis-prone than other types of states, and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a major conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But history suggests that Tehran's development of nuclear weapons wouldencourage Iranian adventurism, leading tomore frequent and intense crises in the Middle East. Such crises would entail some inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation,an accident, or an unauthorized use -- a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. Once the superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were involved in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable deterrent relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisis-prone years would be hair-raising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to spiral out of control, the residual risk of inadvertentescalation stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes would be nontrivial -- and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating.

#### Iran prolif causes extinction

**Russell 09** [James A.-Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26,<http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf> -bg]

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### --A2: MAD/Prolif Good

#### MAD doesn’t apply to Iranian prolif – no second strike capability and diplomatic isolation

Henzel 12/29(John is a Masters’ candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International relations. He is specializing in international security and foreign policy analysis. Deconstructing Policy Responses to the Iranian Nuclear Program, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy (At Senton Hall University).[http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2012/12/deconstructing-policy-responses-to-the-iranian-nuclear-program/](http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2012/12/deconstructing-policy-responses-to-the-iranian-nuclear-program/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), December 29, 2012)

Of foremost concern, is the question of if Iran should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. The most persuasive arguments for allowing Iran to develop a nuclear arsenal propose that, not only are nuclear weapons an indelible sovereign right for nations that desire them, nuclear weapons structurally promote peace. The purported evidence is obvious; the era of nuclear weapons that evolved into the Cold War’s ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ ended serious conflict between nuclear powers. States with nuclear weapons must tread lightly with one another out of mutual fear, which paves over years of conflict to pacify the most intense rivalries. By this logic, Iran’s main strategic deficit, and the core of its bellicosity, is its lack of nuclear strength – and thus an effective deterrent – relative to its perceived adversaries, Israel and the United States. Once you solve this deficit, by allowing Tehran access to a nuclear deterrent, tensions will lessen.¶ However, this position is overly simplistic and ignores key differences between the cases presented. While it is plausible that an Israel/US-Iran peace could be forced through nuclear parity, in actuality, that parity will not exist overnight. In order to have a strong MAD-style nuclear deterrent, a state’s nuclear capability must be able to absorb or evade an opponent’s attack (such as with silos, SLBMs, etc) and deliver an attack of one’s own (requiring miniaturization of warheads, advanced missile design and targeting systems, and extensive personnel training). Iran would not have many of these requisite capabilities for an indefinite interim period that would be characterized byconstant fear of first-strike – possibly leading to an Iranian first-strike to jump aheadof the perceived course of events. If Iran lacks the requisite capabilities to weatheran Israeli or Americanstrike, the logic of nuclear balance falls apart.¶Furthermore, the ‘nuclear peace’ argument has not considered the effects external to the dyadic rivalry between Iran and Israel that will be seen in the region if Iran obtains nuclear weapons. The primary instigating factor for a state seeking nuclear weapons is when it faces a threat of nuclear weapons itself. If Iran gets the bomb, so too must Saudi Arabia, then Egypt, then Lebanon, and Syria, and so on.This cascade of security deficits could effectively break the NPT norm apart throughout the region and have spillover effects to other regions.¶ The final nail in the nuclear peace thesis is the impact of non-state actors and illicit proliferation rings. While realist theorists suggest that states will never provide the state’s ultimate source of military might to an uncontrollable third party, when states are isolated they seek out similarly isolated groups and states to compensate for their strategic deficits. It is probable that Iran would continue tobe diplomatically isolatedfrom the international community even after securing nuclear weapons, so its incentives to participate in proliferation rings would increase. While they may not directly supply third parties with full-fledged nuclear weapons, simple materials and technology in exchange for other goods could substantially support a third party’s nuclear terrorism endeavors. However, this thinking assumes there is a stable, rational, and non-corrupt regime – Tehran’s government officials may have far less scruples in handling its nuclear materials than in other nuclear states.

### --A2: Prolif Good

#### Sparks nuclear confrontation and instability in the region – nuclear balancing

Kroenig 12 – 2/22/12 – Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, author of Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Matthew, “What Will Iran Do If It Gets a Nuclear Bomb?”, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/02/what-will-iran-do-if-it-gets-a-nuclear-bomb/253430/)//javi

A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a grave threat to international peace and security. It would lead to further nuclear proliferation as other countries in the region sought nuclear weapons in response. As I discuss in Exporting the Bomb, a nuclear Iran would likely become a nuclear supplier and transfer uranium enrichment technology--the basis for dangerous nuclear programs--to U.S. enemies in regions around the world. Iran currently restrains its foreign policy for fear of U.S. military retaliation, but with a nuclear counter-deterrent it would be emboldened to push harder, stepping up support for terrorist groups, brandishing nuclear weapons for coercive purposes, and adopting a more aggressive foreign policy. A nuclear Iran could constrain U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East by threatening nuclear war in response to major U.S. initiatives in the region. A more aggressive Iran would lead to an even more crisis-prone region, and any crisis involving a nuclear-armed Iran could spiral out of control and result in a nuclear war against Israel or even, once Iran has developed the requisite delivery vehicles, the U.S. homeland. In sum, a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a severe threat that Washington would have to live with as long as Iran exists as a state and has nuclear weapons, which could be decades or even longer.

#### New proliferators will be fast and efficient – leads to global war

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(Professor François Heisbourg, Apr 04, 2012, How Bad Would the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1171&rtid=2)

