## 1AC – Armenia

### ROTB

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the simulated consequences of the topical aff policy. Prefer this

#### 1. The state is inevitable- speaking the language of power through policymaking is the only way to create social change in debate.

Coverstone 5 Alan Coverstone (masters in communication from Wake Forest, longtime debate coach) “Acting on Activism: Realizing the Vision of Debate with Pro-social Impact” Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Conference November 17th 2005 JW 11/18/15

An important concern emerges when Mitchell describes reflexive fiat as a contest strategy capable of “eschewing the power to directly control external actors” (1998b, p. 20). Describing debates about what our government should do as attempts to control outside actors is debilitating and disempowering. Control of the US government is exactly what an active, participatory citizenry is supposed to be all about. After all, if democracy means anything, it means that citizens not only have the right, they also bear the obligation to discuss and debate what the government should be doing. Absent that discussion and debate, much of the motivation for personal political activism is also lost. Those who have co-opted Mitchell’s argument for individual advocacy often quickly respond that nothing we do in a debate round can actually change government policy, and unfortunately, an entire generation of debaters has now swallowed this assertion as an article of faith. The best most will muster is, “Of course not, but you don’t either!” The assertion that nothing we do in debate has any impact on government policy is one that carries the potential to undermine Mitchell’s entire project. If there is nothing we can do in a debate round to change government policy, then we are left with precious little in the way of pro-social options for addressing problems we face. At best, we can pursue some Pilot-like hand washing that can purify us as individuals through quixotic activism but offer little to society as a whole. It is very important to note that Mitchell (1998b) tries carefully to limit and bound his notion of reflexive fiat by maintaining that because it “views fiat as a concrete course of action, it is bounded by the limits of pragmatism” (p. 20). Pursued properly, the debates that Mitchell would like to see are those in which the relative efficacy of concrete political strategies for pro-social change is debated. In a few noteworthy examples, this approach has been employed successfully, and I must say that I have thoroughly enjoyed judging and coaching those debates. The students in my program have learned to stretch their understanding of their role in the political process because of the experience. Therefore, those who say I am opposed to Mitchell’s goals here should take care at such a blanket assertion. However, contest debate teaches students to combine personal experience with the language of political power. Powerful personal narratives unconnected to political power are regularly co-opted by those who do learn the language of power. One need look no further than the annual state of the Union Address where personal story after personal story is used to support the political agenda of those in power. The so-called role-playing that public policy contest debates encourage promotes active learning of the vocabulary and levers of power in America. Imagining the ability to use our own arguments to influence government action is one of the great virtues of academic debate. Gerald Graff (2003) analyzed the decline of argumentation in academic discourse and found a source of student antipathy to public argument in an interesting place. I’m up against…their aversion to the role of public spokesperson that formal writing presupposes. It’s as if such students can’t imagine any rewards for being a public actor or even imagining themselves in such a role. This lack of interest in the public sphere may in turn reflect a loss of confidence in the possibility that the arguments we make in public will have an effect on the world. Today’s students’ lack of faith in the power of persuasion reflects the waning of the ideal of civic participation that led educators for centuries to place rhetorical and argumentative training at the center of the school and college curriculum. (Graff, 2003, p. 57) The power to imagine public advocacy that actually makes a difference is one of the great virtues of the traditional notion of fiat that critics deride as mere simulation. Simulation of success in the public realm is far more empowering to students than completely abandoning all notions of personal power in the face of governmental hegemony by teaching students that “nothing they can do in a contest debate can ever make any difference in public policy.” Contest debating is well suited to rewarding public activism if it stops accepting as an article of faith that personal agency is somehow undermined by the so-called role playing in debate. Debate is role-playing whether we imagine government action or imagine individual action. Imagining myself starting a socialist revolution in America is no less of a fantasy than imagining myself making a difference on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, both fantasies influenced my personal and political development virtually ensuring a life of active, pro-social, political participation. Neither fantasy reduced the likelihood that I would spend my life trying to make the difference I imagined. One fantasy actually does make a greater difference: the one that speaks the language of political power. The other fantasy disables action by making one a laughingstock to those who wield the language of power. Fantasy motivates and role-playing trains through visualization. Until we can imagine it, we cannot really do it. Role-playing without question teaches students to be comfortable with the language of power, and that language paves the way for genuine and effective political activism. Debates over the relative efficacy of political strategies for pro-social change must confront governmental power at some point. There is a fallacy in arguing that movements represent a better political strategy than voting and person-to-person advocacy. Sure, a full-scale movement would be better than the limited voice I have as a participating citizen going from door to door in a campaign, but so would full-scale government action. Unfortunately, the gap between my individual decision to pursue movement politics and the emergence of a full-scale movement is at least as great as the gap between my vote and democratic change. They both represent utopian fiat. Invocation of Mitchell to support utopian movement fiat is simply not supported by his work, and too often, such invocation discourages the concrete actions he argues for in favor of the personal rejectionism that under girds the political cynicism that is a fundamental cause of voter and participatory abstention in America today.

#### 2. Fairness.

#### Anything moots 6 minutes of 1ac offense – restarts the 1ar. They get a 13-7 minute advantage which means we have worse discussion, even if the subject of discussion is slightly better.

#### Independently, there is a huge spectrum of political theories – the k can be the radical on both sides of the spectrum and multifunctional aff offense is insufficient to interact with every one.

#### Preparation asymmetry – the aff says a ton of things all of which might have representational implications. Holding me accountable for things that are not just the plan lets them pick on issue and prep it all out so affs lose every round.

#### Unfairness denies effective dialogue on kritikal issues which turns your impacts.

Galloway 7 Ryan Galloway, Samford Comm prof, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

#### Focusing on reps is bad:

#### a. Critique is useless without a concrete policy option that solves for your harms.

Bryant 12 Levi Bryant (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College) “A Critique of the Academic Left” 2012 <https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/> JW

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignor[es]ing how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1 without ever explaining what is to be done at phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express [critiques] them in ways that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhD’s in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only universities can afford, with presses that don’t have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesn’t make a sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they don’t embrace every bit of the doxa that we endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and identifications in general?). This type of “revolutionary” is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology. These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isn’t where our most serious shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption. That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution of medicines, etc., etc., etc.

#### b. Excessive focus on discourse and representations kills the liberal movements you seek to promote.

Chait 15 Jonathan Chait “How the language police are perverting liberalism.” NY Magazine January 275h 2015 <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html> JW

Or maybe not. The p.c. style of politics has one serious, possibly fatal drawback: It is exhausting. Claims of victimhood that are useful within the left-wing subculture may alienate much of America. The movement’s dour puritanism can move people to outrage, but it may [and] prove ill suited to the hopeful mood required of mass politics. Nor does it bode well for the movement’s longevity that many of its allies are worn out. “It seems to me now that the public face of social liberalism has ceased to seem positive, joyful, human, and freeing,” confessed the progressive writer Freddie deBoer. “There are so many ways to step on a land mine now, so many terms that have become forbidden, so many attitudes that will get you cast out if you even appear to hold them. I’m far from alone in feeling that it’s typically not worth it to engage, given the risks.” Goldberg wrote recently about people “who feel emotionally savaged by their involvement in [online feminism] — not because of sexist trolls, but because of the slashing righteousness of other feminists.” Former Feministing editor Samhita Mukhopadhyay told her, “Everyone is so scared to speak right now.” That the new political correctness has bludgeoned even many of its own supporters into despondent silence is a triumph, but one of limited use. Politics in a democracy is still based on getting people to agree with you, not making them afraid to disagree. The historical record of political movements that sought to expand freedom for the oppressed by eliminating it for their enemies is dismal. The historical record of American liberalism, which has extended social freedoms to blacks, Jews, gays, and women, is glorious. And that glory rests in its confidence in the ultimate power of reason, not coercion, to triumph.

### Framework

#### Phenomenal introspection is reliable and proves that util’s true.

Sinhababu Neil (National University of Singapore) “The epistemic argument for hedonism” [http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3 accessed 2-4-16](http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3%20accessed%202-4-16) JW

