#### Alternatives to the dialectical model fail since they can not explain why truth is meaningful

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Hegel’s dialectical theory of truth, by contrasts, puts the subject in a quite different predicament. For, in order **to** arrive at the truth (a truth that is not only proven but reclaims, against relativism and skepticism, a strong value of “absoluteness”) one needs in fact to traverse the false and dwell within the negative. Far from being the opposite of science this path through the negative is a constitutive part of science and a constitutive condition of the absoluteness of science’s truth.Hegel criticizes the “logic of the understanding” on two interconnected counts.[4] First, by rejecting what allegedly contradicts truth (but in fact dialectically constitutes it) such un-dialectical logic [does not recognize] is blind to the context in which alone truth becomes meaningful to the knower, i.e., ultimately, is blind to the historical and social meaning and implications of truth. These, however, are not accidental by-products of truth, left to another discipline than epistemology to investigate; they are rather necessary to it (to its pursuit, to its validity, to its scientific relevance). Second, by focusing exclusively on the result, which alone is considered ‘true’, the logic of the understanding necessarily cuts off from epistemology the process whereby true knowledge is achieved — be this an individual or a collective process — hence it ultimately cuts off the historical dimension of truth itself. But it also excludes the possibility of seeing the achieved truth as the result of a confrontation of competing, alternative truths (and not simply as the exclusion of error or as the purely formal fulfillment of the principle of contradiction).In contrast to the logic of the understanding, Hegel’s dialectic-speculative logic reclaims to the truth of cognition and science both the dimension of error — whereby he accounts for things as different as the onesidedness of truth, the false conscience of truth, the pursuit of misguided objectives, and the endorsement of failed scientific methods — and the fundamentally process-oriented and dynamic dimension of the epistemological investigation. Dialectically, truth is a process in which the knowing subject and the known object are inescapably implicated; it is a movement in which truth is constituted as a process through the experience, the recognition, and the correction of error. This is the process that Hegel formally designates as dialectical Aufhebung. For, truth and error emerge as such only in the end, only once the process of truth’s constitution has run its course.[5] The important point, for Hegel, is that only as a result that incorporates error within it (instead of simply excluding it) is truth something “actual” [and] (Wirkliches), i.e., something that is valid as a recognized manifestation of rationality in the world—in the world of science and scientific practices, in the world of culture, social institutions, and learning. Science is not just true knowledge. It is true knowledge that is also actual knowledge, i.e., the manifestation of a rationality that is validated and shared in the intersubjective world of spirit.To the second point connected to Fuller’s problematization of Goldman’s position and concerning the significance of setting truth as science’s highest aim: Fuller notices that “aiming for the truth” in its “original nineteenth-century context meant the ultimate systematic representation of reality” — a project that seems obsolete in the world of contemporary science (with the exception of physics’ quest for a “grand unified theory of everything”) but that Fuller explicitly supports in its contemporary updated version, i.e., as “a project in today’s diversified yet globally undirected epistemic world” (Fuller 2012, 269). Hegel’s philosophy is perhaps the best example of a unified, systematic epistemology.On the ground of the dialectic and process-oriented theory of truth, however, the systematic endeavors of Hegel’s epistemology need not be construed as “totalizing,” absolutistic or hegemonic but are, I submit, the promising antecedent of the pluralistic aspiration proper to Fuller’s epistemology. Hegel’s famous claims that “the truth is the whole” (Phen. §20) and that truth is “actual,” i.e., realized and meaningful in the self-conscious world of spirit only to the extent that it achieves the form of the “system” (Phen. §25) mean that truth is construed as the result of a process that must dialectically take into account all one-sided (or allegedly false) positions of consciousness, all apparent alternatives to the ultimate truth. For, all such positions are eventually constitutive of the highest, all-encompassing truth.

## Speculative Logic -> Mutual Recognition

#### Our recognition of our own truth and the reality of freedom begins but does not end with our ability to make arbitrary choices; the dialectical nature of freedom requires recognition of others and ability to respect their ends within a rational social order

Neuhouser 8 , Frederick. Hegel's Social Philosophy pp. 204-229. Editor: Frederick C. Beiser. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. Print Date: 2008. Online Publication Date: 2009. NP 4/1/16.

Hegel’s argument in the first of these transitions can be reconstructed as follows. As I have noted, personal freedom is realized when an individual is granted exclusive, arbitrary control over a certain portion of the world that constitutes his property. The incompleteness of this conception of freedom comes to light by considering the conditions under which personal freedom can be realized universally – that is, by every being with the capacity for free choice (which is to say, every human being). Hegel’s claim is that when we attempt to think a world in which personal freedom is realized universally, we see that it cannot be the only kind of freedom that the inhabitants of such a world enjoy. More precisely, personal freedom cannot be the only freedom such beings enjoy, if the goal of complete self-determination is to be achieved. The thought here is that a person living in a world where the personal freedom of all individuals is guaranteed could not be fully self-determined if [t]he[y] possessed only an arbitrarily choosing will, for there would be a respect in which his actions would have to be constrained by laws that do not themselves come from his own (merely arbitrary) will. This is because in order to realize the personal freedom of everyone, the actions of all must be subject to constraints. That is, everyone’s actions must be bound by those principles – the principles of abstract right – that specify which of an individual’s actions are inconsistent with the personhood of others. Thus, one of the conditions of the systematic realization of personal freedom is that individuals’ actions conform to the fundamental command of abstract right: “Respect others as persons” (PR, §36). The rational social order will codify the principles of abstract right into a system of laws and use the threat of punishment to enforce them, but if the persons who inhabit such a world are to be fully self-determined, they must be able to grasp the rational purpose behind those laws and affirm them; that is, they must be able to will the principles that constrain their actions. But this is just to say that persons who are fully self-determined must also possess the more complex configuration of will that Hegel ascribes to the moral subject (which takes itself to be bound by moral principles that come from its own will)

To clarify, this is not Kantianism. Recognition does not occur in the abstract when I consider what it is possible to think, rather it incorporates the inherently dialectical nature of thought to derives from the ability to reconcile conflicting conceptions of ourselves by recognizing the other.

#### The realization of moral freedom depends on the formation of a rational social order that enables the instantiation of individual freedom

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What, then, are the deficiencies of moral freedom that necessitate the move to “Ethical Life” and its distinctive conception of freedom (social freedom)? Here, too, the inadequacies of moral freedom come to light by envisaging the conditions under which it can be realized in the world. The problems associated with realizing moral freedom are of two types. First, realizing moral freedom depends on something outside the individual[‘s] subject’s will in the sense that becoming a moral subject presupposes various social processes of character formation, or “education” [Bildung]. Among other things, moral subjects must be socialized to regard their actions as constrained by normative principles, to reflect on the principles that ought to guide their actions, and to willingly obey the principles they recognize as good. Second, moral subjects fall short of complete self-determination in the sense that, considered on their own – apart from the places they occupy in the basic institutions of society – moral subjects lack the resources they need to give concrete, nonarbitrary content to the idea of the good. While socially detached moral subjects may sincerely desire to realize the good, without a concrete vision of the projects and forms of life that best promote the freedom and well-being of all (the good), they cannot know what specific actions their allegiance to the good requires of them. In Hegel’s words, moral subjectivity is “abstract,” “empty,” and “formal” (PR, §§134–137, 141); it fails to satisfy the criteria for a fully self-determining will because it cannot by itself give sufficient determinacy to its own governing concept. The idea behind Hegel’s doctrine of social freedom is that the remedy for both defects of moral subjectivity lies in an account of good (or rational) social institutions. Thus, for Hegel, rational social institutions are charged with the dual task of socializing their members into beings who possess the subjective capacities required to realize personal and moral freedom, and of providing a social framework that defines the particular projects that make their lives meaningful and give determinacy to their understanding of the good. Each of these tasks points to an important respect in which the systematic realization of personal and moral freedom depends on rational social institutions. That such institutions secure the conditions necessary for realizing personal and moral freedom should not, however, lead us to think that Hegel values social membership for purely instrumental reasons (merely as a means to achieving personal and moral freedom). On the contrary, if the problems posed by the first two forms of freedom are to be solved in a way that remains true to the ideal of complete self-determination, this solution must itself give rise to a new configuration of the self-determining will, one that finds expression in the idea of social freedom. In other words, the means through which rational social institutions secure the conditions of personal and moral freedom must themselves embody a kind of self-determination; more than being merely means to the realization of freedom, the rational social order must also itself, considered as a whole, instantiate freedom.9 This claim points to a distinctive and potentially misleading feature of Hegel’s view: social freedom is a property that can be predicated of both the rational social order as a whole and the individual social members that compose it. Until recently, interpreters of Hegel often construed his talk of “the free whole” as evidence of the totalitarian character of his social philosophy, which was thought to subordinate the interests of individuals to some mysterious “freedom of the whole.” One of the principal aims of this paper is to discredit that mistaken understanding. For in addition to being a property of the rationally organized social order itself, social freedom is a freedom that individual social members realize:10 by participating (in the right ways) in the institutions of ethical life, individuals not only secure the conditions of their personal and moral freedom, they also give reality to their own particular identities and, by affirming the laws and social norms that govern them, they see their social participation as having its source in their own wills. Bringing together the various requirements social freedom is supposed to meet will provide us with a concise statement of its essential features: In addition to (i) securing the necessary conditions of personal and moral freedom, the rational social order will realize freedom in two further senses; (ii) individual social members will be self-determining in the sense that, because their self-conceptions are linked to the social roles they occupy, their participation in the institutions of ethical life will be not only voluntary but also an activity through which they constitute and express their identities; and, (iii) the social order itself – the ensemble of social institutions – will constitute a self-determining whole, one that is more completely self-determining (or self-sufficient) than any individual on its own can be. Thus, the actions of socially free individuals will proceed from their own wills in a dual sense: first, their social participation will be expressive of their own self-conceptions (e.g., as mother, teacher, and citizen of a particular state). Second, by acting in accordance with their self-conceptions, they will produce the totality of social conditions that make their own personal and moral freedom possible, as well as help to realize an entity – the social order itself – that is more completely self-determined than any individual.

#### Individualistic ideas of freedom can not be the basis of truth – rather, its dialectical nature makes it fundamentally intersubjective and institutional

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What we have here, yet again, is a transformation of the Cartesian subject and of the epistemological standpoint this represents. And yet, the individualistic epistemology that Hegel outlines in dealing with the spiritual subject’s cognitive relation to its objects is only the beginning of the epistemology of the philosophy of spirit. As a mere beginning, such epistemology is necessarily one-sided and limited in its scope but is also limited with regard to the notion of truth it pursues. It is a merely individualistic, subjectivist, and idealistic epistemology in which the subject’s truth is indeed her truth; it is what she construes as true (Enz. §444). But since theoretical spirit’s pursuit of truth in thinking and knowing reveals, already at this level, the freedom proper to spirit, and since freedom is essentially a process of actualization and the realm of freedom’s actualization is, most properly, the sphere of objective spirit (Enz. §469 and Remark), the epistemology of spirit that begins with theoretical intelligence’s idealistic and subjectivist stance must be overcome, expanded, and fulfilled in the movement toward truth’s and freedom’s realization in the collective and social institutions of objective spirit. In other words, the subjectivity of truth — its belonging to the individual, its idealistic and constructivist paradigm (in the Kantian sense but also in the more radical Foucaultian sense opposed by Goldman) — is a sign of its ultimate un-truth, which must be overcome (aufgehoben) in the objective and collective dimension of a realized truth or of a truth always in the process of its realization. In this crucial point I see Hegel’s position on both truth and freedom (as manifestations and embodiments of dialectical rationality) which are [is] achieved in and through a necessary process of realization and actualization (Verwirklichung and Entwicklung) mediated by the objective—intersubjective, social, and institutional—structures of spirit as an important precursor of Fuller’s self-described “realizationist” epistemology (Fuller 2012, 272). Moreover, on the basis of the general meaning of the systematic transitions proper to Hegel’s philosophy, the fact that subjective spirit finds its actual truth (its realized meaning and fulfillment) in the transition to objectivity — in which subjective conceptions and beliefs are not only “turned into reality” (Fuller 2012, 272) but also tested and changed by the confrontation with reality — means that the sphere of spirit’s social and collective institutions is the foundation of spirit’s individual life. Just as, in good Aristotelian fashion, the social and political whole is (metaphysically) prior to its individual parts, for Hegel the individual epistemology of subjective spirit presupposes and is truly based on the social epistemology of objective spirit. On Hegel’s view, this means that the individual is subject or producer of knowledge only because her cognitive activity is grounded on the presupposed social institutions of the society that supports her individual cognitive endeavors; only because her activity is seen in connection with and as mediated by the cognitive efforts of other (individual or collective) producers of knowledge in exchanges that may be alternatively collaborative or conflicting; she is a producer of knowledge only because the results of her individual cognitive pursuits are recognized and shared by the scientific community to which the individual, in turn, owes her scientific formation and culture (Bildung). Thus, what Hegel has to add to Fuller’s “realizationist” claim that “we increasingly come to turn into reality whatever we conceive” (Fuller 2012, 272) is the stronger claim that we, as individuals, cannot even start conceiving of anything (true) unless we start from a position in which (some form or stage of) truth is already incorporated in real—objective and collective—institutions of learning, in linguistic transactions, in scientific practices that allow us first to even conceive of our cognitive and scientific pursuits and programs, and then to put them into reality (or realize them).

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Indeed, in civil society particularity with all its interests and ends cannot be negated. Particularity sets itself higher than the universal and uses the universal as “means” to further its particular ends. And yet, this movement shows that the individual can reach and satisfy her ends only at the condition of acting “in connection” with all other particular individuals — each of whom does exactly what she herself does. Bildung, in its first emergence, is the movement whereby the individual by recognizing that other particulars do exactly what she herself does, becomes a “member (Glied) of the chain of this connection,” is “formed” or raised to “formal freedom,” i.e., to “the formal universality of knowing and willing” (R§187). Formation-Bildung, in this general sense, indicates the very nature of the dialectical movement proper to civil society, i.e., the integration of concrete particularity and universality taking place precisely by exploiting the potentiality of individual, self-interested action. The formal universal first achieved by Bildung negates particularity by affirming it, i.e., by negating its distinctive negativity or by contextualizing it in a broader framework.

### Link chain

#### Only the ability to abstract away from our contingent motivations is necessary for concepts of freedom – we must be given spheres to arbitrarily exercise abstract right

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

In Hegel's ethical theory, the final good is not happiness but freedom. One consequence of this is the importance of the right of persons in Hegel's the­ ory. Personal rights set limits to what may be done to a person in the name of interests, whether that person's own interests or the interests of others. If rights are there in order to override eudaemonistic considerations generally, then we might expect them to be ascribed to persons independently of those considerations. Hegel's theory meets this expectation, since "abstract" right is so called precisely because it abstracts from all considerations of well-being or happiness: In abstract right "it is not a matter of particular interests, my utility or my well-being" (PR § 37). Instead, it is a matter of securing the abstract freedom of a "person." As we saw in Chapter 2, § 2, Hegel holds that every human being has "formal freedom," the capacity to abstract from all particular determinations, desires, and interests. This capacity is what makes someone a person, "a self-consciousness of itself as a perfectly abstract I, in which all concrete limitedness and validity is negated and invalid" (PR § 35R). As persons, all human beings are equal (VPRig: 67-68). Even though the exercise of this capacity to abstract (as in negative freedom or arbitrariness) is not freedom in its most proper sense, Hegel holds just the same that it is essential to guarantee individuals in the modern state adequate room for the exercise of arbitrariness (Chapter 2, §§ 2, 5, and 11). This is the point of abstract right. "A person must give its freedom an external sphere in order to exist as Idea" (PR § 41). "Idea" for Hegel refers to a rational concept when it ex­ presses or embodies itself in something real (WL6: 462-469/755-760; EL §§ 213-215; PR § 1); a spiritual being "exists as Idea" when it actualizes itself appropriately in the objective world. I "exist as Idea" when my personality, my capacity to make abstract choices, is given adequate scope to actualize itself, and in Hegel's view this happens when I have a sufficient "external sphere" subject to my arbitrary choice.

#### Mutual recognition is the basis of consciousness

Wood 90 summarizes Fichte, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

To justify the claim that human beings have abstract rights, what Hegel must show us is why formally free agents ought to guarantee one another exclusive spheres of arbitrary activity. Hegel's argument on this point is developed in 77 ￼ABSTRACT RIGHT his Jena period lectures and shows up again in the Encyclopedia (1817, final version 1830) (EG §§ 430-436). Much of it is merely presupposed in the Philosophy of Right, since that work deals with objective spirit, whereas the argument in question belongs to the Encyclopedia ys discussion of subjective spirit. Hegel's argument is based on the concept of "recognition" (Anerken- nung), or mutual awareness. The gist of Hegel's position is that I can have an adequate consciousness of myself only if I am recognized by others, and recognition can be adequate only if it is fully mutual. Much in Hegel's discus­ sion of recognition is novel and provocative, but both the concept of recogni­ tion and its use as the basis of a theory of natural right are derived from Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right (GNR) (1796). It will enhance our understanding of Hegel's theory of recognition and the rights of persons if we are aware of the Fichtean theory he adopts and modifies. Fichte's entire philosophy is transcendentally deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness, the consciousness of an object that is identical to the subject of the same consciousness. For Fichte, the self defines itself through its own activity; but it is nevertheless limited or finite, distinguishable from other objects. This means that the self's activity must be limited by a not- self, an objective world different from and opposed to the self. From this Fichte infers that the activity of which we are aware in self-awareness must be practical activity or volition, concerned with altering an outside world (GNR 17-20/31-33). Hence our awareness of this activity as limited must be the awareness of an external object that checks or resists it (GNR 23-24/40). A self's practical activity is related to some possible change in the objective world, through which the self brings about a state of the world contrasting with a previous state. In this way, self-awareness involves the awareness of time (GNR 29/48). The external object that checks the self's activity must be represented as already existing for the self at a moment in time prior to that of the self-awareness we are setting out to explain (GNR 28/47). Fichte argues that this threatens us with a vicious regress (or, alternatively, a vicious circularity). At every moment we presuppose the previous con­ sciousness of an object for the self, and along with it the very self-conscious­ ness that was to be accounted for (GNR 31/49). Fichte proposes to avoid the regress (or circularity) by thinking of the self as related not only to an exter­ nal world, but at the same time also to a different sort of object: one in which an activity of the self is already combined with a limitation of this same activity, all within a single temporal moment (GNR 32/51). The concept that answers to this description, Fichte says, is that of a "requirement" or "de­ mand" (Aufforderung) that the subject should manifest its free activity, but in a determinate way (GNR 32-33/52). More precisely, Fichte argues, self-consciousness presupposes the con­ sciousness of an object that is the ground of such a demand, or - as he also puts it - an object that "addresses a demand" to the subject (GNR 36/57). This must be an object of a very special kind, one whose influence on the subject is to cause the subject not only to act in a determinate way, but also to set itself an end, which means that this subject must bring about in itself 78 ￼RECOGNITION a cognition of the object it intends to produce (GNR 37/58). Fichte now argues that an object whose essential influence on us is to produce such a cognition in us must itself be a conscious being, one that possesses the con­ ceptions both of free activity and of the capacity to manifest it according to a concept (GNR 37-38/58-59): The rational being cannot posit itself as such, without its happening that there is a requirement that it act freely. But if such a requirement to act happens to it, then it must necessarily posit a rational being outside it as the cause of the requirement, and so in general it must posit a rational being outside itself. (GNR 39/60) Fichte understands this to presuppose that a self-conscious being must actu­ ally have been affected by another self-conscious being: "It has been shown that if a rational being is to come to self-consciousness, then necessarily an­ other must have had an effect on it, as on one capable of reason" (GNR 87/129). In fact, Fichte claims, the two must stand in a relation of "free reciprocal effect" of each on the other "through concepts and according to concepts" (GNR 39/61). This mutual relation, which Fichte regards as the "proper characteristic of humanity," is "recognition" (Anerkennung).