PROLIFERATION PUSH AND PULL Ongoing proliferation differs from that of the first half-century of the nuclear era in three essential ways: on the demand side, the set of putative nuclear actors is largely focused in the most strategically stressed regions of the world; on the supply side, the actual or potential purveyors of proliferation are no longer principally the first, industrialized, generation of nuclear powers; the technology involved in proliferation is somewhat less demanding than it was during the first nuclear age. Taken together, these changes entail growing risks of nuclear use. Demand is currently focusing on two regions, the Middle East and East Asia (broadly defined) and involves states and, potentially, non-state actors. In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear program is the focus of the most intense concerns. A potential consequence in proliferation terms would be to lead regional rivals of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons in term: this concern was vividly in 2007 by the then President of France, Jacques Chirac (19) who specifically mentioned Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The likelihood of such a “proliferation chain-reaction” may have been increased by President Obama’s recent repudiation of containment as an option (20): short of Iran being persuaded or forced to abandon its nuclear ambitions, the neighboring states would presumably have to contemplate security options other than a Cold War style US defense guarantee. Given prior attempts by Iraq, Syria and Libya to become nuclear powers, the probability of a multipolar nuclear Middle East has to be rated as high in case Iran is perceived as having acquired a military nuclear capability. Beyond the Middle East, the possibility of civil war in nuclear-armed Pakistan leading to state failure and the possibility of nukes falling out of the hands of an effective central government. There are historical precedents for such a risk, most notably, but not only(21)in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union: timely and lasting action by outside powers, such as the US with the Nunn-Lugar initiative, and the successor states themselves has prevented fissile material from falling into unauthorized hands in significant quantities. Pakistan could pose similar problems in a singularly more hostile domestic environment. As things stand, non-state actors, such as post-Soviet mafiya bosses (interested in resale potential) or Al Qaeda (22) have sought, without apparent success, to benefit from opportunities arising from nuclear disorder in the former USSR and Central Asia. Mercifully, the price Al Qaeda was ready to pay was way below the going rate (upwards of hundreds of $million) for the sorts of services provided by the A.Q.Khan network (see below) to some of his clients. Although North Korea’s nuclear ambitions appear to be both more self-centered and more containable than is the case for Iran, the possibility of state collapse in combination with regional rivalry leave no room for complacency. More broadly we are facing the prospect of a multipolar nuclear Middle East, linked to an uncertain nuclear Pakistan already part of a nuclear South Asia tied via China to the Korean nexus in which nuclear America and Russia also have a stake. More broadly still, such a nuclear arc-of-crisis from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Japan, would presumably imply the breakdown of the NPT regime, or at least its reversion to the sort of status it had during the Seventies, when many of its currently significant members had not yet joined (23), unloosening both the demand and supply sides of proliferation. On the supply side, “old style” proliferation relied on official cooperation between first-generation nuclear or nuclearizing powers, of which the Manhattan project was a forerunner (with American, British and Canadian national contributions and multinational scientific teams), followed inter alia by post-1956 French-Israeli, post-1958 US-UK, pre-1958 USSR-China cooperation. If India relied heavily on the “unwitting cooperation” , notably on the part of Canada and the US involved in the Atoms for Peace CIRUS research reactor, Pakistan set up the first dedicated, broad spectrum, cross-border trading network to make up for the weakness of its limited industrial base. This import-focused organization thus went beyond traditional espionage-aided efforts (as practiced by the USSR during and after the Manhattan project) or case-by-case purloining or diversion of useful material on the global market (as practiced by Israeli operatives). Even before the Pakistani network had fulfilled its primary task of supplying the national program, it began its transformation into an export-oriented venture. Libya, Iran, North Korea and a fourth country which remains officially unnamed became the main outlets of what became the world’s first private-sector (albeit government originated and ,presumably, supported)proliferation company which was only wound down after strong Western pressure on Pakistan after 9/11. Although the by-now richly documented A.Q.Khan network (24) appears to have ceased to function in its previous incarnation, it has powerfully demonstrated that there is an international market for proliferation which other operators can expect to exploit. Furthermore, budding, resource-weak nuclear powers have a strong incentive to cover the cost of their investment by selling or bartering their nuclear-related assets, including delivery systems. The fruits of state-to-state cooperation between Iran, North Korea and Pakistan are clearly apparent in the close-to-identical genealogy of their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of the No-Dong/Ghauri/Shahab families displayed in military parades and test launches. Not all such cooperation consists of televised objects. Even in the absence of game-changing breakthroughs, technical trends facilitate both demand and supply-side proliferation. For the time being, the plutonium route towards the bomb remains essentially as easy and as difficult as from the earliest years of the nuclear era. Provided a country runs a (difficult-to-hide) research or a power reactor from which low-irradiated fuel can be downloaded at will (such as CANDU-type natural uranium reactors), reprocessing is a comparatively straightforward and undemanding task. Forging and machining a multiple-isotope metal which is notorious for its numerous physical states and chemical toxicity is a substantial challenge, with the companion complications of devising a reliable implosion mechanism. Nuclear testing is highly desirable to establish confidence in the end-result. Opportunities for taking the plutonium-proliferation road may increase somewhat as new techniques (such as pyro-processing) come on stream. Developments in the enriched uranium field have been more substantial in facilitating proliferation. The development of lighter and more efficient centrifuges make it easier for a state to extract enriched uranium speedily in smaller and less visible facilities. Dealing with the resulting military-level HEU is a comparatively undemanding task. The long-heralded advent of industrially effective and reliable laser enrichment technology may eventually further increase ease of access. Downstream difficulties would still remain. Although implosion-mechanisms are not mandatory, they are desirable in order both to reduce the critical mass of U235 for a nuclear explosion and to make for a lighter and smaller more-readily deliverable weapons package. In sum, incremental improvements increase the risk of proliferation. However, non-state actors are not yet, and will not be on the basis of known technical trends, in a position to master the various steps of the two existing military nuclear fuel cycles, which remain the monopoly of states. Non-state actors would need the active complicity from (or from accomplices within) states, or benefit from the windfall of state collapse, to acquire a military nuclear capability. The threat of nuclear terrorism continues to be subordinated to developments involving state actors, a remark which is not meant to be reassuring since such developments (see above) are increasingly likely as proliferation spreads to new states and as state failure threatens in the ‘arc of proliferation’ extending from the Mediterranean to North-East Asia. Furthermore, non-state actors can be satisfied with levels of nuclear reliability and performance which states could not accept. A difficult-to-deliver or fizzle-prone nuclear device would not provide a state with the level of deterrence needed to shield it from pre-emptive or retaliatory action, whereas a terrorist group would not be seeking such immunity. A road or ship-delivered imperfect device, which would be closer to a radiological bomb than to a fully-fledged atomic weapon would provide its non-state owners with immense potential. The road to a non-state device does not need to be as well-paved. NUCLEAR FUTURES ‘New’ lessons from a revisited past and current trends in nuclear proliferation, will tie into a number of characteristics of contemporary international relations with potentially destabilizing consequences, leading to an increasing likelihood of nuclear use. Four such characteristics will be singled out here both because of their relevance to nuclear crisis management and because of their growing role in the world system in the age of globalization: - Strategic upsets - Limits of imagination - Unsustainable strains - Radical aims The 2008 French Defence and National Security White Paper (25) developed the concept of ‘ruptures stratégiques’ (strategic upsets)to describe the growing tendency of the world system to generate rapid, unexpected, morphing upsets of international security as a consequence of globalization broadly defined against the backdrop of urbanizing populations generating economic growth and environmental and resource constraints. In themselves, such upsets are not novel (see inter alia, a pandemic such as the Black Death in 1348-49, the Great Depression not to mention World Wars or indeed the major and benign strategic upset of 1989-1991) but the very nature of globalization and the relationship between human activity and the Earth’s ability to sustain them) mean more, and more frequent as well as more complex upsets. If this reading is correct –and the Great financial crisis, the Arab revolutions, the accession of China to superpower status can be mentioned as examples which followed the publication of the White paper-,then the consequences in the nuclear arena will be twofold. First, nuclear doctrines and dispositions which were conceived under a set of circumstances (such as the Cold War or the India-Pakistan balance of power) may rapidly find themselves overtaken by events. For instance it is easier to demonstrate that US and Russian nuclear forces still visibly bear the imprint of their 1950s template than it is to demonstrate their optimal adaptation to post-post-Cold War requirements. Second, more challenges to international security and of a largely unforeseeable nature mean greater strains placed on the ability of nuclear powers to manage crises against the backdrop of their possession of nuclear weapons. In many, indeed most, cases, such ‘ruptures stratégiques’ will no doubt be handled with nuclear weapons appearing as irrelevant: hypothetical security consequences of an epidemic (such as the interhuman transmission of the H5N1 bird flu virus) or prospective conflicts resulting from climate change do not have prima facie nuclear aspects. But beyond the reminder that we don’t know that as a fact, the probability is, under the ‘rupture stratégique’ hypothesis, that there will be more occasions for putting all crisis management, including nuclear, to the test. Human societies tend to lack the imagination to think through, and to act upon, what have become known as ‘black swan’ events (26): that which has never occurred (or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) is deemed not be in the field of reality, and to which must be added eventualities which are denied because their consequences are to awful to contemplate. The extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11) bear testimony to this hard-wired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of growing salience if not for the recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945. Non-use of nuclear weapons may be taken for granted rather than being an absolute taboo. Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs (27) may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent (and often compelling) historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire which downplay the role of the atomic bombings in comparison to early research can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the intention (28). However desirable it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing (29) has removed for more than three decades the periodic reminders which such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely destructive nature of nuclear weapons. There is a real and growing risk that we forget what was obvious to those who first described in 1941 the unique nature of yet-to-be produced nuclear weapons (30). The risk is no doubt higher in those states for which the history of World War II has little relevance and which have not had the will or the opportunity to wrestle at the time or ex post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. Unsustainable strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary proliferation. Tight geographical constraints –with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad located within 300 miles of each other-; nuclear multi-polarity against the backdrop of multiple, criss-crossing, sources of tension in the Middle East (as opposed to the relative simplicity of the US-Soviet confrontation); the existence of doctrines (such as India’s ‘cold start’) and force postures (such as Pakistan’s broadening array of battlefield nukes)which rest on the expectation of early use; the role of non-state actors as aggravating or triggering factors when they are perceived as operating with the connivance of an antagonist state ( in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in Sarajevo in 1914; in the future, Hezbollah operatives launching rockets with effect against Israel or Lashkar-e-Taiba commandos doing a ‘Bombay’ redux in India?) : individually or in combination, these factors test crisis management capabilities more severely than anything seen during the Cold War with the partial exception of the Cuban missile crisis. Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear arsenals in Cold War Central Europe, with their iffy weapons’ safety and security arrangements, were less of a challenge: the US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not putting US and Soviet territory and capitals at risk. It may be argued that these risk factors are known to potential protagonists and that they therefore will be led to avoid the sort of nuclear brinksmanship which characterized US and Soviet behavior during the Cold War in crises such as the Korean war, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom Kippur war. Unfortunately, the multiple nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence, rather to the contrary. And were such restraint to feed into nuclear policy and crisis planning –along the lines of apparently greater US and Soviet nuclear caution from the mid-Seventies onwards-, the fact would remain that initial intent rarely resists the strains of a complex, multi-actor confrontation between inherently distrustful antagonists. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that during the 1980s, there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West was preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear which in turn fed into Soviet policies and dispositions (31). The Cold War was a set of crises and misunderstandings which came within a whisker of a nuclear holocaust; India and Pakistan’s nuclear standoff is deeply unstable not least as a result of the interaction with non-state actors; a multipolar nuclear Middle East would make the Cuban missile crisis look easy in comparison. Great conflicts tend to occur when one or several of the antagonists views the status quo as sufficiently undesirable and/or unsustainable to prompt forceful pro-action. Notwithstanding widespread perceptions to the contrary, this was not the case of the USSR and the United States during the Cold War. The US had chosen a policy of containment, as opposed to roll-back, of the Soviet Empire within its limits established as a result of World War II. The Soviet Union seized targets of opportunity outside of its 1945 area of control but avoided direct confrontation with US forces. Messianic language from the USSR on the global victory of communism or from the US about the end of the Evil Empire did not take precedence over the prime Soviet concern of preserving the Warsaw Pact and the US pursuit of containment –and, no less crucially, their mutual confidence that they could achieve these aims without going to war one with the other. No such generalization can be made about the Middle East, a region in which the very existence of a key state (Israel) is challenged while others have gone to war with each other (e.G.Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War of 1990-1991), or are riven by deep internal conflicts. Actors such as Hezbollah, with its organic and functional links with Islamic Iran and Alawite Syria add to the complexities and dangers. Extreme views and actions vis à vis the strategic status quo are widely prevalent. Although the India-Pakistan relationship corresponds to something akin to the US-Soviet ‘adversarial partnership’, that does not apply to radical non-state actors prevalent in Pakistan with more or less tight links to that country’s military intelligence services (ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence). The potential for danger is compounded by the variety of such groups: the Pashtu-related Pakistani Taliban (TTP), Kashmiri-related groups, Jihadi militants from the core provinces of Punjab and Sind… Their common characteristics are extreme radicalism, high levels of operational proficiency, and shared enmity of India. Their potential for triggering a conflict between the two countries is substantial, above and beyond the intentions of government officials. In sum, some seventy years after the launch of the Manhattan project, there is every reason to upgrade and reinforce non-proliferation policies, if nuclear use is to be avoided during the coming decades. Some markers to that end will be laid in our concluding section.

### Economy

#### Iran nuclearization destroys the economy

#### Phillips 06

#### (Phillips Research Fellow for Middle East­ern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud­ies, at The Heritage Foundation, 06 James, June 2, “U.S. Policy and Iran’s Nuclear Challenge” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Iran/hl942.cfm>)

There is no guaranteed policy that can halt the Iranian nuclear program short of war, and even a military campaign may only delay Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. But U.S. policy­making regarding the Iranian nuclear issue inevita­bly boils down to a search for the least-bad option. And as potentially costly and risky as a preventive war against Iran would be, allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would result in far heavier poten­tial costs and risks. The U.S. probably would be able to deter Iran from a direct nuclear attack on American or Israeli targets by threatening massive retaliation and the assured destruction of the Iranian regime. But there is a lingering doubt that a leader such as President Ahmadinejad, who reportedly harbors apocalyptic religious beliefs, would have the same cost-benefit calculus about a nuclear war as other leaders. The bellicose leader, who boldly called for Israel to be “wiped off the map” before he acquired a nuclear weapon, might be sorely tempted to follow through on his threat after he acquired one. Moreover, his regime might risk passing nuclear weapons off to terrorist surrogates in hopes of escaping retaliation for a nuclear surprise attack launched by an unknown attacker. Even if Iran could be deterred from considering such attacks, an Iranian nuclear breakout would undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that could lead Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and Algeria to build or acquire their own nuclear weap­ons. Each new nuclear power would multiply the risks and uncertainties in an already volatile region. Iran also may be emboldened to step up its sup­port of terrorism and subversion, calculating that its nuclear capability would deter a military response. An Iranian miscalculation could easily lead to a future military clash with the United States or an American ally that would impose expo­nentially higher costs than a war with a non-nucle­ar Iran. Even if it could not threaten a nuclear missile attack on U.S. territory for many years, Tehran could credibly threaten to target the Saudi oil fields with a nuclear weapon, thereby gaining a potent blackmail threat over the world economy.

### Heg

**Iran prolif collapses heg**

Dan **Meridor**, 4-11-20**11**; former Israeli Minister of Finance, The Jerusalem Post April 11, 2011 Monday Can the US block Iran's drive for regional hegemony? Lexis

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the addition of a religious layer to the conflict is new. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah are all religiously-based. When one speaks and acts for God, there is no compromise. Iran is a nation of merchants, and it needs the world and its financial system. This gives leverage to those who want to do something about its nuclear plans. If there is leadership, resolve, and persistence, with more sanctions, and more partners in the game, there is a chance that Iran will have to rethink its policy. Europe can do more. The volume of trade between certain European countries and Iran remains quite heavy. **In the end, this battle will determine the standing of the United States and its power and role in the world in the 21st century**. I believe that America has enough power to reinvent itself economically and restore the power that it had, but the perception that Iran is spreading is just the opposite. Israel is part of the camp that America has been leading for the last 70 years in terms of values, way of life, and democracy. It is important to us that this camp not lose its power in the world, and that is why a strong America is a very clear Israeli interest, regardless of whether the Democrats or Republicans are in power.