The Odyssey's treatment of these events demonstrates how dramatically ancient Greek moral intuitions differ from ours. It doesn't dwell on the brutality of Telemachus, who killed twelve women for the trivial reasons he states, making them suffer as they die. While gods and men seek vengeance for other great and small offenses in the Odyssey, no one finds this mass murder worth avenging. It's a minor event in the denouement to a happy ending in which Odysseus (who first proposes killing the women) returns home and Telemachus becomes a man. That the[y] Greeks could so easily regard these murders as part of a happy ending for heroes shows how deeply we disagree with them. It's as if we gave them a trolley problem with the 12 women on the side track and no one on the main track, and they judged it permissible for Telemachus to turn the trolley and kill them all. And this isn't some esoteric text of a despised or short-lived sect, but a central literary work of a long-lived and influential culture. Human history offers similarly striking examples of disagreement on a variety of topics. These include sexual morality; the treatment of animals; the treatment of other ethnicities, families, and social classes; the consumption of intoxicating substances; whether and how one may take vengeance; slavery; whether public celebrations are acceptable; and gender roles.12 Moral obligations to commit genocide were accepted not only by some 20th century Germans, but by much of the ancient world, including the culture that gave us the Old Testament. One can only view the human past and much of the present with horror at the depth of human moral error and the harm that has resulted. One might think to explain away much of this disagreement as the result of differing nonmoral beliefs. Those who disagree about nonmoral issues may disagree on the moral rightness of a particular action despite agreeing on the fundamental moral issues. For example, they may agree that healing the sick is right, but disagree about whether a particular medicine will heal or harm. This disagreement about whether to prescribe the medicine won't be fundamentally about morality, and won't support the argument from disagreement. I don't think the moral disagreements listed above are explained by differences in nonmoral belief. This isn't because sexists, racists, and bigots share the nonmoral views of those enlightened by feminism and other egalitarian doctrines – they don't. Rather, their differing views on nonmoral topics often are rationalizations of moral beliefs that fundamentally disagree with ours.13 Those whose fundamental moral judgments include commitments to the authority of men over women, or of one race over another, will easily accept descriptive psychological views that attribute less intelligence or rationality to women or the subjugated race.14 Moral disagreement supposedly arising from moral views in religious texts is similar. Given how rich and many-stranded most religious texts are, interpretive claims about their moral teachings often tell us more about the antecedent moral beliefs of the interpreter than about the text itself. This is why the same texts are interpreted to support so many different moral views. Similar phenomena occur with most moral beliefs. Environmentalists who value a lovely patch of wilderness will easily believe that its destruction will cause disaster, those who feel justified in eating meat will easily believe that the animals they eat don't suffer greatly, and libertarians who feel that redistributing wealth is unjust will easily believe that it raises unemployment. We shouldn't assume that differing moral beliefs on practical questions are caused by fundamental moral agreement combined with differing nonmoral beliefs. Often the differing nonmoral beliefs are caused by fundamental moral disagreement. As we have no precise way of quantifying the breadth of disagreement or determining its epistemic consequences, it's unclear exactly how much disagreement the argument requires. While this makes the argument difficult to evaluate, it shouldn't stop us from proceeding, as we have to use the unclear notion of widespread disagreement in ordinary epistemic practice. If 99.9% of botanists agree on some issue about plants, non-botanists should defer to their authority and believe as most of them do. But if disagreement between botanists is suitably widespread, non-botanists should remain agnostic. A more precise and systematic account of when disagreement is widespread enough to generate particular epistemic consequences would be very helpful. Until we have one, we must employ the unclear notion of widespread disagreement, or some similar notion, throughout epistemic practice. Against the background of widespread moral disagreement, there may still be universal or near-universal agreement on some moral questions. For example, perhaps all cultures agree that one should provide for one’s elderly parents, even though they generally disagree elsewhere. How do these narrow areas of moral agreement affect the argument? This all depends on whether the narrow agreement is reliably or unreliably caused. If narrow agreement results from a reliable process of belief-formation, it lets us avoid error, defeating the argument from disagreement. But widely accepted moral beliefs may result from widely prevailing unreliable processes leading everyone to the same errors. There's no special pressure to explain agreement in terms of reliable processes when disagreement is widespread. Explaining agreement in terms of reliable processes is preferable when we have some reason to think that the processes involved are generally reliable. Then we would want to understand cases of agreement in line with the general reliability of processes producing moral belief. But if disagreement is widespread, error is too. Since moral beliefs are so often false, invoking unreliable processes to explain them is better than invoking reliable ones. The next two sections discuss this in more detail. We have many plausible explanations of narrow agreement on which moral beliefs are unreliably caused. Evolutionary and sociological explanations of why particular moral beliefs are widely accepted often invoke unreliable mechanisms.15 On these explanations, we agree because some moral beliefs were so important for reproductive fitness that natural selection made them innate in us, or so important to the interests controlling moral education in each culture that they were inculcated in everyone. For example, parents' influence over their children's moral education would explain agreement that one should provide for one's elderly parents. Plausible normative ethical theories won't systematically connect these evolutionary and sociological explanations with moral facts. If disagreement and error are widespread, they'll provide useful ways to reconcile unusual cases of widespread agreement with the general unreliability of the processes producing moral belief. 1.3 If there is widespread error about a topic, we should retain only those beliefs about it formed through reliable processes Now I'll defend 3. First I'll show how the falsity of others' beliefs undermines one's own belief. Then I'll clarify the notion of a reliable process. I'll consider a modification to 3 that epistemic internalists might favor, and show that the argument accommodates it. I'll illustrate 3's plausibility by considering cases where it correctly guides our reasoning. Finally, I'll show how 3 is grounded in the intuitive response to grave moral error. First, a simple objection: “Why should I care whether other people have false beliefs? That's a fact about other people, and not about me. Even if most people are wrong about some topic, I may be one of the few right ones, even if there's no apparent reason to think that my way of forming beliefs is any more reliable.” While widespread error leaves open the possibility that one has true beliefs, it reduces the probability that my beliefs are true. Consider a parallel case. I have no direct evidence that I have an appendix, but I know that previous investigations have revealed appendixes in people. So induction suggests that I have an appendix. Similarly, I know on the basis of 1 and 2 that people's moral beliefs are, in general, rife with error. So even if I have no direct evidence of error in my moral beliefs, induction suggests that they are rife with error as well. 3 invokes the reliability of the processes that produce our beliefs. Assessing processes of belief-formation for reliability is an important part of our epistemic practices. If someone tells me that my belief is entirely produced by wishful thinking, I can't simply accept that and maintain the belief. Knowing that wishful thinking is unreliable, I must either deny that my belief is entirely caused by wishful thinking or abandon the belief. But if someone tells me that my belief is entirely the result of visual perception, I'll maintain it, assuming that it concerns sizable nearby objects or something else about which visual perception is reliable. While providing precise criteria for individuating processes of belief-formation is hard, as the literature on the generality problem for reliabilism attests, individuating them somehow is indispensable to our epistemic practices.16 Following Alvin Goldman's remark that “It is clear that our ordinary thought about process types slices them broadly” (346), I'll treat cognitive process types like wishful thinking and visual perception as appropriately broad.17 Trusting particular people and texts, meanwhile, are too narrow. Cognitive science may eventually help us better individuate cognitive process types for the purposes of reliability assessments and discover which processes produce which beliefs. Epistemic internalists might reject 3 as stated, claiming that it isn't widespread error that would justify giving up our beliefs, but our having reason to believe that there is widespread error. They might also claim that our justification for believing the outputs of some process depends not on its reliability, but on what we have reason to believe about its reliability. The argument will still go forward if 3 is modified to suit internalist tastes, changing its antecedent to “If we have reason to believe that there is widespread error about a topic” or changing its consequent to “we should retain only those beliefs about it that we have reason to believe were formed through reliable processes.” While 3's antecedent might itself seem unnecessary on the original formulation, it's required for 3 to remain plausible on the internalist modification. Requiring us to have reason to believe that any of our belief-formation processes are reliable before retaining their outputs might lead to skepticism. The antecedent limits the scope of the requirement to cases of widespread error, averting general skeptical conclusions. The argument will still attain its conclusion under these modifications. Successfully defending the premises of the argument and deriving widespread error (5) and unreliability (7) gives those of us who have heard the defense and derivation reason to believe 5 and 7. This allows us to derive 8. (Thus the pronoun 'we' in 3, 6, and 8.) 3 describes the right response to widespread error in many actual cases. Someone in the 12th century, especially upon hearing the disagreeing views of many cultures regarding the origins of the universe, would do well to recognize that error on this topic was widespread and retreat to agnosticism about it. Only when modern astrophysics extended reliable empirical methods to cosmology would it be rational to move forward from agnosticism and accept a particular account of how the universe began. Similarly, disagreement about which stocks will perform better than average is widespread among investors, suggesting that one's beliefs on the matter have a high likelihood of error. It's wise to remain agnostic about the stock market without an unusually reliable way of forming beliefs – for example, the sort of secret insider information that it's illegal to trade on. 3 permits us to hold onto our moral beliefs in individual cases of moral disagreement, suggesting skeptical conclusions only when moral disagreement is widespread. When we consider a single culture's abhorrent moral views, like the Greeks' acceptance of Telemachus and Odysseus' murders of the servant women, we don't think that maybe the Greeks were right to see nothing wrong and we should reconsider our outrage. Instead, we're horrified by their grave moral error. I think this is the right response. We're similarly horrified by the moral errors of Hindus who burned widows on their husbands' funeral pyres, American Southerners who supported slavery and segregation, our contemporaries who condemn homosexuality, and countless others. The sheer number of cases like this requires us to regard moral error as a pervasive feature of the human condition. Humans typically form moral beliefs through unreliable processes and have appendixes. We are humans, so this should reduce our confidence in our moral judgments. The prevalence of error in a world full of moral disagreement demonstrates how bad humans are at forming true moral beliefs, undermining our own moral beliefs. Knowing that unreliable processes so often lead humans to their moral beliefs, we'll require our moral beliefs to issue from reliable processes. 1.4 If there is widespread error about morality, there are no reliable processes for forming moral beliefs A reliable process for forming moral beliefs would avert skeptical conclusions. I'll consider several processes and argue that they don't help us escape moral skepticism. Ordinary moral intuition, whether it involves a special rational faculty or our emotional responses, is shown to be unreliable by the existence of widespread error. The argument from disagreement either prevents reflective equilibrium from generating moral conclusions or undermines it. Conceptual analysis is reliable, but delivers the wrong kind of knowledge to avert skepticism. If all our processes for forming moral beliefs are unreliable, moral skepticism looms. 4 is false only because of one process – phenomenal introspection, which lets us know of the goodness of pleasure, as the second half of this paper will discuss. Widespread error guarantees the unreliability of any process by which we form all or almost all of our moral beliefs. While widespread error allows some processes responsible for a small share of our moral beliefs to predominantly create true beliefs, it implies that any process generating a very large share of moral belief must be highly error-prone. Since the process produced so many of our moral beliefs, and so many of them are erroneous, it must be responsible for a large share of the error. If more of people's moral beliefs were true, things would be otherwise. Widespread truth would support the reliability of any process that produced most or all of our moral beliefs, since that process would be responsible for so much true belief. But given widespread error, ordinary moral intuition must be unreliable. This point provides a forceful response to Moorean opponents who insist that we can't give up the reliability of a process by which we form all or nearly all of our beliefs on an important topic, since this would permit counterintuitive skeptical conclusions. Even if this Moorean response helps against external world skeptics who employ counterfactual thought experiments involving brains in vats, it doesn't help against moral skeptics who use 1 and 2 to derive widespread actual error. Once we accept that widespread error actually obtains, a great deal of human moral knowledge has already vanished. Insisting on the reliability of the process then seems implausible and pointless. I'll briefly consider two conceptions of moral intuition – as a special rational faculty by which we grasp non-natural moral facts, and as a process by which our emotions lead us to form moral beliefs – and show how widespread error guarantees their unreliability. Some philosophers regard moral intuition as involving a special rational faculty that lets us know non-natural moral facts.18 They argue that knowledge on many topics including mathematics, logic, and modality involves this rational faculty, so moral knowledge might operate similarly. This suggests a way for them to defend the reliability of moral intuition in the face of widespread error: if intuition is reliable about these other things, its overall reliability across moral and nonmoral areas allows us to reliably form moral beliefs by using it. This defense won't work. When an epistemic process is manifestly unreliable on some topic, as widespread error shows any process responsible for most of our moral beliefs to be, the reliability of that process elsewhere won't save it on that topic. Even if testimony is reliable, this doesn't imply the reliability of compulsive gamblers' testimony about the next spin of the roulette wheel. Even if intuition remains reliable elsewhere, widespread disagreement still renders it unreliable in ethics. I see ordinary moral intuition as a process of emotional perception in which our feelings cause us to form moral beliefs.19 Just as visual experiences of color cause beliefs about the colors of surfaces, emotional experiences cause moral beliefs. Pleasant feelings like approval, admiration, or hope in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are right, virtuous or good. Unpleasant emotions like guilt, disgust, or horror in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are wrong, vicious, or bad. We might have regarded this as a reliable way to know about moral facts, just as visual perception is a reliable way to know about color, if not for widespread error. But because of widespread error, we can only see it as an unreliable process responsible for our dismal epistemic situation. Reflective equilibrium is the prevailing methodology in normative ethics today. It involves modifying our beliefs about particular cases and general principles to make them cohere. Whether or not nonmoral propositions like the premises of the argument from disagreement are admissible in reflective equilibrium, widespread error prevents reflective equilibrium from reliably generating a true moral theory, as I'll explain. If the premises of the argument from disagreement are admitted into reflective equilibrium, the argument can be reconstructed there, and reflective equilibrium will dictate that we give up all of our moral beliefs. To avoid this conclusion, the premises of the argument from disagreement would have to be revised away on moral grounds. These premises are a metaethical claim about the objectivity of morality which seems to be a conceptual truth, an anthropological claim about the existence of disagreement, a very general epistemic claim about when we should revise our beliefs, and a more empirically grounded epistemic claim about our processes of belief-formation and their reliability. While reflective equilibrium may move us to revise substantive moral beliefs in view of other substantive moral beliefs, claims of these other kinds are less amenable to such revision. Unless ambitious arguments for revising these nonmoral claims away succeed, we must follow the argument to its conclusion and accept that reflective equilibrium makes moral skeptics of us.20 If only moral principles and judgments are considered in reflective equilibrium, it won't make moral skeptics of us, but the argument from disagreement will undermine its conclusions. The argument forces us to give up the pre-existing moral beliefs against which we test various moral propositions in reflective equilibrium. While we may be justified in believing something because it coheres with our other beliefs, this justification goes away once we see that those beliefs should be abandoned. Coherence with beliefs that we know we should give up doesn't confer justification. Now I'll consider conceptual analysis. It can produce moral beliefs about conceptual truths – for example, that the moral supervenes on the nonmoral, and that morality is objective. It also may provide judgments about relations between different moral concepts – perhaps, that if the only moral difference between two actions is that one would produce morally better consequences than the other, doing what produces better consequences is right. I regard conceptual analysis as reliable, so that the argument from disagreement does not force us to give up the beliefs about morality it produces. Unfortunately, if analytic naturalism is false, as has been widely held in metaethics since G. E. Moore, conceptual analysis won't provide all the knowledge we need to build a normative ethical theory.21 Even when it relates moral concepts like goodness and rightness to each other, it doesn't tell us that anything is good or right to begin with. That's the knowledge we need to avoid moral skepticism. So far I've argued that our epistemic and anthropological situation, combined with plausible metaethical and epistemic principles, forces us to abandon our moral beliefs. But if a reliable process of moral belief-formation exists, 4 is false, and we can answer the moral skeptic. The rest of this paper discusses the only reliable process I know of. 2.1 Phenomenal introspection reveals pleasure's goodness Phenomenal introspection, a reliable way of forming true beliefs about our experiences, produces the belief that pleasure is good. Even as our other processes of moral belief-formation prove unreliable, it provides reliable access to pleasure's goodness, justifying the positive claims of hedonism. This section clarifies what phenomenal introspection and pleasure are and explains how phenomenal introspection provides reliable access to pleasure's value. Section 2.2 argues that pleasure's goodness is genuine moral value, rather than value of some other kind. In phenomenal introspection we consider our subjective experience, or phenomenology, and determine what it's like. Phenomenal introspection can be reliable while dreaming or hallucinating, as long as we can determine what the dreams or hallucinations are like. By itself, phenomenal introspection doesn't produce beliefs about things outside experience, or about relations between our experiences and non-experiential things. So it doesn't produce judgments about the rightness of actions or the goodness of non-experiential things. It can only tell us about the intrinsic properties of experience itself. Phenomenal introspection is generally reliable, even if mistakes about immediate experience are possible. Experience is rich in detail, so one could get some of the details wrong in belief. Under adverse conditions involving false expectations, misleading evidence about what one's experiences will be, or extreme emotional states that disrupt belief-formation, larger errors are possible. Paradigmatically reliable processes like vision share these failings. Vision sometimes produces false beliefs under adverse conditions, or when we're looking at complex things. Still, it's so reliable as to be indispensible in ordinary life. Regarding phenomenal introspection as unreliable is about as radical as skepticism about the reliability of vision. While contemporary psychologists reject introspection into one's motivations and other psychological causal processes as unreliable, phenomenal introspection fares better. Daniel Kahneman, for example, writes that “experienced utility is best measured by moment-based methods that assess the experience of the present.”22 Even those most skeptical about the reliability of phenomenal introspection, like Eric Schwitzgebel, concede that we can reliably introspect whether we are in serious pain.23 Then we should be able to introspectively determine what pain is like. So I'll assume the reliability of phenomenal introspection. One can form a variety of beliefs using phenomenal introspection. For example, one can believe that one is having sound experiences of particular noises and visual experiences of different shades of color. When looking at a lemon and considering the phenomenal states that are yellow experiences, one can form some beliefs about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're bright experiences. And when considering experiences of pleasure, one can make some judgments about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're good experiences. Just as one can look inward at one's experience of lemon yellow and recognize its brightness, one can look inward at one's experience of pleasure and recognize its goodness.24 When I consider a situation of increasing pleasure, I can form the belief that things are better than they were before, just as I form the belief that there's more brightness in my visual field as lemon yellow replaces black. And when I suddenly experience pain, I can form the belief that things are worse in my experience than they were before. Having pleasure consists in one's experience having a positive hedonic tone. Without descending into metaphor, it's hard to give a further account of what pleasure is like than to say that when one has it, one feels good. As Aaron Smuts writes in defending the view of pleasure as hedonic tone, “to 'feel good' is about as close to an experiential primitive as we get.” 25 Fred Feldman sees pleasure as fundamentally an attitude rather than a hedonic tone.26 But as long as hedonic tones are real components of experience, phenomenal introspection will reveal pleasure's goodness. Opponents of the hedonic tone account of pleasure usually concede that hedonic tones exist, as Feldman seems to in discussing “sensory pleasures,” which he thinks his view helps us understand. Even on his view of pleasure, phenomenal introspection can produce the belief that some hedonic tones are good while others are bad. There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences. There are sensory pleasures, like the pleasure of tasting delicious food, receiving a massage, or resting your tired limbs in a soft bed after a hard day. There are the pleasures of seeing that our desires are satisfied, like the pleasure of winning a game, getting a promotion, or seeing a friend succeed. These experiences differ in many ways, just as the experiences of looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day differ. It's easy to see the appeal of Feldman's view that pleasures “have just about nothing in common phenomenologically” (79). But just as our experiences in looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day have brightness in common, pleasant experiences all have “a certain common quality – feeling good,” as Roger Crisp argues (109).27 As the analogy with brightness suggests, hedonic tone is phenomenologically very thin, and usually mixed with a variety of other experiences.28 Pleasure of any kind feels good, and displeasure of any kind feels bad. These feelings may or may not have bodily location or be combined with other sensory states like warmth or pressure. “Pleasure” and “displeasure” mean these thin phenomenal states of feeling good and feeling bad. As Joseph Mendola writes, “the pleasantness of physical pleasure is a kind of hedonic value, a single homogenous sensory property, differing merely in intensity as well as in extent and duration, which is yet a kind of goodness” (442).29 What if Feldman is right and hedonic states feel good in fundamentally different ways? Then phenomenal introspection suggests a pluralist variety of hedonism. Each fundamental flavor of pleasure will have a fundamentally different kind of goodness, as phenomenal introspection more accurate than mine will reveal. This isn't my view, but I suggest it to those convinced that hedonic tones are fundamentally heterogenous. If phenomenal introspection reliably informs us that pleasure is good, how can anyone believe that their pleasures are bad? Other processes of moral belief-formation are responsible for these beliefs. Someone who feels disgust or guilt about sex may not only regard sex as immoral, but the pleasure it produces as bad. Even if phenomenal introspection on sexual pleasure disposes one to believe that it's good, stronger negative emotional responses to it may more strongly dispose one to believe that it's bad, following the emotional perception model suggested in section 1.4. Explaining disagreement about pleasure's value in terms of other processes lets hedonists maintain that phenomenal introspection univocally supports pleasure's goodness. As long as negative judgments of pleasure come from unreliable processes instead of phenomenal introspection, the argument from disagreement eliminates them. The parallel between yellow’s brightness and pleasure’s goodness demonstrates the objectivity of the value detected in phenomenal introspection. Just as anyone's yellow experiences objectively are bright experiences, anyone's pleasure objectively is a good experience.30 While one's phenomenology is often called one's “subjective experience”, facts about it are still objective. “Subjective” in “subjective experience” means “internal to the mind”, not “ontologically dependent on attitudes towards it.” My yellow-experiences objectively have brightness. Anyone who thought my yellow-experiences lacked brightness would be mistaken. Pleasure similarly is objectively good. It's true that anyone's pleasure is good. Anyone who denies this is mistaken. As Mendola writes, the value detected in phenomenal introspection is “a plausible candidate for objective value” (712). Even though phenomenal introspection only tells me about my own phenomenal states, I can know that others' pleasure is good. Of course, I can't phenomenally introspect their pleasures, just as I can't phenomenally introspect pleasures that I'll experience next year. But if I consider my experiences of lemon yellow and ask what it would be like if others had the same experiences, I must think that they would be having bright experiences. Similarly, if in a pleasant moment I consider what it's like for others to have exactly the experience I'm having, I must think that they're having good experiences. If they have exactly the same experiences I'm having, their experiences will have exactly the same intrinsic properties as mine. This is also how I know that if I have the same experience in the future, it'll have the same intrinsic properties. Even though the only pleasure I can introspect is mine now, I should believe that others' pleasures and my pleasures at other times are good, just as I should believe that yellow experienced by others and myself at other times is bright. My argument thus favors the kind of universal hedonism that supports utilitarianism, not egoistic hedonism.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing happiness. Prefer the standard:

#### 1. Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought-thus framework is functionally a topicality argument about how to define the terms of the resolution. Definitions should be subject to theoretical contestation in the same way other words should be. My framework interprets ought as maximizing happiness. Prefer this definition:

#### A. Ground- every impact functions under util whereas other ethics flow to one side exclusively, kills fairness since we both need arguments to win.