#### Mutual recognition of the spirit of other individuals within a social order enables us to reconcile conflicting conceptions of the self to form identity

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

We may see Hegel as attempting to supply this deficiency in Fichte's the­ ory. Hegel does not treat [understands] recognition as a transcendental condition for the \* possibility of self-consciousness. He understands it instead as a "process," beginning with a "struggle to the death," and passing through an asymmetri­ cal "master-servant" relation in which one self is recognized by the other without having to recognize the other in turn. In the course of this process, the selves acquire a deeper conception of what it is to be a free self, and the rational outcome of the process is the mutual awareness of free self-conscious -beings as persons with abstract rights. Hegel's model involves a philosophical argument, but it also has historical applications. It attempts to say something about the difference between (modern) societies, which recognize every hu­ man being as a person with abstract rights, and (premodern) societies, which do not. Hegel tries to show that people have a deeper knowledge of their human nature in societies that respect the right of persons than in societies that do not. 83 ￼ABSTRACT RIGHT 5. The desire for self-certainty Earlier we saw that Hegel locates the origin of the concept of a person in ancient Rome. He credits Christianity with extending this status in principle to all, and he finds the worldly application of this Christian view only in the modern state. But Hegel's discussion of recognition, in both his Jena period and his later philosophy of spirit, is not so much an historical account as a rational reconstruction of the process through which the mutual recognition of persons might have developed out of simpler forms of self-consciousness.5 We might think of social contract theories of the state as one analogy for Hegel's procedure, since they, too, are rational reconstructions of the way in which an existing institution might have come about. We would do better, however, to think of the peculiar form of social contract theory found in Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Hegel's reconstruction, like Rousseau's, does not try to show how individuals might construct a social institution in order to satisfy given ends using given resources. Instead, it attempts to understand how the mutual interaction of individuals fundamen­ tally alters their knowledge of themselves, thereby changing their ends, re­ sources, and their human nature itself. In the Berlin Encyclopedia, Hegel divides the development of "self-con­ sciousness" into three distinct stages: (1) desire (EG §§ 426-429), (2) recog­ nition (EG §§ 430-435), and (3) universal self-consciousness or reason (EG §§ 436-439). Hegel's model begins with human individuals conceived simply as living things possessing "self-consciousness" or "will" (PhG K 165; JR 194/ 99; EG § 426). Hegel follows Fichte in regarding the human self as fundamen­ tally a striving of the "I" against the "not-I," of self against otherness, an im­ pulse to overcome all otherness (W 262/231). Hegel expresses this by saying that self-consciousness is "desire." More specifically, it is a desire to achieve "self-certainty" through overcoming an object or "other." Self-consciousness seeks to destroy the independence or "self-sufficiency" (Selbstandigkeit) of the object, in order to establish its own self-standing independence. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it posits this nothingness for itself as the truth of the other; it negates the independent object and thereby gives itself self- certainty, as true certainty as such, which has become so for it in an objective way. (PhG 11 174) It is in this "nothingness" of the object or other that the desire of self-con­ sciousness finds its "satisfaction" (PhG K 175). For Hegel, the "object" of a desire is never merely a subjective mental state, such as pleasure or the absence of pain. Hegel interprets desire as a function of self-conscious, spiritual being - an embodied being situated in a world of external objects toward which its desires are directed. Further, Hegel interprets this desire in accordance with his theory of spirit as self- actualization through the overcoming of otherness. The fundamental desire that Hegel attributes to self-consciousness is a desire for self-worth or "self- certainty." As spirit, the self engages in an activity of positing an object and then interpreting itself in terms of it. Self-certainty is gained only through 84 ￼RECOGNITION something external, which is brought into harmony with the self, an objectiv­ ity whose independence is done away with or "negated." This negation of the object refers to my using it up or consuming it (as when I literally eat it up), but also includes my shaping or forming it. Even more broadly, it covers any sort of integration of it into my plans and projects. In the most abstract form, it occurs when I assert my dominion over the object in the social forms suitable to property ownership (PR §§ 54-70). The attempt to achieve self-certainty through the appropriation of things proves inadequate. Satisfaction taken in external objects merely leads to a new desire for a new object. This result only points to the fact that the desir­ ing self-consciousness is always dependent on a new object, whereas its aim was rather to establish its own independence, and the nothingness of the object (EG § 428). What self-consciousness needs is an object that brings about this negation within itself without ceasing to be an object. But only a self-consciousness is able to endure the "contradiction" of negating itself or being its own other (PhG 11162). In other words, "self-consciousness reaches its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (PhG 1 175). From the standpoint of self-certainty, the fundamental problem with non- human objects of desire is that they can contribute to my self-worth only secondarily or indirectly, by confirming an image of myself that I already have independently of them. Even animals, which are living and conscious objects, cannot provide me directly with a sense of my self-worth, since they possess no conception of a free self, and so I can never find in them a con­ firming perspective on myself. The only "other" that can form a conception of me as a free self is another free self. Self-consciousness can find satisfaction for its desire for self-certainty only when it comes "outside itself," so that its object becomes "another self" (PhG K 179; EG § 429,A). "Self-consciousness has an existence only through being recognized by another self-conscious­ ness" (NP 78); "Self-consciousness is in and for itself insofar and through the fact that it is in and for itself for another, i.e., it is only as something recognized" (PhG 1f 178). When I see my free selfhood reflected back to me out of another self, I actualize my self-consciousness in the form of "spirit," as a "self-restoring sameness." It is only in relation to another free self that I can be truly free, "with myself in another" as regards my self-certainty. Thus the full actualiza­ tion of spirit is possible only through the relation between selves that recog­ nize each other. This is why Hegel even goes so far as to say that the essence of spirit itself lies in recognition, in a community of selves, "the I that is a we and the we that is an I" (PhG 1 177; cf. EG § 43

Mutual recognition and incorporation of another into our ends is necessary since it enables us to conceptualize limitations of our own desires, as they are subjectto an alien will

#### Hegel’s theory best accounts for the complex conception of human nature

Wood 90, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

 These Fichtean ideas are taken up into Hegel's theory of self-awareness, through the thesis that the will's "individuality" results from its own activity of self-determination, proceeding from "universality" through "particularity" (PR §§ 5-7). One can speak of a self at all only in relation to an actively willed system of practical concerns, but these concerns have a dimension that goes beyond my "particularity" - the traits, desires, and other qualities that distinguish me from other people. It is not merely a result of the philoso­ pher's peculiar craving for generality that ethical theories focus on the human good rather than on the good of this or that individual. Fichte's way of expressing this is by developing a theory not of the self- awareness of this or that individual but a theory of das Ich, of the I or the self The Fichtean "I" is not some metaphysical entity distinct from your self and mine, but a transcendental structure or type necessarily exemplified by any particular self. Hegel makes the same point by insisting that one "mo­ ment" of the will, that which enables me to apply the word "I" to myself at all, is the moment of "universality," in which I identify myself with what is common to all beings capable of calling themselves "I" (PR § 5; EG § 381A). But self-concern for Hegel is always socially and culturally situated. An indi­ vidual self is an expression of its culture's historically developed understand­ ing of human nature and its practical possibilities. Self-concern is universal concern, but it is a socially and historically situated concern, expressing a 18 ￼SELF-ACTUALIZATION collective practical project of fashioning a human world (VG 54-56/47-48). The practical project of being a self does not leave either the self or its self-knowledge unaltered. In carrying out the practical project through which they define themselves and their humanity, people acquire a deeper knowl­ edge of themselves and so develop the human nature which it is their project to actualize. In this way, people alter not only their conception of themselves but also the goals involved in this conception. Because this alteration comes about through an alteration of their striving itself, we may even say that people shape or create their own goals and aspirations. Because of this con­ stant interplay of self-understanding, self-actualization, and self-alteration, Hegel refers to the process of creative self-development as a "dialectical" pro­ cess, to which he gives the name "experience" (PhG K 86). The dialectical project of self-understanding and self-actualization is one in which individual human beings participate through the forms shaped by a cultural tradition. Any individual's project of self-actualization must be un­ derstood in its social and historical meaning. Hegel thinks that the strivings of individuals can themselves be understood as cumulative and collective, as aspects of a collective striving of humanity itself for an understanding of its essence and for the proper objective shape in which that essence may be actualized.

## Particularity and Universality = reconciled through mutual recognition

#### Hegel’s theory best accounts for the complex conception of human nature

Wood 90, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

If there is any hope for ethics as a branch of rational inquiry, it lies in show­ ing how ethical conceptions and a theory of the human good can be grounded in human self-understanding.1 Ethics must be grounded in a knowledge of human beings that enables us to say that some modes of life are suited to our nature, whereas others are not. In that sense, ethical theories generally may be regarded as theories of human self-actualization. Plato grounds his ethics in psychology, and Aristotle identifies the human good with a life actualizing the human essence in accordance with its proper excellences. Even the ethical theories of modern times rest on some identifiable conception of human be­ ings, Kantian theories conceiving human nature as finite rational will, and utilitarian theories identifying human beings with bundles of desires, prefer­ ences, or affective states. The common pitfall of ethical theories in this respect is that their conceptions of human nature are too thin, one-sided, and abstract, or else too much dictated by the needs of some convenient theoretical program. Hegel's ethical theory is based on a complex conception of human nature, which system­ atizes a number of different human self-images. Hegel grounds this concep­ tion in his theory of history, which attempts to show how the different ele­ ments arose through a process of cultural development. Hegel's ethical theory is therefore culturally and historically specific in ways that most ethi­ cal theories are not. At the same time, it tries to avoid cultural relativism by defending its conception of human nature as the outcome of a process in which human beings have acquired a measure of genuine human self-knowl- edge. Hegel's account of the historical process through which this self-knowledge has been acquired is grounded in a theory of human selfhood and self-aware­ ness. This theory owes much to the thought of his two principal predeces­ sors, Kant and Fichte. Kant treated theoretical self-awareness not as the awareness of a soul-thing underlying our psychic states (in the Cartesian tra­ dition), or even the passive perception of relations of continuity and causal connectedness between these states (in the Lockean and Humean tradition) but rather as the awareness of the activity of synthesizing or combining them (B 131-133). Self-awareness is therefore essentially practical; it is not so much an awareness of our various urges and desires as it is the awareness of a system of abiding concerns and projects with which we actively identify. J7 ￼HEGELIAN ETHICAL THEORY General self-concerns modify or inhibit our desires, give rise to new desires, and serve as a basis for rational judgments about what is for our own good or about what we have best reason to do on the whole. Thus Kant identifies the will (the practical self) with practical reason (G 412/29). Concernful awareness of oneself is indispensable for a sense of one's identity, in two related senses: that which ties together all one's mental states as the states of a single person, and that which determines the content of one's self-interest and self-worth. Like Derek Parfit, Kant and his idealist followers regard the identity of a person as a rational construct. Contrary to Parfit, however, they think .this enhances rather than diminishes the impor­ tance of individual selfhood. For it makes us our own work and our own task; our fundamental vocation is to make ourselves into what we are.2 Fichte's way of expressing this idea is to say that the self "posits itself" (W 98/99), and that the self is "not a being but a doing" (W 495/66). The self is the object of an awareness, but this awareness is not a detached contempla­ tion. Fichte interprets self-awareness as an activity of reflection on another activity already given; this is practical activity or will (W 264/232-233, GNR 20/36). Self-awareness reflects on will, intuits its own identity with that will, and at the same time forms a concept of it (W 463-464/38-39). Thus self- awareness is always self-concern, involving issues of self-interest and self- worth. It is self-awareness, in fact, that turns given desires into concerns for self-interest and self-worth. T o be a self is always simultaneously to be aware of something and to do something. It is to "posit" what one is by deciding or positing what one is to be. A self-conception involves simultaneously what one is and what one is striving to become. These Fichtean ideas are taken up into Hegel's theory of self-awareness, through the thesis that the will's "individuality" results from its own activity of self-determination, proceeding from "universality" through "particularity" (PR §§ 5-7). 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1. Looking to consequences or constraints alone fails; consequences distort the nature of an action since an action is not connected to the individual who wills it as it’s turned over the external forces, but contingent motivations and principles disjointed from our empirical reality don’t determine the legitimacy of an action since they abstract away from the socially situated nature of an action; any end is embodied in the material world, not just the individual’s mind.
2. The standard does not only care about means or ends - looking to consequences or constraints alone fails; consequences distort the nature of an action since an action is not connected to the individual who wills it as it’s turned over the external forces, but contingent motivations and principles disjointed from our empirical reality don’t determine the legitimacy of an action since they abstract away from the socially situated nature of an action; any end is embodied in the material world, not just the individual’s mind.
3. The laws that guide the state must be ones that individuals could affirm– actualized person would take that specific action

Wood, Allen W. Ed: Beiser, Frederick C. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel Edited by Frederick C. Beiser Book DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL05. Hegel's Ethics, p. 211-233. CambridgeUniversity Press.

A Self-Actualization Theory. Hegel's mature ethical theory may be viewed as an attempt to reconcile traditional Aristotelian ethical theory with the Kantian and Fichtean emphasis on free selfhood. Hegel's Philosophy of Right begins with "spirit" [Geist) in the specific form of the practical subject or free will, and works out the systematic self-actualization of its freedom (PR § 33). Hegel draws the idea that ethics must be founded on a conception of the human good, regarded as the actualization of the human essence. But from Kant, Hegel has learned the lesson that this good is not to be identified with human happiness, or with any other good answering to what is merely given in our nature. Following Fichte, he conceives the human self as free in the radical sense that its identity, and therefore the content of its self-realization, is the result of its own activity. The human Bestimmung, the fundamental human property and at the same time the human vocation, is freedom itself (PR § 4). The resulting theory cannot be comfortably classified either as a teleological theory, like Aristotle's, based on an end or good to be pursued, or as a deontical theory, like Kant's, based on a commandment or principle to be followed. Instead, it is an agent-oriented or self-actualization theory, based on a conception of the human self to be exemplified or instantiated. The theory recommends principles when they are the principles such a self would follow, and ends when they are the ends it would pursue. Actually, Hegel's theory is based not on one conception of the self, but on a system of such conceptions, which determines Hegel's "system of right" in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel sees these conceptions as the results of a long historical development, in which the human spirit collectively has successively deepened its knowledge of itself. In the sphere of "abstract right," the individual is conceived as a "person" (PR §§ 34-36), a free volitional agent, capable of abstracting completely from its desires and situation, and demanding recognition for an external sphere in which the dignity of its personality can be actualized (PR § 41). Within this sphere, including the person's body and life (but extending to all its property), the person's right of arbitrary freedom must be recognized by others. A second but less abstract sphere is that of "morality" in which the individual is conceived as a subject, an agent possessing moral responsibility and a distinctive good or welfare of its own, which makes claims on the subjective will of others. Morality is concerned with our responsibility for actions and their consequences (PR §§ 115-20), with the value of subjective freedom, the right of individuals to determine the course of their own lives and to take satisfaction in their choices (PR §§ 121-24). Self-actualization in the moral sphere consists in the actualization of the subject through the conforDownloaded from Cambridge Companions Online by IP 129.236.221.214 on Fri Apr 08 02:22:01 BST 2016. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521382742.008 Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2016 Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 2l8 THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEGEL mity of its insight and intention to the good (PR § 131). For morality, the good is conceived simply as human welfare or happiness in the abstract, whose goodness is contingent upon its consistency with abstract right (PR § 130). Hegel sees the conceptions of person and subject as applying universally to all human beings, and regards this vision as an achievement of post-Christian European modernity. Both conceptions, however, are abstractions, which cannot be actualized directly. Hegel blames the disastrous limitations of modern theories of the state, as well as all the shortcomings of the moral standpoint, on the failure to appreciate this point. Personhood and subjectivity can be actualized only by being given concrete embodiment in the roles of a harmonious social system or ethical life. Hegel's Philosophy of Right is an attempt to present modern society as an ethical life in which distinctively modern self-conceptions are made concrete and so actualized. The distinctively modern social institution in which this takes place is civil society. Objective Freedom. The essence and vocation of spirit or the will is freedom. Thus far we have looked at freedom "subjectively," in terms of the self-images of the free being. But Hegel thinks it can be looked at from an "objective" standpoint too. In his technical usage, "right" is freedom made objective or actual (PR § 29). Thus The Philosophy of Right is a developing hierarchy of objects in which freedom is actualized. But Hegel insists that what most people mean by freedom, the unhindered capacity to act aribtrarily or do as you please, is not true freedom (PR § 15R). Genuine freedom, "absolute," "concrete," or "positive" freedom, consists not in a mere capacity or potentiality, but in that activity which fully actualizes reason (PR § 22R).

## The State is the Basis of Mutual Recognition

#### Actualization of individuals can only occur by placing them within society – the person alone is an incomplete picture of the subject

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The person and the subject are abstractions, incomplete or one-sided images of the individual human self, which are overcome only when individuals are considered in relation to "ethical life" (Sittlichkeit). Hegel identifies ethical life with "the objective ethical order" (PR § 144), the "ethical substance," to which particular individuals relate as "accidents" (PR § 145). It is above all in his conception of ethical life that Hegel seems to assert the primacy of the social over the individual. But we have just seen that free subjectivity itself is the distinctive principle of modern ethical life. Ethical life is more concrete than abstract right and morality not because it emphasizes the collective over the individual, but because the ethical image of the individual is a more con­ crete one. It addresses every side of the individual self, and situates the self in a living social order.

#### The state enables reconciliation of particularity and universality within a social structure that allows individuals to adopt universal ends as a part of their own particular identities

Neuhouser 9, Frederick. Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory. Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press, 2009. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 1 April 2016. Copyright © 2009. Harvard University Press. All rights reserved. NP 3/1/16.

Finally, the modern state as Hegel understands it embodies the moment of mediated unity. As such, it incorporates two prominent structural elements of the previous spheres: the substantial unity of the family and the element of difference, or atomism, characteristic of civil society. Hegel, following Rousseau, conceives of the state, or political sphere, as the public realm where legislation is framed and executed in accord with a shared conception of the good of society as a whole-as the arena, in other words, where the general will is given both a determinate content and a real existence. The state incorporates the atomism of civil society because citizens enter the political sphere with diverse, independently established identities as particular individuals whose family ties and positions within civil society provide them with divergent particular interests. Because the moment of difference is not to be suppressed by the state but rather incorporated into it, the principal concern of Hegelian politics is to find a way of integrating the particular wills of individual citizens with the general will not only through the framing of laws that further the good of the whole but also by subjectively transforming citizens so as to enable them to embrace the general will as their own. The latter requirement poses a by now familiar problem: What enables citizens to assent to social policies that sometimes subordinate their private interests to the good of the whole? Hegel's response here is to appeal to the same idea that underlies his account of the substantial unity of the family: individuals are capable of embracing the ends of the state as their own only if they are able to experience their roles as citizens as a source of their own selfhood (§261A). Thus, in order for individuals to will the general will (in order for them to be citizens in the full sense of the term) the state must be a substantial unity in which individuals' relations to their fellow citizens-their being joined together as a single nation, or people (Volk)-provides them with a shared, "universal" project, the carrying out of which is for them both an end in itself and a substantial source of the value they ascribe to their own lives.

