## UQ and Link

Obama can get the debt ceiling raised now.

**Gregg 1-17** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**The “fiscal cliff”** experience **should have shown** the **House Republicans that taking a hostage you cannot shoot is not a good tactic.** In the fiscal-cliff drama, it led to the opposite result from what Republicans wanted. They ended up having to pass a bill that did not cut spending and raised taxes. They ran themselves up a boxed canyon, being chased by the likes of Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) and David Axelrod. It was a bad day. Now the same folks are claiming that as a matter of primal rights they should take **the debt ceiling hostage**. There seems to be some belief that this will show their seriousness of purpose, that it will get the people’s and the president’s attention focused on the need to rein in entitlement spending, specifically. The opposite will occur. Taking this hostage **gives the president** and his minions in the press **the opportunity to move the debate away from spending and into** the arena of claiming Republicans are irresponsible and dysfunctional. The issue will become **defaulting on the nation’s debt** and not sending out Social Security checks. **The threat** and possible execution **of not paying Social Security** because the debt ceiling is not extended **is the ultimate political weapon**, one the Democratic leadership will not hesitate to use. Republican House members can spend all day going to the well and making one-minute speeches decrying the failure of the president and his party to address spending, and claiming it is they who have endangered Social Security. But they will not be heard. **The president has** the bully pulpit. He has **the amplification of a fawning press** corps. **He will blame House Republicans — and it will stick. Seniors will be rightly outraged that they might not get their checks**, which many need to live on, and the country will be outraged at the ineptness of it all. It will be ugly. In **the end**, which **will come** rather **quickly, Republicans will fold like the Red Sox** in September and accept a debt-ceiling increase. Most likely, they will get nothing for it. They will have once again, in the name of purity, chosen a path up a boxed canyon. This time the level of citizen ire, especially among seniors, may be such that it will be a political massacre.

Obama’s polcap is key. **Jones 1-16** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

It’s going to be a lot of work for Obama to get Congress to agree to what amounts to the biggest stride forward in gun control since the Gun Control Act was passed in 1968 in the aftermath of the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy. In particular, the assault weapons ban may prove the biggest stumbling block in his negotiations with the GOP. But **the Washington Post poll found that Obama has** the greater stock of **political capital: his approval rating is** at **55 per** **cent**, compared to 24 per cent for Congressional Republicans. **And 67 per** **cent think Republican leaders should do more to compromise with Obama,** whereas just 48 per cent think Obama should do more to compromise with them. **But Obama will** be **expend**ing **that capital** on three fronts in the coming weeks: getting Chuck Hagel confirmed as Defense Secretary, **raising the debt ceiling** and now improving gun control.

Rehab kills Obama’s political capital. **Trinick 12** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

It’s politically toxic. **Any move to alter the current tough stance on criminal justice is inevitably viewed as** being **‘soft on crime’**, regardless of how much sense a new policy might make or how much it might reduce crime in the long-run. **No politician**, especially one running in a race as close as the current match-up, **wants to be seen as ‘soft on crime’.** For Republicans, “the party of law and order”, it would be sacrilege to even suggest a change in policy. For Democrats, especially **Obama**, the **aim[s]** appears to be **to avoid looking “weak and liberal**” and avoid alienating middle-class white voters. In addition, it lacks appeal — few voters (read ‘people likely to vote in swing states’) care about the issue as they perceive that it does not affect them and it requires hard choices to be made.

## FBI Impact

Failure to pass a debt ceiling deal leads to FBI shutdown. It also collapses the criminal justice system, turning the case. **Klein 1/7**[[4]](#footnote-4)

Imagine **[If] we hit the debt ceiling** Feb. 15. The BPC’s analysis suggests that federal spending over the next month will be about $450 billion. Federal revenues will be nearer to $277 billion. That means that **the government will** have to **default on** about **40 percent of its obligations.**

The choices it will face quickly become stark. It can cover interest on the debt, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, defense spending, education, food stamps and other low-income transfers, and a handful of other programs, but doing all that will mean defaulting on everything — really, everything — else. **The FBI will shut down.** The people responsible for tracking down loose nukes will lose their jobs. **The prisons won’t operate.** The biomedical researchers won’t be funded. **The court system will close its doors.** The tax refunds won’t go out. The Federal Aviation Administration will go offline. The parks will close. Food safety inspections will cease.