#### B. Topic lit- most articles are written through the lens of util because they’re crafted for policymakers and the general public who take consequences to be important, not philosophy majors. Key to fairness and education- the lit is where we do research and determines how we engage in the round.

#### Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity-no debater ought to have an advantage otherwise you’re picking the better cheater. Education is a voter since it’s why schools fund debate and also provides portable skills for the real world. This is a framework warrant, not a reason to drop the debater.

#### 2. No intent foresight distinction – by willing any action with knowledge that it could cause X harm, we necessarily intend X to happen because we could always decide not to act. Thus, means-based frameworks devolve to the aff.

#### 3. Actor specificity. Policymaking must be consequentialist since collective action results in conflicts that only util can resolve. Side constraints paralyze state action since policy makers have to consider tradeoffs between multiple people. States lack intentionality since they're composed of multiple individuals—there is no act-omission distinction for them since they create permissions and prohibitions in terms of policies so authorizing action could never be considered an omission since the state assumes culpability in regulating the public domain.

#### 4. Reductionism: personal identity doesn’t exist.

Olson Eric T. (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield) “Personal Identity” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Aug 20, 2002; substantive revision Oct 28, 2010 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/#PsyApp> JW

Whatever psychological continuity may amount to, a more serious worry for the Psychological Approach is that you could be psychologically continuous with two past or future people at once. **If your cerebrum**—the upper part of the brain largely responsible for mental features—**were transplanted, the recipient would be** psychologically continuous with **you** by anyone's lights (even if there would also be important psychological differences). The Psychological Approach implies that she would be you. If we destroyed one of your cerebral hemispheres, the resulting being would also be psychologically continuous with you. (Hemispherectomy—even the removal of the left hemisphere, which controls speech—is considered a drastic but acceptable treatment for otherwise-inoperable brain tumors: see Rigterink 1980.) What **if we** did both at once, **destroy**ing **one hemisphere and transplant**ing **the other**? Then too, **the one who got the transplant**ed hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and according to the Psychological Approach **would be you.** But now **suppose** that **both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head.** (We needn't pretend, as some authors do, that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) **The two recipients**—call them Lefty and Righty—**will each be** psychologically continuous with **you.** The Psychological Approach as I have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. **But that cannot be**: Lefty and Righty are two, and **one thing cannot be** numerically identical with **two things.** Suppose Lefty is hungry at a time when Righty isn't. If you are Lefty, you are hungry at that time. If you are Righty, you aren't. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: **a contradiction.**

#### This means consequentialism – moral theories can’t focus on individuals since there’s nothing that unifies them across time. Only states of affairs can have value.

#### 5. Determinism is true: our bodies are controlled by biological principles only – there’s no room for free will.

Drescher Gary L. (Visiting Fellow at the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, PhD in Computer Science from MIT) “Good and Real: Demystifying Paradoxes from Physics to Ethics” Bradford Books May 5th 2006

One prominent notion is that we have both a ghostlike component (our consciousness or soul) and a mechanical component (everything else, including our body). The mechanical component is governed by the usual physical laws. The ghostlike component, unconstrained by those laws, can be said to be extraphysical. That is, the ghostlike component is something in addition to the kinds of things that exist in the physical realm, something ontologically extra.1 This so-called dualist view was advanced by Descartes in the 1600s. Dualism is a tempting compromise, but an awkward one, for reasons that are well known. The problem is that the mechanical principles that govern each particle of our bodies (and of the things around us) already specify how each of those particles behaves, which in turn specifies how each of us behaves as a whole. But in that case, there is no room for the ghostlike component to have any influence—if it did so, it would have to make some of the particles sometimes violate the principles that all particles are always observed to obey whenever we check carefully. (Descartes was admirably precise about the locus of this supposed intervention—he proposed that the interface between the ghostlike component and the physical world occurs within the brain in the pineal gland.)2 Thus, we have the mind– body problem: how can we reconcile the nature of the mind with the mechanical nature of the body? Some see quantum-mechanical uncertainty as the wiggle room that could let a ghostlike consciousness nudge some of the particles in our body without violating the rules of physics. But in fact—even apart from the newer, deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics discussed in chapter 4—any such nudging would at least constitute a change in the probability distribution for some of the particles in our body, and even that would break the (probabilistic) rules that particles always seem to obey. Granted, it could be the case that particles somewhere in our brains behave differently than particles ever do when we watch them carefully, violating otherwise exceptionless rules (be they deterministic or probabilistic rules). But since the rules are otherwise exceptionless (as far as we can tell), there should be a strong presumption that there’s no exception in our brains either—especially in view of the longstanding retreat of other beliefs about the alleged physically exceptional behavior of conscious or living organisms. The doctrine of vitalism, for instance, supposed that there is some distinctive ‘‘life force’’ that animates living things, enabling them to grow and move. But the more we learned of biochemistry—DNA and RNA, ATP energy cycles, neurotransmitters, and the like—the more we understood that the growth and movement of living things is explicable in terms of the same molecular building blocks, following the same exceptionless rules, as when those building blocks exist outside of animate objects. And the more we learn about computation and neuroscience, the more we discover how cognitive processes that were once supposed to require an ethereal spirit—perception, motor control, memory, spatial reasoning, even key aspects of more general reasoning (e.g., deduction, induction, planning)—can be implemented by basic switching elements (e.g., neurons or transistors) that need not themselves be conscious, or even animate. By monitoring brain activity, we can see different regions of the brain performing computations when different sorts of cognitive functions are performed (language, singing, spatial imaging, etc.). And when certain brain regions are damaged by injury or illness, the corresponding cognitive abilities degrade or vanish. To be sure, we are still far from understanding human cognition as a whole. But the trend in our knowledge does not lend comfort to the expectation that any particles in our brain will, at long last, ever be found to deviate sometimes from the same rules that such particles otherwise always obey.

#### Only consequentialism is consistent with determinism.

Greene and Cohen Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen (Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, Princeton University) “For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything” November 26th 2004 Phil.Trans.R.Soc.Lond.B (2004)359,1775–1785 <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1693457/pdf/15590618.pdf> JW

The forward-looking–consequentialist approach to punishment works with all three responses to the problem of free will, including hard determinism. This is because consequentialists are not concerned with whether anyone is really innocent or guilty in some ultimate sense that might depend on people’s having free will, but only with the likely effects of punishment. (Of course, one might wonder what it means for a hard determinist to justify any sort of choice. We will return to this issue in x 8.) The retributivist approach, by contrast, is plausibly regarded as requiring free will and the rejection of hard determinism. Retributivists want to know whether the defendant truly deserves to be punished. Assuming one can deserve to be punished only for actions that are freely willed, hard determinism implies that no one really deserves to be punished. Thus, hard determinism combined with retributivism requires the elimination of all punishment, which does not seem reasonable. This leaves retributivists with two options: compatibilism and libertarianism. Libertarianism, for reasons given above, and despite its intuitive appeal, is scientifically suspect. At the very least, the law should not depend on it. It seems, then, that retributivism requires compatibilism. Accordingly, the standard legal account of punishment is compatibilist.

#### 6. Morality must be universalizable.

Pettit Phillip “Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 50 No. 199 pp. 175-190 April 2000 JW

Every prescription as to what an agent ought to do should be capable of being universalized, so that it applies not just to that particular agent, and not just to that particular place or time or context, or whatever.7 So at any rate we generally assume in our moral reasoning. If we think that it is right for one agent in one circumstance to act in a certain way, but wrong for another, then we commit ourselves to there being some further descriptive difference between the two cases, in particular a difference of a non- particular or universal kind. Thus if we say that an agent A ought to choose option O in circumstances C – these may include the character of the agent, the behaviour of others, the sorts of consequences on offer, and the like – then we assume that something similar would hold for any similarly placed agent. We do not think that the particular identity of agent A is relevant to what A ought to do, any more than we think that the particular location or date is relevant to that issue. In making an assumption about what holds for any agent in C- type circumstances, of course, we may not be committing ourselves to anything of very general import. It may be, for all the universalizability constraint requires, that C-type circumstances are highly specific, so specific, indeed, that no other agent is ever likely to confront them.

#### Only consequentialism can be universalized.

Pettit 2 Phillip “Non-Consequentialism and Universalizability” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 50 No. 199 pp. 175-190 April 2000 JW

There is no difficulty in seeing how the universalizability challenge is supposed to be met under consequentialist doctrine. Suppose that I accept consequentialist doctrine and believe of an agent A that in A’s particular circumstances C, A ought to choose an option O. For simplicity, suppose that I am myself that agent and that as a believer in consequentialism I think of myself that I ought to do O in C. If that option really is right by my consequentialist lights, then that will be because of the neutral values that it promotes. But if those neutral values make O the right option for me in those circumstances, so they will make it the right option for any other agent in such circumstances. Thus I can readily square the prescription to which my belief in consequentialism leads with my belief in universalizability. I can happily universalize my self-prescription to a prescription for any arbitrary agent in similar circumstances. In passing, a comment on the form of the prescription that the universalizability challenge will force me to endorse. I need not think that it is right that in the relevant circumstances every agent do O; that suggests a commitment to a collective pattern of behaviour. I shall only be forced to think, in a person-by-person or distributive way, that for every agent it is right that in those circumstances he do O. Let doing O in C amount to swimming to the help of a child in trouble in the water. Universalizability would not force me to think that it is right that everyone swim to the help of a child in such a situation; there might be many people around, and, were they all to swim, then they would frustrate one another’s efforts. It only requires me to think, as we colloquially put it, that it is right that anyone swim to the help of the child: no one is exempt from this person-by-person non-collective prescription (even if all do face a collective requirement to decide who in particular is going to do the swimming).8 So much for the straightforward way in which consequentialism can make room for universalizability. But how is the universalizability challenge supposed to be met under non-consequentialist theories? According to non- consequentialist theory, the right choice for any agent is to instantiate a certain pattern P: this may be the pattern of conforming to the categorical imperative, manifesting virtue, respecting rights, honouring special obligations, or whatever. Suppose that I accept such a theory and that it leads me to say of an agent – again, let us suppose, myself – that I ought to choose O in these circumstances C, or that O is the right choice for me in these circumstances. Can I straightforwardly say, as I could under consequentialist doctrine, that just for the reasons that O is the right choice for me – in this case, that it involves instantiating pattern P – so it will be the right choice for any agent in C-type circumstances? I shall argue that there are difficulties in the path of such a straightforward response and that these raise a problem for non-consequentialism. III. A PROBLEM FOR NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST UNIVERSALIZATION Suppose I do say, in the straightforward way, that pattern P requires not just that I do O in C, but also, for any agent whatsoever, that that agent should do O in C as well. Suppose I say, in effect, that it is right for me to do O in C only if it would be right for any agent X to do O in C. Whatever makes it right that I do O in C makes it right, so the response goes, that any agent do O in C. This response, so I now want to argue, is going to lead me, as a non- consequentialist thinker, into trouble. Judging that an action is right involves approving of the deed and gives one a normative reason to prefer it. Imagine someone who said that he thought his doing something or other, or indeed another person’s doing something or other, was the right choice and who thereby communicated that he approved of it. Would it not raise a question as to whether he knew what he was saying if he went on to add that he did not think that there was any good reason for him to prefer that the action should take place rather than not? If the judgement of rightness is to play its distinctive role in ad- judicating or ranking actions – if it is to connect with approval in the stan- dard way – then, whether or not it actually motivates the person judging, it must be taken to provide him with a normative reason to prefer that the action should take place. When I think that it is right that I do O in C, therefore, I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer that I do O. And when I assert that it is right that anyone should do O in C-type circumstances, I commit myself – again because of the reason-giving force of the notion of rightness – to there being a normative reason for holding a broader preference. I commit myself to there being a normative reason for me to prefer, with any agent whatsoever, that in C-type circumstances that agent do O. The problem with these reasons and these commitments, however, is that they may come apart. For it is often going to be possible that, perversely, the best way for me to satisfy the preference that, for any arbitrary agent X, that agent do O in C-type circumstances, is to choose non-O myself in those circumstances.9 Choosing non-O myself means that there is one person – me – in respect of whom the general preference is not satisfied, but in the perverse circumstances it will mean that there are more agents or actions in respect of whom it is satisfied than there would be did I choose O. Perverse circumstances of this kind are not just abstract possibilities, for what an agent does can easily affect the incentives or opportunities of others in a way that generates perversity. The best way to get people to renounce violence may be to take it up oneself and threaten resistance to their violence; the best way to get people to help their children may be to proselytize and not pay due attention to one’s own. More generally, the best way to promote the instantiation of pattern P, where this is the basic pattern to which one swears non-consequentialist allegiance, may be to flout that pattern oneself.

### Inherency

#### Armenia has plans for new nuclear reactors but they’ve been postponed –they’re stuck with Metsamor for the foreseeable future.

Sahakyan 4-27-16 Armine (Human rights activist based in Armenia) “Armenia Continues to Gamble on Aging Nuclear Plant in a Quake-Prone Area” Huffington Post <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/armine-sahakyan/armenia-continues-to-gamb_b_9788186.html> JW

Armenia was supposed to have a new nuclear power plant this year that would replace one that National Geographic suggested a few years ago was the most dangerous in the world. The new plant was to have twice the electrical-generating capacity of the current one, allowing Armenia not only to meet its own power needs but to export electricity to neighboring counties. We’re well in to 2016, and not only is the new plant not operational — work on it hasn’t even begun.

#### Armenia has existing legislation that vows to build new nuclear reactors.

Adamyan 14 Mane “THE CLOSURE OF METSAMOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: COSTS AND BENEFIT” AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA, A MASTER’S ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FOR PARTIAL FULFILLEMENT OF THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS May 2014 <https://dspace.aua.am/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/615/Mane_Adamyan.pdf?sequence=1> JW

In October 2009 the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia has adopted a law about building a new nuclear power plant in Armenia. According to the law, the new nuclear power plant will be based on the Russian designed VVER-1000 whose design life reaches 60 years. Based on the initial calculations the total cost of the construction of the plant equals 5 billion USD. Even though the international experience has shown, the initial calculations rarely coincide with the real expenses and since 2002 there has been significant escalation in worldwide materials costs64, this study takes the initial price for the new NPP.

### Plan Text

#### Resolved: the Republic of Armenia ought to prohibit the production of nuclear power.

### Meltdown Adv.

#### The Metsamor power plant – Armenia’s only form of nuclear power – is incredibly dangerous. Uses old tech and lies on earthquake territory.