#### The state is the instantiation of conceptual unity – it unites particular interests of individuals with the universal character of obligation

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This, however, raises a further question: What is the source of the more than merely instrumental ties that citizens are said to have to one another? What kind of attachment in the political sphere substitutes for the bond of love that unites individuals in the family? It is tempting to assume that Hegel's appeal to the idea of national identity implies that the ties among citizens are akin to bonds of brotherhood, having their roots in a prereflective attachment citizens feel to one another by virtue of their all belonging, through birth, to a single people. The ability of citizens to embrace the general will, then, would be parasitic on a lovelike concern they feel for the welfare of their compatriots prior to (independently 00 the dealings they have with one another within the specifically political institutions of their society. Yet Hegel repeatedly emphasizes that there is a fundamental qualitative difference-one that makes the state an instance of mediated rather than immediate unity between the attachments of the family and those within the state. The unity that characterizes the latter, Hegel insists, is not grounded in immediate feeling or any other "bond of nature" (VPRl, 250) but is instead a "union through laws" and therefore a "unity that is known, conscious, expressly pronounced, and thought" (§157N).20 The state, then, embodies the Conceptual moment of mediated unity because the tie that binds citizens together-the bond that endows them with a single will comes into being only through a collective act of legislating reason: in giving itself laws, the state establishes for itself principles that are universally binding, explicitly known, and consciously endorsed through a process of public reflection on the common good. 21 The state, Hegel says, differs from the family in that it "knows what it wills and knows it in its universality, as something thought; it therefore functions and acts in accord with conscious ends, recognized principles and according to laws that ... are present to consciousness" (§270).

#### *Only through the state can individual freedom be actualized*

*Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.*

*Hegel regards the state as the highest actualization of the individual's free­ dom (PR § 257). In relation to the state, the individual is a citizen (PR §§ 27 ￼HEGELIAN ETHICAL THEORY 261R, 265A), a Burger als citoyen (VPR17 : 94). As such, however, individu­ als are also members of the state (PR §§ 258R, 261R), parts of a whole as members of a family are. In this respect, the state is unlike civil society, where the differentiation or separation of individuals is the fundamental de­ terminant of their relationship to one another (PR §§ 181, 184, 186, 263R). Membership in the state is also fundamentally different from membership in the family: "The family is also ethical, only the end is not a conscious one . . . but [in the state] the ground, the final truth, is spirit, which is [the state's] universal end and conscious object" (PR § 263A). In the family, the social whole is not a conscious end; the individual's commitment to this insti­ tution is always experienced as an immediate feeling of love for other particu­ lar individuals. But citizens devote themselves to the state as an institution, with an explicit political constitution. Their participation in the state takes the form not of immediate feeling but of rational thought (PR § 257R). The state is an "end in itself" (PR § 257): "Unification as such is itself the [state's] true content and end, and the individual's vocation is to lead a uni­ versal life" (PR § 257R). Hegel has often been criticized for holding that participation in the state gives to individuals a universal end, over and above the particular well-being of its individual members. He certainly does hold this. But it is a serious distortion of Hegel's meaning to think that the good of individuals is supposed to be swallowed up in, or sacrificed to, some quite different end. Hegel maintains that the modern state works only because the universal life of the state provides for the subjective freedom and particular happiness of its members. The "rationality" of the modern state consists in the "thoroughgoing unity of universality and individuality" (PR § 257R). "The principle of modern states has this tremendous strength and depth, that it lets the principle of subjectivity complete itself in the independent extreme of personal particularity, and simultaneously brings it back to sub- stantial unity" (PR § 260). Hegel rejects the common view that patriotism is the readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of one's country. He insists that it is rather "the disposi­ tion that habitually knows the community as the substantial foundation and end in the usual conditions and relationships of life" (PR § 268R). Far from being a disposition to sacrifice oneself for the state, patriotism is closely allied to "trust," the sense that one's own particular self-interest is "contained and preserved in another's: whereby this other is immediately no other for me, and in this consciousness I am free" (PR § 268). Hegel does hold that all particular interests must give way to the universal interest of the state in time of war (PR §§ 323-325). But he does so precisely because he takes war to be the extreme case in which the universal interest can (for once) be clearly distinguished from the particular. The state has "stability" only insofar as the universal end is "identical" with particular ends (PR § 265A); war strengthens the state only in the sense that it poses a threat to its stability, and a healthy state grows stronger for overcoming the threat. Hegel asks explicitly whether the state exists for the sake of its citizens, or whether the state is an end and they are its instruments. He replies by deny- 28 ￼SELF-ACTUALIZATION ing both alternatives, because the state is an organic unity in which no mem­ ber is end and none is means (VG 112/95), Elsewhere he insists that "the end of the state is the happiness of the citizens" (PR § 265A). Hegel's view at this point is not, after all, so very different from that of John Stuart Mill, who holds that an individual's life has meaning only when devoted to a social or collective good, a "good to the aggregate of all persons," which is pursued in concert with others.7 For the content of this end, neither Mill nor Hegel can conceive of anything except the well-being of individuals who comprise the collective. But there is an important difference in the way in which the two philoso­ phers think of individual well-being, and so of the collective human end. Because an individual for Hegel is always a product of a determinate social order, he conceives of the human good not abstractly, as the maximizing of pleasures, but as an ethical life providing for the individual's self-actualiza­ tion as person, subject, family member, burgher, and citizen. This structure reaches its highest point in the political state, because there the structure of social life is consciously known and willed for the sake of its rationality. The state is an institution in which human beings make rational collective decisions about the-form of their life together. In the family, such decisions are very limited, not only in scope but also through the fact that the family is held together by feelings of love rather than by rational thought. In civil society, the common mode of life is the result of rational choices, but of isolated individual choices,and not collective ones. For this reason, civil soci­ ety can be apprehended as a rational form of social life only from the higher standpoint of the state, and Hegel describes the rationality of civil society as an illusion or "show" (Schein) (PR § 189). In the state, Hegel thinks that social life based on rational choice is ho longer a mere appearance but a living institutional reality. The term "state" for Hegel has a broader and a narrower meaning: "State" refers to the whole organized existence of a people, including its family life and its civil society; but it also refers, more narrowly to a set of political institutions (PR § 267; VG 114-115/96-97). The two meanings are con­ nected, because it is only in the political state that the form of social life becomes an object of rational human choice: Only there is it true that "the state knows what it wills, and knows it in its universality, as something thought" (PR § 270). Hegel has other reasons for regarding the political state as the highest actu­ alization of freedom (PR § 257). He regards the state as the only social insti­ tution that can claim genuine independence. Modern family life is economi­ cally dependent on the life of civil society; both the family and civil society depend on the political state and are subordinate to it. The state, however, is sovereign, dependent on nothing larger. Unlike "humanity" at large or the Kantian "realm of ends" composed ideally of all rational beings, it is not a mere mental construct or a creation of the cosmopolitan moralist's wishful imagination. The state has an institutional reality; it is in fact the supreme human power on earth. 29 ￼HEGELIAN ETHICAL THEORY The state is an actual reality only because it is has "individuality, as exclu­ sive being for itself, [which] appears as a relation to other states" (PR § 322). Hegel thinks that human beings unite for the accomplishment of great ends (even ends of universal or cosmopolitan worth) only when they form a deter­ minate social unity, distinct from - at least implicitly in opposition to - others. Hegel believes that states are the unities that make history, just as Marx later thought classes were.8 States are therefore the "material" of world history, the concrete agents of world-historical development (VG 111-112/93-94). Thus it is through my relation to my state that I as an individual acquire a genuine and positive relation to the process of world history (PR § 348). Hegers insistence that each individual's supreme duty is to be a member of the state (PR § 258) is therefore not a rejection of the idea that the individual should aspire to pl^y a role in the universal life of the human race. On the contrary, Hegel thinks that it is only through participation in the state that individuals can realistically hope that their actions will gain such a universal significance. Hegel’s picture of the state has lost a good deal of its credibility in our century. The political states we know have long been divided into great world empires; the political processes of even the most powerful states are at the mercy of multinational corporations and other geopolitical social and eco­ nomic influences. State sovereignty is sometimes a just demand, sometimes an unconvincing ploy (sometimes both at once), sometimes an approxima­ tion, seldom a full reality. If the most powerful states may still claim to be the greatest powers on earth, even they have credible competitors in the form of international political or religious movements, as well as drug cartels and other multinational corporations. For these reasons, it is only too evident to us that the political state cannot play the role, whether in the life of the individual or in the collective life of the human race, which Hegel tried to assign it. But it doesn't follow that we as rational beings don't have the needs that the Hegelian state was supposed to fulfill. Hegel's theory of the state may still teach us a great deal about ourselves and our aspirations, even if the lesson cannot have the joyful effect on us Hegel intended it to have (PR Preface 27).*

## Independent Reasons to Prefer

## Impact Calculus

#### Individual instantiations of an action do not determine it’s validity – rather individual actions must be considered as part of a broader set of actions of the same category to be evaluated

Hegel. G.W.F. Hegel. Philosophy of Right. Translated by S.W. Dyde. socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hegel/right.pdf Batoche Books, Kitchener, 2001. 102-103.

119. The external embodiment of an act is composed of many parts, and may be regarded as capable of being divided into an infinite number of particulars. An act may be looked on as in the first instance coming into contact with only one of these particulars. But the truth of the particular is the universal. A definite act is not confined in its content to one isolated point of the varied external world, but is universal, including these varied relations within itself. The purpose, which is the product of thought and embraces not the particular only but also the universal side, is intention . Note.—Intention (in German, “a looking away from”) implies, according to its etymology, an abstraction, which has in part the form of universality, and partly is the extraction of a particular side of the concrete thing. The attempt to justify oneself by the intention consists, in general, in asserting that one special isolated phase is the subjective essence of the act.—To pass judgment upon an act simply as an external deed, without qualifying it as right or wrong, imparts to it a universal predicate; it is killing, arson, etc.—When the parts of external reality are taken one by one, their connection must naturally be external. Reality may be, in the first instance, touched at only a single point. Arson, e.g., may be directly concerned with only a small piece of wood, a statement which is merely a proposition, but not a judgment. But this single point has a universal nature, which involves the extension of it. In life the separate part is not a mere part, but directly an organ, in which the universal is really present. Hence in murder it is not a separate piece of flesh, but the life itself which is destroyed. On one side subjective reflection, in its ignorance of the logical nature of the particular and the universal, permits of a dissection into mere particulars and their consequences. On the other side, the act in its finite and casual character naturally breaks up into separate parts.—The invention of the dolus indirectus is due to this way of thinking.

Addition.—I, as independent and self-referred, am particular, and opposed to the external side of the act. Its content is decided by my end. Murder and arson, e.g., are quite general and not the positive content of me, a subject. When anyone has committed a crime, we ask why he has done it. Murder is not done for the sake of murder. There must be besides a particular positive end. If delight in murder were the motive of the crime, it would be the positive content of the subject as such, and the deed would be the satisfaction of his desire. The motive of a deed contains the moral element, which has the twofold signification of the universal in purpose and of the particular in intention. In modern times we are at pains to ask after the motive. Formerly the question was merely, Is this man just? Does he do his duty? Now we scrutinize the heart, and 106/G. W. F. Hegel fix a gulf between the objective side of conduct and the internal subjective side, or motive. No doubt the subject’s own determination must be con-sidered. What he wills has its ground within him; he wills to satisfy a pleasure or gratify a passion. But right and good are also precisely such a content, due, however, not to nature but to my reason. To make my own freedom the content of my will is a pure characteristic of my freedom itself. Hence the higher moral phase is to find satisfaction in the act, not to harp upon a breech between the objectivity of the deed, and the self- consciousness of man. This defective mode of interpretation has its epochs as well in world- history as in the history of individuals. 122. By virtue of the particular element the act has for me subjective value or interest. In contrast with this end, whose content is the intention, the direct act in its wider content is reduced to a means. This end, as far as it is finite, can again be reduced to a means for a wider intention, and so on indefinitely. 123. The content of these ends is only (a) formal activity, that is, the subject’s interest or aim is to be effected by his agency. Men desire to be themselves actively interested in whatever is or ought to be their own. (b) Further definite content is found for the still abstract and formal freedom of subjectivity only in its natural subjective embodiment, as inclinations, passions, opinions, whims, etc. The satisfaction of this content is well-being or happiness in its particular as also in its universal features. In this satisfaction consist the ends of finitude generally. Note.—This is the standpoint of relation (§108). The subject at this stage emphasizes his distinctive and particular nature. Here enters the content of the natural will (§11). But the will is not in its simple and direct form, since the content belongs to a will which is turned back into itself, and raised to the level of a universal end, namely, well-being or happiness. Addition.—In so far as the elements of happiness are externally provided, they are not the true elements of freedom. Freedom truly is itself only in an end constituted by itself, i.e., the good. Here the question may be raised, Has man a right to set up for himself ends which are not free, and depend simply on his being a living thing? But life in man is not a mere accident, since it accords with reason. Man has. so far a right to make his wants an end. There is nothing degrading in one’s being alive. There is open to us no more spiritual region, in which we can exist, than that of life. Only through the exaltation of what is exter- The Philosophy of Right/107 nally provided to the level of something self-created do we enter the higher altitude of the good. But this distinction implies no intolerance of either side of man’s nature. 124. Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual, the recognition for example of oneself as honoured or famous, is involved in the realization of absolutely valid ends, the demand that only subjective satisfaction should appear as willed and attained, and also the view that in action subjective and objective ends exclude each other, are empty assertions of the abstract understanding. Nay, more, the argument becomes a positive evil when it is held that, because subjective satisfaction is always found in every finished work, it must be the essential intention of the agent, the objective end being only a means to the attainment of this satisfaction. The subject is the series of his acts. If these are a series of worthless productions, the subjectivity of the will is also worthless; if the acts are substantial and sound, so likewise is the inner will of the individual

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118. An act, when it has become an external reality, and is connected with a varied outer necessity, has manifold consequences. These The Philosophy of Right/103 consequences, being the visible shape, whose soul is the end of action, belong to the act. But at the same time the inner act, when realized as an end in the external world, is handed over to external forces, which attach to it something quite different from what it is in itself, and thus carry it away into strange and distant consequences. It is the right of the will to adopt only the first consequences, since they alone lie in the purpose. Note.—The division of consequences into necessary and accidental is not accurate, because the inner necessity, involved in the finite, is realized as a necessity which is external, a necessity, that is to say, implying a relation of separate things, which are independent, indifferent to one another, and only externally connected. The principle “In acting neglect the consequences,” and the principle “Judge an act by its consequences, and make them the standard of what is right and good,” belong both alike to the abstract understanding. The consequences are the native form of the act, simply manifest its nature, and are nothing but the act itself. The act cannot scorn and disown them. Yet amongst the consequences is included that which is only externally attached to them and has no fellowship with the act itself. The development of the contradiction involved in the necessary nature of the finite is in external reality the conversion of necessity into contingency and vice versa. An overt act must therefore conform to this law. This law it is which stands the criminal in such good stead, if his act has had but few consequences; so also must the good act be contented to have few or no consequences. But when the consequences of crime have fully developed themselves, they add to the severity of the punishment. The self-consciousness of the heroic age, painted in the tragedy of “Œdipus,” for instance, had not risen out of its simplicity, or reflectively appreciated the difference between realized deed and inner act, between the outer occurrence and the purpose and knowledge of surroundings. Nor did it distinguish between one consequence and another, but spread responsibility over the whole area of the deed. Addition.—In the fact that I recognize as mine only what was in my representation is to be found the transition from purpose to intention. Only what I knew of the surroundings can be imputed to me. But there are necessary results attached to even the simplest act, and they are its universal element. The consequences, which may be prevented from taking effect, I cannot indeed foresee, but I ought to know the universal 104/G. W. F. Hegel nature of each separate concrete deed. The thing which I ought to know is the essential whole, which refers not to special details of an act, but to its real nature. The transition from purpose to intention consists in my being aware not merely of my separate act, but of the universal bound up with it. This universal, when willed by me, is my intention.

# Cards

## Syllogism

1. This conceptual (rather than historical) argument begins with the simplest conception of a self-determined will – the arbitrarily choosing will that characterizes persons – and demonstrates the necessity of supplementing that conception with a more complex idea of freedom (moral freedom) by showing how personal freedom by itself is incomplete.
2. A conception of freedom is shown to be incomplete when the attempt to think a world in which it is realized reveals that such a world fails in some way fully to embody the core ideal of freedom, that of a will determined only by itself. Hegel’s conceptual (or “logical”) argument in the Philosophy of Right is obscured by the fact that it is not articulated in the straightforwardly deductive form that philosophers traditionally employ. Instead, its central claims are embedded (implicitly) in the famous “dialectical” transitions that mark the text’s progression from “Abstract Right” to “Morality” to “Ethical Life.”