### Iran-Israel

#### Iran proliferation ensnares Israel-Iran into nuclear war through proxies

**Robb 12** (Charles, B.A. from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, J.D. at the University of Virginia Law School, Charles Wald, Master of Political Science degree in international relations, Troy State University, Bipartisan Policy Center Board Member “The Price of Inaction: Analysis of Energy and Economic Effects of a Nuclear Iran,” October 10th, 2012, <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/PriceofInaction.pdf>)

A nuclear Iran wouldimmediatelyencounter another nuclear state—even if an undeclared one—in the region: Israel. Compared with the relative stability of the Cold War, an initial stalemate between Israel and Iran would be highly precarious at best and would also threaten the entirety of Gulf exports, although for a more limited duration. Were Iran to become nuclear,the frequency ofcrises and**proxy conflicts**between Iran and Israel would likely increase, as wouldthe probability ofsuchconfrontations **spiraling into a nuclear exchange**, with horrendous humanitarian consequences. There could be an Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange**through miscalc**ulation and/or miscommunication. There could also be a calculated nuclear exchange, as the Israeli and Iranian sides would each have incentives to strike the other first. Tehran would likely have the ability to produce only a small handful of weapons, whereas Israel is already estimated to possess more than 100 devices, including thermonuclear warheads far beyond the destructive power of any Iranian fission weapon. Under such circumstances, Iran’s vulnerability to a bolt-from-the-blueIsraeli nuclearstrike wouldactuallyincrease its incentive to launch its own nuclear attack, lest its arsenal be obliterated.Israel’s smallterritorialsize reduces the survivability of its second-strike capability and, more importantly, the survivability of the country itself, despite its vastly larger and more advanced arsenal. Thus, Israeli leaders might feel the need to act preventatively to eliminate the Iranian arsenal before it can be used against them, just as American military planners contemplated taking out the fledgling Soviet arsenal early in the Cold War, except that as a much smaller country Israel has far less room for maneuver. Xxvi

### Middle East

#### Iranian proliferation turns the Middle East

#### Brookes 06

#### (Peter, senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, July 24.” Ground zero for Mideast instability is Iran: Arab world, take notice” <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed072406a.cfm>)

And Iran’s increasing willingness to underwrite militancy, terrorism and instability in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gaza Strip and now Israel and Lebanon, can’t make anyone in the Middle East comfortable. The region’s nations are keenly aware of Iran’s big power aspirations, too. In addition to large oil/gas reserves, Iran dwarfs most other Middle Eastern states in terms of population (70 million) and land mass (three times the size of Iraq). Spiritually, Tehran also wants to see Shia Iran lead the Muslim world, putting them in direct head-to-head competition with Sunni Saudi Arabia just across the Persian Gulf, and home to Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina. And how can its neighbors not be unhappy with Tehran’s nuclear program? If Iran joins the once exclusive nuclear club, others will feel obligated to follow for their own security, causing a cascading proliferation effect. Rumors of covert Egyptian and Saudi Arabian nuclear programs as a hedge against Iran abound. Turkey has openly said that if Iran goes nuclear it will have to reconsider its current non-nuclear stance. Tehran could give Damascus the bomb. Iran has stealthily advanced its anti-American, anti-Israeli agenda by proxy and terrorism in the past. But it may have overplayed its hand this time, fomenting more death and destruction in the crisis-weary Middle East. This latest provocation may finally convince Iran’s neighbors that Tehran isn’t just a serious threat to the United States and Israel, but to themselves as well. The searing question is: Will they do anything about it?

### Terrorism

#### Turns terrorism

Kahl 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

Specifically, a nuclear-armed Tehran would likely provide Hezbollah and Palestinian militants with more sophisticated, longer-range, and more accurate conventional weaponry for use against Israel. In an effort to bolster the deterrent capabilities of such allies, Iran might consider giving them "dual-capable" weapons, leaving Israel to guess whether these systems were conventional or armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear material. A nuclear-armed Iran might also give its proxies permission to use advanced weapons systems instead of keeping them in reserve, as Tehran reportedly instructed Hezbollah to do during the militant group's 2006 war with Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran, believing that it possessed a powerful deterrent and could thus commit violence abroad with near impunity, might also increase the frequency and scale of the terrorist attacks against U.S. and Israeli targets carried out by Hezbollah and the Quds Force, the covert operations wing of Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. And a bolder Iran might increase the number of Revolutionary Guard forces it deployed to Lebanon, allow its navy to engage in more frequent shows of force in the Mediterranean, and assert itself more aggressively in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. To further enhance its image in the eyes of domestic and regional audiences as the leader of an anti-Western resistance bloc, a nuclear-armed Iran might respond to regional crises by threatening to use all the means at its disposal to ensure the survival of the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah, or Palestinian groups. And Iran might be emboldened to play the spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by encouraging large-scale militant attacks and might try to destabilize its neighbors through more coercive diplomacy and subversion in Iraq and the Gulf states.

### Strikes

#### Strikes cause extinction

**Nazemroaya 11** [Research Associate at the Centre for Research on Globalization, Mahdi, “The Next World War: The “Great Game” and the Threat of Nuclear War,” 1/10, Global Research]

Any attack on Iran will be a joint operation between Israel, the U.S., and NATO. Such an attack will escalate into a major war. The U.S. could attack Iran, but can not win a conventional war. General Yuri Baluyevsky, the former chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff and Russian deputy defence minister, even publicly came forward in 2007 to warn that an attack on Iran would be a global disaster and unwinnable for the Pentagon. [97]¶ Sucha war against Iran and its allies in the Middle East would lead to the use of nuclear weapons against Iran as the only means to defeat it. Even Saddam Hussein, who during his day once commanded the most powerful Arab state and military force, was aware of this. In July 25, 1990, in a meeting with April C. Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein stated: “But you know you [meaning the U.S.] are not the ones who protected your friends during the war with Iran. I assure you, had the Iranians overrun the region, the American troops would not have stopped them, except by the use of nuclear weapons.” [98]¶ The diabolically unthinkable is no longer a taboo: the use of nuclear weapons once again against another country by the U.S. military. This will be a violation of the NPT and international law. Any nuclear attack on Iran will have major, long-term environmental impacts. A nuclear attack on Iran will also contaminate far-reaching areas that will go far beyond Iran to places such as Europe, Turkey, the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, Pakistan, and India.¶ Within the NATO alliance and amongst U.S. allies a consensushas been underway to legitimize and normalize theidea of using nuclearweapons. This consenus aims at paving the way for a nuclear strike against Iran and/or other countries in the future.This groundwork also includes the normalization of Israeli nukes.¶ Towards the end of 2006, Robert Gates stated that Israel has nuclear weapons, which was soon followed by a conveniently-timed slip of the tongue by Ehud Olmert stating that Tel Aviv possessed nuclear weapons. [99] Within this framework, Fumio Kyuma, a former Japanese defence minister, during a speech at Reitaku University in 2007 that followed the statements of Gates and Olmert, tried to publicly legitimize the dropping of atom bombs by the U.S. on Japanese civilians. [100] Because of the massive public outrage in Japanese society, Kyuma was forced to resign his post as defence minister. [101]¶ The Uncertain Road Ahead: Armageddon at Our Doorstep? The March into the Unknown Horizon...¶ According to the*Christian Science Monitor*, Beijing is a barometre on whether Iran will be attacked and it seems unlikely by the acceleration in trade between China and Iran. [102] Stilla major war in the Middle East and an even more dangerous global war with the use of nuclear weapons should not be ruled out. The globe is facing a state of worldwide military escalation. What is looming in front of humanity is the possibility of an all-out nuclear war and theextinction of most life on this planet as we know it.

## A2 Impact Defense

### A2: Impact Defense

**Limited war is impossible --- escalation is inevitable.**

**White 11**(Jeffrey – defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, July/August 2011,

http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982)

In general, the more expansive a war’s goals as a plan escalates from strike to campaign to broad offensive, the greater the force needed to achieve those goals, the greater the uncertainty in achieving them, and the greater the consequences of both success and failure. Moreover, a war’s goals at the outset of conflict may not remain stable. Early sudden successes or unanticipated failures can lead to the escalation of initially limited goals, particularly if terminating hostilities proves difficult. Lateral expansion as well as escalation is also possible: Iranian leaders might surrender or agree to a truce but be unable to enforce a similar decision on Hezbollah leaders or terror agents around the world. This leads to yet another layer of complexity and uncertainty: Whose war would this be?

**Alliances draw in outside powers.**

**White 11**(Jeffrey – defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, July/August 2011,

http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982)

A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by theUnited States and Iran alone.Each would havepartners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstandingrelationships, the course of operations and other factors would placetheUnited States and Iran at thecenter of more or less structured coalitions of the marginally willing. A Western coalition could consist of the United States and most of its traditional allies (but very likely not Turkey, based on the evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states, Jordan and perhaps Egypt, depending on where its revolution takes it. Much would depend on whether U.S. leaders could persuade others to go along, which would mean convincing them that U.S. forces could shield them from Iranian and Iranian-proxy retaliation, or at least substantially weaken its effects. Coalition warfare would present a number of challenges to the U.S. government. Overall, it would lend legitimacy to the action, but it would also constrict U.S. freedom of action, perhaps by limiting the scope and intensity of military operations. There would thus be tension between the desire for a small coalition of the capable for operational and security purposes and a broader coalition that would include marginally useful allies to maximize legitimacy. The U.S. administration would probably not welcome Israeli participation. But if Israel were directly attacked by Iran or its allies, Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel out—as it did during the 1991 Gulf War. That would complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition, although it would not necessarily break it apart. Iranian diplomacy and information operations would seek to exploit Israeli participation to the fullest. Iranwould have its own coalition. Hizballah in particular could act at Iran’s behest both by attacking Israel directly and by using its asymmetric and irregular warfare capabilities to expand the conflict and complicate the maintenance of the U.S. coalition. The escalation of the Hizballah-Israel conflict could draw in Syria and Hamas; Hamas in particular could feel compelled to respond to an Iranian request for assistance. Some or all of these satellite actors might choose to leave Iran to its fate, especially if initial U.S. strikes seemed devastating to the point of decisive. But theirinvolvement would spread the conflictto the entire eastern Mediterranean and perhaps beyond, complicating both U.S. military operations and coalition diplomacy.

**Iranian doctrine ensures escelation.**

**White 11**(Jeffrey – defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, July/August 2011,

http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982)

If Iran’s advantage lies in broadening and widening a conflict once begun, how might we expect its leaders to go about it? At least three types of escalation are open to Tehran: horizontal, vertical and domain. Horizontal escalation involves the spread of hostilities from beyond the immediate area of conflict to additional geographic areas and political actors.13 Iran’s means and methods, as discussed above, give it the ability to escalate horizontally within the Middle East region and beyond to include Europe and the United States. Vertical escalation involves the employment of new or increasingly potent weapons systems, attacking new types of targets, or introducing additional types of forces into the conflict.14 What begins as essentially a fight between U.S. and allied air and naval strike assets and Iranian air defense assets could be quickly expanded by Iran to the use of offensive missile systems and naval surface and sub-surface forces in retaliation. Iranian escalation to the employment of WMD (if a war occurred after an Iranian breakout) seems unlikely short of an imminent threat to the regime, but that threat would be hanging in the air as fighting escalated. Domain escalation refers to the expansion of the conflict from the purely military domain to the diplomatic, economic and social domains, in which Iran has some advantages. In summary, an attack on Iran could produce dynamics that would push either or both sides to escalate the conflict even if neither had an interest or an initial intention to do so. Iranian civilian casualties, for example, could provoke Iran to step up its response. This becomes more likely as the scale of a U.S. attack increases. Downed U.S. aircrews could lead to search and rescue operations that could become significant military actions in their own right. The need to restrike targets that were missed or inadequately damaged could also prolong the conflict and involve additional forces. As the conflict developed, internal and external political pressures could press both antagonists to escalate the fighting.