Lavelle et al 11 Marianne Lavelle and Josie Garthwaite (National Geographic News) “Is Armenia's Nuclear Plant the World's Most Dangerous?” National Geographic News April 14th 2011 <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2011/04/110412-most-dangerous-nuclear-plant-armenia/> JW

In the shadow of Mount Ararat, the beloved and sorrowful national symbol of Armenia, stands a 31-year-old nuclear plant that is no less an emblem of the country's resolve and its woe. The Metsamor power station is one of a mere handful of remaining nuclear reactors of its kind that were built without primary containment structures. All five of these first-generation water-moderated Soviet units are past or near their original retirement ages, but one salient fact sets Armenia's reactor apart from the four in Russia. Metsamor lies on some of Earth's most earthquake-prone terrain. In the wake of Japan's quake-and-tsunami-triggered Fukushima Daiichi crisis, Armenia's government faces renewed questions from those who say the fateful combination of design and location make Metsamor among the most dangerous nuclear plants in the world. Seven years ago, the European Union's envoy was quoted as calling the facility "a danger to the entire region," but Armenia later turned down the EU's offer of a 200 million euro ($289 million) loan to finance Metsamor's shutdown. The United States government, which has called the plant "aging and dangerous," underwrote a study that urged construction of a new one. Plans to replace Metsamor after 2016—with a new nuclear plant at the same location—are under way. But until then, Armenia has little choice but to keep Metsamor's turbines turning. As Armenians learned in the bone-chilling cold and dark days when the plant was closed down for several years, Metsamor provides more than 40 percent of power for a nation that is isolated from its neighbors and closed off from other sources of energy. "People compare the potential risk with the potential shortage of electricity that might arise if the plant were closed," says Ara Tadevosyan, director of Mediamax, a major Armenian news agency. "Having had this negative experience, people prefer to live with it, and believe that it will not be damaged in an earthquake." A Need for Nuclear The 3 million people of landlocked Armenia are unique in their energy dependence on one aging nuclear power reactor. Regional conflicts that broke out in the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the smallest of its former republics at odds with its neighbors. Azerbaijan to the east and Turkey to the west closed their borders with Armenia, cutting off most routes for oil and natural gas. The blockade, which remains in place to this day, heaped a new economic wound onto an old scar. After the massacre of more than one million Armenians during World War I and subsequent conflict, the Soviets ceded the western part of the historic Armenian homeland to Turkey. The snow-capped peak of Mount Ararat, still revered in Armenia as the resting place of Noah's Ark, emblazoned on trinkets and storefronts throughout the land, is now in Turkey. (Related: "Tough Situations in Difficult Countries") The Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant is just 10 miles (16 kilometers) from the Turkish border—in an area that includes the fertile agricultural region of the Aras River valley. It's only 20 miles (36 kilometers) from the capital of Yerevan, home to one-third of the nation's population. And it is in the midst of a strong seismic zone that stretches in a broad swath from Turkey to the Arabian Sea near India. On December 7, 1988, a 6.8-magnitude earthquake struck, killing 25,000 people and leaving 500,000 homeless. Some 60 miles (100 kilometers) from the epicenter, Metsamor, then with two operating reactors, survived the temblor without damage, according to Armenian officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Because the devastating earthquake heightened concerns about the seismic hazard to the facility, the Soviet government shut the nuclear plant down. Tadevosyan said that public attitudes toward Metsamor have been strongly shaped by the nation's experience living without it during the six-and-a-half years that followed. "There were severe power shortages during the winter months," he recalled in a telephone interview from Yerevan. "We had a situation where you had one hour of power a day, and sometimes no power at all for a week. You can imagine—it was as cold in the apartment as it was in the street." A pipeline to import Russian natural gas through neighboring Georgia in the north was built in 1993, but it was regularly interrupted by "sabotage and separatist strife in that country," as the World Bank noted in a 2006 report. In 1995, the government of then-independent Armenia decided to restart the younger of the two reactors. Richard Wilson, nuclear physics professor emeritus at Harvard University, was part of a delegation of outside experts in Armenia at the time. He recalls that the Russians who came from the airport to help reopen the reactor were cheered from the side of the road upon their arrival. When the unit restarted, "It became a source of energy and a source of hope for Armenia," explained Tadevosyan. "It was a symbol that dark times are over: 'We have electricity.' And it is still seen as such today." Fortifying an Old War Horse Armenian officials say modifications made to the reactor over the past 15 years have made it safer. Before Metsamor was reopened, Armenia airlifted more than 500 tons of equipment to the site (most of it from Russia), for upgrades, according to the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry group in the United States. In the years since the restart, the IAEA says close to 1,400 safety improvements have been made. Those included "seismic-resistant" storage batteries, reinforcement of the reactor building, electrical cabinets and cooling towers. The United States provided equipment for a seismic-resistant, spray-pond cooling system. Fire safety was viewed as a critical deficiency at the plant, so extensive upgrades were made, including 140 new fire doors. The result, officials say, is a reactor that is much safer than the original unit that went into service at the site on January 10, 1980. When construction began in 1969, Metsamor was a VVER 440, Model 230, an example of one of the earliest pressurized-water nuclear plant designs, developed by the Soviets between 1956 and 1970. It was not the same design as Chernobyl, which used solid graphite instead of water to moderate—or slow down—the fission reaction. (The graphite fire contributed to the world's worst nuclear disaster, and 11 of these early graphite-moderated reactors continue to operate in Russia.) (Related: "How is Japan's Nuclear Disaster Different?") The VVER 440, in contrast, used water both to moderate and to cool the fuel, as in Western designs. (Its initials, in Russian, stand for "water-water-power-reactor.") In fact, the VVER system, with multiple cooling loops, was seen as "more forgiving" than Western plants, according to archived documents from the International Nuclear Safety Program, a former U.S. Department of Energy program aimed at aiding in safety improvements at Soviet plants. VVER 440 units would be able to stand a power loss for a longer period of time than Western plants because of the large coolant volume. After Japan's nuclear crisis erupted, the head of the Armenian State Committee on Nuclear Safety Regulation, Ashot Martirosian, pointed to Metsamor's cooling system as one reason Armenians should rest assured. "Such an emergency situation cannot arise here," he told Radio Free Europe. (Related: "Japan Battles to Avert Nuclear Disaster" and "Pictures—A Rare Look Inside Fukushima Daiichi") Nuclear engineering expert Robert Kalantari, whose Framingham, Massachusetts, firm, Engineering Planning and Management, consults for U.S. and Canadian regulatory authorities, says Metsamor is like any other nuclear plant in operation worldwide. Although its safety features are different, all have to be able to be shut down safely during a so-called "design basis accident," the kind of accident anticipated in its design. He said he is confident that Metsamor could operate safely in such an accident, and that it could cope even with accidents beyond its design basis. "Metsamor is no less safe than any other reactor in operation throughout the world," Kalantari said. "Armenia as an independent country cannot survive without [Metsamor], which is a functioning, safe, and reliable source of energy for the country." Lack of Containment But the VVER 440s share one characteristic with Chernobyl that has been a continuing concern to many who live nearby: They have no containment structure. Instead, VVER 440s rely on an "accident localization system," designed to handle small ruptures. In the event of a large rupture, the system would vent directly to the atmosphere. "They cannot cope with large primary circuit breaks," the NEI's 1997 Source Book on Soviet nuclear plants concluded. "As with most Soviet-designed plants, electricity production by the VVER-440 Model V230s came at the expense of safety." Antonia Wenisch of the Austrian Institute of Applied Ecology in Vienna, calls Metsamor "among the most dangerous" nuclear plants still in operation. A rupture "would almost certainly immediately and massively fail the confinement," she said in an email. "From that point, there is an open reactor building, a core with no water in it, and accident progression with no mitigation at all."

#### Armenian Meltdown kills agriculture and threatens four other countries.

Sahakyan 4/27-16 Armine (Human rights activist based in Armenia) “Armenia Continues to Gamble on Aging Nuclear Plant in a Quake-Prone Area” Huffington Post <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/armine-sahakyan/armenia-continues-to-gamb_b_9788186.html> JW

So Armenia continues to make due with the Metsamor plant. The International Atomic Energy Agency has inspected the facility, and declared it safe. But other experts are skeptical. The big worry is that the plant has no containment building — a steel or concrete shell that would prevent radiation from escaping during an accident. If a rupture developed in the reactor’s skin, radiation would have to be vented into the air to prevent a build-up of pressure that could trigger a meltdown or explosion. The longer a nuclear plant operates, the thinner its reactor skin becomes, experts say — and thinner skins are subject to rupture. A rupture would mean “an open reactor building, a core with no water in it (to cool the reactor) and accident progression with no mitigation at all,” said Antonia Wenisch of the Vienna-based Austrian Institute of Applied Ecology in Vienna. The stakes in Armenia’s nuclear gamble are high. An accident at Metsamor would devastate the capital of Yerevan, only 20 miles away and home to a third of Armenia’s population. It would also render unusable the Aras River Valley, Armenia’s premier agricultural area, where Metasamor is situated. In addition, radiation would envelop Turkey, whose border is only 10 miles from the nuclear facility, and Armenian neighbors Georgia and Iran. Despite the danger of an older nuclear plant situated in an earthquake-prone area, Armenians are unwilling to return to the days without electricity, when people died in ice-cold apartments, stripped forest land of trees they could burn, and drew down the water in Lake Sevan to dangerous levels to obtain power from the dam there. Until the government is able to obtain the financing for a new nuclear plant, Armenia will continue to hope that Metsamor will not fail. And the region and the world will join Armenians in holding their breath.

#### New reactors won’t solve – can still melt down and cause increased cancer rates.

Idayatova 5/20/16 Anakhanum “Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear plant can cause major radiation accident” Trend News Agency <http://en.trend.az/world/turkey/2536379.html> JW

Armenia's Metsamor nuclear power plant is a major threat not only for the entire Caucasus region, but it also poses a danger for the Armenian population, Malik Ayub Sumbal, journalist, expert on geopolitical and international conflicts, told Trend via e-mail May 20. Sumbal, who is also the founder of The Caspian Times news platform, said that the international community must learn a lesson from an accident at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and prevent another disaster, which may be caused by Armenia's Metsamor nuclear power plant. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster was an energy accident at the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant, initiated primarily by the tsunami that was triggered by the earthquake on March 11, 2011. "The Metsamor nuclear power plant also poses a great threat for Turkey, as it is located just 16 kilometers off its borders," the expert said. "Moreover, the plant can cause cancer and other dangerous diseases among people living on the border with Armeni**a**." Armenia has a nuclear power plant, Metsamor, built in 1970. The power plant was closed after a devastating earthquake in Spitak in 1988. But despite the international protests, the power plant's operation was resumed in 1995. Moreover, a second reactor was launched there. According to the ecologists and scholars all over the region, seismic activity of this area turns operation of the Metsamor nuclear power plant in an extremely dangerous enterprise, even if a new type of reactor is built.

#### Harms to Armenian agriculture cause mass increases in poverty.

McKinley et al 2 Terry (Senior Policy Adviser on poverty and macroeconomic policies in the Bureau for Development Policy, UNDP, New York. He is the editor of UNDP’s global poverty report, Overcoming Human Poverty. He is the author of The Distribution of Wealth in Rural China, coauthor of Implementing a Human Development Strategy and editor of Macroeconomic Policies, Growth and Poverty Reduction. Much of his work in recent years has centered on China, Mongolia, Central Asia, Vietnam and the transition economies of the former Soviet Union and eastern and central Europe.) (this report is published with others, but the part I cut is just by Terry McKinley) “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Armenia” A Report Commissioned by the Poverty Group, Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations Development Programme August 2002 <http://www.ipc-undp.org/publications/reports/Armenia.pdf> JW

In order to reduce Armenia’s widespread poverty, a development strategy and supporting public policies are needed to generate growth with equity. Given the high incidence of poverty, what is needed is a strategy for growth that is effective above all in raising the material living standards of the poorer half of the population. In other words, Armenia should seek a pattern of growth that is more “pro-poor.” But how is such a pattern of growth to be achieved? For growth to be effective in reducing poverty, the additional income that it generates should flow disproportionately to the sectors in which the poor work (such as small-scale agriculture) , to the areas in which they live (such as mountainous regions) or to the factors of production that they possess (such as land or low-skilled labour). Alternatively, the character of growth should pull the poor into higher-income sectors (such as rural non-farm enterprises) or into more rapidly growing regions (such as central Armenia) or investment in human capital should be allocated to the poor to enable them to migrate to more skilled jobs at home and abroad. A combination of both approaches—“bottom-up” growth as well as “top-down” growth—is often necessary. Excessive reliance on “bottom-up” growth could deprive the more efficient sectors of the economy of resources while excessive reliance on “top-down” growth could fail to direct resources to the poor. In both approaches, the state must play an active role in directly channeling resources to priority sectors (such as through investment in agriculture) or indirectly influencing the flow of resources (such as through pricing or exchange rate policies). If the right combination of public policies is implemented, there need be no conflict between growth and greater equity. Bringing the poorer half of the Armenian labour force into productive employment would greatly stimulate growth as well as help to reduce poverty dramatically. Under current conditions, Armenia has achieved moderate growth but has not succeeded in lowering inequality. Hence, widespread poverty persists. Inequality rose sharply in the early years of the transition and has remained high. This implies that very little of the additional income generated by growth has gone to the poor since they lack access to productive resources and employment. This helps to explain the so-called “mystery” of growth without poverty reduction. In this chapter, we examine more closely the character of growth by investigating trends in its sectoral composition among agriculture, industry and services. In the next chapter, we examine trends in the relationship between growth and employment. We start with agriculture, which has played a crucial role in mitigating poverty during the transition. The impact of agriculture on poverty Before the transition, Armenia was a relatively industrialized country. Agriculture played a minor role in the economy. In 1990, for example, it accounted for only about 13 per cent of national output (see Table 2.1). However, as we saw in Chapter 2, by 1993—within three short years—this share skyrocketed to over 46 per cent because the Armenian industrial sector collapsed during the early years of the transition. This resulted in a rapid and wrenching process of de-industrialization in which agriculture played the role of a “shock absorber”, cushioning the impact on people’s living standards of the drastic fall in industrial output. But the agricultural sector was also simultaneously undergoing sweeping structural changes. In 1991-92, in the midst of the industrial collapse, the large collective and state farms that had dominated the sector were disbanded and 70 per cent of the arable land was privatized and parceled out to individual farmers.1 The complete privatization of livestock followed soon afterwards. As a result, most farms have become mixed cropping and livestock production units. These changes helped to soften the potentially devastating impact of “shock therapy” on people’s livelihoods. The early policies of the government in equitably distributing the country’s agricultural wealth had a propoor impact.