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Hegel’s argument in the first of these transitions can be reconstructed as follows. As I have noted, personal freedom is realized when an individual is granted exclusive, arbitrary control over a certain portion of the world that constitutes his property. The incompleteness of this conception of freedom comes to light by considering the conditions under which personal freedom can be realized universally – that is, by every being with the capacity for free choice (which is to say, every human being). Hegel’s claim is that when we attempt to think a world in which personal freedom is realized universally, we see that it cannot be the only kind of freedom that the inhabitants of such a world enjoy. More precisely, personal freedom cannot be the only freedom such beings enjoy, if the goal of complete self-determination is to be achieved. The thought here is that a person living in a world where the personal freedom of all individuals is guaranteed could not be fully self-determined if [t]he[y] possessed only an arbitrarily choosing will, for there would be a respect in which his actions would have to be constrained by laws that do not themselves come from his own (merely arbitrary) will. This is because in order to realize the personal freedom of everyone, the actions of all must be subject to constraints. That is, everyone’s actions must be bound by those principles – the principles of abstract right – that specify which of an individual’s actions are inconsistent with the personhood of others. Thus, one of the conditions of the systematic realization of personal freedom is that individuals’ actions conform to the fundamental command of abstract right: “Respect others as persons” (PR, §36). The rational social order will codify the principles of abstract right into a system of laws and use the threat of punishment to enforce them, but if the persons who inhabit such a world are to be fully self-determined, they must be able to grasp the rational purpose behind those laws and affirm them; that is, they must be able to will the principles that constrain their actions. But this is just to say that persons who are fully self-determined must also possess the more complex configuration of will that Hegel ascribes to the moral subject (which takes itself to be bound by moral principles that come from its own will)

#### The realization of moral freedom depends on the formation of a rational social order that enables the instantiation of individual freedom

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What, then, are the deficiencies of moral freedom that necessitate the move to “Ethical Life” and its distinctive conception of freedom (social freedom)? Here, too, the inadequacies of moral freedom come to light by envisaging the conditions under which it can be realized in the world. The problems associated with realizing moral freedom are of two types. First, realizing moral freedom depends on something outside the individual[‘s] subject’s will in the sense that becoming a moral subject presupposes various social processes of character formation, or “education” [Bildung]. Among other things, moral subjects must be socialized to regard their actions as constrained by normative principles, to reflect on the principles that ought to guide their actions, and to willingly obey the principles they recognize as good. Second, moral subjects fall short of complete self-determination in the sense that, considered on their own – apart from the places they occupy in the basic institutions of society – moral subjects lack the resources they need to give concrete, nonarbitrary content to the idea of the good. While socially detached moral subjects may sincerely desire to realize the good, without a concrete vision of the projects and forms of life that best promote the freedom and well-being of all (the good), they cannot know what specific actions their allegiance to the good requires of them. In Hegel’s words, moral subjectivity is “abstract,” “empty,” and “formal” (PR, §§134–137, 141); it fails to satisfy the criteria for a fully self-determining will because it cannot by itself give sufficient determinacy to its own governing concept. The idea behind Hegel’s doctrine of social freedom is that the remedy for both defects of moral subjectivity lies in an account of good (or rational) social institutions. Thus, for Hegel, rational social institutions are charged with the dual task of socializing their members into beings who possess the subjective capacities required to realize personal and moral freedom, and of providing a social framework that defines the particular projects that make their lives meaningful and give determinacy to their understanding of the good. Each of these tasks points to an important respect in which the systematic realization of personal and moral freedom depends on rational social institutions. That such institutions secure the conditions necessary for realizing personal and moral freedom should not, however, lead us to think that Hegel values social membership for purely instrumental reasons (merely as a means to achieving personal and moral freedom). On the contrary, if the problems posed by the first two forms of freedom are to be solved in a way that remains true to the ideal of complete self-determination, this solution must itself give rise to a new configuration of the self-determining will, one that finds expression in the idea of social freedom. In other words, the means through which rational social institutions secure the conditions of personal and moral freedom must themselves embody a kind of self-determination; more than being merely means to the realization of freedom, the rational social order must also itself, considered as a whole, instantiate freedom.9 This claim points to a distinctive and potentially misleading feature of Hegel’s view: social freedom is a property that can be predicated of both the rational social order as a whole and the individual social members that compose it. Until recently, interpreters of Hegel often construed his talk of “the free whole” as evidence of the totalitarian character of his social philosophy, which was thought to subordinate the interests of individuals to some mysterious “freedom of the whole.” One of the principal aims of this paper is to discredit that mistaken understanding. For in addition to being a property of the rationally organized social order itself, social freedom is a freedom that individual social members realize:10 by participating (in the right ways) in the institutions of ethical life, individuals not only secure the conditions of their personal and moral freedom, they also give reality to their own particular identities and, by affirming the laws and social norms that govern them, they see their social participation as having its source in their own wills. Bringing together the various requirements social freedom is supposed to meet will provide us with a concise statement of its essential features: In addition to (i) securing the necessary conditions of personal and moral freedom, the rational social order will realize freedom in two further senses; (ii) individual social members will be self-determining in the sense that, because their self-conceptions are linked to the social roles they occupy, their participation in the institutions of ethical life will be not only voluntary but also an activity through which they constitute and express their identities; and, (iii) the social order itself – the ensemble of social institutions – will constitute a self-determining whole, one that is more completely self-determining (or self-sufficient) than any individual on its own can be. Thus, the actions of socially free individuals will proceed from their own wills in a dual sense: first, their social participation will be expressive of their own self-conceptions (e.g., as mother, teacher, and citizen of a particular state). Second, by acting in accordance with their self-conceptions, they will produce the totality of social conditions that make their own personal and moral freedom possible, as well as help to realize an entity – the social order itself – that is more completely self-determined than any individual.

## Nuzzo

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In presenting the unfolding of the phenomenological process as, subjectively and individually, the propedeutic to the position of science (see Phen. §26), and systematically the condition of science itself, i.e., of the logic, Hegel appropriates Kant’s Copernican and transcendental turn to the subject thereby making the truth of knowledge dependent on the position of consciousness by which and for which determinate beliefs are construed as true. This paradigm (itself an appropriation of Reinhold’s “proposition of consciousness”)[9] whereby consciousness is necessarily always implicated in the construction of the relation between the knowing subject and the known object (knowledge being this very relation) and their correspondence (which is the “truth” of knowledge) is the paradigm on which consciousness’ “experience” develops. What is relevant to our present discussion is the identity of the subject at stake in this relation. Who is the “subject” into which the metaphysical “substance” of the tradition is now transformed (Phen. §17, 54)? As Hegel famously claims that the substance that as “living substance” is “essentially subject” is Geist (Phen. §§18, 25, 26) the question regards the identity of Hegel’s “spirit”—the spiritual substance-subject. What kind of subject is spirit—and more precisely, what kind of subject is spirit, respectively, before and after the Logic, i.e., the spirit that emerges in the Phenomenology and the spirit thematized in the encyclopedic Philosophy of Spirit? In the first chapter of the Phenomenology, following the methodological program put forth in the introduction, Hegel begins the “science of the experience of consciousness” by presenting an epistemology that has “consciousness” as its center. Bewusstsein is the subject (and the object) of the epistemological paradigms put forth successively by “sense-certainty,” “perception,” the “understanding.” Such consciousness-based epistemology appears, in all respects, to be the individualistically oriented epistemology that Goldman identifies with the modern, Cartesian way (Goldman 2009, 1). In the second chapter of the book, addressing this time the structure of “self-consciousness,” Hegel moves on to lay the foundation of his social epistemology. The chapter is one of the most studied texts in Hegel’s entire philosophy. However, while the turn to an intersubjective dimension of the subject’s practical activity that occurs at this juncture is impossible to miss, it has never been noticed that such a turn has a fundamental impact on the further development of the epistemology proposed in this work. Hegel famously notices that with the resolution of the movement of self-consciousness — passing through the duplication of self-consciousness and the struggle for recognition — the “concept of spirit” is gained: at least “for us,” Hegel specifies (Phen. §177). In fact, what consciousness additionally has to experience in and of the reality that spirit is (i.e., in addition to the “concept” that we entertain) is the unity of opposites that constitutes spirit itself: “the I that is we and the we that is I” (Phen. §177). Herein I want to briefly underscore only two points that are relevant to our discussion.

#### Self-consciousness necessitates intersubjective relations between individuals

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First, the concept of self-consciousness that leads in its development to the intersubjective, collective reality that is already the reality of spirit is the result of — not the alternative to — the preceding movement of consciousness (see Phen. §166). Second, the concept of self-consciousness[’] discloses an epistemological paradigm: its validity is not restricted to a crucial statement on the nature of action (moral, ethical, political action) but concerns the nature of knowledge as reflective self-knowledge, as knowledge of objects which is necessarily mediated by the consciousness of the self as producer of knowledge. It follows that the epistemology connected to this figure is the result of — not the alternative to — the individualistic epistemology of consciousness (of sense-certainty, perception, understanding). This conclusion allows in turn for two considerations. With regard to the subject side of the cognitive relation, it leads me to suggest that in the production of knowledge the subject is not implicated as an isolated individual but rather that, in following through as an isolated individual who holds on to a certain epistemic paradigm, the subject is forced to a confrontation with other subjects producers of knowledge, and that eventually precisely in force of this confrontation the individual has to recognize that truth is constituted as a collective — although deeply oppositional and far from collaborative — enterprise. If we connect this claim to Goldman’s example of the Galileo-Bellarmino controversy (Goldman 2009, 5), the suggestion is not the relativistic contention that one truth is as justified as the other given the differing epistemic systems of reference of the two individuals but that to the full-fledged actuality of the one objective scientific truth at stake herein the opposition manifested in such controversy belongs essentially and constitutively.

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With regard to the object side of the epistemic relation at stake in the shift pursued in the Self-consciousness chapter, the claim that the phenomenological figure of self-consciousness entails an epistemological paradigm that is a paradigm of social epistemology, implies that the “object” to which knowledge claims are directed always and necessarily reveals intersubjective interests and choices, that the object to which knowledge refers is an object that is always and necessarily already mediated by self-consciousness, i.e., by (individual and social) desire, by language, and by the cognitive and practical activities that modify and appropriate the objective reality of nature (“labor” is famously the last figure of such practices discussed by Hegel — a practice that significantly displays a cognitive dimension of its own).

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Hegel’s notion of “objective thinking” expresses an idea of rationality that is objective or actual (wirklich) in the sense of being independent of the subject (individual or collective) but not in the sense of being merely “given” (i.e., displaying the givenness of mere “existence”— Dasein, Existenz, Erscheinung — which is not necessarily “rational”).[15] To the extent in which the objectivity of rationality is the objectivity of thinking’s own self-constituting activity the idea of “objective thinking” is connected to the notion of Geist. Since objective thinking is the topic (or properly the “standpoint” — Enz. §25) assumed by the logic, what we have, in this case, is a theory of knowledge that has “truth” (and “all truth”) as it highest goal,[16] that develops a “method” for the scientific cognition of all possible objects (objects of nature and spirit) [17] but is not anchored in a presupposed subject (be it a metaphysical substrate or subject as for Descartes, a phenomenological consciousness as in Hegel’s 1807 work or a transcendental subject as for Kant) as it rather yields, immanently and from its own movement, the subject of cognition itself. [18] This is, I suggest, an epistemology that is neither individualistic in the Cartesian, modern sense pointed out by Goldman, nor social in the sense of the Phenomenology and in Fuller’s own sense. It is, however, the necessary basis (or the condition) for both. As the first part of the system of philosophy —and of the philosophical sciences — Hegel’s logic is the methodological and epistemological foundation of his theory of spirit. This is articulated, in turn, in the forms of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. Now Hegel’s theory of spirit is the systematic realm in which the logic explicitly reveals its function or application, as it were, as a properly epistemological theory [19] — an epistemological theory that similarly to the one of the Phenomenology starts out with the individualistic orientation of subjective spirit and develops as a full-fledged social epistemology at the level of objective and absolute spirit. After the development of the Logic, which proceeds in the element of pure objective thinking without reference to a finite thinking subject or consciousness, the logical forms and their relevance to the cognitive process come again to the fore in the Psychology of the philosophy of subjective spirit, at the end of the movement of “theoretical spirit” (Enz. §467 Remark). This time such forms are used and enacted by the knowing subject (or by “theoretical intelligence”) in her attempts to know objects. What Hegel presents, at this point, is “thinking” (Denken) as the activity of the subject engaged in the pursuit of knowledge (Erkennen), as one — and the highest — of all the subjective mental activities characterizing the spiritual individual involved in a cognitive, theoretical relation to the world (denkendes Erkennen: Enz. §466).

#### Individualistic ideas of freedom can not be the basis of truth – rather, its dialectical nature makes it fundamentally intersubjective and institutional

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What we have here, yet again, is a transformation of the Cartesian subject and of the epistemological standpoint this represents. And yet, the individualistic epistemology that Hegel outlines in dealing with the spiritual subject’s cognitive relation to its objects is only the beginning of the epistemology of the philosophy of spirit. As a mere beginning, such epistemology is necessarily one-sided and limited in its scope but is also limited with regard to the notion of truth it pursues. It is a merely individualistic, subjectivist, and idealistic epistemology in which the subject’s truth is indeed her truth; it is what she construes as true (Enz. §444). But since theoretical spirit’s pursuit of truth in thinking and knowing reveals, already at this level, the freedom proper to spirit, and since freedom is essentially a process of actualization and the realm of freedom’s actualization is, most properly, the sphere of objective spirit (Enz. §469 and Remark), the epistemology of spirit that begins with theoretical intelligence’s idealistic and subjectivist stance must be overcome, expanded, and fulfilled in the movement toward truth’s and freedom’s realization in the collective and social institutions of objective spirit. In other words, the subjectivity of truth — its belonging to the individual, its idealistic and constructivist paradigm (in the Kantian sense but also in the more radical Foucaultian sense opposed by Goldman) — is a sign of its ultimate un-truth, which must be overcome (aufgehoben) in the objective and collective dimension of a realized truth or of a truth always in the process of its realization. In this crucial point I see Hegel’s position on both truth and freedom (as manifestations and embodiments of dialectical rationality) which are [is] achieved in and through a necessary process of realization and actualization (Verwirklichung and Entwicklung) mediated by the objective—intersubjective, social, and institutional—structures of spirit as an important precursor of Fuller’s self-described “realizationist” epistemology (Fuller 2012, 272). Moreover, on the basis of the general meaning of the systematic transitions proper to Hegel’s philosophy, the fact that subjective spirit finds its actual truth (its realized meaning and fulfillment) in the transition to objectivity — in which subjective conceptions and beliefs are not only “turned into reality” (Fuller 2012, 272) but also tested and changed by the confrontation with reality — means that the sphere of spirit’s social and collective institutions is the foundation of spirit’s individual life. Just as, in good Aristotelian fashion, the social and political whole is (metaphysically) prior to its individual parts, for Hegel the individual epistemology of subjective spirit presupposes and is truly based on the social epistemology of objective spirit. On Hegel’s view, this means that the individual is subject or producer of knowledge only because her cognitive activity is grounded on the presupposed social institutions of the society that supports her individual cognitive endeavors; only because her activity is seen in connection with and as mediated by the cognitive efforts of other (individual or collective) producers of knowledge in exchanges that may be alternatively collaborative or conflicting; she is a producer of knowledge only because the results of her individual cognitive pursuits are recognized and shared by the scientific community to which the individual, in turn, owes her scientific formation and culture (Bildung). Thus, what Hegel has to add to Fuller’s “realizationist” claim that “we increasingly come to turn into reality whatever we conceive” (Fuller 2012, 272) is the stronger claim that we, as individuals, cannot even start conceiving of anything (true) unless we start from a position in which (some form or stage of) truth is already incorporated in real—objective and collective—institutions of learning, in linguistic transactions, in scientific practices that allow us first to even conceive of our cognitive and scientific pursuits and programs, and then to put them into reality (or realize them).

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Hegel introduces civil society by way of its two “principles” (R§182). The first principle is the “concrete person” that is a “particular end” to itself, a “totality of needs and a mixture of natural necessity and arbitrariness.” The second principle is the “particular person” who as such “stands essentially in relation to other similar particulars, and their relation is such that each asserts itself and gains satisfaction through the other,” and more precisely “through the exclusive mediation of the form of universality.” It is in the sphere outlined by these principles that Hegel discerns a necessary moment in the realization of freedom proper to the modern world. The particular attains the form of universality not by negating its particularity and self-interest (in the name of the self-identical yet fundamentally empty prescription of Kant’s categorical imperative for example) or by being entirely absorbed in the universal (as Hegel deems Plato’s political project to be doing: R§185 Remark) but by asserting and satisfying the claims of particularity in an essential engagement and interaction with other particulars. Importantly, these are theoretical as well as practical claims; they are cognitive as well as practical interests and beliefs. At stake in this sphere is the task of “forming (bilden) subjectivity in its particularity,” educating and raising the individual to the “formal universality of knowing and willing” (R§187). Bildung is both “theoretical culture” and “practical culture.” (R§197). The concrete formation-Bildung of particularity is, at this point, the exact opposite of (Kantian) morality’s abstraction in the name of an empty universal but is also far removed both from the idealistic and subjectivist pursuits of “theoretical intelligence” at the level of subjective spirit and from the (modern, Cartesian) individualistic epistemic position represented by the phenomenological consciousness. While the dynamic of civil society gives “free rein” to contingency, natural needs, personal beliefs, and egoistic pursuits, it also establishes the fundamental mediation that connects the concrete, particular person to the higher universal by forming, as it were, a culture of the universal or a universal culture. This is the first “liberation” (Befreiung) of the individual (R§187 Remark, TW 7, 344f.), the process of her Bildung to the ethical universal. The point is for the individual to recognize what her personal beliefs owe to the universal culture of which she is part, and accordingly not to renounce her particularity but to connect it to the (similar) particularity of others.

On the basis of Bildung a different epistemology than the individualistic epistemology of subjective spirit and a different morality than the empty formalism of Kant’s ethics of duty is proposed — an epistemology that is now “social,” a morality that is based on the universalization of the particular standpoint reached through culture and education. Both knowledge claims and moral goals are now based on the capacity of regarding individual beliefs, interests, and desires — i.e., the totality of my “concrete person” — as others regard them, that is, ultimately, as set in necessary connection with others. It is at this level that Bildung is brought to bear on the movement of recognition discussed by Hegel, for the first time, in the Self-Consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology.

Nuzzo 13, Angelica. (Angelica Nuzzo, Graduate Center and Brooklyn College, CUNY, anuzzo@gc.cuny.edu) 2013. “The Social Dimension of Dialectical Truth: Hegel’s Idea of Objective Spirit.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8): 10-25. NP 4/2/16.

Indeed, in civil society particularity with all its interests and ends cannot be negated. Particularity sets itself higher than the universal and uses the universal as “means” to further its particular ends. And yet, this movement shows that the individual can reach and satisfy her ends only at the condition of acting “in connection” with all other particular individuals — each of whom does exactly what she herself does. Bildung, in its first emergence, is the movement whereby the individual by recognizing that other particulars do exactly what she herself does, becomes a “member (Glied) of the chain of this connection,” is “formed” or raised to “formal freedom,” i.e., to “the formal universality of knowing and willing” (R§187). Formation-Bildung, in this general sense, indicates the very nature of the dialectical movement proper to civil society, i.e., the integration of concrete particularity and universality taking place precisely by exploiting the potentiality of individual, self-interested action. The formal universal first achieved by Bildung negates particularity by affirming it, i.e., by negating its distinctive negativity or by contextualizing it in a broader framework.

## Neuhouser

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Finally, the modern state as Hegel understands it embodies the moment of mediated unity. As such, it incorporates two prominent structural elements of the previous spheres: the substantial unity of the family and the element of difference, or atomism, characteristic of civil society. Hegel, following Rousseau, conceives of the state, or political sphere, as the public realm where legislation is framed and executed in accord with a shared conception of the good of society as a whole-as the arena, in other words, where the general will is given both a determinate content and a real existence. The state incorporates the atomism of civil society because citizens enter the political sphere with diverse, independently established identities as particular individuals whose family ties and positions within civil society provide them with divergent particular interests. Because the moment of difference is not to be suppressed by the state but rather incorporated into it, the principal concern of Hegelian politics is to find a way of integrating the particular wills of individual citizens with the general will not only through the framing of laws that further the good of the whole but also by subjectively transforming citizens so as to enable them to embrace the general will as their own. The latter requirement poses a by now familiar problem: What enables citizens to assent to social policies that sometimes subordinate their private interests to the good of the whole? Hegel's response here is to appeal to the same idea that underlies his account of the substantial unity of the family: individuals are capable of embracing the ends of the state as their own only if they are able to experience their roles as citizens as a source of their own selfhood (§261A). Thus, in order for individuals to will the general will (in order for them to be citizens in the full sense of the term) the state must be a substantial unity in which individuals' relations to their fellow citizens-their being joined together as a single nation, or people (Volk)-provides them with a shared, "universal" project, the carrying out of which is for them both an end in itself and a substantial source of the value they ascribe to their own lives.

This, however, raises a further question: What is the source of the more than merely instrumental ties that citizens are said to have to one another? What kind of attachment in the political sphere substitutes for the bond of love that unites individuals in the family? It is tempting to assume that Hegel's appeal to the idea of national identity implies that the ties among citizens are akin to bonds of brotherhood, having their roots in a prereflective attachment citizens feel to one another by virtue of their all belonging, through birth, to a single people. The ability of citizens to embrace the general will, then, would be parasitic on a lovelike concern they feel for the welfare of their compatriots prior to (independently 00 the dealings they have with one another within the specifically political institutions of their society. Yet Hegel repeatedly emphasizes that there is a fundamental qualitative difference-one that makes the state an instance of mediated rather than immediate unity between the attachments of the family and those within the state. The unity that characterizes the latter, Hegel insists, is not grounded in immediate feeling or any other "bond of nature" (VPRl, 250) but is instead a "union through laws" and therefore a "unity that is known, conscious, expressly pronounced, and thought" (§157N).20 The state, then, embodies the Conceptual moment of mediated unity because the tie that binds citizens together-the bond that endows them with a single will comes into being only through a collective act of legislating reason: in giving itself laws, the state establishes for itself principles that are universally binding, explicitly known, and consciously endorsed through a process of public reflection on the common good. 21 The state, Hegel says, differs from the family in that it "knows what it wills and knows it in its universality, as something thought; it therefore functions and acts in accord with conscious ends, recognized principles and according to laws that ... are present to consciousness" (§270).