FBI is key to solve terrorism. **Karmon 02**[[5]](#footnote-5)

Many **terrorist attacks have been prevented** or foiled, but as is known, the successes of **[by] intel**ligence **services** generally are not published**.** In a known case, the swift **FBI deployment after the World Trade Center bombing** in 1993 **and** its **infiltration of the group involved, foiled a** much greater **plan to bomb the U**nited **N**ations **building** and the Lincoln Tunnel in New York**.** It is a fact that bin Laden’s organization and his allies failed to carry out any serious attack since the bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salam in August 1998. **Most of the infrastructure of** the **al Qaida** organization **was uncovered** in the weeks following the bombings, **and new attempts at attacks** in Jordan, Israel, Pakistan and even the United States **have been foiled**, leading to the arrest of many of the militants involved**.** It has yet to be proved that the USS Cole bombing was perpetrated by bin Laden’s network. From the organizational point of view, the security and **intelligence agencies have taken serious steps to improve** their capabilities. The FBI has tripled its **counter-terrorism** force since the World Trade Center attack and the CIA has created its Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC) to deal with the threat at the highest civilian and military levels. The German authorities have greatly enhanced the police and security units dealing—successfully at that—with right-wing activities. Russia has formed new elite units in order to cope with the threat of terrorist attacks against its nuclear facilities, and so on.

Terrorism is the most likely existential threat. **Rhodes 09**[[6]](#footnote-6)

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005.

This group of **85 experts judged that** the **possibility of** a **WMD attack** against a city or other target somewhere in the world **is real and increasing over time**. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. **There was strong**, though not universal, **agreement that** a **nuclear attack is more likely** to be carried out **by a terrorist organization than by a government.** The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other **nations will face an existential threat** from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: **A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike** on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely **initiat[ing]**e **a new round of nuclear armament** and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

Solving nuclear terror strengthens the nuclear taboo which solves all scenarios for nuclear war.

**Bin 09** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

**The nuclear taboo is a** kind of international **norm** and this type of norm is supported by the promotion of the norm through international social exchange. **But** at present the increased **threat of nuclear terror**ism **has lowered people’s confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used.** China and the United States have a broad common interest in combating nuclear terrorism. Using technical and institutional **measures to break** the foundation of **nuclear terror**ism and lessen the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack can not only weaken the danger of nuclear terrorism itself but also **strengthen** people’s **confidence in the nuclear taboo**, and in this way preserve an international environment beneficial to both China and the United States. In this way **even if there is crisis** in China-U.S. relations caused by conflict, **the nuclear taboo can** also help both countries **reduce suspicions** about the nuclear weapons problem, **avoid miscalculation and** thereby **reduce the danger of** a **nuclear war.**

## Econ Impact

Debt ceiling collapses the economy.

**Freyer 1-15** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

The consequences of refusing a debt limit increase are very real. As **a bipartisan litany of mainstream economists have warned**, refusing to increase **the debt limit will inflict significant damage to the national economy and likely pitch us into another recession—either by ensuring the** federal **government defaults on its** existing **debt or** by **significantly shrinking** current **federal expenditure**s, including payouts to [Social Security and Medicare beneficiaries](http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci_22370252/obama-debt-ceiling-fight-threatens-ss-checks), war-fighting expenses, and on K-12 education, healthcare, highways, and research and development.

US is key to global economy. **Helbing et al. 07**[[9]](#footnote-9)

As a starting point, it is useful to establish some basic facts about the relative size of the U.S. economy and its linkages with other regions. • **The U**nited **S**tates **remains** by far **the** world’s **largest economy** (Table 4.1). When measured at PPP exchange rates, **the U.S. economy accounts for** about one-fifth of global GDP. In terms of market exchange rates, it accounts for **slightly less than one-third of global GDP**. These ratios have not changed much in the past three decades. • **The U**nited **S**tates **is the largest importer in the global economy.** It has been importing, on average, about one-fifth of all internationally traded goods since 1970. It is the second largest exporter after the euro area. • In line with the generally rapid growth in intraregional trade, **the share of trade with the U**nited **S**tates **has greatly increased in the Western Hemisphere** region, including in neighboring countries—Canada and Mexico— and some others in Central and South America (Figure 4.2). Compared with the euro area and Japan, the United States has seen a larger increase in trade with emerging market and other developing countries in general, not just with countries in the Western Hemisphere. Export exposure to the United States—the share of exports to the United States as a percent of GDP—has generally continued to increase, even for countries where the U.S. share of total exports has declined, as trade openness has increased everywhere (Table 4.2). Export exposure to the United States also tends to be larger than that to the euro area and Japan, except in neighboring regions. • Overall, U.S. financial markets have been and remain by far the largest, reflecting not only the size of the economy but also their depth. Changes in U.S. asset prices tend to have strong signaling effects worldwide, and **spillovers from U.S. financial markets have been important, especially during** periods of **market stress.** In particular, correlations across national stock markets are highest when the U.S. stock market is declining (Box 4.1). • Reflecting the size and depth of its financial markets, as well as its increasing net external liabilities, claims on the United States typically account for the lion’s share of extra-regional foreign portfolio assets of the rest of the world (Table 4.3). At the same time, the share of foreign portfolio liabilities held by U.S. investors typically also exceeds the holdings of investors elsewhere, except for the euro area, where intraregional holdings are more important. This illustrates the extent of important international financial linkages with U.S. markets.