**Most probably scenario for escalation and super power draw in**

**Kahl, ’12** (Colin H, Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort”, *Foreign Affairs*, Mar/Apr 2012. Vol. 91, Iss. 2; pg. 166, 8 pgs, JD)

 [166] In "Time to Attack Iran" ( January/ February 2012), Matthew Kroenig takes a page out of the decade-old playbook used by advocates of the Iraq war. He portrays the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran as both grave and imminent, arguing that the United States has little choice but to attack Iran now before it is too late. Then, after oaering the caveat that "attacking Iran is hardly an attractive prospect," he goes on to portray military action as preferable to other available alternatives and concludes that the United States can manage all the associated risks. Preventive war, according to Kroenig, is "the least bad option." But the lesson of Iraq, the last preventive war launched by the United States, is that Washington should not choose war when there are still other options, and it should not base its decision to attack on best-case analyses of how it hopes the conflict will turn out.A realistic assessment of Iran's nuclear progress and how a conflict would likely unfold leads one to a conclusion that is the opposite of Kroenig's: now is not the time to attack Iran. Bad Timing Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) has documented Iranian eaorts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them. In arguing for a six-month horizon, Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of State, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon.And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The iaea would thus detect such activity with su/cient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be yearsoa. Kroenig is also inconsistent about the timetable for an attack. In some places, he suggests that strikes should begin now, whereas in others, he argues that the United States should attack only if Iran takes certain actions-such as expelling iaea inspectors, beginning the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, or installing large numbers of advanced centrifuges, any one of which would signal that it had decided to build a bomb. Kroenig is likely right that these developments-and perhaps others, such as the discovery of new covert enrichment sites-would create a decision point for the use of force. But the Iranians have not taken these steps yet, and as Kroenig acknowledges, "Washington has a very good chance" of detecting them if they do. Riding the Escalator Kroenig's discussion of timing is not the only misleading part of his article; so is his contention that the United States could mitigate the "potentially devastating consequences" of a strike on Iran by carefully managing the escalation that would ensue. His picture of a clean, calibrated conflict is a mirage. Any war with Iran would be a messy and extraordinarily violent affair, with significant casualties and consequences. According to Kroenig, Iran would not respond to a strike with its "worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe" unless its leaders felt that the regime's "very existence was threatened." To mitigate this risk, he claims, the United States could "make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government." But Iranian leaders have staked their domestic legitimacy on resisting international pressure to halt the nuclear program, and so they would inevitably view an attack on that program as an attack on the regime itself. Decades of hostility and perceived U.S. eaorts to undermine the regime would reinforce this perception. And when combined with the emphasis on anti-Americanism in the ideology of the supreme leader and his hard-line advisers, as well as their general ignorance about what drives U.S. decision-making, this perception means that there is little prospect that Iranian leaders would believe that a U.S. strike had limited aims. Assuming the worst about Washington's intentions, Tehran is likely to overreact to even a surgical strike against its nuclear facilities. Kroenig nevertheless believes that the United States could limit the prospects for escalation by warning Iran that crossing certain "redlines" would trigger a devastating U.S. counter response. Ironically, Kroenig believes that a nuclear-armed Iran would be deeply irrational and prone to miscalculation yet somehow maintains that under the same leaders, Iran would make clear-eyed decisions in the immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike. But the two countries share no direct and reliable channels for communication, and the inevitable confusion brought on by a crisis would make signaling di/cult and miscalculation likely. To make matters worse, in the heat of battle, Iran would face powerful incentives to escalate. In the event of a conflict, both sides would come under significant pressure to stop the fighting due to the impact on international oil markets. Since this would limit the time the Iranians would have to reestablish deterrence, they might choose to launch a quick, all-out response, without care for redlines. Iranian fears that the United States could successfully disrupt its command-and-control infrastructure or preemptively destroy its ballistic missile arsenal could also tempt Iran to launch as many missiles as possible early in the war. And the decentralized nature of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, especially its navy, raises the prospect of unauthorized responses that could rapidly expand the fighting in the crowded waters of the Persian Gulf. Controlling escalation would be no easier on the U.S. side. In the face of reprisals by Iranian proxies, "token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships," or "the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels,"Kroenig says that Washington should turn the other cheek and constrain its own response to Iranian counterattacks. But this is much easier said than done. Just as Iran's likely expectation of a short war might encourage it to respond disproportionately early in the crisis, so the United States would also have incentives to move swiftly to destroy Iran's conventional forces and the infrastructure of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And if the United States failed to do so, proxy attacks against U.S. civilian personnel in Lebanon or Iraq, the transfer of lethal rocket and portable air defense systems to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, or missile strikes against U.S. facilities in the Gulf could cause significant U.S. casualties, creating irresistible political pressure in Washington to respond. Add to this the normal fog of war and the lack of reliable communications between the United States and Iran, and Washington would have a hard time determining whether Tehran's initial response to a strike was a one-oa event or the prelude to a wider campaign. If it were the latter, a passive U.S. approach might motivate Iran to launch even more dangerous attacks-and this is a risk Washington may choose not to take. The sum total of these dynamics would make staying within Kroenig's proscribed limits exceedingly di/cult. Even if Iran did not escalate, purely defensive moves that would threaten U.S. personnel or international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz-the maritime chokepoint through which nearly 20 per- cent of the world's traded oil passes- would also create powerful incentives for Washington to preemptively target Iran's military. Of particular concern would be Iran's "anti-access/area-denial" capabilities, which are designed to prevent advanced navies from operating in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. These systems integrate coastal air defenses, shore-based long-range artillery and antiship cruise missiles, Kilo-class and midget submarines, remote-controlled boats and unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles, and more than 1,000 small attack craft equipped with machine guns, multiple-launch rockets, antiship missiles, torpedoes, and rapid mine- laying capabilities. The entire 120-mile-long strait sits along the Iranian coastline, within short reach of these systems. In the midst of a conflict, the threat to U.S. forces and the global economy posed by Iran's activating its air defenses, dispersing its missiles or naval forces, or moving its mines out of storage would be too great for the United States to ignore; the logic of preemption would compel Washington to escalate. Some analysts, including AfshinMolavi and Michael Singh, believe that the Iranians are unlikely to attempt to close the strait due to the damage it would inflict on their own economy. But Tehran's saber rattling has already intensified in response to the prospect of Western sanctions on its oil industry. In the immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian leaders might perceive that holding the strait at risk would encourage international pressure on Washington to end the fighting, possibly deterring U.S. escalation. In reality, it would more likely have the opposite effect, encouraging aggressive U.S. resorts to protect commercial shipping. The U.S. Navy is capable of keeping the strait open, but the mere threat of closure could send oil prices soaring, dealing a heavy blow to the fragile global economy.The measures that Kroenig advocates to mitigate this threat, such as opening up the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and urging Saudi Arabia to boost oil production, would be unlikely to succeed, especially since most Saudi crude passes through the strait. Ultimately, if the United States and Iran go to war, there is no doubt that Washington will win in the narrow operational sense. Indeed, with the impressive array of U.S. naval and air forces already deployed in the Gulf, the United States could probably knock Iran's military capabilities back 20 years in a matter of weeks. But a U.S.-Iranian conflict would not be the clinical, tightly controlled, limited encounter that Kroenig predicts. Spillover Keeping other states in the region out of the fight would also prove more di/cult than Kroenig suggests. Iran would presume Israeli complicity in a U.S. raid and would seek to drag Israel into the conflict in order to undermine potential support for the U.S. war eaort among key Arab regimes. And although it is true, as Kroenig notes, that Israel remained on the sidelines during the 1990-91 Gulf War, the threat posed by Iran's missiles and proxies today is considerably greater than that posed by Iraq two decades ago. If Iranian-allied Hezbollah responded to the fighting by firing rockets at Israeli cities, Israel could launch an all-out war against Lebanon. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad might also try to use the moment to divert attention from the uprising in his country, launching his own assault on the Jewish state. Either scenario, or their combination, could lead to a wider war in the Levant. Even in the Gulf, where U.S. partners are sometimes portrayed as passive, Iranian retaliation might draw Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates into the conflict. The Saudis have taken a much more confrontational posture toward Iran in the past year, and Riyadh is unlikely to tolerate Iranian attacks against critical energy infrastructure. For its part, the uae, the most hawkish state in the Gulf, might respond to missiles raining down on U.S. forces at its Al Dhafra Air Base by attempting to seize Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, three disputed Gulf islands currently occupied by Iran. A strike could also set oa wider destabilizing effects. Although Kroenig is right that some Arab leaders would privately applaud a U.S. strike, many on the Arab street would reject it. Both Islamist extremists and embattled elites could use this opportunity to transform the Arab Spring's populist antiregime narrative into a decidedly anti-American one. This would rebound to Iran's advantage just at the moment when political developments in the region, chief among them the resurgence of nationalism in the Arab world and the upheaval in Syria, are significantly undermining Iran's influence. A U.S. strike could easily shift regional sympathies back in Tehran's favor by allowing Iran to play the victim and, through its retaliation, resuscitate its status as the champion of the region's anti-Western resistance.

**Iran strikes causes multiple scenarios for extinction.**

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The Bush Administration has embarked upon **a military adventure which threatens the future of humanity**. This is not an overstatement. **If aerial bombardments were to be launched against Iran, they would trigger a ground war and the escalation of the conflict to a much broader region. Even in the case of aerial and missile attacks using conventional warheads, the bombings would unleash a "Chernobyl type" nuclear nightmare resulting from the spread of nuclear radiation** following the destruction of Iran's nuclear energy facilities. Throughout history, the structure of military alliances has played a crucial role in triggering major military conflicts. In contrast to the situation prevailing prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, America's ongoing military adventure is now firmly supported by the Franco-German alliance. Moreover, Israel is slated to play a direct role in this military operation. NATO is firmly aligned with the Anglo-American-Israeli military axis, which also includes Australia and Canada. In 2005, NATO signed a military cooperation agreement with Israel, and Israel has a longstanding bilateral military agreement with Turkey. Iran has observer status in The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and is slated to become a full member of SCO. China and Russia have far-reaching military cooperation agreements with Iran. China and Russia are firmly opposed to a US-led military operation in the diplomatic arena. While the US sponsored military plan threatens Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia and the Caspian sea basin, it is unlikely that they would intervene militarily on the side of Iran or Syria. **The planned attack on Iran must be understood in relation to the existing active war theaters in the Middle East, namely Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon-Palestine. The conflict could easily spread from the Middle East to the Caspian sea basin. It could also involve the participation of Azerbaijan and Georgia, where US troops are stationed. Military action against Iran** and Syria **would directly involve Israel's participation, which in turn would trigger a broader war throughout the Middle East, not to mention the further implosion in the Palestinian occupied territories**. Turkey is closely associated with the proposed aerial attacks. If the US-UK-Israeli war plans were to proceed, th**e broader Middle East- Central Asian region would flare up, from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Afghan-Chinese border.** At present, there are three distinct war theaters: Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine-Lebanon. **An attack directed against Iran would serve to integrate these war theaters transforming the broader Middle East Central Asian region into an integrated war zone.** (see map above) **In turn the US sponsored aerial bombardments directed against Iran could contribute to triggering a ground war** characterized by Iranian attacks directed against coalition troops in Iraq. In turn, Israeli forces would enter into Syria. An attack on Iran would have a direct impact on the resistance movement inside Iraq. **It would** also **put pressure on America's overstretched military capabilities and resources in both the Iraqi and Afghan war theaters.**  In other words, **the shaky geopolitics of the Central Asia- Middle East region, the three existing war theaters in which America is currently, involved, the direct participation of Israel and Turkey, the structure of US sponsored military alliances**, etc. **raises the specter of a broader conflict. The war against Iran is part of a longer term US military agenda which seeks to militarize the entire Caspian sea basin, eventuallyleading to the destabilization and conquest of the Russian Federation**.

### --Terminals

#### Iran war escalates

White, July/August 2011(Jeffrey—defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, p. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982>)

A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by theUnited States and Iran alone.Each would havepartners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstandingrelationships, the course of operations and other factors would placetheUnited States and Iran at thecenter of more or less structured coalitions of the marginally willing. A Western coalition could consist of the United States and most of its traditional allies (but very likely not Turkey, based on the evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states, Jordan and perhaps Egypt, depending on where its revolution takes it. Much would depend on whether U.S. leaders could persuade others to go along, which would mean convincing them that U.S. forces could shield them from Iranian and Iranian-proxy retaliation, or at least substantially weaken its effects. Coalition warfare would present a number of challenges to the U.S. government. Overall, it would lend legitimacy to the action, but it would also constrict U.S. freedom of action, perhaps by limiting the scope and intensity of military operations. There would thus be tension between the desire for a small coalition of the capable for operational and security purposes and a broader coalition that would include marginally useful allies to maximize legitimacy. The U.S. administration would probably not welcome Israeli participation. But if Israel were directly attacked by Iran or its allies, Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel out—as it did during the 1991 Gulf War. That would complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition, although it would not necessarily break it apart. Iranian diplomacy and information operations would seek to exploit Israeli participation to the fullest. Iranwould have its own coalition. Hizballah in particular could act at Iran’s behest both by attacking Israel directly and by using its asymmetric and irregular warfare capabilities to expand the conflict and complicate the maintenance of the U.S. coalition. The escalation of the Hizballah-Israel conflict could draw in Syria and Hamas; Hamas in particular could feel compelled to respond to an Iranian request for assistance. Some or all of these satellite actors might choose to leave Iran to its fate, especially if initial U.S. strikes seemed devastating to the point of decisive. But theirinvolvement would spread the conflictto the entire eastern Mediterranean and perhaps beyond, complicating both U.S. military operations and coalition diplomacy.