#### Publicity and public discussion is key to the actualization of an ethical community, mutual recognition, and the ability for individuals to identify their individual reasons with the will of the state

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Hegel's claim that the substantial attachments among citizens first get fully constituted through the enacting of laws implies that the specific workings of the legislative process playa crucial role in his account of how the modern state solves its central problem of bringing citizens to embrace the general will as their own. For Hegel the key to achieving this integration of wills lies in a certain (ideal) feature of the act of legislation itself, namely, its "publicity" (§§314-315), or, as I shall refer it to here, the public transparency of the process through which the general will acquires a determinate content. The legislative process in the rational state is transparent not only in the sense that it is open to public view but also in the more substantive sense that the rational basis of the laws that issue from it is clearly articulated and accessible to all citizens. There are two main ideas behind Hegel's claim that the public transparency of the legislative process helps to enable citizens to will the general will. The first idea is that citizens come to apprehend their laws as rational-as reflecting the interests of the whole-when they see how those laws emerge from public deliberation that is aimed at discerning the collective good and that gives due consideration to the input of all major interest groups of society.22 For Hegel, in contrast to Rousseau, the demand that resulting laws "come from all" requires not that each individual participate in the legislative process-a requirement Hegel thought impracticable in large, modern societies-but only that all basic interest groups be fairly represented in the legislative process (§309Z). Second, in addition to seeing their laws as universally rational (rational from the perspective of the whole), citizens must also be able to regard the general will as in some way continuous with their own particular wills. The public transparency of the legislative process works to this end by allowing citizens to become spectators of the real process which Hegel calls a "spectacle," or Schauspiel (§315Z)-through which their particular interests are taken into account-recognized as having a weight-in arriving at the necessary social compromise among competing particular interests. This distinctively political way in which individuals find particular satisfaction in the universal is predicated on their identification with (at least one 0f the principal actors that occupy the legislative stage, namely, "the associations, communities, and corporations" (§308) to which, as members of civil society, they belong prior to their political involvement. Insofar as individuals see their corporate deputies as representations of themselves-and hence as representing their own particular interests-they are able to experience the recognition accorded to corporate interests in the legislative process as a kind of recognition of themselves as particular beings. Given his metaphysical doctrine of the Concept, together with the claim that the family, civil society, and the state embody its three characteristic moments, it is possible to appreciate the general idea behind Hegel's assertion that the modern social world is a spiritual, thoroughly rational whole. But this assertion, properly understood, is more than simply a claim about the abstract structure required of the social world in order for it, as a whole, to count as a spiritual entity. It is also a claim about the different kinds of social membership individuals need to experience in order to exist as whole, fully developed subjects. This point becomes clearer when we realize that the idea of a Conceptually organized social world not only specifies the necessary internal structure of the three basic institutions and the relations that must obtain among their members but also gives an account of the different kinds of identities required of individuals if they are to participate freely in such institutions. Focusing on the latter point suggests that Hegel's demonstration of the Conceptual structure of Sittlichkeit includes the claim that the modern social world is rational (in part) because it allows its members to develop and express different, complementary types of identities, each of which is indispensable to realizing the complete range of relations to others (and to selO that are available to human subjects and worthy of achieving. On this view, then, to lack membership in any of the three basic institutions would be to miss out on an important part of what it is to be a fully realized (individual) self.

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It should be obvious that this view of citizenship is incompatible with one of the fundamental tenets of social contract theory. For in setting out to derive the principles of political association from the idea of individuals who are free and equal in the state of nature, social contract theory commits itself to allotting the same basic rights of citizenship to all members of the state. No version of methodological atomism that begins with the assumption that individuals are qualitatively indistinguishable (in all politically relevant respects) can consistently uphold a view, like Hegel's, that assigns different rights of political participation to different classes of individuals. The fact that Hegel's political theory differentiates among individuals in this way may also appear to conflict with the claim I argued for earlier, namely, that the theory of Sittlichkeit implicitly operates with a conception of the fundamental interests individuals have as such and that it recognizes a set of social institutions as rational only if the fundamental interests of each, most notably the interest in freedom, can be realized within them. Further reflection, however, shows this impression to be mistaken: in Hegel's theory of Sittlichkeit the demand that the rational social order accommodate the fundamental interests of all individuals translates into the requirement that the organically structured social whole be constituted such that all individual members are able to maintain a free will while contributing in their own particular ways to reproducing their society in accord with the kind of being it essentially is. In the narrower context of Hegel's political theory this implies, among other things, that it must be possible for each member of the state to acquire a general will-to know and endorse as one's own the laws that govern society as a whole-in order to avoid being subject to a foreign will in one's role as citizen. In effect this requirement imposes two main conditions on rational political institutions. It means that the state must be structured so as to ensure not only that the particular interests of each class are taken into account (represented) in the legislative process but also that each (male) individual has available to him a means of gaining access to a point of view from which he can regard as good, and hence endorse, the laws that express the general will of his society.

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I shall now turn to the second of the two theses that differentiate Hegel's view of the state from social contract theory, the claim that the state embodies an unconditioned good that cannot be broken down into the good it achieves for its individual members. Although assertions to this effect can be found throughout Hegel's texts, by far the fullest statement of the view appears at the beginning of the Philosophy of Right's discussion of the state in section three of "Ethical Life." Fragments of this passage have been cited earlier, but it will be helpful to have a more complete version of the passage before us now as we attempt to make sense of Hegel's claim: The state is ... that which is rational in and for itself [das an und fur sich Vernunftige]. This substantial unity is an absolute, unmoved end in itself in which freedom achieves its highest right, just as this final end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals, whose highest duty is to be members of the state ... The state in and for itself is the ethical whole [das sittliche Ganze]-the actualization of freedom-and it is the absolute end of reason that freedom be actual [wirklich]. The state is spirit [Geist] that stands in the world and consciously actualizes itself therein ... The existence of the state is God's march in the world; its foundation is the power of reason actualizing itself as [free] will (§258+Z).35 Appended to this passage, and highly relevant to the critique of social contract theory, is a statement directed against Rousseau in which Hegel asserts that understanding the state on the model of a contract has the consequence of denying the state's status as divine-as something that "exists in and for itself"-and therefore "destroys its absolute authority and majesty" (§258A). In addition to the claim of primary concern to us here-that the state possesses unconditioned value (is an "absolute end in itself")-this passage makes four closely related assertions about the state: 1. The state is rational; (it is an "absolute end of reason"). 2. The state is free; (it is the highest, most completely realized embodiment of practical freedom). 3. The state is divine; (it is a form of spirit, or Geist, that exists "in and for itself"). 4. The state possesses absolute authority and majesty in relation to human individuals; (their "highest duty" is to belong to the state). Statements 1 through 3 are to be understood as enumerating three properties of the state-rationality, freedom, and divinity-that are the source of the unconditioned value Hegel thinks it has. Statement 4, in contrast, articulates what Hegel takes to be one of the consequences of the state's having such value, namely, that it possesses both majesty and absolute authority over its members. In order to understand Hegel's view that the state realizes a good above and beyond the good it has for individuals, we must examine each of these points in some detail. Before doing so, however, it is important to note that in the passage cited here Hegel explicitly equates the state with "the ethical whole" (das sittliche Ganze). This is significant, for it means that the characteristics I have just identified apply not to the specifically political institutions of Sittlichkeit taken on their own but to the social order as a whole, which comprises not only the state narrowly construed but also civil society and the family. One important implication of this point is that the social entity Hegel characterizes as having an unconditioned value (the social order as a whole) covers a much larger domain than the set of institutions that social contract theory aims to give an account of (the state in the narrower, strictly political sense). Apart from making the import of Hegel's critique of social contract theory even more difficult to assess, this fact is significant because it points to a further way in which Hegel's own view of the state in the narrow sense diverges from that put forth by standard versions of liberalism: for Hegel the political sphere is not a detachable, relatively self-standing realm but one that is integrally related to the other (nonpolitical) institutions that make up the social order as a whole. This is to say that it is impossible to formulate the principles of rational political association independently of an account of which non-political social institutions are rationally necessary (necessary in order for practical freedom to be realized) and an understanding of how they contribute to that end. For, on Hegel's view, the proper ends of political institutions are themselves partially defined in relation to the needs of the other required institutions; thus, one of the primary ends of rational legislation is to ensure the flourishing of the family and civil society, without which the will's freedom could not be realized. With this point in mind I shall begin to examine the three properties of the social order by virtue of which it is claimed to have an unconditioned value. To say that the social order is rational-that it is an "absolute end of reason"-is, in this context, simply to say that it serves the end of realizing freedom. ("It is the absolute end of reason that freedom be actual.") It might seem that an explanation of what makes the social order rational ought also to make reference to the fact that it is organized in accord with the Concept, or with what Hegel takes to be the structure of reason itself. But in fact this quality of the social order is not something distinct from its freedom-promoting character properly understood. For, as we saw in chapter 1, the structure Hegel ascribes to the Concept is derived from a consideration of how an entity must be constituted in order to exist as self-determined (here in the sense that its particular properties are determined by itself, by what it needs in order to achieve its essential nature). The Concept is equated with reasonwith "that which is rational in and for itself"-only because to embody its structure is to achieve a certain form of self-determination. Thus, the task of explicating the first property attributed to the social order leads directly to a consideration of the second: What makes the social order an embodiment of freedom? In response to this question the passage cited here has little to add to the view I have set out at great length in the preceding chapters: the social order endorsed by the theory of Sittlichkeit realizes freedom because (1) as a whole, it is self-determining in the sense of being self-sustaining and exhibiting the rational structure of the Concept; (2) it secures the necessary conditions of personhood and moral subjectivity; and (3) its members find their particular identities by participating in it, and, in embracing the general will as their own, they remain subject only to their own wills.

 Because Hegel takes over the Rousseauean principle that human individuals cannot realize their essential nature as free beings (cannot satisfy a fundamental interest they have as individuals) unless they are able to regard their membership in a political community as (partially) constitutive of their own identity, he is wrong to think that his ascription of divinity or unconditioned value to the social whole is necessary in order to explain either the duty citizens have to put their lives at risk when their state's independence is endangered or their motivation for doing so. Since Hegel has no quarrel with the social contract tradition over whether citizens of the rational state have such a duty, nor a need to reach beyond the resources of methodological atomism in order to make sense of it, is there, then, no real difference between Hegel and methodological atomists on the nature of the state's authority? Such a difference exists, I believe, but it turns out to be both less significant and of a different nature than we are likely at first to expect. Hegel's divergence from traditional liberalism on this issue is located not in the actual duties each assigns to citizens but rather in the attitude, or frame of mind, the respective theories envisage members of a rational political order as having when making the sacrifices demanded by the state. This suggestion brings us back to Hegel's point concerning the majesty of the self-sufficient social order and his claim that it deserves to be revered by its members as a being greater than themselves, as an entity that both achieves the ideal of self-determination more perfectly than they are capable of and surpasses, as greatly as possible, the limits of human finitude. The aspect of Hegel's view that distinguishes it from Rousseau's and from other versions of methodological atomism is the idea that members of Sittlichkeit regard the legitimate demands their state makes on them as authoritative not only because they subjectively identify with the social whole-not only because they regard it as an extension of themselves and as "of their own essential nature" (§ 147)-but also because they revere its quality of self-sufficiency (Selbstandigkeit) for itself (§ 146) and recognize it as a higher good, and hence a worthier goal, than the satisfaction of their own merely particular ends. 48 In other words, maintaining the state's independence and sovereignty is an important project for them not only because it is necessary for achieving their own particular ends and for realizing their essential nature as free but also because the idea of a self-sufficient, perfectly achieved will carries weight with them and has the power to motivate them to do what they can in order to give that divine ideal an earthly existence.

 The fact that Hegel's theory of Sittlichkeit invokes a version of Spinoza's conception of divine substance in order to explain the state's authority is no doubt one important reason for the widespread perception among contemporary philosophers that his theory does not merit serious attention as a vision of the rational social order. One obvious objection to this aspect of Hegel's theory is that it implausibly supposes that human individuals could, or even ought to, care whether or not the social order exhibits a property like self-sufficiency in Spinoza's sense. While showing the social order to be conceptually and ontologically self-sufficient may suffice to persuade a confirmed Spinozist that it is worthy of our reverence, those qualities seem far too abstract to be of much concern to ordinary members of society, or even to philosophers who do not share the presuppositions of Spinoza's metaphysics. But this objection can be answered if we bring to mind all that is included in the concept of self-sufficiency as it is actually applied in the theory of Sittlichkeit. Doing so reveals that, for Hegel, to revere the social order for its divine self-sufficiency is nothing more than to revere it as a set of institutions that is systematically rational in the sense that it both coordinates and realizes the various components of the good, as he conceives it. According to this view, the self-sufficient social order is an enduring, selfcontained, self-reproducing system of institutions rationally organized so as to realize the practical freedom of individuals (in all its various senses), to harmonize that freedom with their basic well-being, and to accomplish these aims with the full awareness of its members.

## Cards that seem relevant for framework

#### Thought is dialectical – our ability to understand and form a picture of the world is based on reconciliation of conflicting thoughts into a higher unity

Wood 90, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

Hegel sees traditional Aristotelian logic as an empty, formal discipline; he intends speculative logic to transform it into a science with profound meta­ physical content {EL § 24). Speculative logic will thereby provide a meta­ physical key to the a priori comprehension of all reality, enabling philosophy to encompass and systematize the results of empirical science and give to them an a priori character {EL § 12). In so doing, it will overcome the alien, accidental, and objective form taken by these facts in the modern empirical sciences {EL § 7), exhibiting the inner essence of the objective world as at one with our own freedom as thinkers {EL § 23).1 Hegel thus regards his own philosophical achievement as fundamentally a contribution to metaphysics or "first philosophy."

The lifeblood of Hegel's system of speculative logic is the famous Hegelian dialectic. Hegel's dialectic may be viewed as a highly novel theory of philosophical paradoxes: where and why philosophical thought runs into them, what they mean, how to deal with them. Kant argues that when human rea­ son attempts to extend its cognition beyond the bounds of possible experi­ ence, it not only is tempted to make unwarranted claims to knowledge [and], but also is in danger of falling into contradictions (antinomies); the only way to avoid them is by carefully observing the proper limits of its cognitive powers. The part of this account Hegel retains is the idea that our thinking has an inherent tendency to go beyond every limit, and thus to undermine or over­ throw itself. He associates this idea with the human self's tendency to change, develop, and progress through a process involving a stage of self-conflict fol­ lowed by its resolution.3 Hegel holds that a thought determination is what it is because it is deter­ mined (or limited) in a definite way. But each such thought has an inherent tendency to push beyond its limit and turn into its opposite, resulting in a contradiction. This "dialectic" of thought determinations, as Hegel calls it, is a cause of consternation to the "understanding" - that analytical disposition of thought which tries to grasp thought determinations in their determinacy, keeping them clearly and distinctly separated from one another. For the un­ derstanding, dialectic is a source of scandal and paradox, something to avoid at all costs. But the understanding's efforts are to no avail, because thought itself is dynamic, self-transcending, fundamentally dialectical. Kant realized that thoughts obey the understanding's rules only so long as they remain within their proper bounds. Hegel hastens to add that they have an inherent tendency not to remain confined, a tendency that is as much a part of their nature as the neat analytical definitions within which the understanding wants to confine them. Dialectical paradoxes cannot be avoided, done away with, or treated as mere illusions, as the understanding would wish. They are real, unavoidable, virtually omnipresent. Hegel argues that the proper way to resolve dialectical paradoxes is not to suppress them, but to systematize them. If you become master of them, they can do positive philosophical work for you. Just as thought inevitably gives rise to contradictions, so it also inevitably reconciles them in a higher unity, as a human self that grows through self-conflict proves its growth by emerg­ ing from the conflict into a higher self-harmony. For example, Kant's Second Antinomy opposes the infinite divisibility of the real in space to the indivisi­ bility of its smallest parts (A434/B462). Hegel thinks the antinomy can be resolved by recognizing that the concept of quantity contains within itself both of the opposed determinations, discreteness and continuity (WL 5: 216- 227/190-199; cf. EL § 100). Kant resolves the antinomy by saying that as a mere appearance, matter is neither infinitely divisible nor composed of sim­ ples (A502-507/B530-53 6); Hegel resolves it by saying that matter is both at once. It can be both because our thought may legitimately employ both conceptions involving discreteness and conceptions involving continuity in its theorizing about matter. In effect, Hegel resolves philosophical paradoxes such as the Second An­ tinomy by relying on an idealist or constructivist picture of the relation of theory to reality. If reality is constituted by our thought about it, and that thought systematically involves contrasting (even contradictory) aspects or moments, then reality itself must embody the same contradictions. Contradictory thinking about reality is tolerable if we are capable (via the under­ standing) of distinguishing clearly between the contradictory aspects of our thought, and also (via speculative reason) of reconciling the contradictions in a higher theoretical conception. We might compare Hegel's treatment of philosophical paradoxes with the later Wittgenstein's. Wittgenstein held that contradictions or paradoxes do not "make our language less usable" because, once we "know our way about" and become clear about exactly where and why they arise, we can "seal them off"; we need not view a contradiction as "the local symptom of a sickness of the whole body."4 For Wittgenstein contradictions can be tolerated be­ cause they are marginal and we can keep them sequestered from the rest of our thinking; for Hegel, they arise systematically in the course of philosophi­ cal thought, but they do no harm so long as a system of speculative logic can keep them in their proper place, refusing them admittance to those contexts in which they would do harm. Thus Hegel claims that the old-fashioned logic of the understanding is just a limiting case of speculative logic, which we obtain simply by omitting the dialectical element in thought (EL § 82). The guarantee that contradictions need not ultimately disrupt thinking is provided by the higher unity, in which the opposites are reconciled and the proper place of each is simultaneously determined. For example, the opposition between continuous quantity and discrete quantity leads to a contradiction when we don't realize that the concept of quantity contains both (WL5: 229/200). Their difference is overcome in the concept of a determinate quantity or a quantum. This concept sets limits to simple continuity, and hence supersedes (aufliebt) the opposition between continuous and discrete quantity (WL 5: 230/201).Hegel has a broader and a narrower conception of dialectic. Sometimes he includes the "positive reason" that "grasps opposites in their unity" within "dialectic" (WL5: 52/56), but sometimes he calls this stage "speculation" or "positive reason," in contrast to "dialectic" or "negative reason" (EL § 82). Negative reason is the activity of reason that drives thought determinations beyond themselves and engenders the contradictions that so plague the un­ derstanding; speculation or positive reason reconciles contradictions in a higher unity, enabling them to be included in a rational system. In the sys­ tem of speculative logic, each thought determination leads to another that opposes it, and that opposition leads in turn to a new determination in which the opposition is overcome. (The regrettable tradition of expounding this theme in the Hegelian dialec­ tic through the grotesque jargon of "thesis," "antithesis," and "synthesis" began in 1837 with Heinrich Moritz Chalybaus, a bowdlerizer of German idealist philosophy, whose ridiculous expository devices should have been forgotten along with his name.5 This triad of terms is used by both Fichte and Schelling, though never to express the Hegelian ideas we have just been examining; to my knowledge, it is never used by Hegel, not even once, for this purpose or for any other. The use of Chalybaus's terminology to ex­ pound the Hegelian dialectic is nearly always an unwitting confession that the expositor has little or no firsthand knowledge of Hegel.) Hegel's speculative logic attempts to run through all basic determinations of thought in a systematic way, assigning each its proper place within the development. At the pinnacle of the system is the "Idea" - thought's ten­ dency to actualize itself by going outside itself. Hegel associates the Idea with the ontological proof for God's existence, since the Idea exhibits the capacity of the highest thought directly to demonstrate its own existence (EL § 64). But the Idea also represents, in religious terms, God's creation of the world. The Idea is thought's proceeding beyond itself to give itself immediate reality in finite, sensuous nature (EL § 244). Hegel's system, comprising the philos­ ophy of nature and philosophy of spirit, attempts to develop the structure of the world of nature and the world of the human mind, using the categories and movement of the system of speculative logic as its key. Nature is thought going outside itself; mind or spirit is its return to itself. As a natural being, the human being, through its awareness of itself as thought, transcends the merely natural to the level of the spiritual. "Spirit" embraces not only "sub­ jective spirit" (or individual psychology), but also "objective spirit" (society or culture, culminating in the political state), and finally "absolute spirit," the realms of art, religion, and philosophy - those forms of higher human culture in which spirit becomes aware of itself as absolute, or the ultimate reality.