### Prolif Adv.

#### Metasomor can be used to make nuclear weapons

Azer News 9/13/16 [S.Korea says Armenia poses nuke threat to entire region, <http://www.azernews.az/region/102159.html>, ml]

The Armenian Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) poses a nuclear threat and the international community must assess that fact, Choe Chong-dae, president of Dae-kwang International Co., said in an article in The Korea Times. Choe Chong-dae, who is also director of the Korean-Swedish Association, said that Hrant Bagratyan, former prime minister of Armenia, stressed that Armenia has created nuclear weaponry. The author said that Bagratyan’s comments raise profound concern. “Armenian former prime minister's comments should not be taken lightly, the author said. “Armenian citizens have played an instrumental role in smuggling nuclear and radioactive nuclear waste materials, as reflected in media reports exposing them.” “Many groups of Armenian citizens associated with the smuggling of radioactive materials were exposed many times in the territories of neighboring countries,” he added. “Furthermore, some Armenian groups even tried to smuggle highly enriched uranium and cesium-137 from Armenia in 2003 and 2010.” The author added that three Armenian citizens who previously worked at Metsamor NPP were arrested in Georgia in April 2016 for attempting to smuggle and illegally sell nuclear materials. “One of the detainees was identified as a former associate of the Armenian secret service,” the author said. “This group planned to sell a quantity of uranium-238 costing $200 million to the Middle East.” “There is great nuclear security risk to the region regarding Metsamor NPP, especially in the context of the occupation of Azerbaijan territory by Armenia,” the article said. “The dubious condition of spent fuel and waste material from Metsamor NPP also raises safety concerns.” The author said that built in 1976, Metsamor NPP is based on technologies from Chernobyl NPP that ceased operations in 1988 due to a nuclear disaster. “The operation of the Metsamor NPP in Armenia and the cases of smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials from this NPP poses a nuclear threat to the entire region, and it also constitutes a serious threat and danger for the Korean investment in the region,” the article said. The author said that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev delivered a speech at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on March 31-April 1, 2016. “The president’s speech drew great attention from the international community to Metsamor NPP and called on nations to take measures against the threat emanating from this facility,” he added. “We urge that the International Atomic Energy Agency and global community assess and exercise strict control of the systematic cases of smuggling of radioactive materials arranged by Armenia,” the article said. “Threats of the use of nuclear weapons by Armenian officials who are obsessed with revenge against Azerbaijan are unnerving,” the author said. “If Armenia and North Korea continue to pursue their nuclear weapon ambitions and smuggling of nuclear materials, we will all face hastening self-destruction.”

#### Armenian nuclearization destabilizes the Caucuses and causes Iran prolif—risk is extremely high now

Petra Posega 5-30-16 [Security Studies candidate with a degree in political science. She writes for platforms and magazines on four continents, including Geopolitics of Energy, Addleton and AEI Insights: An International Journal of Asia-Europe Relations, Dangerous Nuclear Security Failures in Russia's Backyard, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dangerous-nuclear-security-failures-russias-backyard-16392?page=show>, ml]

Nuclear security is seemingly at the forefront of global attention, but the large framework of international safeguards is increasingly perceived as a toothless tiger. In the contemporary age, where asymmetric threats to security are among the most dangerous, the time is nigh to mitigate the risk of rogue actors having potential access to materials that are necessary to develop nuclear weapons. Nowhere is this urgency more pivotal than in already turbulent areas, such as the South Caucasus. With many geopolitical instabilities, lasting for decades with no completely bulletproof conflict resolution process in place, adding the threat of potential nuclear weapons means creating a house of cards that can cause a complete collapse of regional peace and stability. That is precisely why Armenia’s recently uncovered recurring actions toward the goal of building its own nuclear capacity must be addressed more seriously. They should also attract a bolder response to ensure safety of the region is sustained. According to a report by the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Armenia has established a record of illegal trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. There have been several serious incidents spanning from 1999 onward. A large number of reported incidents has occurred on the country’s border with Georgia, leading the IAEA to conclude there is high probability that a so-called Armenian route does in fact exist. There is a further evidence to support this assertion. An unusually high number of Armenians have been caught in nuclear trafficking activities. Additionally, some of the incidents that made their way into the official reports suggest that the main focus of trafficking activities is the smuggling of materials that could be used for nuclear weapons. There were also reports suggesting the trafficking of other radioactive materials that could be used for alternate purposes, such as building a so-called dirty bomb. Since the stakes are always high with nuclear weapons, this threat must not be underrated and dismissed too easily. Only days after the latest illegal activities were uncovered by border control in April 2016, former Armenian Prime Minister Bagratyan shocked the international public with the claim that Armenia indeed has nuclear capabilities and the ability to further develop them. The main reason for Armenia to possess nuclear weapons is to deter neighbors such as Turkey and Azerbaijan. More specifically, to discourage them from resorting to aggressive foreign policy measures, and to mitigate potential threats to Armenian territorial integrity, especially in the disputed regions. Even though Turkey and its intelligence network were quick to dismiss these claims and labeled them as a failed attempt to increase Armenia’s geopolitical importance, as well as to deter its much more militarily capable neighbors, such claims should not be taken lightly, either. Thus, there is no cause for immediate alarm. However, there should be increased interest in the international community to investigate these serious claims. If documented, they would pose a grave threat of destabilization to an already turbulent region. They would also trigger deepening of hostilities and mistrust in the extremely delicate regional peace framework. The prospects and danger of rogue actors potentially acquiring a dirty bomb are rising on the international agenda. The recently detected activities in South Caucasus showed that substantial efforts have been made to smuggle and illegally sell uranium-238, which is highly radioactive. At the beginning of 2016, a different group was trying to smuggle a highly radioactive cesium isotope that usually forms as a waste product in nuclear reactors. What is also worrying is that the majority of the activities are occurring in highly unstable and unmonitored territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia that are under the control of separatists, such as Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. The mere existence of the Armenian route goes to show that illegal activities can flourish in the region’s security “blind spots.” There is also the Iranian connection. Armenia borders this Middle Eastern country that found itself at the center of global attention until the ratification of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. The international agreement supposedly effectively mitigated the risk of Tehran developing its own nuclear capabilities and established a proper international regime to monitor compliance with the provisions that were put in place. However, fears remain over future developments on this issue. The unusually large amount of truck traffic between Armenia and Iran further fuels suspicion on what exactly takes place under the cloak of darkness. Iran is not the only powerful Armenian ally that holds knowledge on all things nuclear. Yerevan has been extremely close with Russia since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and fully relies on Moscow when it comes to upholding its security, territorial integrity and political autonomy. Russia is, of course, a member of the elite nuclear club, and holds one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear capabilities in the world (outside the United States). This is, of course, a leftover of the Cold War era and fears of the Eastern or the Western devil, depending on which side of the wall the threat was perceived. It is worrying that some of the nuclear material that was trying to find its way into Armenia through South Ossetia has been, at least according to some reports, traced back to Russian nuclear facilities. This is of course no small wonder, since Russia is the official supplier of nuclear fuel for the only nuclear power plant in Armenia—the Metsamor nuclear plant, which supplies roughly 40 percent of the country’s electricity. But the reactor itself demonstrates another facet of the nuclear threats that Armenia poses, namely, nuclear safety threats. The reactor is extremely outdated, and there are no proper safeguards and safety mechanisms installed to ensure adequate monitoring of its operations and recognition of potential faults in the system. The world just marked the thirtieth anniversary of the devastating Chernobyl accident, and it is unsettling to know there is high risk of a similar disaster in an adjacent area. Nuclear safety, like nuclear security, should be taken extremely seriously. Any outdated systems, like the one at the Metsamor nuclear plant, should be either closed down until repaired and adjusted to proper security standards, or else shut down completely if the plant is unable to follow necessary legal provisions. To make future prospects even grimmer, the area where the Metsamor plant is located is said to have very turbulent seismic activity. Thus, not only is the plant dangerous due to outdated security systems and technology, but also due to a naturally occurring phenomenon that is likely to cause significant damage to the plant itself. Armenian officials should protect their own population, and not risk a nuclear holocaust. But instead, they continue to stubbornly expand their grand ambitions and self-entrapment. Reviewing the manifold danger that Armenia represents in nuclear terms, there are no simple answers, although there are a few clear conclusions. The Metsamor power plant should be seen as an imminent and serious threat to millions of people in Asia, Middle East and Europe, and shut down. Additionally, this issue should not be shielded anymore for the sake of pure machtpolitik. Macht prefers secrecy and coercion, and we already well know how that always ends. After Chernobyl, Three Mile Island and the Fukushima disaster, the last thing the world needs is another nuclear catastrophe. Additionally, clear ambitions are present in Armenia to develop and acquire nuclear capabilities. For more than one reason, that is an extremely dangerous endeavor to pursue—not just for the region and adjacent countries, but also for a world that should be evolving towards a nuclear-free future instead. Consequently, we must do all we can to prevent yet another blow to an already shaky Non-Proliferation Treaty. Conclusively, the Caucasus is full of frozen yet unresolved, highly polarizing, toxic and potentially inflammable conflicts. We also have to be aware that the raging flames of instability from Syria and Iraq are not far away. We do not need another nuclear inferno. It is high time to localize the overheated blaze of the Middle East. A good start would be stabilizing the Caucasus in a just, fair and sustainable way.

#### Central Asia conflict will escalate to US-Russian nuclear war.

McDermott 11—Roger McDermott, Honorary senior fellow, department of politics and international relations, university of Kent at Canterbury and senior fellow in Eurasian military studies, Jamestown Foundation [December 6, 2011, “General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=38748&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=dfb6e8da90b34a10f50382157e9bc117]

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister AnatoliySerdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that thepotential for armed conflict along the entire Russian periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; MoskovskiyKomsomolets, November 28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to escalate into large-scale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; MoskovskiyKomsomolets, KrasnayaZvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired“color revolutions” similar to the Arab Springand the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central Asian security much more seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention—especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

#### Iran prolif causes nuke war – miscalc and rapid escalation.

Goldberg 12 Jeffrey (Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the Atlantic.) “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon: Jeffrey Goldberg” January 23rd 2012 Bloomberg <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg> JW

Jan. 24 (Bloomberg) -- One of the arguments often made in favor of bombing Iran to cripple its nuclear program is this: The mullahs in Tehran are madmen who believe it is their consecrated duty to destroy the perfidious Zionist entity (which is to say, Israel) and so are building nuclear weapons to launch at Tel Aviv at the first favorable moment. It’s beyond a doubt that the Iranian regime would like to bring about the destruction of Israel. However, the mullahs are also cynics and men determined, more than anything, to maintain their hold on absolute power. Which is why it’s unlikely that they would immediately use their new weapons against Israel. An outright attack on Israel - - a country possessing as many as 200 nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems -- would lead to the obliteration of Tehran, the deaths of millions, and the destruction of Iran’s military and industrial capabilities. The mullahs know this. But here’s the problem: It may not matter. The threat of a deliberate nuclear attack pales in comparison with the chance that a nuclear-armed Iran could accidentally trigger a cataclysmic exchange with Israel. WARP-SPEED ESCALATION The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation. Here’s one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand. Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollah’s political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of August’ on steroids.” Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance? Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear strategy, told me that in a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime safeguards, making an accidental exchange more likely. “A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch-readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice,” he said. “Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack.” Then comes the problem of misinterpreted data, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.” ‘COGNITIVE BIAS’ Blair notes that in a crisis it isn’t irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of incorrect information,” he said. Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is far-fetched -- make the situation even more hazardous. “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t have any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.” The answer to this predicament is to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,” Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.” Ross argues that the Obama administration’s approach -- the imposition of steadily more debilitating sanctions -- may yet work. There’s a chance, albeit slim, that he may be right: New sanctions are just beginning to bite and, combined with an intensified cyberwar and sabotage efforts, they might prove costly enough to deter Tehran. But opponents of military action make a mistake in arguing that a nuclear Iran is a containable problem. It is not.

### Terror Adv.

#### Nuclear waste products and uranium are being stolen from Armenia’s nuclear power plant now. That causes dirty bombs and nuclear terror.

Murinson 5/3 Alexander “The other nuclear threat” Washington Times May 3rd 2016 <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/may/3/alexander-murinson-armenias-nuclear-threat/> JW

The fourth Nuclear Security Summit was recently hosted in America’s capital by President Obama. Optimists contend that the summit’s message of nonproliferation resonated with both nuclear and nuclear-threshold nations alike. The reality, however, is that lacking any teeth in terms of oversight, credible or reliable sanctions on nations who “break the rules,” Mr. Obama’s efforts were likely a nice opportunity for world leaders to hold important meetings on the periphery of the summit. Conversely, it seems that, rather unexpectedly, the summit reverberated quite loudly in the South Caucasus. Apparently, photo ops offered by the White House to regional leaders and the particularly warm welcome bestowed upon Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, complete with substantive meetings with Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State John Kerry and congressional leaders, seems to have irritated Moscow. This expression of solidarity, close bilateral relations and strategic partnership between the United States and Azerbaijan exasperated the Kremlin to such an extent that before Mr. Aliyev even had the opportunity to return home, major hostilities broke out between Moscow-controlled and -backed Armenia and sovereign and independent Azerbaijan. Ever the “peacemaker,” Russian President Vladimir Putin helped restore a cease-fire several days later, clearly and visibly seizing the diplomatic initiative and generally making quite the self-serving show of the process and proceedings. Currently, another major concern seems to be arising in the Caucasus. Mere days ago, Georgian authorities reported the arrest of an elderly Georgian man and several Armenian nationals — alarmingly suspected of being current or former members of the Armenian Security Service — who were attempting to smuggle and illegally sell some $200 million worth of nuclear-grade materials. The highly radioactive U-238 can be used to produce a myriad of deadly and destructive apparatuses, not the least of which is a dreaded “dirty bomb.” The specter of a dirty bomb is of paramount concern for security services and counterterrorism officials worldwide. Internationally, the deep alarm of officials associated with the discovery of U-238 was compounded earlier this year when a group of individuals was discovered attempting to smuggle Cesium-137, a highly radioactive isotope that is a waste product from nuclear reactors. Some of this material entered Georgia through the separatist Russia-annexed enclave of South Ossetia and was traced back to Russian facilities. This adds much credence to constant complaints by Georgia and Azerbaijan related to the fact that their territories under separatist control, such as Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, are being used for all manner of illegal smuggling from nuclear material to arms to narcotics. Nagorno-Karabakh and the rest of the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia, in particular, have another peculiarity of having an uncontrolled border with Iran. Not surprisingly, there are frequent reports of numerous Iranian trucks traveling in the area, usually under the cover of darkness and thought by many counterterrorism officials to be transporting illegal arms to and from Iran, the second of Armenia’s closest allies — Russia being Armenia’s closest ally. To substantially add to the threat emanating from Armenian nationals and Armenia is the presence in Armenia of an outdated Chernobyl-type nuclear reactor operating long past its original planned lifetime. This, when taken with the news from Georgia, elevates the nuclear alarm to a new level. Coincidentally (or not), the safety of Armenia’s aged reactor was discussed at the Nuclear Security Summit and notably in the presence of Mr. Obama and other world leaders. Two of the region’s most prominent leaders and both closely aligned with the United States, Azerbaijan’s Mr. Aliyev and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, spoke with apprehension about the reactor’s danger, sounding the alarm of the present and mounting dangers originating in Armenia. Armenian President Serj Sarkissian was quick to dismiss these concerns. However, if Armenia’s reactor is not only a safety threat, but potentially a source of radioactive material for a “dirty” bomb, as suggested by the recent foiled plots, then the problem is no longer limited to the Caucasus region. Moreover, if Georgians arrested the smugglers, a question is whether Armenia’s other neighbor — Iran — is equally eager to stop smuggling of radioactive material to and from Armenia. Maybe Mr. Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit will prove useful and visionary after all.