#### Extinction

Giribets 12[Miguel Giribets, “If US Attacks Iran, Human Survival May Be at Risk (Part III),” Argen Press, 10 January 2012, pg. http://watchingamerica.com/News/141596/if-us-attacks-iran-human-survival-may-be-at-risk-part-iii/]

The dangers of global war are clear. On one side, hundreds of Russian technicians would die working on Iranian nuclear facilities, to which Russia could not stand idly by. According to Chossudovsky: "Were Iran to be the object of a "pre-emptive" aerial attack by allied forces, the entire region, from the Eastern Mediterranean to China's Western frontier with Afghanistan and Pakistan, would flare up, leading us potentially intoa World War III scenario. The war would also extend into Lebanon and Syria. It is highly unlikely that the bombings, if they were to be implemented, would be circumscribed to Iran's nuclear facilities as claimed by US-NATO official statements. What is more probable is an all out air attack on both military and civilian infrastructure, transport systems, factories, public buildings.

"The issue of radioactive fallout and contamination, while casually dismissed by US-NATO military analysts, would be devastating, potentially affecting a large area of the broader Middle East (including Israel) and Central Asian region." As an example, a few years ago Burma moved its capital Rangoon to Pyinmana, because it believed that the effects of nuclear radiation caused by an attack on Iran would be less there. Radiation and nuclear winter could have uncontrollable consequences for humans. Put plainly, the survival of the human race would be put at stake if the U.S. attacks Iran.

**Extinction.**

**Avery 12**– Professor of [quantum chemistry](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_chemistry) and [thermodynamics](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thermodynamics) @ University of Copenhagen, [John Scales Avery (Associate with the Nobel Peace Prize recipient [Pugwash Conferences](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pugwash_Conferences) on Science and World Affairs), “Iran: Automatic Escalation to World War III?,” TRANSCEND Media Service, Oct 28, 2012, pg. http://tinyurl.com/bgqjxw5

A few days ago Brigadier GeneralAmir Ali Hajizadeh , who is in charge of the Revolutionary Guards missile systems told Iran’s Arabic-language television network that should Israel and Iran engage militarily, “nothing is predictable… and it will turn into **World War III**”.

He added thatIran would deem any Israeli strike to be conducted with US authorisation, so “whether the Zionist regime attacks with or without US knowledge, then we will definitely attack US bases in Bahrain, Qatar and Afghanistan.”
The first point to notice is that an attack on Iran by Israel would be both criminal and insane. It would be criminal because it would be a violation of the United Nations Charter and the Nuremberg Principles. It would be insane because it would initiate a conflict that might **escalate in an unpredictable way**. Such a conflict might easily be the start of a Third World War.

But what General Hajizadeh proposes in his statement is perhaps even more criminal and even more insane.

Let us suppose that Netanyahu’s and his government carry through their irresponsible plan of attacking Iran. If Iran then responds by attacking US bases in Bahrain, Qatar and Afghanistan, then the **escalation of the conflict would be absolutely automatic**. US leaders would then have no choice. They would be forced to respond by attacking Iran, despite the danger that **Russia, China and Pakistan** would be drawn into the conflict on the side of Iran.

One is reminded ofthe start of World War I, when a small conflict started by Austria to punish the Serbian Panslavic Movement escalated into a global disaster which still casts a shadow over the world almost a century later. The difference between 1914 and 2012 is that today we possess **all-destroying thermonuclear weapons**.A new world war could lead to the destruction of human civilization and much of the biosphere.

### Top Shelf/Energy/Economy

**Strikes don’t solve, cause massive escalation, destroy energy supplies and the global economy**

**Mattair 10** (Thomas R., executive director of the Middle East Policy Council, associate editor of Middle East Policy, “The United States and Iran: Diplomacy, Sanctions and War”)

The threatened military strikes against Iran’s known nuclear facilities would, if actually carried out, probably enable the regime to change the subject from its own repression and mismanagement to the behavior of the West, rally more public support for the regime, and justify even more repression of the opposition, portrayed as a tool of the West anyway. It would also probably kill a lot of Iranians, something that never endears the bombers to the bombed. The leaders of Iran’s opposition — again, the ones we are trying to help — oppose military strikes. And again, to look at it from another angle, these strikes might only set Iran’s nuclear programs back a few years. First, Israel does not have conventional bunker-busting weapons that would destroy facilities buried under layers of steel and concrete or tunneled into mountainsides. Its aircraft would have trouble getting to Iran and returning home. Israel could rely on ballistic missiles or submarine- launched cruise missiles, but they do not carry a heavy enough payload to do the job, unless Israel used so-called lowradiation tactical nuclear warheads. Israel’s former top general, air force commander Dan Halutz, recently said he does not think Israel has the capability to strike Iran alone. The United States is producing conventional bunker busting weapons that would be more effective, but they cannot kill the technical knowledge of Iranian scientists or the political will of Iran’s leaders. Moreover, if we do not know the location of all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, as some of the advocates of military strikes acknowledge, how can we target them? Would Iran not use its aircraft and surfaceto- air defensive missile systems to stop this? Would the United States not target those defensive systems? And would this not lead to an obvious but unpredictable escalation of the strikes? Wouldn’t it be more accurate to call this war instead of strikes? “Strikes,” whatever that means, would lead at the very least to covert Iranian retaliation against any GCC country that provided airspace or any facility for the strike, which is why so many GCC leaders have said they don’t want this issue resolved through force. So has the Iraqi regime. Strikes would at the very least raise the insurance rates for any ship entering the Gulf to transport oil and gas and would raise the price of oil and gas for everyone in the world. It could lead to sabotage of GCC oil and gas fields, processing facilities, pipelines and shipping lanes, interrupting the flow of energy supplies out of the Gulf to consumers worldwide. It might also lead to Iranian efforts to kill U.S. forces attempting to withdraw from Iraq or stabilize Afghanistan. Iran does have the capability to do that. The Obama administration rightly wants to avoid this. It is trying to persuade China that it can best avoid such a scenario by agreeing to more sanctions. It is also trying to get more sanctions to assure Israel that it does not need to rush to military strikes. It is also arguing more sanctions will lead Iran back to the negotiating table.

### Econ/Oil Shocks

#### Strikes destroy the economy and cause oil shocks

Poor 10 (Jeff.Staffer for the Business and Media Institute. “Dr. Doom Roubini to Synagogue Audience: Israeli Air Strike on Iran Would Lead to Another Global Recession” Business and Media Institute, 5/14/10, lexis)

With European economies on the brink and other emerging markets slowing down, is there any possible way things could get worse? As if the public needed any more evidence we’re living in perilous times, Dr. Nouriel Roubini, professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and co-author of “Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance,” warned that there is one single event that could push the global economy down even further. Roubini, who was the economist that predicted the current economic crisis, spoke to an audience at the Sixth & I Synagogue in Washington, D.C. on May 13. He said that, should Israel or the United States initiate an attack on Iran, as it is attempting to procure nuclear weapons, the price of oil would skyrocket. “And you know, on the issue of if there is a strike on Iran, the point I was making in the article was, if that were to occur, oil prices would double literally overnight and we would have another global recession.” Roubini cited other historical events that impacted a fragile global economy. “Oil spiked sharply in ’73 after the Yom Kippur War,” Roubini explained. “It doubled in ’79 after the Iranian Revolution, it spiked again in 1990 after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.” He also explained the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a spark for the current global financial crisis, a point he had made earlier for Forbes back on April 22. He advised policy makers to keep this in mind when it comes to dealing with the rogue power. “So if an air strike were to occur, and I’m not making a statement whether Israel and/or the United States would be right—so I’m just pointing out that if that were to occur, the financial consequences would be a spike in the price of oil and that would lead to another global recession. So when it comes to some pros and cons that should be something we keep in mind.”

#### That causes oil wars

**King 08**, September (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17)

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

**And economic collapse causes war**

**Burrows and Harris 09** -Mathew J. Burrows is a counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, Jennifer Harris is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, The Washington Quarterly, April, http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nationsi n thesame period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attack and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emergenaturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. Thelack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missileflight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus onpreemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continuesto experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if governmentleaders deem assured access to energy resources,for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival oftheir regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopoliticalimplications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for navalbuildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup ofregional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, andcounterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer inAsia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in amoredog-eat-dog world.What Kind of World will 2025 Be? Perhaps more than lessons, history loves patterns. Despite widespread changes in the world today, there is little to suggest that the future will not resemble the past in several respects. The report asserts that, under most scenarios, the trendtoward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been ongoing for acouple of decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new globalplayers, the worsening institutional deficit, potential growth in regional blocs,and enhanced strength of non-state actors and networks. The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could either strengthen the international system, by filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions, or could further fragment it and incapacitate international cooperation. The diversity in both type and kind of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community. Because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, the rising powers will enjoy a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms. They are also likely to cherish their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with terrorism, climate change, proliferation, energy security, and other system maintenance issues. Existing multilateral institutions, designed for a different geopolitical order, appear too rigid and cumbersome to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources. Nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic foundations, concentrating on specific issues, increasingly will populate the landscape but are unlikely to affect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments. Efforts at greater inclusiveness, to reflect the emergence of the newer powers, may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges. Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted. An ongoing financial crisis and prolonged recession would tilt the scales even further in the direction of a fragmented and dysfunctional international system with a heightened risk of conflict. The report concluded that the rising BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem averse to challenging the international system, as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, but this of course could change if their widespread hopes for greater prosperity become frustrated and the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.