#### The actual is rational but deviates from reality

Wood 90, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

This is the point of Hegers saying, "The rational is actual, and the actual is rational." In his own exegesis of the saying, Hegel is at pains to distinguish what is "actual" from what merely "exists/' The "actual," he says, includes only those existents that fully express and correspond to their essence (EL §§6, 142). Such an existent Hegel calls an "appearance" or "phenomenon" (Erscheinung) (EL § 131). The transitory existents that we encounter in ev­ eryday life (including societies and states) often fail to be "actual," fail to be "appearances" of their "essence." In them the outer expression is inadequate to the inner essence; and an existent that is imperfect in this way Hegel calls "illusion" or "show" (Schein) (WL6: 17/394; EL § 131A). (Hegel's use of the term Schein is likely to mislead, since "illusions" in this sense— e.g., evil or sick human beings, badly organized or unjust states - certainly -exist every bit as much as "actualities" do.) What is actual is rational. But one must know, distinguish, what is in fact actual. In common life all is actual, but [in philosophy] there is a distinction between the world of appearance and actuality. The actual has also an external existence, which displays arbitrariness and contingency. . . . Men will always be wicked and depraved, but this is not the Idea. On the surface passions wrestle everywhere, but that is not the actuality of substance. The temporal and transitory certainly exists, and may cause us enough distress; but in spite of that it, along with the particularity of the subject and its wishes and inclinations, is no true actuality. (VGP 2: 110-111/95-96) Hegel distinguishes between the rational "essence," whose adequate ap­ pearance is the "actual," and the "transitory, contingent, superficial exte­ rior," which this essence wears in the sphere of finitude. In effect, this is Hegel's way of drawing the distinction between God and creation; God is the "rational essence" of things, whereas creation is their "superficial exte­ rior" (WL 5; 44/50). Because "philosophy is the true theodicy" (VGPj: 455/ 546; VPG 28/15), the only true subject matter of philosophy is God, and philosophy proper occupies itself with the finite world only to the extent that the divine presence is immanent in it - that is, only to the extent that the finite is "actual." The defects of finitude exist, but they are superficial con­ tingencies, justified by the fact that contingency itself is a necessary factor in God's self-manifestation (WL6: 180/542-553; EL § 145A).14 Hegel's philosophy of the state justifies not the status quo, but God; it hallows not the political order but the divine revealing itself in the spiritual realm of the state, just as it does in the lower realm of nature (PR Preface 24). Together with a long tradition of Hegel's detractors, the Prussian censors seem to have been too dull to draw the plain inference that as far as Hegel's protestations in its Preface are con­ cerned, the Philosophy of Right might just as easily be the same sort of apology for Prussian absolutism as Plato's Republic was for Athenian democracy. The rational state described in the Philosophy of Right does closely resem­ ble Prussia; not as it ever was, but Prussia as it was to have become under the reform ministry led by Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg, with the advice of Interior Minister Wilhelm von Humboldt (who had established the professorship Hegel occupied) and Minister of Education Karl von Al- tenstein (who had arranged for Hegel's appointment to it). In May of 1815, King Friedrich Wilhelm III had issued a proclamation promising that Prus­ sia would be given a written constitution providing for the regular convening of an estates assembly (or parliament). Early in 1819, Hardenberg and Hum­ boldt both drafted plans for such a constitution. The rational state described in the Philosophy of Right bears a striking resemblance to these plans. They would have converted Prussia from an absolute monarchy into a constitu­ tional monarchy (PR § 273, R) and would have established a bicameral estates assembly, with an upper house drawn from the hereditary nobility, and a lower house comprised of representatives drawn from municipal and profes­ sional corporations (PR §§ 300-316).16

#### Hegel’s theory best accounts for the complex conception of human nature

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If there is any hope for ethics as a branch of rational inquiry, it lies in show­ ing how ethical conceptions and a theory of the human good can be grounded in human self-understanding.1 Ethics must be grounded in a knowledge of human beings that enables us to say that some modes of life are suited to our nature, whereas others are not. In that sense, ethical theories generally may be regarded as theories of human self-actualization. Plato grounds his ethics in psychology, and Aristotle identifies the human good with a life actualizing the human essence in accordance with its proper excellences. Even the ethical theories of modern times rest on some identifiable conception of human be­ ings, Kantian theories conceiving human nature as finite rational will, and utilitarian theories identifying human beings with bundles of desires, prefer­ ences, or affective states. The common pitfall of ethical theories in this respect is that their conceptions of human nature are too thin, one-sided, and abstract, or else too much dictated by the needs of some convenient theoretical program. Hegel's ethical theory is based on a complex conception of human nature, which system­ atizes a number of different human self-images. Hegel grounds this concep­ tion in his theory of history, which attempts to show how the different ele­ ments arose through a process of cultural development. Hegel's ethical theory is therefore culturally and historically specific in ways that most ethi­ cal theories are not. At the same time, it tries to avoid cultural relativism by defending its conception of human nature as the outcome of a process in which human beings have acquired a measure of genuine human self-knowl- edge. Hegel's account of the historical process through which this self-knowledge has been acquired is grounded in a theory of human selfhood and self-aware­ ness. This theory owes much to the thought of his two principal predeces­ sors, Kant and Fichte. Kant treated theoretical self-awareness not as the awareness of a soul-thing underlying our psychic states (in the Cartesian tra­ dition), or even the passive perception of relations of continuity and causal connectedness between these states (in the Lockean and Humean tradition) but rather as the awareness of the activity of synthesizing or combining them (B 131-133). Self-awareness is therefore essentially practical; it is not so much an awareness of our various urges and desires as it is the awareness of a system of abiding concerns and projects with which we actively identify. J7 ￼HEGELIAN ETHICAL THEORY General self-concerns modify or inhibit our desires, give rise to new desires, and serve as a basis for rational judgments about what is for our own good or about what we have best reason to do on the whole. Thus Kant identifies the will (the practical self) with practical reason (G 412/29). Concernful awareness of oneself is indispensable for a sense of one's identity, in two related senses: that which ties together all one's mental states as the states of a single person, and that which determines the content of one's self-interest and self-worth. Like Derek Parfit, Kant and his idealist followers regard the identity of a person as a rational construct. Contrary to Parfit, however, they think .this enhances rather than diminishes the impor­ tance of individual selfhood. For it makes us our own work and our own task; our fundamental vocation is to make ourselves into what we are.2 Fichte's way of expressing this idea is to say that the self "posits itself" (W 98/99), and that the self is "not a being but a doing" (W 495/66). The self is the object of an awareness, but this awareness is not a detached contempla­ tion. Fichte interprets self-awareness as an activity of reflection on another activity already given; this is practical activity or will (W 264/232-233, GNR 20/36). Self-awareness reflects on will, intuits its own identity with that will, and at the same time forms a concept of it (W 463-464/38-39). Thus self- awareness is always self-concern, involving issues of self-interest and self- worth. It is self-awareness, in fact, that turns given desires into concerns for self-interest and self-worth. T o be a self is always simultaneously to be aware of something and to do something. It is to "posit" what one is by deciding or positing what one is to be. A self-conception involves simultaneously what one is and what one is striving to become. These Fichtean ideas are taken up into Hegel's theory of self-awareness, through the thesis that the will's "individuality" results from its own activity of self-determination, proceeding from "universality" through "particularity" (PR §§ 5-7). One can speak of a self at all only in relation to an actively willed system of practical concerns, but these concerns have a dimension that goes beyond my "particularity" - the traits, desires, and other qualities that distinguish me from other people. It is not merely a result of the philoso­ pher's peculiar craving for generality that ethical theories focus on the human good rather than on the good of this or that individual. Fichte's way of expressing this is by developing a theory not of the self- awareness of this or that individual but a theory of das Ich, of the I or the self The Fichtean "I" is not some metaphysical entity distinct from your self and mine, but a transcendental structure or type necessarily exemplified by any particular self. Hegel makes the same point by insisting that one "mo­ ment" of the will, that which enables me to apply the word "I" to myself at all, is the moment of "universality," in which I identify myself with what is common to all beings capable of calling themselves "I" (PR § 5; EG § 381A). But self-concern for Hegel is always socially and culturally situated. An indi­ vidual self is an expression of its culture's historically developed understand­ ing of human nature and its practical possibilities. Self-concern is universal concern, but it is a socially and historically situated concern, expressing a 18 ￼SELF-ACTUALIZATION collective practical project of fashioning a human world (VG 54-56/47-48). The practical project of being a self does not leave either the self or its self-knowledge unaltered. In carrying out the practical project through which they define themselves and their humanity, people acquire a deeper knowl­ edge of themselves and so develop the human nature which it is their project to actualize. In this way, people alter not only their conception of themselves but also the goals involved in this conception. Because this alteration comes about through an alteration of their striving itself, we may even say that people shape or create their own goals and aspirations. Because of this con­ stant interplay of self-understanding, self-actualization, and self-alteration, Hegel refers to the process of creative self-development as a "dialectical" pro­ cess, to which he gives the name "experience" (PhG K 86). The dialectical project of self-understanding and self-actualization is one in which individual human beings participate through the forms shaped by a cultural tradition. Any individual's project of self-actualization must be un­ derstood in its social and historical meaning. Hegel thinks that the strivings of individuals can themselves be understood as cumulative and collective, as aspects of a collective striving of humanity itself for an understanding of its essence and for the proper objective shape in which that essence may be actualized.

#### Freedom is actualized through participation within an ethical community

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We often hear that Hegel's ethical thought is oriented more toward society than toward the individual. There is a foundation in reality for saying this. Hegel's Philosophy of Right belongs to "objective" rather than "subjective" spirit: Hegel's ethical system is a theory of rational social life rather than a theory of individual conduct. But probably its chief foundation is Hegel's belief that rational individuals actualize their freedom most fully when they participate in a state (PR § 258). Like utilitarianism, Hegel's ethical theory tells individuals to devote themselves to the good of society, not solely to their own private good. But utilitarianism treats the social good as a simple sum of individual goods; Hegel thinks of it in terms of a certain institutional structure that is a "universal end," valuable in itself and not merely as a means to the good of individuals. That is doubtless one reason why Hegel's ethical theory culminates in the description of a rational social order, and not in an account of the good life for an individual or a doctrine of duties for the regulation of our private lives. Nevertheless, the developmental structure of the theory presented in the Philosophy of Right is dictated not by collective ends but by a certain concep­ tion of the modern human individual - or, more accurately, a system or de­ veloping series of such conceptions. It is this system of self-images, together with the necessary forms of activity corresponding to it, that founds the com­ plex system of social institutions constituting the Hegelian rational state. The rational state is an end in itself only because the highest stage of individual self-actualization consists in participating in the state and recognizing it as such an end. This means that Hegel's ethical theory is after all founded on a conception of individual human beings and their self-actualization. Even the state's rationality is grounded on the fact that the individual will is actual­ ized through participating in it and contributing to it as a universal end. In that sense, Hegel's ethical thought is oriented to the individual, not the collective. We can see this in Hegel's procedure in the Philosophy of Right. This book is a fuller version of the science of "objective spirit," part of the third volume of Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (EG §§ 483-552). As in the Encyclopedia, the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right presents a phil­ osophical propaedeutic to objective spirit (PR § 2) drawn from Hegel's treat­ ment of the will or "practical spirit" (EG §§ 469-482), which is the final stage in the development of "subjective spirit," of individual psychology (EG §§ 387, 440). Hegel's discussion of "the free will" in the Introduction deals with the human individual as a rational agent whose freedom is to be actual­ ized.

#### Actualization of individuals can only occur by placing them within society – the person alone is an incomplete picture of the subject

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The person and the subject are abstractions, incomplete or one-sided images of the individual human self, which are overcome only when individuals are considered in relation to "ethical life" (Sittlichkeit). Hegel identifies ethical life with "the objective ethical order" (PR § 144), the "ethical substance," to which particular individuals relate as "accidents" (PR § 145). It is above all in his conception of ethical life that Hegel seems to assert the primacy of the social over the individual. But we have just seen that free subjectivity itself is the distinctive principle of modern ethical life. Ethical life is more concrete than abstract right and morality not because it emphasizes the collective over the individual, but because the ethical image of the individual is a more con­ crete one. It addresses every side of the individual self, and situates the self in a living social order.

#### Love is central to our situation within society; our participation in civil society actualizes the abstract person

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What is most basic or primitive to a self, its first need, is love, "spirit's feeling of its own unity." It finds its ethical place in the family, where one has "the self-consciousness of [one's] individuality in this unity as an essen­ tiality in and for itself, so that in it one is not a person for oneself but a member" (PR § 158). Hegel thinks that family life satisfies a fundamental human need for love or unity with others at the level of feeling. He accords such importance to the family that he believes that half the human race (the female sex) must restrict its sphere of activity to family life (PR § 166; see Chapter 14, §§ 5-6). But Hegel rejects the view of some of his Romantic contemporaries, who saw the familial principle as the basis of social life gen­ erally. On the contrary, in the modern world, where individuals are free persons, Hegel thinks that this principle must be kept carefully circum­ scribed. In modern society, for instance, the family can mean only a nuclear family; an extended family or clan (Stamm) has no status in modern society because it would compromise the free personality of the clan's adult members (PR §§ 172, 177, 180R). Hegel restricts the scope of the family as a form of economic organization in order to make room for the distinctively modern social institution: "civil society" (biirgerliche Gesellschaft). Civil society is the system of social rela­ tionships in which individuals participate when they interact economically as free, independent persons. One of Hegel's most original contributions to so­ cial theory is his conception of the modern market economy as a social insti­ tution distinct from both the family and the political state.5 Hegel acknowl­ edges his debt to the political economists, who studied the market system and its laws (PR § 189R); but his original contribution is to see civil society not merely as the natural result of the interaction of private persons - a con­ ception Hegel ridicules, calling it the "spiritual animal kingdom" (PhG MI 397-418) - but as a social institution, a distinctively modern form of human community, indispensable for the self-actualization of the modern self (see Chapter 14, §§ 1-2). Civil society is a social institution, a form of ethical life, grounded on the self-image of modern individuals, on a far richer and more complex image of the individual self than that which grounds the family. It is only within civil society that the self as person gains concreteness, through the economic relation of private property owners (PR § 182) recognized by the system of legal justice (PR §§ 209-229). It is also chiefly in the contingent interactions of private persons afforded by civil society that moral subjectivity finds free scope for its activity (PR §§ 207, 242). The human self-images of person and subject become concrete only in one's self-image as a "burgher" (Burger), a member of civil society (burgerliche Gesellschaft). [In this context, Hegel insists that Burger does not mean "citizen" (French: citoyen), a member of the political state, but is equivalent to the French bourgeois (PR § 190R; cf. VPRi7: 108).] It is in his exposition of civil society that Hegel makes most explicit the fact that it is a series of self-images of the individual human being that struc­ tures his theory of objective spirit: "In [abstract] right, the object is the person, in the moral standpoint it is the subject, and in the family it is the family member, in civil society in general it is the burgher (as bourgeois); here at the standpoint of need it is the concretum formed by conception which we call a human being (Mensch)" (PR § 190R). We understand ourselves as "hu­ man beings" when we think of ourselves as beings with "needs" - both animal needs and needs engendered by social life (PR § 190). Thus Hegel character­ izes a "human being" as "a concrete whole of many powers" whose "end" is its own "particular subjectivity" (VPR17: 109-110). We might say that our conception of ourselves as "human beings" is our conception of ourselves simply as consumers of what civil society produces. As "human beings" we are concerned with pur own welfare (cf. PR ,§§ 190R, 123), and we are induced to participate in civil society simply in order to satisfy our needs and advance our welfare (PR § 196). It is not true, however, to say that "civil society, for Hegel, is essentially the market and its legal framework."6 The bourgeois is not simply the self- interested homo oeconomicus. Once human beings are drawn into the life and labor of civil society, Hegel thinks that they receive through it both a theoret­ ical and practical education (Bildung) (PR § 197). Individuals participate in civil society as part of a particular "estate" (Stand), which gives them a defi­ nite social "standing" or "position" (Stand) in civil society (PR § 201). Their image of themselves comes to be bound up with the honor or dignity of their estate (Standesehre), through which they gain recognition both in their own eyes and in the eyes of others (PR § 207). At the same time they acquire ethical dispositions, values, and interests in common with others in their estate, and this leads to a sense of solidarity with these others, institutionalized in corpora­ tion membership (PR § 251; see Chapter 14, §§ 3-4). A burgher thus becbmes a "man with a trade or profession" (Gewerbsmann), whose sense of dignity and self-worth is bound up with the skill and ethical rectitude (Rechtschajfenheit) which he displays in his work (PR § 253R). Finally, the burgher's concerns as a professional man and a corporation member prominently include concerns about the welfare of others and about the common good of civil society as a whole. In this way, the individual's participation in civil society passes over naturally into the universal life of the state (PR § 256