#### Terrorism is the most likely existential threat.

Rhodes 9 Richard (a visiting scholar at Harvard and MIT, and currently he is an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Rhodes is the author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), which won the Pulitzer Prize in Nonfiction, National Book Award, and National Book Critics Circle Award) “Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety” December 14th 2009 JW

The response was very different among nuclear and national security experts when Indiana Republican Sen. Richard Lugar surveyed PDF them in 2005. This group of 85 experts judged that the possibility of a WMD attack against a city or other target somewhere in the world is real and increasing over time. The median estimate of the risk of a nuclear attack somewhere in the world by 2010 was 10 percent. The risk of an attack by 2015 doubled to 20 percent median. There was strong, though not universal, agreement that a nuclear attack is more likely to be carried out by a terrorist organization than by a government. The group was split 45 to 55 percent on whether terrorists were more likely to obtain an intact working nuclear weapon or manufacture one after obtaining weapon-grade nuclear material. "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not just a security problem," Lugar wrote in the report's introduction. "It is the economic dilemma and the moral challenge of the current age. On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the destructive potential of international terrorism. But the September 11 attacks do not come close to approximating the destruction that would be unleashed by a nuclear weapon. Weapons of mass destruction have made it possible for a small nation, or even a sub-national group, to kill as many innocent people in a day as national armies killed in months of fighting during World War II. "The bottom line is this," Lugar concluded: "For the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction." It's paradoxical that a diminished threat of a superpower nuclear exchange should somehow have resulted in a world where the danger of at least a single nuclear explosion in a major city has increased (and that city is as likely, or likelier, to be Moscow as it is to be Washington or New York). We tend to think that a terrorist nuclear attack would lead us to drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I think the opposite case is at least equally likely: A terrorist nuclear attack would almost certainly be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on whatever country we believed to be sheltering the perpetrators. That response would surely initiate a new round of nuclear armament and rearmament in the name of deterrence, however illogical. Think of how much 9/11 frightened us; think of how desperate our leaders were to prevent any further such attacks; think of the fact that we invaded and occupied a country, Iraq, that had nothing to do with those attacks in the name of sending a message.

### Underview (Theory)

#### 1. Prefer a comparing worlds paradigm—the neg must prove proactive desirability of a competitive advocacy. Truth-testing gives the neg an infinite amount of NIBs-they can prove morality doesn’t exist, it’s inaccessible, or read multiple side constraint theories. If they have to prove desirability then they share assumptions with the aff which levels out the playing field, so it’s key to fairness. This takes out textuality standards on T because they presume my burden is to prove the resolution is true

#### 2. Aff gets 1AR theory- otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this. 1AR theory is drop the debater- the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance- you must be punished.

#### 3. Vote aff if I win a counter interp to T

A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible unless I can collapse to the top layer.

#### 4. If the neg wins T, reevaluate my offense underneath their interp by dropping the aff advocacy, not the aff offense.

A. Substantive education – 1AR restart means we still get to discuss the topic and learn as opposed to devoting the whole round to theory.

B. Stratskew – there are multiple bidirectional interps that every aff will violate, a frontlined neg will always win the T debate if they can pick whatever the aff doesn’t do and go hard for the 2NR as a voter.

# 1AR Case Debate

## Meltdown Adv.

### Extensions

#### Metsamor power plant has a high chance of meltdown – it uses Chernobyl tech and lies on earthquake territory. That’s Lavelle et al 11.

#### When it melts down, the agricultural sector will be destroyed and people in four countries will be killed. That’s Sahakyan 4/27.

#### New reactors won’t solve – they’re still in earthquake territory and cause increased cancer rates. That’s Idayatova 5/20.

#### Armenian agriculture is key to preventing poverty – it acts as a shock absorber when the industrial sector fails. That’s McKinley et al 2.

### AT: It’s Safe!

#### Cross/apply Lavelle et al 11 – Metsamor is one of the most dangerous plants in the world. Prefer my warrants:

#### A] International consensus – EU energy facilities and US studies have verified that the plant is dangerous and needs to be shut down. That outweighs specific opinions since it reflects general ideas held by the atomic community

#### B] Geography – even if the plant would normally be safe, it lies in prime earthquake zone. Japan proves earthquakes cause devastating meltdowns, outweighs on probability.

#### C] No containment structure – Metsamor’s one of the only plants left with no primary containment structure – that’s what caused Chernobyl’s accident to turn deadly, proves the impacts empirically confirmed.

### High Probability 1st

#### Prefer high probability, low magnitude impacts.

#### 1. Magnitude-lack of credible specific brink means that we don’t know when the neg impacts will occur but the aff impact aggregates every day, the magnitude will be greater by the time your scenario occurs.

#### 2. Reversibility-systemic impacts create irreversible harms to people-we can’t un-murder someone, but intervening actors can solve disads with lots of link chains.

#### 3. Extinction first causes policy paralysis – any action by changing states of affairs has a miniscule risk of extinction, but we can have good reasons for taking actions like picking up a pen.

#### 4. Expert predictions are incorrect.

Menand 5 Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert

“Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

## Terror Adv.

### Extensions

#### The Armenian nuclear power plant is very insecure – multiple incidents of stealing dirty bomb materials have been recorded, makes nuclear terror more likely. That’s Murinson 5/3.

#### Nuclear terrorism causes extinction – retaliatory strikes ensure escalation and full-scale nuke war. That’s Rhodes 9.

### Nuke Terror O/W

#### Nuclear terror outweighs.

#### A] Magnitude – a single small strike causes retaliation and escalation aimed at an entire region, triggering global war that affects everyone.

#### B] Probability – panel of 85 experts agree terrorism is the most likely nuclear threat. Also, 9/11 proves we’re willing to start wars based on a single event.

### Extinction 1st

#### Tiny risk of extinction outweighs because of future generations.

Bostrom 11 Nick Bostrom (Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School & Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford), “THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENTIAL RISK”, 2011 http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html

Even if we use **the most conservative** of these **estimates,** which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we **find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than** the value of **1018**human **lives.  This implies that** the expected value of **reducing existential risk by** a mere**one millionth of one percentage point is** at least **ten times** the value of **a billion** human **lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.

# DA Frontlines

## AT: Any arguments about new reactors

#### New reactors are stalled in production. They were supposed to be online in 2016 but they haven’t even started. That’s Sahakyan 4-27.

#### New reactors won’t be built, not enough infrastructure.

McGinnity 15 Ian “Risky Business – Roadblocks to Building Armenia’s New Nuclear Power Plant” Regional Studies Center May 25th 2015 <http://regional-studies.org/blog/445-250515#_edn4> JW

Most importantly, Armenia faces feeble prospects for long-term GDP growth and short term economic crisis as blowback from a weakened Russian economy sweeps into the Southern Caucasus.[v] Armenia is particularly susceptible to changes in the Russian economy, as Russian and Armenian economies are intricately linked. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner and investor, and Armenia relies on remittances sent from Armenians living and working in Russia for a staggering 21% of its GDP.[vi] To put the direness of the current economic situation into some perspective, remittances from Russia dropped by as much as 56% from January 2014 to January 2015.[vii] Corresponding with downgraded credit ratings for Russian banking institutions, international credit agency Moody’s in January 2015 downgraded Armenia’s credit, bond, and currency ratings.[viii] While this development more severely impacts specific investment portfolios more than the broader economy, it does negatively contribute to Armenia’s overall uncertain economic outlook, creating a bleak investment environment. Of course, changes in the international political environment could shift Armenia’s economic outlook, revealing more positive economic indicators that would likely restore a healthier credit rating. However, the current economic situation, complemented by geological and geopolitical factors, signals heightened risk to international investors. Even if Armenia was able to attract the estimated $3.4 – 6 billion investment necessary to finance construction of the nuclear plant, it faces additional domestic hurdles. A $6 billion dollar loan would double Armenia’s sovereign debt, requiring the National Assembly, the legislative body of the Armenian government, to amend the Armenian Constitution and raise the debt ceiling.This may not be as difficult as it sounds. Almost all members of the Armenian government support construction of a nuclear plant and a constitutional amendment could be expected to move quickly and pass easily. From there it gets more complicated. The Armenian government would have to provide a sovereign guarantee to potential investors. Such guarantees are common in costly nuclear projects, and ensure financers return of investment even in the event of project failure. Often, governments that do not have the financial resources to repay the loan outright offer public assets as collateral.[ix] It will be difficult for the Armenian government to make such an offer worthwhile for investors. Over the past 15 years, the Armenian government has systematically relinquished control of state assets – mostly to Russian state-owned companies, and mostly as a means of debt repayment.[x] Russian companies manage and operate Metsamor and own outright the power distribution grid, Hrazdan Thermal Plant, and Armenia’s natural gas transit pipelines.[xi], [xii]Russian ownership does not extend merely to the energy sector. Most of the banking, telecommunication, and transport sector also lies under Russian control.[xiii] Simply put, the Armenian government lacks the sort of substantial assets that would satisfactorily pad potential investors against risk of failure.

## AT: Coldness DA

### 1AR Block

#### 1. New pipelines provide Armenia enough energy.

Sarukhanyan 10 Sevak (Ph.D. in Political Sciences, expert of energy and regional security in the South Caucasus, deputy director of “Noravank” Foundation, the editor-in-chief of “Globus: Energy and Regional Security” bulletin (in Armenian).) “The Prospects of Nuclear Energy in Armenia” 21st Century No. 1 (7) 2010 JW

The construction of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline capable of providing Armenia with 2.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, which covers roughly the entire yearly gas consumption in the country, has been a very important development for Armenia. Although with the currently stable operation of the gas pipeline going through the territory of Georgia Armenia needs no Iranian gas and the gas received by that pipeline will be used to produce electricity to be exported to Iran, in case of force majeure with the Russian gas supply this pipeline could provide for the stable functioning of the Armenian economy. Thus, the Iran- Armenia gas pipeline is not an alternative to the Russian gas as long as the latter is regularly supplied to Armenia.

#### 2. Meltdown advantage outweighs

#### A] Severity – explosions cause death through radioactive waste. Not having electricity is a major inconvenience but it doesn’t kill you.

#### B] Scope – affects four other countries and millions of people, not just Armenia – that’s Sahakyan 4-27.

#### 3. Non unique – when Metsamor explodes, it won’t be able to provide people energy – proves your impacts happen in both worlds.

#### 4. Your evidence says Armenia uses nuclear power for a lot of their energy needs but that doesn’t mean that it depends on them, they can always switch. Using it currently just proves it’s a matter of convenience and they won’t just give up on having energy after it closes.

### AT: It was cold when they didn’t have nuclear power

#### Armenia only suffered with the closedown of nuclear power because of the war in Azerbaijan – otherwise thermal plants would have continued operating and solved the impact.

Sahakyan 4-27-16 Armine (Human rights activist based in Armenia) “Armenia Continues to Gamble on Aging Nuclear Plant in a Quake-Prone Area” Huffington Post <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/armine-sahakyan/armenia-continues-to-gamb_b_9788186.html> JW

Even Armenians who worry about the plant’s safety don’t want to return to the days between 1989 and 1995 when it was shut down after a 1988 earthquake in Gyumri, 48 miles from Metsamor. The quake devastated Armenia’s second-largest city, killing 25,000 and leaving half a million homeless. Although the plant came through the 1988 quake without a hitch, it is located in an active seismic zone — and many Armenian nuclear officials feared a catastrophe if the next temblor involved a direct hit on Metsamor. At the time they recommended closing it, Armenia was able to obtain oil and gas from Russia and Turkmenistan for its thermal power plants. The government decided to increase its purchase of those supplies to produce additional power from thermal plants to cover the loss of electricity from the nuclear plant. The war between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, which had long been Azerbaijani territory, dashed the thermal-plant plans, however. That’s because the oil and gas that Russia and Turkmenistan were sending to Armenia came through Azerbaijan, which refused to transport the fuel once the conflict started. With the nuclear plant shut down and thermal plants unable to be ramped up, Armenians went through the Dark Ages for several years. Power was available only one hour a day, bringing industry to a standstill and making life at home miserable. “You can imagine—it was as cold in the apartment as it was in the street” in winter, journalist Ara Tadevosyan recalled. Although a truce in the war was negotiated in 1994, Armenia was still unable to get oil and gas from Russia and Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan demanded nothing less than the return of Nagorno-Karabakh. Desperate for electricity, Armenia reopened the Metsamor plant — the first time in history that a shuttered nuclear facility had been restarted.

## AT: Econ DA

### UQ + LT

#### I control uniqueness – Armenia’s economy sucks now. Banning nuclear power is key to preventing bankruptcy.

McGinnity 15 Ian “Risky Business – Roadblocks to Building Armenia’s New Nuclear Power Plant” Regional Studies Center May 25th 2015 <http://regional-studies.org/blog/445-250515#_edn4> JW

Most importantly, Armenia faces feeble prospects for long-term GDP growth and short term economic crisis as blowback from a weakened Russian economy sweeps into the Southern Caucasus.[v] Armenia is particularly susceptible to changes in the Russian economy, as Russian and Armenian economies are intricately linked. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner and investor, and Armenia relies on remittances sent from Armenians living and working in Russia for a staggering 21% of its GDP.[vi] To put the direness of the current economic situation into some perspective, remittances from Russia dropped by as much as 56% from January 2014 to January 2015.[vii] Corresponding with downgraded credit ratings for Russian banking institutions, international credit agency Moody’s in January 2015 downgraded Armenia’s credit, bond, and currency ratings.[viii] While this development more severely impacts specific investment portfolios more than the broader economy, it does negatively contribute to Armenia’s overall uncertain economic outlook, creating a bleak investment environment. Of course, changes in the international political environment could shift Armenia’s economic outlook, revealing more positive economic indicators that would likely restore a healthier credit rating. However, the current economic situation, complemented by geological and geopolitical factors, signals heightened risk to international investors. Even if Armenia was able to attract the estimated $3.4 – 6 billion investment necessary to finance construction of the nuclear plant, it faces additional domestic hurdles. A $6 billion dollar loan would double Armenia’s sovereign debt, requiring the National Assembly, the legislative body of the Armenian government, to amend the Armenian Constitution and raise the debt ceiling.This may not be as difficult as it sounds. Almost all members of the Armenian government support construction of a nuclear plant and a constitutional amendment could be expected to move quickly and pass easily. From there it gets more complicated. The Armenian government would have to provide a sovereign guarantee to potential investors. Such guarantees are common in costly nuclear projects, and ensure financers return of investment even in the event of project failure. Often, governments that do not have the financial resources to repay the loan outright offer public assets as collateral.[ix] It will be difficult for the Armenian government to make such an offer worthwhile for investors. Over the past 15 years, the Armenian government has systematically relinquished control of state assets – mostly to Russian state-owned companies, and mostly as a means of debt repayment.[x] Russian companies manage and operate Metsamor and own outright the power distribution grid, Hrazdan Thermal Plant, and Armenia’s natural gas transit pipelines.[xi], [xii]Russian ownership does not extend merely to the energy sector. Most of the banking, telecommunication, and transport sector also lies under Russian control.[xiii] Simply put, the Armenian government lacks the sort of substantial assets that would satisfactorily pad potential investors against risk of failure.