### --Oil Shocks Turn Econ

#### Robust empirical data proves the economy would be wrecked

Hamilton, 11 [James D. Hamilton Department of Economics University of California, San Diego, “Historical Oil Shocks”, <http://dss.ucsd.edu/~jhamilto/oil_history.pdf>]

As noted in the previous sections, these historical episodes were often followed by economic recessions in the United States. The last column of Table 1 reports the starting date of U.S. recessions as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. All but one of the 11 postwar recessions were associated with an increase in the price of oil, the single exception being the recession of 1960. Likewise, all but one of the 12 oil price episodes listed in Table 1 were accompanied by U.S. recessions, the single exception being the 2003 oil price increase associated with the Venezuelan unrest and second Persian Gulf War. The correlation between oil shocks and economic recessions appears to be too strong to be just a coincidence (Hamilton, 1983a, 1985). And although demand pressure associated with the later stages of a business cycle expansion seems to have been a contributing factor in a number of these episodes, statistically one cannot predict the oil price changes prior to 1973 on the basis of prior developments in the U.S. economy (Hamilton, 1983a). Moreover, **supply disruptions** arising from dramatic geopolitical events are prominent causes of a number of the most important episodes. Insofar as eventssuch as the Suez Crisis and first Persian Gulf War were not caused by U.S. business cycle dynamics, a correlation between these events and subsequent economic 27 downturns should be viewed as causal. This is not to claim that the oil price increases themselves were the sole cause of most postwar recessions. Instead the indicated conclusion is that oil shocks were a contributing factor in at least some postwar recessions. That an oil price increase could exert some drag on the economy of an oil importingcountry should not be controversial. On the supply side, energy is a factor of production, and an exogenous decrease in its supply would be expected to be associated with a decline in productivity. However, standard neoclassical reasoning suggests that the size of such an effect should be small. If the dollar value of the lost energy is less than the dollar value of the lost production, it would pay the firm to bid up the price of energy so as to maintain production. But the dollar value of the lost energy is relatively modest compared with the dollar value of production lost in a recession. For example, the global production shortfall associated with the OPEC embargo (the area above the dashed line in Figure 10) averaged 2.3 mb/d over the 6 months following September 1973. Even at a price of $12/barrel, this only represents a market value of $5.1 billion spread over the entire world economy. By contrast, U.S. real GDP declined at a 2.5% annual rate between 1974:Q1 and 1975:Q1, which would represent about $38 billion annually in 1974 dollars for the U.S. alone. The dollar value of output lost in the recession exceeded the dollar value of the lost energy by an order of magnitude. Alternatively, oil shocks could affect the economy through the demand side. The short-run elasticity of oil demand is very low.28 If consumers try to maintain their real purchases of energy in the face of rising prices, their saving or spending on other goods 28 must fall commensurately. Although there are offsetting income gains for domestic oil producers, the marginal propensity to spend out of oil company windfall profits may be low, and by 1974, more than a third of U.S. oil was imported. Again, however, the direct effects one could assign to this mechanism are limited. For example, between September 1973 and July 1974, U.S. consumer purchases of energy goods and services increased by $14.4 billion at an annual rate,29 yet the output decline was more than twice this amount. Hamilton (1988) stressed the importance of the composition of consumer spending in addition to its overall level. For example, one of the key responses seen following an increase in oil prices is a decline in automobile spending, particularly the larger vehicles manufactured in the United States (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009; Ramey and Vine, forthcoming). Insofar as specialized labor and capital devoted to the manufacture and sales of those vehicles are difficult to shift into other uses, the result can be a drop in income that is greater than the lost purchasing power by the original consumers. Table 2 reproduces the calculations in Hamilton (2009b) on the behavior of real GDP in the 5 quarters following each of 5 historical oil shocks, and the specific contribution made to this total from motor vehicles and parts alone. This did seem to make a material contribution in many cases. For example, in the 5 quarters following the oil price increases of 1979:Q2 and 1990:Q3, real GDP would have increased rather than fallen had there been no decline in autos. In addition, there appears to be an important response of consumer sentiment to rapid increases in energy prices (Edelstein and Kilian, 2009). Combining these changes in spending with traditional Keynesian multiplier 28 See for example the literature surveys by Dahl and Sterner (1991), Dahl (1993), Espey (1998), Graham and Glaister (2004) and Brons, et. al. (2008). Examples of studies finding higher elasticities include Kilian (2010), Baumeister and Peersman (2009), and Davis and Kilian (forthcoming). 29 Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.3.5.U. 29 effects appears to be the most plausible explanation for why oil shocks have often been followed by economic downturns. In addition to disruptions in supply arising from geopolitical events, another contributing factor for several of the historical episodes is the interaction of growing petroleum demand with production declines from the mature producing fields on which the world had come to depend. In the postwar experience, this appears to be part of the story behind the 1973-1974 and 2007-2008 oil price spikes, and, going back in time, in the 1862-1864 and 1895 price run-ups as well. It is unclear as of this writing where the added global production will come from to replace traditional sources such as the North Sea, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, if production from the latter has indeed peaked. But given the record of geopolitical instability in the Middle East, and the projected phenomenal surge in demand from the newly industrialized countries, it seems quite reasonable to expect that within the next decade we will have an additional row of data to add to Table 1 with which to inform our understanding of the economic consequences of oil shocks.

#### Even if high prices are okay, abrupt shocks are devastating—prefer our evidence

Ronald Bailey, 3-8-2011; award-winning science correspondent for Reason magazine; Oil Price Shocks and the Recession of 2011? http://reason.com/archives/2011/03/08/oil-price-shocks-and-the-reces

Hamilton is not arguingthat oil price shocks are the sole cause of recessions, but that they tip an already vulnerable economy into contraction. A 2010 study by economists at the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank agrees: “For most countries, oil shocks do affect the likelihood of entering a recession. In particular, an average-sized shock to WTI [West Texas Intermediate crude] oil prices increases the probability of recession in the U.S. by nearly 50 percentage points after one year and nearly 90 percentage points after two years.” On the other hand, a 2005 study by the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum found that “when oil prices move gradually higher (perhaps somewhat erratically), as they have done over the last several years, they do not directly result in economic recessions, even though the economy may grow modestly slower.” Gradual price increases do not derail economic growth because consumers and entrepreneurs are able to adjust smoothly to them. So how do oil shocks cause recessions? Hamilton and many other analysts note that the actual amount spent on oil relative to the overall size of the economy initially suggests that the effect of a price increase should be relatively small. For example, as a result of the 1973 oil embargo, the world spent an extra $5.1 billion ($23 billion in 2009 dollars) on oil. Yet, U.S. real GDP declined by 2.5 percent, which is about $38 billion ($164 billion). One of the key ways oil price hikes negatively affect the U.S. economy is by provoking a decline in demand for new automobiles. Unemployed autoworkers and idled factories can’t be rapidly deployed to other sectors. In addition, uncertainty over oil prices also leads people and firms to postpone purchases of capital and durable goods. While higher oil prices contribute to recessions, lower oil prices do not appear to have much effect on economic expansions. People may postpone buying a new car when gas prices are high, but they don’t rush out to buy one just because pump prices are low. So will the recent run up in the price of crude push the U.S. economy back into recession? The good news is that the U.S. economy grew at a rate of 3.2 percent in the most recent quarter, and gross domestic product has returned to the level it reached in 2007. On March 1, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs that “sustained rises in the prices of oil or other commodities would represent a threat both to economic growth and to overall price stability, particularly if they were to cause inflation expectations to become less well anchored.”

### Middle East War/Econ

#### Strikes cause Middle East War and Economic Collapse

Hussain 12, writer and analyst on Middle East politics, 9/12/2012

(Murtaza, “Why war with Iran would spell disaster,”

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html)

After a decade of exhausting and demoralising conflict between the United States and two of the weakest, most impoverished countries in the world, Iraq and Afghanistan, manywithin the USpolitical establishment are calling forthe country to engage in yet another conflict; this time with a relatively powerful enemy in Iran. In the past week alone, top Republican figures such as John McCain and Joseph Lieberman have called for increasing belligerence towards the Iranian regime, bringing the two countries closer to the **brink of armed conflict**. The heightening standoff with Iran over its nuclear programme, curious in itself for its recent rapid escalation given that leading American and Israeli intelligence estimates have both concluded that Iran has neither developed nor is planning to develop nuclear weapons, is leading to increasingly belligerent rhetoric out of Washington calling for war with Iran. Leading members of the House and Congress from both parties as well as the closest advisers to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney have called for attacking Iran, with some high-ranking GOP advisers even suggesting that the time is now for a Congressional resolution formally declaring war on the country. Romney and many other leading Republican figures have called for pre-emptive war against Iran, and have continually upped the ante in terms of threats of military action throughout the election campaign. This alarming and potentially highly consequential rhetoric is occurring in a context where the American people are still recovering from the disastrous war in Iraq and winding down the US occupation of Afghanistan, while at the same time coping with the worst economic drought since the Great Depression. Public statements claiming that the extent of the conflict would be limited to targeted airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities are utterly disingenuous, ignoring the escalating cycle of retribution that such "limited" conflicts necessarily breed. As did the war in Libya start off with calls only for a benign "no-fly zone" to protect civilians and seamlessly turned into an all-out aerial campaign to topple Muammar Gaddafi, any crossing of the military threshold with Iran would also likely result in a far bigger conflagration than the public has been prepared for by their leaders. War with Iran would be no quick and clean affair, as many senior political and military figures have pointed out it would make the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which cost trillions of dollars and the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians, seem like "a cakewalk". The fact that it is becoming increasingly likely, inevitable in the eyes of many, and that it is high on the agenda of so many leading political figures warrants exploration of what such a conflict would really entail. Conflict on an unprecedented scale Not a war of weeks or months, but a "generations-long war" is how no less a figure than former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy describes the consequences of open conflict with Iran. In comparison with Iraq and Afghanistan, both countries with relatively small populations which were already in a state of relative powerlessness before they were invaded, Iran commands the eighth largest active duty military in the world, as well as highly trained special forces and guerilla organisations which operate in countries throughout the region and beyond. Retired US General John Abizaid has previously described the Iranian military as "the most powerful in the Middle East" (exempting Israel), and its highly sophisticated and battle-hardened proxies in Lebanon and Iraq have twice succeeded in defeating far stronger and better funded Western military forces. Any attack on Iran would assuredly lead to the activation of these proxies in neighbouring countries to attack American interests and would create a situation of **borderless war unprecedented in any past US conflicts in the Middle East**. None of this is to suggest that the United States would not "win" a war with Iran, but given the incredibly painful costs of Iraq and Afghanistan; wars fought again weak, poorly organised enemies lacking broad influence, politicians campaigning for war with Iran are leading the American people into a battle which will be guaranteed to make the past decade of fighting look tame in comparison. A recent study has shown that an initial US aerial assault on Iran would require hundreds of planes, ships and missiles in order to be completed; a military undertaking itself unprecedented since the first Gulf War and representative of only the first phase of what would likely be a long drawn-out war of attrition. For a country already nursing the wounds from the casualties of far less intense conflicts and still reeling from their economic costs, the sheer battle fatigue inherent in a large-scale war with Iran would stand to greatly exacerbate these issues. Oil shocks and the American economy The **fragile American economic recovery would be completely upended** were Iran to target global energy supplies in the event of war, an act which would be both catastrophic and highly likely if US Iran hawks get their way. Not only does the country itself sit atop some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves on the planet, its close proximity to the shipping routes and oil resources of its neighbours means that in the event of war, its first response would likely be to choke off the global supply of crude; a tactic for which its military defences have in fact been specifically designed. The Strait of Hormuz, located in the Persian Gulf is the shipping point for more than 20 per cent of the world's petroleum. Iran is known to have advanced Silkworm missile batteries buried at strategic points around the strait to make it impassable in the event of war, and has developed "swarming" naval tactics to neutralise larger, less mobile ships such as those used by the US Navy. While Iran could never win in straightforward combat, it has developed tactics of asymmetrical warfare that can effectively inflict losses on a far stronger enemy and render the strait effectively closed to naval traffic. The price of oil would immediately skyrocket, by some estimates upwards several hundred dollars a barrel, shattering the already tenuous steps the US and other Western economies are taking towards recovery. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has said a war with Iran could drag out years and would have economic consequences "devastating for the average American"; but these facts are conspicuously absent in public discussion of the war. Every conflict has blowback, but if US politicians are attempting to maneouver the country into a conflict of such potentially devastating magnitude, potentially sacrificing ordinary Americans' economic well-being for years to come, it would behoove them to speak frankly about these costs and not attempt to obfuscate or downplay them in order to make their case. Conflict across borders Finally, a war with Iran would be not be like conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya where the fighting was constrained to the borders of the country in question. Despite widespread resentment towards the country due to the perception of it as a regionally imperialist power as well sectarian animosity towards it as Shia Muslim theocracy, Iran maintains deep links throughout the Middle East and South Asia and can count on both popular support as well as assistance from its network of armed proxies in various countries. In a report for Haaretz, Ahmed Rashid noted that an attack on Iran would likely inflame anti-American sentiment throughout the region, across both Shia and Sunni Muslim communities. Despite Iran's poor human rights record and bellicose leadership, polls have consistently shown that Iranian and Iranian-backed leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah remain among the most popular figures throughout the Arab and Muslim world. This popularity comes not necessarily out of respect for Iranian ideology, but from a perception that Iran is the only assertive power in the region and is the target of aggression from the United States and its allies. In Rashid's analysis, **both the Middle East and South Asia** would become unsafe for American citizens and their interests for years to come; popular anger would reach a level which would render these area effectively off-limits and would cause grave and immediate danger to both American businesses and troops based in the region. Again, this would be a situation quite different from the other wars of the past decade, fought against isolated regimes without the ability to call upon large and often well-funded numbers of regional sympathisers; a fact also rarely mentioned by war advocates. Not a political game Going to war with Iran would be an elective decision for the United States, but it is for too grave and consequential a choice to be left up to the whims of politicians seeking to win the approval of lobby groups and one-up each other to appeal to influential campaign donors who would like to see a war with Iran. Make no mistake, **the possibility of war is very real** and has become eminently more so in recent months. Many of the same politicians and political advisers responsible for engineering the Iraq War have returned to public life and are at the forefront of pushing a new American conflict with Iran.