#### Only through the state can individual freedom be actualized

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Hegel regards the state as the highest actualization of the individual's free­ dom (PR § 257). In relation to the state, the individual is a citizen (PR §§ 27 ￼HEGELIAN ETHICAL THEORY 261R, 265A), a Burger als citoyen (VPR17 : 94). As such, however, individu­ als are also members of the state (PR §§ 258R, 261R), parts of a whole as members of a family are. In this respect, the state is unlike civil society, where the differentiation or separation of individuals is the fundamental de­ terminant of their relationship to one another (PR §§ 181, 184, 186, 263R). Membership in the state is also fundamentally different from membership in the family: "The family is also ethical, only the end is not a conscious one . . . but [in the state] the ground, the final truth, is spirit, which is [the state's] universal end and conscious object" (PR § 263A). In the family, the social whole is not a conscious end; the individual's commitment to this insti­ tution is always experienced as an immediate feeling of love for other particu­ lar individuals. But citizens devote themselves to the state as an institution, with an explicit political constitution. Their participation in the state takes the form not of immediate feeling but of rational thought (PR § 257R). The state is an "end in itself" (PR § 257): "Unification as such is itself the [state's] true content and end, and the individual's vocation is to lead a uni­ versal life" (PR § 257R). Hegel has often been criticized for holding that participation in the state gives to individuals a universal end, over and above the particular well-being of its individual members. He certainly does hold this. But it is a serious distortion of Hegel's meaning to think that the good of individuals is supposed to be swallowed up in, or sacrificed to, some quite different end. Hegel maintains that the modern state works only because the universal life of the state provides for the subjective freedom and particular happiness of its members. The "rationality" of the modern state consists in the "thoroughgoing unity of universality and individuality" (PR § 257R). "The principle of modern states has this tremendous strength and depth, that it lets the principle of subjectivity complete itself in the independent extreme of personal particularity, and simultaneously brings it back to sub- stantial unity" (PR § 260). Hegel rejects the common view that patriotism is the readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of one's country. He insists that it is rather "the disposi­ tion that habitually knows the community as the substantial foundation and end in the usual conditions and relationships of life" (PR § 268R). Far from being a disposition to sacrifice oneself for the state, patriotism is closely allied to "trust," the sense that one's own particular self-interest is "contained and preserved in another's: whereby this other is immediately no other for me, and in this consciousness I am free" (PR § 268). Hegel does hold that all particular interests must give way to the universal interest of the state in time of war (PR §§ 323-325). But he does so precisely because he takes war to be the extreme case in which the universal interest can (for once) be clearly distinguished from the particular. The state has "stability" only insofar as the universal end is "identical" with particular ends (PR § 265A); war strengthens the state only in the sense that it poses a threat to its stability, and a healthy state grows stronger for overcoming the threat. Hegel asks explicitly whether the state exists for the sake of its citizens, or whether the state is an end and they are its instruments. He replies by deny- 28 ￼SELF-ACTUALIZATION ing both alternatives, because the state is an organic unity in which no mem­ ber is end and none is means (VG 112/95), Elsewhere he insists that "the end of the state is the happiness of the citizens" (PR § 265A). Hegel's view at this point is not, after all, so very different from that of John Stuart Mill, who holds that an individual's life has meaning only when devoted to a social or collective good, a "good to the aggregate of all persons," which is pursued in concert with others.7 For the content of this end, neither Mill nor Hegel can conceive of anything except the well-being of individuals who comprise the collective. But there is an important difference in the way in which the two philoso­ phers think of individual well-being, and so of the collective human end. Because an individual for Hegel is always a product of a determinate social order, he conceives of the human good not abstractly, as the maximizing of pleasures, but as an ethical life providing for the individual's self-actualiza­ tion as person, subject, family member, burgher, and citizen. This structure reaches its highest point in the political state, because there the structure of social life is consciously known and willed for the sake of its rationality. The state is an institution in which human beings make rational collective decisions about the-form of their life together. In the family, such decisions are very limited, not only in scope but also through the fact that the family is held together by feelings of love rather than by rational thought. In civil society, the common mode of life is the result of rational choices, but of isolated individual choices,and not collective ones. For this reason, civil soci­ ety can be apprehended as a rational form of social life only from the higher standpoint of the state, and Hegel describes the rationality of civil society as an illusion or "show" (Schein) (PR § 189). In the state, Hegel thinks that social life based on rational choice is ho longer a mere appearance but a living institutional reality. The term "state" for Hegel has a broader and a narrower meaning: "State" refers to the whole organized existence of a people, including its family life and its civil society; but it also refers, more narrowly to a set of political institutions (PR § 267; VG 114-115/96-97). The two meanings are con­ nected, because it is only in the political state that the form of social life becomes an object of rational human choice: Only there is it true that "the state knows what it wills, and knows it in its universality, as something thought" (PR § 270). Hegel has other reasons for regarding the political state as the highest actu­ alization of freedom (PR § 257). He regards the state as the only social insti­ tution that can claim genuine independence. Modern family life is economi­ cally dependent on the life of civil society; both the family and civil society depend on the political state and are subordinate to it. The state, however, is sovereign, dependent on nothing larger. Unlike "humanity" at large or the Kantian "realm of ends" composed ideally of all rational beings, it is not a mere mental construct or a creation of the cosmopolitan moralist's wishful imagination. The state has an institutional reality; it is in fact the supreme human power on earth. 29 ￼HEGELIAN ETHICAL THEORY The state is an actual reality only because it is has "individuality, as exclu­ sive being for itself, [which] appears as a relation to other states" (PR § 322). Hegel thinks that human beings unite for the accomplishment of great ends (even ends of universal or cosmopolitan worth) only when they form a deter­ minate social unity, distinct from - at least implicitly in opposition to - others. Hegel believes that states are the unities that make history, just as Marx later thought classes were.8 States are therefore the "material" of world history, the concrete agents of world-historical development (VG 111-112/93-94). Thus it is through my relation to my state that I as an individual acquire a genuine and positive relation to the process of world history (PR § 348). Hegers insistence that each individual's supreme duty is to be a member of the state (PR § 258) is therefore not a rejection of the idea that the individual should aspire to pl^y a role in the universal life of the human race. On the contrary, Hegel thinks that it is only through participation in the state that individuals can realistically hope that their actions will gain such a universal significance. Hegel’s picture of the state has lost a good deal of its credibility in our century. The political states we know have long been divided into great world empires; the political processes of even the most powerful states are at the mercy of multinational corporations and other geopolitical social and eco­ nomic influences. State sovereignty is sometimes a just demand, sometimes an unconvincing ploy (sometimes both at once), sometimes an approxima­ tion, seldom a full reality. If the most powerful states may still claim to be the greatest powers on earth, even they have credible competitors in the form of international political or religious movements, as well as drug cartels and other multinational corporations. For these reasons, it is only too evident to us that the political state cannot play the role, whether in the life of the individual or in the collective life of the human race, which Hegel tried to assign it. But it doesn't follow that we as rational beings don't have the needs that the Hegelian state was supposed to fulfill. Hegel's theory of the state may still teach us a great deal about ourselves and our aspirations, even if the lesson cannot have the joyful effect on us Hegel intended it to have (PR Preface 27).

#### Only the ability to abstract away from our contingent motivations is necessary for concepts of freedom – we must be given spheres to arbitrarily exercise abstract right

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

In Hegel's ethical theory, the final good is not happiness but freedom. One consequence of this is the importance of the right of persons in Hegel's the­ ory. Personal rights set limits to what may be done to a person in the name of interests, whether that person's own interests or the interests of others. If rights are there in order to override eudaemonistic considerations generally, then we might expect them to be ascribed to persons independently of those considerations. Hegel's theory meets this expectation, since "abstract" right is so called precisely because it abstracts from all considerations of well-being or happiness: In abstract right "it is not a matter of particular interests, my utility or my well-being" (PR § 37). Instead, it is a matter of securing the abstract freedom of a "person." As we saw in Chapter 2, § 2, Hegel holds that every human being has "formal freedom," the capacity to abstract from all particular determinations, desires, and interests. This capacity is what makes someone a person, "a self-consciousness of itself as a perfectly abstract I, in which all concrete limitedness and validity is negated and invalid" (PR § 35R). As persons, all human beings are equal (VPRig: 67-68). Even though the exercise of this capacity to abstract (as in negative freedom or arbitrariness) is not freedom in its most proper sense, Hegel holds just the same that it is essential to guarantee individuals in the modern state adequate room for the exercise of arbitrariness (Chapter 2, §§ 2, 5, and 11). This is the point of abstract right. "A person must give its freedom an external sphere in order to exist as Idea" (PR § 41). "Idea" for Hegel refers to a rational concept when it ex­ presses or embodies itself in something real (WL6: 462-469/755-760; EL §§ 213-215; PR § 1); a spiritual being "exists as Idea" when it actualizes itself appropriately in the objective world. I "exist as Idea" when my personality, my capacity to make abstract choices, is given adequate scope to actualize itself, and in Hegel's view this happens when I have a sufficient "external sphere" subject to my arbitrary choice.

#### Mutual recognition is the basis of consciousness

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

To justify the claim that human beings have abstract rights, what Hegel must show us is why formally free agents ought to guarantee one another exclusive spheres of arbitrary activity. Hegel's argument on this point is developed in 77 ￼ABSTRACT RIGHT his Jena period lectures and shows up again in the Encyclopedia (1817, final version 1830) (EG §§ 430-436). Much of it is merely presupposed in the Philosophy of Right, since that work deals with objective spirit, whereas the argument in question belongs to the Encyclopedia ys discussion of subjective spirit. Hegel's argument is based on the concept of "recognition" (Anerken- nung), or mutual awareness. The gist of Hegel's position is that I can have an adequate consciousness of myself only if I am recognized by others, and recognition can be adequate only if it is fully mutual. Much in Hegel's discus­ sion of recognition is novel and provocative, but both the concept of recogni­ tion and its use as the basis of a theory of natural right are derived from Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right (GNR) (1796). It will enhance our understanding of Hegel's theory of recognition and the rights of persons if we are aware of the Fichtean theory he adopts and modifies. Fichte's entire philosophy is transcendentally deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness, the consciousness of an object that is identical to the subject of the same consciousness. For Fichte, the self defines itself through its own activity; but it is nevertheless limited or finite, distinguishable from other objects. This means that the self's activity must be limited by a not- self, an objective world different from and opposed to the self. From this Fichte infers that the activity of which we are aware in self-awareness must be practical activity or volition, concerned with altering an outside world (GNR 17-20/31-33). Hence our awareness of this activity as limited must be the awareness of an external object that checks or resists it (GNR 23-24/40). A self's practical activity is related to some possible change in the objective world, through which the self brings about a state of the world contrasting with a previous state. In this way, self-awareness involves the awareness of time (GNR 29/48). The external object that checks the self's activity must be represented as already existing for the self at a moment in time prior to that of the self-awareness we are setting out to explain (GNR 28/47). Fichte argues that this threatens us with a vicious regress (or, alternatively, a vicious circularity). At every moment we presuppose the previous con­ sciousness of an object for the self, and along with it the very self-conscious­ ness that was to be accounted for (GNR 31/49). Fichte proposes to avoid the regress (or circularity) by thinking of the self as related not only to an exter­ nal world, but at the same time also to a different sort of object: one in which an activity of the self is already combined with a limitation of this same activity, all within a single temporal moment (GNR 32/51). The concept that answers to this description, Fichte says, is that of a "requirement" or "de­ mand" (Aufforderung) that the subject should manifest its free activity, but in a determinate way (GNR 32-33/52). More precisely, Fichte argues, self-consciousness presupposes the con­ sciousness of an object that is the ground of such a demand, or - as he also puts it - an object that "addresses a demand" to the subject (GNR 36/57). This must be an object of a very special kind, one whose influence on the subject is to cause the subject not only to act in a determinate way, but also to set itself an end, which means that this subject must bring about in itself 78 ￼RECOGNITION a cognition of the object it intends to produce (GNR 37/58). Fichte now argues that an object whose essential influence on us is to produce such a cognition in us must itself be a conscious being, one that possesses the con­ ceptions both of free activity and of the capacity to manifest it according to a concept (GNR 37-38/58-59): The rational being cannot posit itself as such, without its happening that there is a requirement that it act freely. But if such a requirement to act happens to it, then it must necessarily posit a rational being outside it as the cause of the requirement, and so in general it must posit a rational being outside itself. (GNR 39/60) Fichte understands this to presuppose that a self-conscious being must actu­ ally have been affected by another self-conscious being: "It has been shown that if a rational being is to come to self-consciousness, then necessarily an­ other must have had an effect on it, as on one capable of reason" (GNR 87/129). In fact, Fichte claims, the two must stand in a relation of "free reciprocal effect" of each on the other "through concepts and according to concepts" (GNR 39/61). This mutual relation, which Fichte regards as the "proper characteristic of humanity," is "recognition" (Anerkennung).

#### Mutual recognition culminates in mutual respect of other’s ends

Wood 90 summarizes Fichte, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

Thus far we have considered only Fichte's argument that self-awareness requires the awareness of another's demand on me to manifest my free activ­ ity in a determinate way. But he also thinks that these demands have a deter- minable content. When free beings recognize each other, the fundamental demand that they address to each other is the demand to respect each other's external spheres. The determinate action I demand is that you not encroach on my external sphere (GNR 43/66). Presumably Fichte thinks that this is so because self-awareness is fundamentally an awareness of the will to act freely in the external world. As soon as I become aware of other free beings, this volition naturally leads to a desire that others should not prevent me from doing what I fundamentally will to do, hence it expresses itself as the demand that others should respect my external sphere of freedom. Naturally, the demand is reciprocal, addressed by each rational being to every other. When I make such a demand, I am also reciprocally recognizing the other's demand upon me.

#### Mutual recognition of the spirit of other individuals within a social order enables us to reconcile conflicting conceptions of the self to form identity

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

We may see Hegel as attempting to supply this deficiency in Fichte's the­ ory. Hegel does not treat [understands] recognition as a transcendental condition for the \* possibility of self-consciousness. He understands it instead as a "process," beginning with a "struggle to the death," and passing through an asymmetri­ cal "master-servant" relation in which one self is recognized by the other without having to recognize the other in turn. In the course of this process, the selves acquire a deeper conception of what it is to be a free self, and the rational outcome of the process is the mutual awareness of free self-conscious -beings as persons with abstract rights. Hegel's model involves a philosophical argument, but it also has historical applications. It attempts to say something about the difference between (modern) societies, which recognize every hu­ man being as a person with abstract rights, and (premodern) societies, which do not. Hegel tries to show that people have a deeper knowledge of their human nature in societies that respect the right of persons than in societies that do not. 83 ￼ABSTRACT RIGHT 5. The desire for self-certainty Earlier we saw that Hegel locates the origin of the concept of a person in ancient Rome. He credits Christianity with extending this status in principle to all, and he finds the worldly application of this Christian view only in the modern state. But Hegel's discussion of recognition, in both his Jena period and his later philosophy of spirit, is not so much an historical account as a rational reconstruction of the process through which the mutual recognition of persons might have developed out of simpler forms of self-consciousness.5 We might think of social contract theories of the state as one analogy for Hegel's procedure, since they, too, are rational reconstructions of the way in which an existing institution might have come about. We would do better, however, to think of the peculiar form of social contract theory found in Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Hegel's reconstruction, like Rousseau's, does not try to show how individuals might construct a social institution in order to satisfy given ends using given resources. Instead, it attempts to understand how the mutual interaction of individuals fundamen­ tally alters their knowledge of themselves, thereby changing their ends, re­ sources, and their human nature itself. In the Berlin Encyclopedia, Hegel divides the development of "self-con­ sciousness" into three distinct stages: (1) desire (EG §§ 426-429), (2) recog­ nition (EG §§ 430-435), and (3) universal self-consciousness or reason (EG §§ 436-439). Hegel's model begins with human individuals conceived simply as living things possessing "self-consciousness" or "will" (PhG K 165; JR 194/ 99; EG § 426). Hegel follows Fichte in regarding the human self as fundamen­ tally a striving of the "I" against the "not-I," of self against otherness, an im­ pulse to overcome all otherness (W 262/231). Hegel expresses this by saying that self-consciousness is "desire." More specifically, it is a desire to achieve "self-certainty" through overcoming an object or "other." Self-consciousness seeks to destroy the independence or "self-sufficiency" (Selbstandigkeit) of the object, in order to establish its own self-standing independence. Certain of the nothingness of this other, it posits this nothingness for itself as the truth of the other; it negates the independent object and thereby gives itself self- certainty, as true certainty as such, which has become so for it in an objective way. (PhG 11 174) It is in this "nothingness" of the object or other that the desire of self-con­ sciousness finds its "satisfaction" (PhG K 175). For Hegel, the "object" of a desire is never merely a subjective mental state, such as pleasure or the absence of pain. Hegel interprets desire as a function of self-conscious, spiritual being - an embodied being situated in a world of external objects toward which its desires are directed. Further, Hegel interprets this desire in accordance with his theory of spirit as self- actualization through the overcoming of otherness. The fundamental desire that Hegel attributes to self-consciousness is a desire for self-worth or "self- certainty." As spirit, the self engages in an activity of positing an object and then interpreting itself in terms of it. Self-certainty is gained only through 84 ￼RECOGNITION something external, which is brought into harmony with the self, an objectiv­ ity whose independence is done away with or "negated." This negation of the object refers to my using it up or consuming it (as when I literally eat it up), but also includes my shaping or forming it. Even more broadly, it covers any sort of integration of it into my plans and projects. In the most abstract form, it occurs when I assert my dominion over the object in the social forms suitable to property ownership (PR §§ 54-70). The attempt to achieve self-certainty through the appropriation of things proves inadequate. Satisfaction taken in external objects merely leads to a new desire for a new object. This result only points to the fact that the desir­ ing self-consciousness is always dependent on a new object, whereas its aim was rather to establish its own independence, and the nothingness of the object (EG § 428). What self-consciousness needs is an object that brings about this negation within itself without ceasing to be an object. But only a self-consciousness is able to endure the "contradiction" of negating itself or being its own other (PhG 11162). In other words, "self-consciousness reaches its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" (PhG 1 175). From the standpoint of self-certainty, the fundamental problem with non- human objects of desire is that they can contribute to my self-worth only secondarily or indirectly, by confirming an image of myself that I already have independently of them. Even animals, which are living and conscious objects, cannot provide me directly with a sense of my self-worth, since they possess no conception of a free self, and so I can never find in them a con­ firming perspective on myself. The only "other" that can form a conception of me as a free self is another free self. Self-consciousness can find satisfaction for its desire for self-certainty only when it comes "outside itself," so that its object becomes "another self" (PhG K 179; EG § 429,A). "Self-consciousness has an existence only through being recognized by another self-conscious­ ness" (NP 78); "Self-consciousness is in and for itself insofar and through the fact that it is in and for itself for another, i.e., it is only as something recognized" (PhG 1f 178). When I see my free selfhood reflected back to me out of another self, I actualize my self-consciousness in the form of "spirit," as a "self-restoring sameness." It is only in relation to another free self that I can be truly free, "with myself in another" as regards my self-certainty. Thus the full actualiza­ tion of spirit is possible only through the relation between selves that recog­ nize each other. This is why Hegel even goes so far as to say that the essence of spirit itself lies in recognition, in a community of selves, "the I that is a we and the we that is an I" (PhG 1 177; cf. EG § 43

#### Morality is concerned with the scope of the obligations individuals have in ethical life

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/31/16.