Economic crisis causes nuclear war–strong statistical support. **Royal 10**[[10]](#footnote-10)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances **Modelski and Thompson**’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, **find**ing **that rhythms in the global economy are associated with** the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often **bloody transition from one** pre-eminent **leader to the next.** As such, exogenous **shocks** such as economic crises could **usher in a redistribution of** relative **power** (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, **increasing** the risk of **miscalculation** (Fearon 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflicts as **a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power** (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remains unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggest that “future expectation of trade” is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, **if** the **expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace item such as energy resources, the likelihood for **conflict increases**, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic **decline has also been linked with** an increase in the likelihood of **terrorism** (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, **crises** generally **reduce the popularity of a sitting government.** “Diversionary theory” suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting **governments have** increased **incentive**s **to fabricate** external military **conflict**s **to create a “rally around the flag” effect**. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995) and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states due to the fact the democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. De DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States and thus weak Presidential popularity are statically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

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3. Richard Trinick [Currently working for a legal software start-up company in London, Richard graduated in Jurisprudence (Law) from the University of Oxford and is a future joiner of Hogan Lovells LLP. His blogging interests include just about anything with a legal or political angle on either side of the pond. Away from a computer Richard enjoys great food, exciting music, any sport except golf, and gripping TV (not to mention giving recommendations about all of these things). All opinions are his own.] Why Won’t The Candidates Talk About Prisons? 17 October 2012. <http://www.article-3.com/why-wont-the-candidates-talk-about-prisons-99475> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
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6. RICHARD RHODES He has been a visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and currently he is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Rhodes is the author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award. It was the first of four volumes he has written on the history of the nuclear age. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (1995), Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (2007), and The Twilight of the Bombs (forthcoming in autumn 2010) are the others. Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety 14 DECEMBER 2009 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Li Bin and Nie Hongyi. 5-22-09. About the Authors Prof. Li Bin is a leading Chinese expert on arms control and is currently the director of Arms Control Program at the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University. He received his Bachelor and Master Degrees in Physics from Peking University before joining China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) to pursue a doctorate in the technical aspects of arms control. He served as a part-time assistant on arms control for the Committee of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).Upon graduation Dr. Li entered the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) as a research fellow and joined the COSTIND technical group supporting Chinese negotiation team on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He attended the final round of CTBT negotiations as a technical advisor to the Chinese negotiating team. Nie Hongyi is an officer in the People’s Liberation Army with an MA from China’s National Defense University and a Ph.D. in International Studies from Tsinghua University, which he completed in 2009 under Prof. Li Bin. “An Investigation of China – U.S. Strategic Stability” <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/Li-and-Nie-translation-final-5-22-09.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
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9. Thomas, advisor in the IMF's Research Department where he focuses on commodity market prospects \*Peter Berezin, Ph. D in Economics from the University of Toronto, a Master of Science (Economics) from the London School of Economics and a Bachelor of Arts (Economics) from McMaster University. He has extensive experience in analyzing global economic and financial market trends \*Ayhan Kose Ph.D. in Economics, H. B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa. \*Michael Kumhof, PhD at Stanford in Econ \*Doug Laxton, the Head of the Economic Modeling Unit of the IMF's Research Department. \*Nikola Spatafora, Senior Economist in the Research Department, Development Macroeconomics Division, of the IMF “Decoupling the Train? Spillovers and Cycles in the Global Economy” <http://www.contexto.org/pdfs/FMIecdecouplingUS.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
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