**Middle East War causes extinction**

**Steinbach 02 (John, March 3, pg.** **http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm****)**

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, &quot Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said &quotThe nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, &quot... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration.”

**And economic collapse causes war**

**Burrows and Harris 09** -Mathew J. Burrows is a counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the principal drafter of Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, Jennifer Harris is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”, The Washington Quarterly, April, http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nationsi n thesame period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attack and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized,particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emergenaturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. Thelack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missileflight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus onpreemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. Types of conflict that the world continuesto experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if governmentleaders deem assured access to energy resources,for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival oftheir regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopoliticalimplications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for navalbuildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup ofregional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, andcounterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer inAsia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in amoredog-eat-dog world.What Kind of World will 2025 Be? Perhaps more than lessons, history loves patterns. Despite widespread changes in the world today, there is little to suggest that the future will not resemble the past in several respects. The report asserts that, under most scenarios, the trendtoward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been ongoing for acouple of decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new globalplayers, the worsening institutional deficit, potential growth in regional blocs,and enhanced strength of non-state actors and networks. The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could either strengthen the international system, by filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions, or could further fragment it and incapacitate international cooperation. The diversity in both type and kind of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community. Because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, the rising powers will enjoy a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms. They are also likely to cherish their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with terrorism, climate change, proliferation, energy security, and other system maintenance issues. Existing multilateral institutions, designed for a different geopolitical order, appear too rigid and cumbersome to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources. Nongovernmental organizations and philanthropic foundations, concentrating on specific issues, increasingly will populate the landscape but are unlikely to affect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments. Efforts at greater inclusiveness, to reflect the emergence of the newer powers, may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges. Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted. An ongoing financial crisis and prolonged recession would tilt the scales even further in the direction of a fragmented and dysfunctional international system with a heightened risk of conflict. The report concluded that the rising BRIC powers (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) seem averse to challenging the international system, as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, but this of course could change if their widespread hopes for greater prosperity become frustrated and the current benefits they derive from a globalizing world turn negative.

### Middle East War

#### The conflict will quickly escalate to involve Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the UAE

Kahl 12—Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University [Colin H. Kahl (Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East), “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, pg. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran]

Keeping other states in the region out of the fight would also prove more difficult than Kroenig suggests. Iran would presume Israeli complicity in a U.S. raid and would seek to drag Israel into the conflictin order to undermine potential support for the U.S. war effort among key Arab regimes.And although it is true, as Kroenig notes, that Israel remained on the sidelines during the 1990-91 Gulf War, the threat posed by Iran's missiles and proxies today is considerably greater than that posed by Iraq two decades ago. If Iranian-allied Hezbollah responded to the fighting by firing rockets at Israeli cities, Israel could launch an all-out war against Lebanon. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad might also try to use the moment to divert attention from the uprising in his country, launching his own assault on the Jewish state. Either scenario, or their combination, could lead to a wider war in the Levant.

Even in the Gulf, where U.S. partners are sometimes portrayed as passive, Iranian retaliation might draw Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates into the conflict. The Saudis have taken a much more confrontational posture toward Iran in the past year, and Riyadh is unlikely to tolerate Iranian attacks against critical energy infrastructure. For its part, the UAE, the most hawkish state in the Gulf, might respond to missiles raining down on U.S. forces at its Al Dhafra Air Base by attempting to seize Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, three disputed Gulf islands currently occupied by Iran.

### Prolif/NPT

#### Lack of Certainty Means Bunker Busters will be used in strikes

**Hirsch 2005** (Jorge [Professor of physics Ph.D. @ U of C] “Can a Nuclear Strike on Iran Be Prevented?” November 21, 2005, accessed 09/20/07, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8089>) IB

In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge. However**, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed** by a nuclear superpower **against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons** as a deterrent. **With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed**. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, enough to erase Earth's population many times over.

#### Kills the Nuclear Taboo and Collapses the NPT – turns prolif

**Hirsch 2007** [Jorge [Professor of physics Ph.D. @ U of C], “Congress Can Stop the Iran Attack, or Be Complicit in War Crimes”, January 20, 2007, accessed 09/20/07 <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=10360>) IB

**Using** nuclear weapons against Iran, even just destroying one Iranian underground facility with **nuclear bunker busters**, with minimal "collateral damage," is a crime against humanity because: \* It **will break the 60-year old taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.** Once a nuclear weapon is used again, **it will invite use by others. There is no sharp line dividing small from large nuclear weapons, nor between nuclear weapons targeting facilities and those targeting humans, civilians or military.**\* Iran is years away from the capability of acquiring nuclear weapons by any estimate, hence it is a "non-nuclear-weapon state" (NNWS). \* A US or Israeli use of a nuclear weapon against a NNWS will instantly destroy the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and lead to widespread nuclear proliferation. \* "Weight for weight, the energy produced by a nuclear explosion is millions of times more powerful than a conventional explosion." So is the number of people it kills. **With no NPT and many more nuclear countries the potential for escalating nuclear war will be exponentially enhanced.** **Nuclear war can lead to hundreds of millions of deaths, to the destruction of civilization and to the destruction of all life on earth.** The American Physical Society, representing the community of scientists that brought nuclear weapons into existence, has recently for the first time in its history issued a statement of deep concern about "the possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states" and its consequences for the Nonproliferation Treaty, and some of America's most eminent scientists recently wrote to President Bush that **such action would be "gravely irresponsible" and lead to "disastrous consequences."**

### Terrorism

**Strikes end Muslim cooperation in the War on Terror**

**Larrabee 06**

[Stephen,- Corporate Chair in European Security @ RAND 3-9 “Defusing the Iranian Crisis” <http://www.rand.org/commentary/030906OCR.html> //MGW-JV]

Moreover, the political costs would be very high. A military strike would unleash a wave of nationalism and unite the Iranian population behind the current regime, ending any prospect of internal change in the near future and ensuring decades of enmity from the Iranian middle class and youth, who are largely opposed to the current regime. It would also provoke outrage in the Muslim world, probably making any attempt to obtain the support of moderate Muslims in the war on terror impossible.

**That’s the key internal link to victory**

**AFP 05** [Agence France Presse. “Trust and Confidence of Muslims “Crucial” in Fight Against Terror” 2005. Lexis//MGW-JV]

The United States must use its "soft power" to gain the trust and confidence of Muslims worldwide if it is to "prevail over terrorism", Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said Friday. Opening an international security conference, Lee said one reason why many moderate Muslims are reluctant to condemn and disown religious extremists was the "wide gap that separates the US from the Muslim world". He said the large-scale US assistance to Indonesia, the world's biggest Muslim nation, in the aftermath of the December 26 tsunami disaster had not completely erased the resentment many Muslims feel toward the United States. "The sources of this Muslim anger are historical and complex, but they have been accentuated in recent years by Muslim perceptions of American unilateralism and hostility to the faith," Lee told the audience, which included US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Lee cited a survey that found that in 2000 three quarters of Indonesians said they were "attracted" to the United States but that by 2003 the number had fallen to just 15 percent. Lee said US help to bring relief assistance to the tsunami victims in Indonesia had touched the hearts of many Indonesians. "But this singular event has not eliminated the antipathy that many Muslims still feel towards the US," he said. He cited demonstrations worldwide, including in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, following a report by the US magazine Newsweek that US interrogators at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre had flushed a copy of the Koran down the toilet. Newsweek later withdrew the report, saying they could not confirm the story with their source. "The US needs to make more use of its 'soft power' to win over international opinion, correct misperceptions and build trust and credibility, especially in the Muslim world," Lee said. "In the long term this is vital if the US is to prevail over terrorism, and to maintain its position of global leadership."

## A2: Strikes Good

### A2: Strikes Good

#### The CIA Knows Squat About Iran’s Nuclear Program – the only facilities we know about are those announced publicly – can’t strike them all

**Logan 07** (Justin [foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute] “War With Iran is Not the Answer” USA Today, March, Lexis)

**The U.S. government appears to know very little about Iran’s nuclear program.** **It is quite difficult to gather worthwhile intelligence on a country with which America has not had commercial or diplomatic relations for almost three decades, and a successful attack** against a nuclear program as dispersed and effectively hidden as Iran’s apparently is **would require very good intelligence. In 2002**, the U.S. learned of startling advances in Iran’s nuclear program **after revelations regarding the Natanz enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water reactor were made very publicly** by the Mujahedeen- e-Khalq’s (MEK’s) political arm, the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI). **Given that these facilities obviously would rank highly on any list of potential targets, we must understand that the Iranian leadership knows that we know about them. It is likely that the leadership in Tehran has taken into account that those locations would be first on a list of American aim points, and have adjusted their programs accordingly**, either by diversifying the locations even further than they were, or by relocating nuclear activity. The intelligence gap **Another problem**, according to The New York Times’ James Risen, **is that** **the entire CIA intelligence network inside Iran was "rolled up" in 2004 when a CIA operative accidentally sent a full roster of U.S. assets inside Iran to an Iranian double agent. This left the CIA "virtually blind in Iran." Even before the "roll-up,"** a presidential commission concluded in 2004 that **the U.S. intelligence community has "disturbingly little" information on Iran’s nuclear activities.**

**Striking Iran fails – success is impossible, it destroys US influence, spurs hard-line elements, and causes war.**

**Kaye 11**(Dalia Dassa, Visiting Professor and Fellow -- UCLA's International Institute and Burkle Center for International Relations, “Why bombing Iran is still a bad idea,” http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/21/why\_bombing\_iran\_is\_still\_a\_bad\_idea)

First, the operational challenges of a military attack remain daunting. Iran's nuclear facilities are widely dispersed and deeply buried and so difficult, if not impossible, to eliminate.An Israeli attack would be even more challenging, though not impossible, due to long distances to Iranian targets and over flight challenges. Second, and more significantly, the aftermath of an attack could be devastating militarily and politically. It could unleash a wave of Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces, allies, and interests. Iran maintains a wide array of levers across the region, including militia groups it has trained and funded, that it could employ to retaliate against U.S. forces or diplomatic personnel, particularly in countries like Iraq. Iranian missiles have ranges that can reach Israeland all its Gulf Arab neighbors, including those hosting U.S. military forces. Such an attack could also backfire by fomenting nationalist sentiment within Iran (particularly if large numbers of civilians are killed) and boost support for more hard-line elements within the regime that current policies are attempting to marginalize. It could also increase Iranian incentives to obtain nuclear weapons to avoid such attacks in the future, while undermining painstaking U.S. efforts to bolster international and regional support for economic and diplomatic pressure against Iran. In short, there are serious risks associated with this option with little potential to actually solve the problem, and possibly making it harder to solve in the future. A military strike would be particularly damaging in a post Arab spring environment, in which public opinion is already hostile toward U.S. policies. Even if Arab governments may quietly welcome forceful U.S. actions, Arab publics are far more sympathetic to Iran's anti-Western positions. Despite Iran's waning regional influence as Arab revolts and Turkish activism have decreased its relevance in the resistance narrative, Arab publics would likely rally behind Iran in the face of an attack. Additionally, they could constrain their governments' ability to support US-backed efforts to isolate Iran. Some may view the assassination plot as an opportunity to bring the military option back to the table, believing that only a forceful response to Iran's actions will prevent the country from striking again. However this type of response would be a strategic mistake. A military attack would isolate the United States rather than Iran, further weakening U.S. influence regionally and globally while giving an increasingly isolated and vulnerable Iran a second chance.