### AT: Decommissioning Costs

#### The EU will donate money to the plan – solves the link.

Sarukhanyan 10 Sevak (Ph.D. in Political Sciences, expert of energy and regional security in the South Caucasus, deputy director of “Noravank” Foundation, the editor-in-chief of “Globus: Energy and Regional Security” bulletin (in Armenian).) “The Prospects of Nuclear Energy in Armenia” 21st Century No. 1 (7) 2010 JW

In 2007 Euratom initiated official talks with the Ministry of Energy of Armenia seeking prospects for closure of the plant, but the technical format of the talks could not address the main issue: what will Armenia get in return for the shutting down the plant. This is a matter of alternative thermal, hydro- and nu- clear power capacities. Neither Euratom nor the EU made any tangible proposal to Armenia on financing the construction of alternative capacities. During the 6th meeting of the Armenia-EU Cooperation Council, Hugues Mingarelli, Director- General for the European Commission’s external relations with Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia formulated the maximum assistance that Armenia could expect from Europe: “If the government of Armenia takes steps to shut down the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant as soon as possible, the European Union would hold an international conference of the donor countries to raise the necessary funds for that” [2]. As a matter of fact, this has to do solely with financing the safe shutdown of the plant.

## AT: Energy Sector DA

#### Non-unique – when Metsamor explodes, it won’t be able to provide people energy – proves your impacts happen in both worlds.

#### New pipelines provide Armenia enough energy – solves the link.

Sarukhanyan 10 Sevak (Ph.D. in Political Sciences, expert of energy and regional security in the South Caucasus, deputy director of “Noravank” Foundation, the editor-in-chief of “Globus: Energy and Regional Security” bulletin (in Armenian).) “The Prospects of Nuclear Energy in Armenia” 21st Century No. 1 (7) 2010 JW

The construction of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline capable of providing Armenia with 2.3 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, which covers roughly the entire yearly gas consumption in the country, has been a very important development for Armenia. Although with the currently stable operation of the gas pipeline going through the territory of Georgia Armenia needs no Iranian gas and the gas received by that pipeline will be used to produce electricity to be exported to Iran, in case of force majeure with the Russian gas supply this pipeline could provide for the stable functioning of the Armenian economy. Thus, the Iran- Armenia gas pipeline is not an alternative to the Russian gas as long as the latter is regularly supplied to Armenia.

#### Your evidence says Armenia uses nuclear power for a lot of their energy needs but that doesn’t mean that it depends on them, they can always switch. Using it currently just proves it’s a matter of convenience and they won’t just give up on having energy after it closes.

#### Non unique, Armenia already imports natural gas in the squo.

Sarukhanyan 10 Sevak (Ph.D. in Political Sciences, expert of energy and regional security in the South Caucasus, deputy director of “Noravank” Foundation, the editor-in-chief of “Globus: Energy and Regional Security” bulletin (in Armenian).) “The Prospects of Nuclear Energy in Armenia” 21st Century No. 1 (7) 2010 JW

Regional situation. The energy crisis in Armenia after the **collapse of the USSR came to prove that failure of the energy system might be caused** not necessarily by the absence of the power generating capacities, but **by the impossibility of the fuel imports**. **Natural gas**, the second by significance input for energy after the nuclear fuel **for Armenia, is imported to the country through the territory on unstable Georgia where the risks of** new **destabilization are** very **high, and from Iran, which may** eventually **become a new focal point of regional conflicts**. The **closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey** effectively **put Armenia in a full dependence on the situation in Georgia and Iran**. **Even if the relations with** Azerbaijan and **Turkey** are **normalize**d, **one should not expect that after such a long conflict these two countries would become reliable energy partners** for Armenia in short-term or even mid-term perspectives. **If some day in future getting natural gas from the south or north turns impossible, then in absence of a nuclear power plant Armenia, may suffer the same kind of energy crisis** as it did in 1993-1995. Consequently, **the construction of a new reactor**, the fuel supply for which is not dependent on Georgia’s or Iran’s transit policies, **is of vital importance for Armenia.**

#### No risk of war in the Caucasus

Friedfeld 12(Alex Friedfeld, “USEUCOM: Rising Tensions in the Caucasus Will Not Lead to War,” [GLOBAL SECURITY MONITOR](http://c4ads.org/latest/) , the blog of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, September 14, 2012, <http://c4ads.org/latest/?p=840>) -Lack of resources, -No draw great power draw-in, -Natural gas checks

Despite rising tension between Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is unlikely that the conflict will escalate beyond small skirmishes at the Nargorno-Karabakh border. Though Azerbaijan has superior military capabilities, it would find it difficult to overcome Armenia’s control of the high-ground in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory and it lacks the resources necessary to sustain an extended conflict. Yusef Agayev, an Azerbaijani military expert and a veteran of the last war between the two nations, noted that the army could only fight for a month or two as anything beyond that would have to involve the Azerbaijani society. As Agayev [said](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/us-azerbaijan-armenia-conflict-idUSBRE88A0DQ20120911): “I don’t think the society of my country is ready for war.” Without outside assistance, an all-out war would most likely end in a deadly stalemate. Azerbaijan will not start a war it is unlikely to win. The international community is concerned that if fighting does break out, outside forces would get involved and provide assistance. Armenia is currently partaking in a collective security agreement with Russia, and Azerbaijan is participating in a collective security agreement with Turkey, which is a NATO member. However, Russia and NATO have shown little interest in the matter and have not gone beyond issuing public condemnations of Azerbaijan. While Russia currently has a strong relationship with Armenia, it is working on improving its relations with Azerbaijan as well. On September 12, the two nations[inaugurated the Bridge of Azerbaijani-Russian Friendship](http://www.news.az/articles/politics/68054), the latest in a series of attempts by Russia to increase its influence in Baku. For NATO countries like Turkey, Azerbaijan is an important source of energy, and it will not want to do anything that could jeopardize this flow. Several Western oil companies – such as British Petroleum and ExxonMobil – operate in the Azerbaijani oil fields and would be strongly opposed to any act that would damage their holdings. Any conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia could also disrupt the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, each of which is essential to European attempts to reduce dependence on Russian energy. Though the language employed by officials has become increasingly aggressive since the Safarov pardon, it is important to consider the actual actions – or in this case the lack thereof – of the two states. It has been two weeks since the pardon and neither side has taken any steps that would provoke a war. Perhaps most importantly, there has been no military mobilization by either country. Azerbaijan has publicly insisted for months that it is strong enough to take back the contested territory through force, and yet it has given no physical indication that it intends to do so at this time. Despite its rhetoric and unhappiness with the process, Azerbaijan still considers negotiation a viable alternative to armed conflict

#### No Central Asia war --- your impacts are threat construction.

Megoran et al 11 John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran, 6/16/2011. Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Exeter, working on the politics of aid and conflict resolution in Central Asia; and political geography lecturer at Newcastle Univerity, in the school of Geography, Politics and Sociology. “Central Asia: the discourse of danger,” http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/john-heathershaw-nick-megoran/central-asia-discourse-of-danger.

Question: What do a recently-released International Crisis Group report (‘Tajikistan: the changing insurgent threats’) and the latest Red River computer game (‘Operation Flashpoint’) have in common? Answer: They both feature Islamist insurgents infiltrating Tajikistan and posing a threat to Western security. In fact such portrayals of Central Asia are commonplace in the West, from popular culture to the quasi-academic work of policy analysts. In research conducted since the 1990s, we have charted how UK and US representations of Central Asia routinely present it as especially dangerous, fusing the traditional insecurities of the Orient to dysfunctional post-Soviet authoritarianism. This has elicited a small debate on the margins of Central Asian studies about the significance of the discourse of danger. In response, we wrote a paper on the subject that was presented at Chatham House and recently published in the journal International Affairs (‘Contesting danger: a new agenda for policy and scholarship on Central Asia’), outlining three features of the Western discourse of danger on Central Asia. By ‘Western discourse of danger on Central Asia’ we mean how Western policy, popular and even academic accounts identify Central Asia as obscure, ethnically and politically fractious, essentially Oriental and—for these reasons—dangerous. Typically, Central Asia is spuriously identified as a source of a considerable Islamic terrorist threat as in the recent International Crisis Group report on Tajikistan. It can also mean that ethnic conflict is misread and great power conflict is assumed where in fact it may not exist. Why does the overlap between popular culture and policy analysis matter? The link we make between computer games and policy reports may seem trite. Surely these are incommensurable genres of discourse for quite diverse audiences and with wholly different intentions? Surely one is primarily for the entertainment of adolescent males, and the other seeks serious understanding in order to change policy? We should not be too quick to dismiss the effect of popular culture on policy making. Many of the Western military misadventures which have been undertaken since the end of the Cold War may have been made more likely by the feeling of interconnectedness generated by new technologies and cultural forms such as the internet. The portrayal of the military and intelligence services in the era of the ‘war on terror’ are often critical, but most ascribe to governments an ability to get things done which far exceeds what is practically possible in a globalised world. There are three reasons why popular culture matters in policymaking, and which justify the making of links between forms of representations from quite different genres. Firstly, there is the basic point that in Western democracies government are more or less responsive to public opinion. If citizens feel Afghanistan is an essentially dangerous place then they are more likely to accept the problematic argument of their governments that threats to the West will continue to come from that country unless we offer military support to a government we have placed in power. On the other hand, public interest in Central Asia is so limited that few votes are cast and few letters are sent to MPs on the basis of concern about the region. Public opinion only indirectly affects foreign policy and we should not overstate the link between the two. In many respects it is the effect of popular culture on those that do research and make decisions, in governments and non-governmental organisations, that is most significant. Secondly, the dearth of knowledge on the region amongst so-called experts means that popular culture and quasi-academic studies have greater significance. Misguided applications of the ‘great game’ or the idea of Muslim radicalisation are frequently left unchallenged. Moreover, even powerful Western governments have relatively few people with knowledge of the region and its languages. Area studies has been in decline for decades and nowhere is the phenomenon more acute than Central Asia where there was very little knowledge of the region even during the Cold War when funding was poured into the development of Sovietology. Finally, and most importantly, knowledge is produced interpretatively. This means that where ideas about the region emerge that associate it with conflict, Islamism and great power conflict they are often difficult to shift even when academic knowledge seems to refute these claims.

## AT: Space DA

#### No internal link – even if Armenia can’t fuel spaceships, other regional allies will let them go on their spaceships. No one’s just going to abandon Armenia. Also no link to extinction – even if they did it’s just one less country that couldn’t colonize.

#### Armenia isn’t interested in colonizing space.

Piccioto no date Esther “Armenia’s Position on the Issue of Colonization of Space” <http://yu.edu/uploadedfiles/Admissions/Events/YUNMUN/Position_Papers/copous/Picciotto_COPUOS_Colonization%20of%20Space.pdf> JW

Many countries are interested in colonizing outer space, to get to know other planets and see if people are able to live there. In the 1960's U.S.A and the U.S.S.R were racing to get a man to the moon, the U.S. succeeded that in 1969 with Neil Armstrong. Before "The Space Race", the United Nations created COPUOS, the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1958. Originally there were 19 countries participating in this committee. One of them was the U.S.S.R. (15 Soviet Republics) and Armenia was one of these Soviet Republics. Armenia didn't have a stake in the foreign policy of the former Soviet Union and didn't participate directly in the United Nations activities. Before Armenia's independence from the U.S.S.R. in 1991, Armenia had participated with the USSR and had been actively involved in space research and some Armenian scientists participated in designing soviet space satellites. Armenia was very involved in this issue, in 1971 helped to build the Orion-1, the first observatory on the Salut-1 space station. Armenia is a really young and small country, although it reached its independence from the former Soviet Union it continued to be influenced by it. After independence it was still in a difficult situation of transition from soviet policy and economy, so in this sense, the outer space wasn't very important to the development of the country. Armenia has many other priorities other than being involved with outer space activities and research. We can see that the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia is aimed at: “strengthening the county's external security; presenting the positions of Armenia on the international scene; maintaining external favorable conditions for development of the country; raising efficiency in protecting the interests of Armenia and its citizens abroad; deepening engagement in the international organizations and processes; strengthening cooperation with the friendly and partner states, as well as resolving regional problems and creating an atmosphere of cooperation”. Another issue that has recently affected the country is a priority for us is the Nagorno Karabakh conflict that is an ethical conflict which demands many efforts, both economic and political. Considered the above, something that we have to think about is that Armenia doesn't have a considerable financial capability to be involved actively in a space program of its own. Armenia hasn't taken part of the COPUOS yet, so it doesn't have its own position. However, the position of Armenia can be expressed by the European Union statements in the issue of outer space colonization. “The European Union promotes the elaboration of an international set of guidelines, a tool that would strengthen safety, security and predictability of all space activities like limiting or minimizing harmful interference, collisions or accidents in outer space, as well as the creation of debris (spacial trash); freedom for all to use outer space for peaceful purposes; preservation of the security of space objects in orbit...” We can say that it is the official position of Armenia. Armenia has access to all types of space based-information for disaster management through the UN-SPIDER network. Trough this network Armenia can monitor space related activities throughout the world. The sixty seven members of the COPUOS are trying to strengthen the cooperation in the discussion about colonization and the peaceful uses of the outer space. The developed countries with strong economies are trying to colonize the space and to move population to other planets, but still this is a matter of distant future. We predict that only in 25 to 30 years will governments and companies be able to accomplish this.

## AT: US Relations DA

#### Non unique – US/Armenian relations are bad now.

Sassounian 3/15 [Harut Sassounian, March 15, 2016, "U.S. Ambassador to Armenia Faces Criticism at Glendale Appearance," Asbarez, http://asbarez.com/147502/u-s-ambassador-to-armenia-faces-criticism-at-glendale-appearance/]

**Richard Mills, U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, spoke** at the Western Prelacy in La Crescenta, California, on March 10, **during his tour of Armenian communities** throughout the United States to brief them on his diplomatic work in Armenia. In his welcoming remarks, Archbishop Moushegh Mardirossian, Prelate of the Western Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, expressed the hope that “the United States, as a champion of justice and human rights, will in due time join the scores of nations that have formally acknowledged the indisputable truth of the Armenian Genocide.” Amb. Mills spoke about the progress Armenia has made in the last two decades and presented the four priorities being pursued the U.S. Embassy: 1) deepening business and trade relations between Armenia and the United States; 2) countering corruption; 3) strengthening democracy, human rights, and civil society; 4) creating a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy goals. The Ambassador explained that **the United States encourages reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey** by continuing to support the Protocols that were signed in 2009, but not ratified. Speaking of the Armenian Genocide Centennial, Amb. **Mills** remarked that “Armenians were massacred and marched to their deaths by the Ottoman Empire,” **carefully avoid**ing **the term ‘Armenian Genocide**.’ At the end of the Ambassador’s presentation, I had the privilege of being called upon to ask the first question. I respectfully commented: “I know that ambassadors don’t decide U.S. foreign policy. You are simply the messenger. I would like to go on record to say that it is deeply offensive to the Armenian community for you to come here and not use the word genocide to describe what happened to Armenians in 1915. I am not blaming you. It is not your fault! You know what happened and the U.S. government knows what happened. American officials have repeatedly recognized the Armenian Genocide since 1951. I have written a book that documents U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide which I will be happy to give you. It is not understandable to Armenians and non-Armenians around the world why the U.S. government is now reluctant to use a word that describes what it acknowledged a long time ago. This reluctance puts the United States at a disadvantage when its officials give lectures to Armenians in Armenia about democracy, morality and justice, and yet they fail to comply with their own principles. The U.S. government should be an example to the rest of the world! I am just using you as a messenger. I see that one of your colleagues from the State Department is here with you. I hope that you would transmit my message to your superiors in Washington.” Amb. Mills gave the following brief answer: “My only response will be to reiterate Pres. Obama’s goal which he set forth in his statement on April 24th: ‘We want full, frank and just acknowledgment of what happened from the Turkish government and Turkish people.’” Regrettably, **the U.S. Ambassador was simply following Pres. Obama’s deplorable reluctance to utter** the words ‘**Armenian Genocide**,’ despite his repeated promises to do so as a candidate. Regardless of whether Pres. Obama and his underlings use the term genocide, the fact remains that the United States has repeatedly acknowledged the Armenian Genocide at the Presidential and Congressional levels. Nevertheless, **the** Armenian-American **community** and Armenians worldwide **have an obligation to confront** and reject every attempt to minimize or distort the proper characterization of **the Armenian Genocide**. **Remaining silent** upon hearing such reprehensible terminology **is an insult** to the memory of the Armenian Martyrs, particularly when unacceptable euphemisms are uttered in Armenian church halls and community centers. Amb. Mills was probably surprised by the adverse reaction of the audience to his statements not only regarding the Armenian Genocide, but also his faulty claim that Turkey was fighting against ISIS! Unfortunately, we cannot expect every American Ambassador to sacrifice his/her diplomatic career by telling the truth to power as did John Evans, the former U.S. Ambassador to Armenia. He boldly acknowledged the Armenian Genocide at a great personal cost, during a similar tour of the Armenian communities in the United States. Amb. Mills should be commended for his efforts to improve **U.S.-Armenia relations**. However, his superiors in **Washington should be made aware that** **his** good **work is being undermined by their shameful word games** **regarding** the **Armenian Genocide**!