The subject is the "reflection of the [free] will into itself and its identity for itself over against being in itself and immediacy" (PR § 105) JAs a s u b j e c t I attend to my own willing and the way in which my external actions can be judged as expressions of it. Thus morality is concerned not only with my assertion of my right to act freely within a proper sphere, but also with the worth of my actions as measured by the goodness or badness of my will (PR §§ i3i-i33)I^oral will is essentially a striving to overcome the gap between the objective and the subjective, and to give itself a real expression in the objective world (PR §§ 8-9, 109). Thus morality is inevitably concerned with the scope of my moral responsibility for what happens in the world (PR §§ 115-12075 It is respect for people as subjects that makes us place value on what HSgel calls "subjective freedom," action from reasons that the agents approve on the basis of their own conscience and their individual thinking (PR §§ 132, 136-138, 228R, 274). Hegel is known as a critic of the moral standpoint, especially as it is repre­ sented in the ethical thought of Kant and Fichte. But at least after his Jena period, subjective freedom and morality play an important role in Hegel's own ethical thought: The substance of spirit is freedom. Its end in the historical process is given along with this: it is the freedom of the subject to have its own conscience and morality, to have its own universal ends for itself and to make them valid; the subject must have infinite value and also come to consciousness of this extremity. What is substantial in the world spirit's end is reached through the freedom of each individual. (VG 64/55) \Hegel thinks that morality, the conception of the self as a subject, is the 23 ￼HEGELIAN ETHICAL^THEORY most distinctive feature of Christianized modernity. The dissolution of an­ cient ethical life under the Roman empire led to a culture in which individu­ als were alienated from their common social life. Their own social essence assumed the form of the emperor, a supreme person with all the legal per­ son's tyrannical arbitrariness (PhG 11481; VPG 380-385/314-318). The spiri­ tual life of individuals, alienated from the real social world, turned inward (PR § 138R). Their self-loss became the suffering and unhappiness of the self-alienated individual (PhG Iflf 207-210, 483-484, 751-752; VPG 388/ 320). In this crisis the ancient world naturally turned to a religion of Hebraic origin because Hebrew religious culture, with its spirit of submission to the law of a single jealous God, alien to both nature and humanity, had long been a veritable school of self-alienation (PR § 358; cf. VPG 241-245/195- 198; TJ 274-297/ETW 182-205). Christianity began as an expression of self- alienation, in the practical forms of self-chastisement (Zucht) and culture (Bildung) (VPGt 388/320). But its vocation was equally to overcome alien­ ation, at least on the plane of religious thougfitjj "Spirit thrust back into itself in the extreme of its absolute negativity grasps the turning point in and for itself, the infinite positivity of this, its inwardness, the principle of the unity of divine and human nature, reconciliation" (PR § 358).

Hegel sees the servant's subjection to an alien will as a preparation for the self-discipline of a rational life and membership in a community of free per­ sons. The servant's self-consciousness "labors off its particular will and its self-will, supersedes (hebt . . . auf) the inner immediacy of desire, and, in this alienation and fear of the lord - the beginning of wisdom - it makes the transition to universal self-consciousness" (EG § 435; cf. PhG 11 196). Servi­ tude to an alien will makes possible the disciplining of particular whims and desires, so that they may be brought under the sway of one's own rational or universal will. "This subjection of the servant's selfishness forms the begin- ning of true human freedom, . . . a necessary moment in the formative edu­ cation (Bildung) of every human being" (EG § 435A).

In this last point, there seem to be two distinct ideas at work. One is nothing but a doubtful platitude of authoritarian pedagogy: You learn to command by learning to obey, and acquire self-discipline by having your will forcibly broken by another's will. The other idea is more Kantian: Genuine freedom and self-worth are available only to those who are capable of detaching them­ selves from their particular desires and adopting a universal or rational stand­ point that respects equally the freedom of others. It is through the second idea that we may pass from the second stage of self-consciousness (recogni­ tion) to the third and final stage (universal self-consciousness). What matters about the education of servitude is not the breaking of self- 88 ￼RECOGNITION will, but the dawning conviction that what is important for self-worth is not the gratification of desire but the dignity of formally free agency. Thus being recognized consists not in the domination of another self-consciousness, but in the mutual relation of different self-consciousnesses who identify their dignity with the freedom they have in common. Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative knowing of oneself in another self, so that each self has absolute self-sufficiency as free individuality; . . . each is thus universal [self-consciousness] and objective, and has real universality as reciprocity, in such a way that it knows itself as recognized in the free other, and knows this other insofar as it recognizes it and knows it as free. (EG § 436) I win freedom for myself not by subjugating others but by liberating them, granting thern the same free status I claim for myself. "The master standing over against the servant was still not truly free, for he still did not thoroughly look on himself in the other. Consequently, it is only through the liberation of the servant that the master, too, becomes perfectly free" (EG § 436A). Hegel's point might be viewed as an instance of the general truth that if I want to acquire worth in my own eyes on the basis of another's esteem, I can do it only to the extent that I esteem the other as a judge of my worth. An author will add nothing to her self-esteem by reading favorable critical no­ tices of her work if she despises the opinion of all the critics. Only a free being has the capacity to recognize another as free. Hence if I want self- certainty as a free being through recognition, then I can get it only from a being I regard as free. The master's attempt to achieve recognition through dominion over another is necessarily a failure, because it demands the impos­ sible: that the other be free and independent, and yet do away with this very freedom and independence in the act of giving recognition. To provide self- certainty for self-consciousness, recognition must be reciprocal. The deeper source of the master's failure is that he has an inadequate con­ cept of self. He is trying to claim self-sufficiency for the merely particular self, distinguished from others by its selfish desires and special traits. The attempt to win self-certainty through recognition for that self leads to the w strategy of domination, which necessarily fails for the reasons we have just seen. The recognition I need from others requires a different self-image, that of an abstractly free person participating equally with others in a "universal self-consciousness." By providing an argument that "universal self-conscious­ ness" is the only solution to the problem of self-certainty, Hegel succeeds in vindicating Fichte's claim that the correct concept of a rational nature must be a "reciprocal concept" or a "common concept," which I can apply to my­ self only by applying it in the same way to others, and granting to others the same rights I claim for myself. "Universal self-consciousness" means more for Hegel than the mutual rela­ tion of persons having abstract rights. He insists that "it forms the substance of ethical life" generally, and is "the form of consciousness of the substance of every essential spirituality, whether of family, fatherland, state, or of all virtues - love, friendship, courage, honor, fame" (EG § 436,A). That is why 89 ￼ABSTRACT RIGHT Hegel says that the master-servant relation pertains to "the transition from the natural state of humanity to a truly ethical condition" (PR § 57A). Be­ yond this, universal self-consciousness is for Hegel the foundation of reason generally, regarded as the human mind's highest capacity (EG § 437; NP 8 2 - 85). For Hegel, rational thought in general is possible for a human mind only as part of a community of minds that mutually recognize each other's rationality. Nevertheless, the most immediate application of universal self-conscious­ ness is to the abstract right of persons. In the Jena lectures, Hegel states quite directly the connection between personal right and the universal self- consciousness arising from genuine recognition. The knowing will is now universal. It is recognition. Put opposite itself in the form of universality it is being, actuality in general, and the individual, the subject, is the person. The will of individuals is the universal and the universal is individual; it is ethical life in general, but immediately it is right. (jfR 212/118) In the Phenomenology of Spirit the connection is indicated less directly, but still quite clearly. Hegel identifies Stoicism as the form of self-consciousness that emerges from servitude, and indicates that a society founded on persons and their rights is one that corresponds to Stoical self-consciousness (PhG f 479). The dependence of abstract right on the dialectic of recognition is stated quite directly in the Philosophy of Right: "Contract presupposes that those who enter into it recognize each other as persons and property owners; since it is a relation of objective spirit, the moment of recognition is already contained and presupposed in it" (PR § 7 1 ; cf. VPR17: 56-57).

## Kant Interaction

#### Property rights are contingent not a priori – they can only be actualized within a community that enables ethical life

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

Prominent among existent rights are the institutions of a rational society. Hegel also says that "the true and proper ground in which freedom is existent [is] the relation of will to will" (PR § 71). Property rights become actual and recognized only within legal institutions where they can be specified and enforced (PR § 217). Even the moral rights of the subjective will, such as its right to be judged according to its knowledge and conviction of the conse­ quences and worth of its acts (PR §§ 117, 120, 132R) are actual rights only within a community that recognizes such rights and treats subjects accord­ ingly. An existent right for Hegel seems always to involve (explicitly or im­ plicitly) a social institution, whose external functioning realizes my freedom. As we have seen, Hegel holds that only the institutions of ethical life provide a concrete foundation for the rights found in the spheres of abstract right and morality. For Hegel, existent rights of other kinds seem to have their foundation in social institutions that are the fundamental or concrete existent rights.

## Framing Issues

#### Speculative logic means that the failure of institutions to live up to their expected roles is irrelevant – the institution in its perfect form is still contained in the idea of the imperfect institution

Wood 90, Allen W. Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

Hegel's philosophy is fundamentally a speculative metaphysics whose aim is to overcome, through philosophical insight, the alienation of the modern mind from itself, nature, and society. Because of this, in Hegel's mature system even "practical philosophy" is treated from a contemplative perspec­ tive - as a stage in spirit's self-knowledge (EG §§ 469-552). Thus Hegel treats "the will'' not from the perspective of the volitional agent engaging in practical deliberation, but from the perspective of the speculative philoso­ pher contemplating the will and its mode of actualization. Likewise, the avowed aim of the Philosophy of Right is not to tell the state how it ought to be, but rather to provide us with a rational theodicy of modern social life, by exhibiting the actuality of divine reason and the rationality of the social world it has created (PR Preface 24-28). ffTis simply false to say that Hegel's philosophy aims at justifying the social1 ana political status quo. On the contrary, Hegel insists that every existing state, standing as it does in the sphere of transkoriness and contingency, is disfigured to some extent by error and wickedness,, and fails to be wholly rational, because it fails to be wholly actual (PR § 258A). The Philosophy of 8 ￼INTRODUCTION Right clearly leaves room for rational criticism of what exists, and also for practical efforts to improve the existing state by actualizing: it, bringing it more into harmony with its own rational essence or concept} Hegel does deny, however, that such criticism belongs among the tasks of philosophy: For who is not clever enough to see much in his environment that is not in fact as it ought to be? But this cleverness is wrong to imagine that such objects and their "ought" have any place within the interests of philosophical science. For science has to do only with the Idea, which is not so impotent that it only ought to be without actually being; hence philosophy has to do with an actuality of which those objects, institutions, conditions, etc. are only the superficial outside. (EL § 6; cf. PR Preface 25) The rhetorical question that introduces this passage is in effect a declara­ tion that no one (least of all Hegel) is so stupid as to claim that the status quo is always as it ought to be. Yet the passage contains two other controver­ sial ideas which, though they do not deny that much in the world is not as it ought to be, nevertheless tend to denigrate the importance often attached to this obvious truth by partisans of the "understanding." The first is an idea about the scope and aim of philosophy. Hegel claims that although it may often be correct to say that social institutions and conditions are not as they should be, it is always wrong to regard such assertions (even where they are correct) as of interest to "philosophical science." For the task of philosophy (conceived here in 1830 very much as it was in the Differenzschrift of 1801) is to heal the division or bifurcation (Entzweiung) which the modern princi­ ple of reflection has opened between our minds and the world; it effects this healing by exhibiting to our reason the world's own deep inner rationality. We might take Hegel to be agreeing with Aristotle that the highest end of reason is philosophical contemplation and not the ends of practice in the narrower sense (VGP 2: 167/151). But Hegel opposes speculative cognition both to theory and to practice, treating it as a higher unity in which both are contained. The absolute Idea lies beyond both the Idea of cognition and the Idea of the good (EL § 236), just as the realm of absolute spirit transcends both theoretical and practical spirit (EG § 553}. Hegel's view seems to be that speculative wisdom belongs equally in contemplation of the reason that shows itself in the world, and in practice that actualizes reason in the world - just as art, religion, and philosophy nourish the human spirit equally in its cognition and its action. This conception of philosophy rests on a second controversial idea: that although there is much in the contingent, transitory world of existence and appearance that is not as it ought to be, nevertheless the inner essence of things, viewed by speculative reason in its necessity, is inevitably seen to be fully rational and hence spiritually satisfying. Because of this there can be a genuine "science" of speculative logic, which deals entirely with the "thought determinations" that constitute the conceptual essence of the world, and dis­ play themselves in external reality. This science is philosophy proper, and its object is solely the "Idea" - the self-realizing rational concept, or the "ab- 9 ￼INTRODUCTION solute unity of the concept and objectivity" (EL § 213). In the "real" part of philosophical science, the outward forms taken by thought in the worlds of nature and human society can be reappropriated by the human spirit through our cognition of them. Hegel is convinced that once we have tasted of this purely philosophical science and its truth, we will want to distinguish it from all other standpoints on the world, including the practical one, and to treat them all as essentially inferior.

#### Contingent appearances are not relevant to actuality

Wood 90, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

Hegel's thesis that "the rational is actual, and the actual is rational" has both a speculative meaning and a practical one. The speculative meaning is that philosophical wisdom consists in contemplating the inner rational es­ sence of things rather than dwelling on their contingent appearances. The practical meaning is that rational action proceeds not from ideals or princi­ ples set up in independence of what is, but rather from a rational comprehen­ sion of what is. The thesis in its speculative meaning gives some support to the thesis in its practical meaning, by providing a metaphysical rationale for the Aristotelian assumptions of an ethical theory of self-actualization. But it is possible to accept the thesis in its practical meaning while repudiating it in its speculative meaning, if we are prepared to give a conception of human self-actualization some other basis (e.g., an empirical, historical analysis of the nature of human beings in modern Western culture). In neither meaning does the thesis deny that there may be defects in what exists. In its specula­ tive meaning it does imply that the business of philosophical science involves a principled direction of one's attention away from these defects, in order to obtain a purer insight into God's immanence in the world. In its practical meaning the thesis is controversial, since it involves a variety of ethical natu­ ralism and an Aristotelian self-actualization theory of the human good. But it has no more tendency to sanctify whatever happens to exist than most other versions of Aristotelian naturalism.

## Framework Interaction

#### Ordinary language is subject to corruption and can not be the basis of ethics, as it is in need of philosophical correction

Wood 90 summarizes Hegel, Allen W. *Hegel’s Ethical Thought.* Cambridge University Press. 1990. NP 3/29/16.

Hegel makes it plain that for philosophical purposes, the technical mean­ ing should always be primary. Hegel takes himself to be engaging in the uniquely philosophical task of deducing or developing categories or thought- determinations out of one another. He believes that the system of philosophi­ cal categories is in fact "stored in language," and hence (perhaps to our as­ tonishment) Hegel denies that philosophy needs any special terminology (WL 5: 20/31-32). At the same time, he realizes that ordinary language re­ flects ordinary thinking, which is often confused, shallow, and erroneous, in need of philosophical correction. Appeals to ordinary usage are therefore entirely out of place in philosophy. "Rather the main thing in philosophical cognition is the necessity of the concept, and the process of having come to be as a result [is] its proof and deduction. Since the content is necessary for 72 ￼HAPPINESS itself, the second thing is to look around for what corresponds to it in [ordi­ nary] conceptions and language" (PR § 2R).

# Contention

#### Gun laws = Hegelian dialectic

David Risselada, 7-29-2014, "The Hegelian Dialectic: Offering Communistic Solutions to Fabricated Crises," Freedom Outpost, http://freedomoutpost.com/hegelian-dialectic-offering-communistic-solutions-fabricated-crises/, accessed 4-1-2016

This same strategy is being used with the [Second Amendment](http://joshuamark5.com/2014/07/federal-gun-laws-unconstitutional/%22%20%5Co%20%22%20The%20Hegelian%20Dialectic%3A%20Offering%20Communistic%20Solutions%20to%20Fabricated%20Crises%20%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) as well. Not only are they using tragedy as a means of getting people to accept, or rather get politicians to push for, more [gun](http://joshuamark5.com/%22%20%5Co%20%22%20The%20Hegelian%20Dialectic%3A%20Offering%20Communistic%20Solutions%20to%20Fabricated%20Crises%20%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) control, but I would argue that, in many cases, they are lax on existing gun laws with the hopes of creating a crisis. For example, take the words of Eric Holder as he explains how to ["brainwash" people into looking at guns in a different manner](http://freedomoutpost.com/2012/11/attorney-general-eric-holder-we-must-brainwash-people-on-guns/%22%20%5Co%20%22%20The%20Hegelian%20Dialectic%3A%20Offering%20Communistic%20Solutions%20to%20Fabricated%20Crises%20%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank). People in the United States, as a result of one too many high-profile shootings, are literally begging for the government to restrict their rights. When you consider the fact that the worse gun violence occurs in states where there are more gun laws, it becomes self-evident that the laws of said states are not being enforced, and the result of reoccurring violence is of course, more [gun](http://joshuamark5.com/%22%20%5Co%20%22%20The%20Hegelian%20Dialectic%3A%20Offering%20Communistic%20Solutions%20to%20Fabricated%20Crises%20%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank)laws. The issue of gun control is the perfect example of the Hegelian Dialectic at work.

# IEP

The political State, as the third moment of Ethical Life, provides a synthesis between the principles governing the Family and those governing Civil Society. The rationality of the state is located in the realization of the universal substantial will in the self-consciousness of particular individuals elevated to consciousness of universality. Freedom becomes explicit and objective in this sphere. "Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members that the individual has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life … and the individual's destiny is the living of a universal life" (¶ 258). Rationality is concrete in the state in so far as its content is comprised in the unity of objective freedom (freedom of the universal or substantial will) and subjective freedom (freedom of everyone in knowing and willing of particular ends); and in its form rationality is in self-determining action or laws and principles which are logical universal thoughts (as in the logical syllogism).

The Idea of the State is itself divided into three moments: (a) the immediate actuality of the state as a self-dependent organism, or Constitutional Law; (b) the relation of states to other states in International Law; (c) the universal Idea as Mind or Spirit which gives itself actuality in the process of World-History.

1) Constitutional Law

(1) The Constitution (internally)

Only through the political constitution of the State can universality and particularity be welded together into a real unity. The self-consciousness of this unity is expressed in the recognition on the part of each citizen that the full meaning of one's actual freedom is found in the objective laws and institutions provided by the State. The aspect of identity comes to the fore in the recognition that individual citizens give to the ethical laws such that they "do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end" (¶ 260). The aspect of differentiation, on the other hand, is found in "the right of individuals to their particular satisfaction," the right of subjective freedom which is maintained in Civil Society. Thus, according to Hegel, "the universal must be furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development. It is only when both these moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organized" (¶ 260, addition).

As was indicated in the introduction to the concept of Ethical Life above, the higher authority of the laws and institutions of society requires a doctrine of duties. From the vantage point of the political State, this means that there must be a correlation between rights and duties. "In the state, as something ethical, as the inter-penetration of the substantive and the particular, my obligation to what is substantive is at the same time the embodiment of my particular freedom. This means that in the state duty and right are united in one and the same relation" (¶ 261). In fulfilling one's duties one is also satisfying particular interests, and the conviction that this is so Hegel calls "political sentiment" (politische Gesinnung) or patriotism. "This sentiment is, in general, trust (which may pass over into a greater or lesser degree of educated insight), or the consciousness that my interest, both substantive and particular, is contained and preserved in another's (that is, the state's) interest and end, i.e., in the other's relation to me as an individual" (¶ 268). Thus, the "bond of duty" cannot involve being coerced into obeying the laws of the State. "Commonplace thinking often has the impression that force holds the state together, but in fact its only bond is the sense of order which everybody possesses" (¶ 268, addition). According to Hegel, the political state is rational in so far as it inwardly differentiates itself according to the nature of the Concept (Begriff). The principle of the division of powers expresses inner differentiation, but while these powers are distinguished they must also be built into an organic whole such that each contains in itself the other moments so that the political constitution is a concrete unity in difference. Constitutional Law is accordingly divided into three moments: (a) the Legislature which establishes the universal through lawmaking; (b) the Executive which subsumes the particular under the universal through administering the laws; (c) the Crown which is the power of subjectivity of the state in the providing of the act of "ultimate decision" and thus forming into unity the other two powers. Despite the syllogistic sequence of universality, particularity, and individuality in these three constitutional powers, Hegel discusses the Crown first followed by the Executive and the Legislature respectively. Hegel understands the concept of the Crown in terms of constitutional monarchy.