### A2: Solve Iran Prolif

#### Strikes will delay their acquisition time by only a couple of years

Kahl 12—Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University [Colin H. Kahl (Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East), “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2012, pg. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137031/colin-h-kahl/not-time-to-attack-iran]

Even if a U.S. strike went as well as Kroenig predicts, there is little guarantee that it would produce lasting results. Senior U.S. defense officials have repeatedly stated that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would stall Tehran's progress for only a few years. Kroenig argues that such a delay could become permanent. "Those countries whose nuclear facilities have been attacked -- most recently Iraq and Syria," he writes, "have proved unwilling or unable to restart their programs." In the case of Iraq, however, Saddam Hussein restarted his clandestine nuclear weapons program after the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor, and it required the Gulf War and another decade of sanctions and intrusive inspections to eliminate it. Iran's program is also more advanced and dispersed than were Iraq's and Syria's, meaning it would be easier to reconstitute. A U.S. strike would damage key Iranian facilities, but it would do nothing to reverse the nuclear knowledge Iran has accumulated or its ability to eventually build new centrifuges.

**Strikes will fail, make prolif more likely, and risk full scale war**

**Innocent,** 3/8/**’12** (Malou, fopo analyst at CATO, “Nuclear Iran is an exaggerated threat”, <http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/nuclear-iran-exaggerated-threat-article-1.1035003?localLinksEnabled=false>, JD)

The Republican presidential hopefuls, Ron Paul excepted, would prefer a more bellicose response to Iran’s nuclear aspirations than President Obama’s current stance. But a more aggressive policy could lead to another war in the Middle East, or at least a regime in Tehran more committed to seeking a nuclear bomb.The assumption that a short war of limited strikes will keep Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is flawed.Damage to Iran’s nuclear program from such a strike would be modest, likely requiring more strikes in another few years or a longer-term presence on the ground. James Clapper, U.S. director of national intelligence, said an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would set back its nuclear program by one to two years. U.S. military action every few years is an unmanageable strategy. Worse, attempts to stop Iran’s program militarily will bolster its resolve to pursue a nuclear deterrent. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said the military solution will make Iranians “absolutely committed to obtaining nuclear weapons.” He continued, “. . . they will just go deeper and more covert.”So if Iran lives to fight another day, with the ayatollahs still standing, hawks in Washington will surely argue that the U.S. cannot afford to show weakness — and that our credibility depends on staying behind to create a friendly state in Tehran. It would be a slippery slope from this to a wider war. If that is the case, Iran, a country with two-and-a-half times the population and four times the territory of Iraq, will not be a cakewalk. Many of those pushing for immediate action ignore these realities, focusing on the claim that Iran is on the verge of acquiring enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon. But according to the U.S. intelligence community, Iranian leaders have not actually decided to build a weapon. As nuclear expert Joseph Cirincioneof the Ploughshares Fund has argued, Iran might decide, like Japan and other countries, to have only the ability to produce a nuclear weapon fast — in short, a rapid breakout option. Even with a bomb, Iran is not an imminent threat to America’s security. If it ever became one, the U.S. could quickly ensure Iran’s absolute destruction, potentially through a nuclear strike. As for the oft-cited question of Israel’ssecurity, our staunch ally’s second-strike capability remains robust and can deter Iran. Variously over the course of the past 60 years, the U.S. government has overthrown Iran’s democratically elected government, supported its Western-oriented dictator, covertly backed militants and regional actors against it, sternly enjoined other countries to not trade with it, encircled the country with its armed forces and declared its intention to bomb it. Unless Americans are willing to fight Iranians to the death — possibly every few years — Washington must stop polarizing the situation. Aggressive policies and rhetoric do not benefit our security. Without demanding that Iran surrender on the issue of uranium enrichment, the U.S. — which accounts for almost half of the world’s military spending, wields one of the planet’s largest nuclear arsenals and can project its power around the globe — should lift sanctions, stop its belligerence and open a direct line of communication with Tehran. The President has said repeatedly that “all options are on the table.” But contrary to popular belief, diplomacy with Iran is an option that has yet to be fully exhausted. In the end, Iranians must decide that nuclear capability is not in their best interest. Mounting evidence and recent history suggest that anything else is a short-term solution.

#### Iran already has the required uranium hidden and will prolif after strikes

**Fitzpatrick, 07** (Mark,- senior fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies “Can Iran’s Nuclear Capability be Kept Latent?” Survival, March, InformaWorld Online)

At best, air strikes will only delay the programme a few years, and probably not at all, unless the United States or Israel were prepared to extensively widen the bombing campaign and to repeat it in a few short years - in effect, to launch an interminable war against a Middle East foe stronger, larger and more cohesive than Saddam's Iraq. America's disastrous experience in Iraq after Saddam should make such a scenario unacceptable. Iran's nuclear facilities are more dispersed than were Iraq's in 1981, the time of Israel's pre-emptive air strike, popularly credited with having significantly set back an Iraqi nuclear-weapons programme. In any case, as Richard Betts convincingly argues, the Israeli 1981 example is a fallacy: destroying the nuclear reactor at Osirak did not delay Iraq's nuclear programme and probably accelerated it.17 After the bombing, Saddam increased the budget and number of scientists dedicated to the programme twentyfold.18 Without accurate intelligence about Iran's dispersed nuclear facilities and hidden equipment, air strikes that only target the known facilities will not cripple the nuclear programme. An unnamed senior US official said on 7 November 2006: 'We do not have enough information about the Iranian nuclear program to be confident that you could destroy it in a single attack. The worst thing you could do is try and not succeed.'19 The uranium-conversion plant at Esfahan is vulnerable, but Iran may no longer need it for a small weapons programme, having already produced enough UF6 for at least 30 bombs. According to a knowledgeable Western official, the UF6 produced to date is of sufficient purity for Iran's initial purposes and is stored in dispersed locations safe from air strikes.20 Iran could also build smaller uranium-conversion facilities elsewhere, if it has not already done so. The above-ground pilot enrichment plant at Natanz, with its 360 installed centrifuges, is also vulnerable. Bombing Natanz, however, would not destroy Iran's other centrifuges and centrifuge components. Iran may already have up to 2,000 centrifuges stockpiled in unknown locations.21 By accelerating to round-the-clock production, Iran could conceivably triple the 70-100 per month centrifuge production rate at which it was known to have operated two years ago, and replace the 360 centrifuges at Natanz within two months. Iran would also have to build a new facility and equip it with replacements for the autoclaves, piping and other equipment in the Natanz plant, but it is prudent to assume that Iran already has a replacement facility being readied. Above all, short of commando operations to target scientists and engineers, bombing would not destroy the knowledge in nuclear and related sciences and engineering skills that Iran has amassed to date.

#### Strikes can’t solve prolif – 3 reasons

**Ochmanek, 07** (David,- senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation . March, “Coping with Iran” http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\_proceedings/2007/RAND\_CF237.pdf)

Second, even a highly effective attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will not destroy the human capital and the technology base needed to reconstruct the program. Like the Iraqis after Israel’s attack on the reactor complex at Osirak, the Iranians should be expected to rebuild their program postattack in a more dispersed, covert, and survivable form. 􀁸 Third, popular support for the program within Iran would probably be high. Historically, short bombing campaigns have typically prompted citizens of the victimized country to rally around their government, and the majority of Iranians should be expect to do just that. The regime would point to the U.S. attack as an example of the sort of thing a nuclear capability is intended to deter. Of course, reactions to an attack on Iran would spread far beyond Iran and the gulf. Jihadist elements worldwide would characterize the attack——the United States’ third on a Muslim country since 2001——as further evidence that the United States is engaged in an all-out “war on Islam.” As such, the attack would be expected to boost support for radical Islamist groups. Notwithstanding the concerns that countries of the GCC have about Iranian power, opinion among the gulf Arabs would be overwhelmingly against the United States. This would make it more difficult for these governments to cooperate openly with Washington on a variety of issues. And, to the extent that the U.S. attack would be seen as legitimating Iran’s claims that it needs stronger deterrent capabilities, it might make it harder to enforce restrictions on Iran’s access to technologies related to nuclear, missile, and other weapons.

#### Iran strikes fail – diplomatic engagement not military force is the only way to solve Iran’s nuclear problems in the long term

#### Lennon and Eiss, 04 (Alexander T. & Camille Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy, MIT Press, pg. 246-247)

#### Because the exact status of Iran’s nuclear program is unknown, the time available to attempt to resolve this thorny issue diplomatically is uncertain as well. External pressure is undoubtedly a necessary element of such a strategy, but it is unlikely to be sufficient in the long term even if it is successful in buying some time in the short term. A complementary effort is needed to influence nuclear politics within Iran by generating a real debate among the Iranian public. This type of political transparency would end Iranian radical hard-liners’ monopoly on information and debunk the putative energy rationale for the nuclear program. Moreover, informed discussion would help Iranians distinguish between the development of nuclear technology and that of nuclear weapons, that is, between programs that are legal and accompanied by assurances and inspections and those that are used to cover up illicit activities. Such a debate could similarly subject to hard scrutiny the important strategic motivations for a weapons option, which remain either unstated or mentioned obliquely because the regime denies violating its NPT obligations in the first place. Formidable political impediments exist, but in the quasi-democracy of contemporary Iran, the nuclear issue could become contested turf – a process that could potentially lead to a positive long-term change in the country’s strategic culture and thus help curtail nuclear proliferation in Iran. Government hard-liners have long determined the security policies of the Islamic Republic. The particular experience of Iran – revolution, war, sanctions, and estrangement from international society – has created a shared sense of embattlement in a hostile environment, leaving little scope for debate. In addition, foreign and security policies historically have not been at the forefront of the reformists’ concerns. This situation has changed in recent years; as the costs of the hard-liners’ choices in security policy have mounted, affecting Iran’s development prospects, so have public scrutiny of such security policies as well as the inclination to question their rationale. The particular character of the Iranian proliferation challenge and the country’s dynamic domestic politics present an opportunity for the United States and its allies to pursue a comprehensive strategy that promotes the transformation of Iran’s internal debate in tandem with external efforts to induce or compel Iranian compliance with nonproliferation norms.

1. [**Paul D. Miller**](http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/users/paul-d-miller)**, “It’s Not Just Al-Qaeda: Stability in the Most Dangerous Region”. World Affairs Journal, March/April 2012.** Quals: PAUL MILLER served as director for Afghanistan on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Bush and Obama. He is an assistant professor of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University and director for the Afghanistan-Pakistan program at the College of International Security Affairs. [http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it’s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region](http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/it%27s-not-just-al-qaeda-stability-most-dangerous-region). RP 12/21/13 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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7. Owen B. Toon, Alan Robock, and Richard P. Turco, “Environmental consequences of nuclear war”. December 2008, page 37 (<http://ptonline.aip.org/journals/doc/PHTOAD-ft/vol_61/iss_12/37_1.shtml?bypassSSO=1#bio>). Quals: Brian Toon is chair of the department of atmospheric and oceanic sciences and a member of the laboratory for atmospheric and space physics at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Alan Robock is a professor of atmospheric science at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Rich Turco is a professor of atmospheric science at the University of California, Los Angeles. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
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