#### No link. Your evidence says some US companies want to be apart of construction but that Russia will still be the primary builders.

#### No link. The US government isn’t the ones helping Armenia build reactors – it’s private companies. They have no control over regional influence.

#### New reactors won’t be built, not enough infrastructure.

McGinnity 15 Ian “Risky Business – Roadblocks to Building Armenia’s New Nuclear Power Plant” Regional Studies Center May 25th 2015 <http://regional-studies.org/blog/445-250515#_edn4> JW

Most importantly, Armenia faces feeble prospects for long-term GDP growth and short term economic crisis as blowback from a weakened Russian economy sweeps into the Southern Caucasus.[v] Armenia is particularly susceptible to changes in the Russian economy, as Russian and Armenian economies are intricately linked. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner and investor, and Armenia relies on remittances sent from Armenians living and working in Russia for a staggering 21% of its GDP.[vi] To put the direness of the current economic situation into some perspective, remittances from Russia dropped by as much as 56% from January 2014 to January 2015.[vii] Corresponding with downgraded credit ratings for Russian banking institutions, international credit agency Moody’s in January 2015 downgraded Armenia’s credit, bond, and currency ratings.[viii] While this development more severely impacts specific investment portfolios more than the broader economy, it does negatively contribute to Armenia’s overall uncertain economic outlook, creating a bleak investment environment. Of course, changes in the international political environment could shift Armenia’s economic outlook, revealing more positive economic indicators that would likely restore a healthier credit rating. However, the current economic situation, complemented by geological and geopolitical factors, signals heightened risk to international investors. Even if Armenia was able to attract the estimated $3.4 – 6 billion investment necessary to finance construction of the nuclear plant, it faces additional domestic hurdles. A $6 billion dollar loan would double Armenia’s sovereign debt, requiring the National Assembly, the legislative body of the Armenian government, to amend the Armenian Constitution and raise the debt ceiling.This may not be as difficult as it sounds. Almost all members of the Armenian government support construction of a nuclear plant and a constitutional amendment could be expected to move quickly and pass easily. From there it gets more complicated. The Armenian government would have to provide a sovereign guarantee to potential investors. Such guarantees are common in costly nuclear projects, and ensure financers return of investment even in the event of project failure. Often, governments that do not have the financial resources to repay the loan outright offer public assets as collateral.[ix] It will be difficult for the Armenian government to make such an offer worthwhile for investors. Over the past 15 years, the Armenian government has systematically relinquished control of state assets – mostly to Russian state-owned companies, and mostly as a means of debt repayment.[x] Russian companies manage and operate Metsamor and own outright the power distribution grid, Hrazdan Thermal Plant, and Armenia’s natural gas transit pipelines.[xi], [xii]Russian ownership does not extend merely to the energy sector. Most of the banking, telecommunication, and transport sector also lies under Russian control.[xiii] Simply put, the Armenian government lacks the sort of substantial assets that would satisfactorily pad potential investors against risk of failure.

#### No risk of arctic war.

**Economist 12**

<Economist 6-16-2012“Too much to fight over”, http://www.economist.com/node/21556797>

During the cold war the Arctic bristled with Soviet submarines and American bombers operating from airbases in Iceland and Greenland. The talk of Arctic security risks sometimes betrays a certain nostalgia for that period. Some people also worry about Arctic countries militarising the north. Canada conducted its biggest-ever military exercise in the north, involving 1,200 troops, in the Arctic last year. Yet the **risks of Arctic conflict have been exaggerated**. Most of the Arctic is clearly assigned to individual countries. According to a Danish estimate, **95% of Arctic** mineral **resources are within agreed** national **boundaries. The biggest** of the half-dozen remaining territorial **disputes is between the U**nited **S**tates **and Canada**, over whether the north-west passage is in international or Canadian waters, hardly a casus belli. Far from violent, the **development of the Arctic is** likely to be **uncommonly harmonious**, for three related reasons. One is the profit motive. The five Arctic littoral countries, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have. A sign of this was an agreement between Russia and Norway last year to fix their maritime border in the Barents Sea, ending a decades-long dispute. The border area is probably rich in oil; both countries are now racing to get exploration started. **Another spur to Arctic co-operation is the high cost of operating in the region.** This is behind the Arctic Council's first binding agreement, signed last year, to co-ordinate search-and-rescue efforts. Rival oil companies are also working together, on scientific research and mapping as well as on formal joint ventures. The third reason for peace is equally important: a strong reluctance among Arctic countries to give outsiders any excuse to intervene in the region's affairs. An illustration is the stated willingness of all concerned to settle their biggest potential dispute, over their maritime frontiers, according to the international Law of the Sea (LOS). Even the United States accepts this, despite its dislike for treaties—though it has still not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an anomaly many of its leaders are keen to end.

#### Zero chance of Arctic war---experts

Mahony 13

Honor, EU Observer, "Fear of Arctic conflict are 'overblown'", 19 March 2013, euobserver.com/foreign/119479

The Arctic has become a new frontier in international relations, but **fear of potential conflict in the** resource-rich **region is overblown, say experts**. For long a mystery because of its general impenetrability, melting ice caps are revealing more and more of the Arctic region to scientists, researchers and industry. Climate change experts can take a more precise look at a what global warming is doing to the planet, shipping trade routes once considered unthinkable are now possible, and governments and businesses are in thrall to the potential exploitation of coal, iron, rare earths and oil. The interest is reflected in the growing list of those wanting to have a foot in the Arctic council, a forum of eight countries with territory in the polar region. While the US, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and Canada form the council, the EU commission, China, India, South Korea and Japan have all expressed an interest in having a permanent observer status. "The Arctic has become a new meeting place for America, Europe and the Asia Pacific," says Damien Degeorges, founder of the Arctic Policy and Economic Forum. During a recent conference on Arctic shipping routes in the European Parliament, Degeorges noted that "China has been the most active by far in the last years." He points to its red-carpet treatment of politicians from Greenland, a territory that recently got full control over its wealth of natural resources. Bejing also cosied up to Iceland after the island's financial meltdown. The two undertook a joint expedition to the North Pole and the Chinese have the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik. Meanwhile, South Korea's president visited Greenland last year and shipping hubs like Singapore are holding Arctic conferences. The interest is being spurred by melting icebergs. Last year saw a record low of multi-year ice - permanent ice - in the polar sea. This means greater shipping and mineral exploitation potential. There were 37 transits of the North East Passage (NEP), running from the Atlantic to the Pacific along the top of Russia, in 2011. This rose to 47 in 2012. For a ship travelling from the Netherlands to China, the route around 40 percent shorter than using the traditional Suez Canal. A huge saving for China, where 50 percent of its GDP is connected to shipping. Russia is also keen to exploit the route as the rise in temperatures is melting the permafrost in its northern territory, playing havoc with its roads and railways. According to Jan Fritz Hansen, deputy director of the Danish shipowners’ association, the real breakthrough will come when there is a cross polar route. At the moment there are are two options - the North East Passge for which Russia asks high fees for transiting ships - or the much-less developed North West Passage along Canada. His chief concern is that "trade up there is free. We don't want protectionism. Everyone should be allowed to compete up there." And he believes the biggest story of the Arctic is not how it is traversed but what will be taken out of it. According to the US Geological Survey (2009), the Arctic holds 13 percent of undiscovered oil and 30 percent of undiscovered gas supplies. Greenland is already at the centre of political tussle between the EU and China over future exploitation of its rare earths - used in a range of technologies such as hybrid cars or smart phones. "The biggest adventure will be the Arctic destination. There is a lot of valuable goods that should be taken out of nature up there," he said. This resource potential - although tempered by the fact that much of it is not economically viable to exploit - has led to fears that the Arctic region is ripe for conflict. **But this is nonsense, says Nil Wang, a former Danish admiral and Arctic expert**. Most resources have an owner "There is a general public perception that the Arctic region holds great potential for conflict because it is an ungoverned region where all these resources are waiting to be picked up by the one who gets there first. **That is completely false**," he said. **He notes that it is an "extremely well-regulated region**," with international rules saying that coastal states have territorial jurisdiction up to 12 nautical miles off their coast. On top of that is a further 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone "where you own every value in the water and under the seabed." "Up to **97 percent of energy resources** is **actually belong**ing **to someone already**," says Wang. He suggest **the actors in the region all want to create a business environment, which requires stable politics and security.**

#### Interdependence means no Artic War

Pate 10

(Chad P. Pate Major, United States Air Force B.S., Iowa State University, 1996 M.S. Troy University, 2008, December 2010, “EASING THE ARCTIC TENSION: AN ECONOMIC SOLUTION)//CC

Climate change in the Arctic is affecting the ice melt more rapidly than previously anticipated and the Arctic is now forecast to be ice-free by 2013. International borders, fossil fuel reservoirs and new sea routes for navigation are just a few of the issues at stake due to the receding ice cover. Contrary to those who perceive U.S.-Russian conflict arising out of the region and advocate a military response, this thesis argues that the Arctic, precisely because of its rich hydrocarbon resources, may prove to be amenable to a capitalist peace. Research suggests that nations linked by economic interdependence are less apt to engage in conflict with each other. Nations seeking foreign direct investment will be less likely to initiate conflict, as this would diminish the potential for attracting foreign capital. Russia’s economy is dependent on oil and natural gas exports and these industries have created enormous wealth for the nation. Yet Russia’s existing fossil fuel reservoirs are nearing exhaustion. Tapping into Arctic reserves is a strategic imperative for Russia; however, it lacks the technological capacity to do so. The energy industry in the West is farther along in developing such extractive technology. This thesis argues that Russia’s need of foreign assistance in its hydrocarbon sector will make Russia more pacific, thereby offsetting realist fears of a military conflict in the Arctic.

## AT: Uranium Mining DA

#### There is no more uranium mining in Armenia.

Newsfeed 15 July 16th 2015 “Armenian-Russian venture on uranium mining to be dissolved” http://news.am/eng/news/277174.html JW

YEREVAN. – The Armenian-Russian Mining Enterprise Company will be liquidated. The Government of Armenia has made the respective decision at Thursday’s Cabinet meeting. At the session, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Yervand Zakharyan, noted that the company closure due to the fact that the search for uranium deposits in Armenia—and which this enterprise was engaged in—has not found the necessary uranium deposits in the country. “[The company] has carried out all of its activities envisioned by the license, and the Russian side, [has fulfilled] its financial commitments,” noted the minister. The government owned 50 percent of this company while the ARMZ Uranium Holding Co. (AtomRedMetZoloto), which is a Russian uranium mining company, owned the Russian part of this enterprise. A total of US$3 million were spent on the search for uranium in Armenia.

# K Frontlines

## AT: Terror Talk

### 1AR: AT: Nuclear Imperialism K

No link. The plan text specifically doesn’t have securitizing language – it’s only the advantages. Proves the K only links to the discourse of the cards. Two implications:

#### A. Not a reason to drop me—the judge has the option to vote aff for any reason, just like I can kick out of one advantage but win another one, you can choose to vote for parts of the AC that don’t link to the K.

#### B. Justifies K’s that link to only one word in one card, makes debate vacuous and not about substantive issues, also crushes discussion about the overall legitimacy of our speech acts.

#### Threats real – threat inflation would get my authors fired

Earl C. Ravenal 9, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of *Designing Defense for a New World Order.*What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” *Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society* 21.1 (2009) 21-75

My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### The K just proves that my impacts are wrong – not that I should lose. Prefer a model which makes threat construction a reason to reject the advantage, not the debater since otherwise people could read any amount of impact defense and claim it as a reason to vote neg

#### Alt can’t solve – securitization is a single act in a socially engrained discourse.

**Ghughunishvili 10**

(Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>)

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where **a single speech does not create** the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that **a single speech will not** be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

#### Expertism means our epistemology is sound – the alternative devolves into stereotypes and biases that collapses epistemology and turns the kritik

Snjezana 10

(Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences “Trusting Experts: Trust, Testimony, and Evidence”. Received: 2010-02-19. Original scientific article. University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Omladinska 14, 51000, Scholar)

Let us define expertism as being a position that is composed of three statements: (i) experts exist; (ii) we should ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts due their exceptional expertise; (iii) therefore, we have the epistemic right to trust experts without evidence. Expertism is a genuine anti-evidentialist position with regards to trusting experts. 1. Experts exist. While it is rather plausible that there are experts in science because they deal with facts, the existence of moral or aesthetic experts, who deal with values, is generally much more problematic. For instance, Milton Friedman holds that differences in values are differences caused by people's tastes which are more or less hardwired, undebatable and unchangeable (Friedman, 1984). Logical positivists believe that value judgments are "nonsense" and cannot be a matter of expertise because they are not verifiable. Many people think that most people have reasonable ethical competence and that philosophers (who are the prime candidates for moral experts) are inclined to the same self-serving rationalizations as other people. However, the untouchable status of experts in science can be disputed. From Kant, Kuhn, Quine to Goodman and Putnam, we are aware of an intelligible objection that theoretical hypotheses involve a theory laden, cognitively biased, socially manipulated and subjective interpretation of the world (Goldman, 1999). Also, in science as well as in ethics and aesthetics there are battles between experts who propose opposite theories. In spite of the fact that claiming the first thesis is not without its difficulties, I will assume that it is correct: there are people who are objective (not only reputational) experts. These objective experts are people who, in comparison with other people, are more effective in problem solving. When compared with other people, they are better guides to the truth or better in recognizing a false statement as false, and a true one as true.While the views of ordinary people are typically an ill sorted mass of material derived from experience and tradition which contains inconsistencies and tensions, skilled experts can detect inconsistencies, fallacious inferences, unwarranted generalizations and false premises. In contrast to the average person in ordinary epistemic circumstances, they possess knowledge about the appropriate methods of research and argumentation, more systematized information derived from long term **experience** of dealing with difficulties, distinctions, critics, and alternative conceptions. They are generally better trained to deal with epistemic, moral or aesthetic issues. Or, we can say like Aristotle that it is reasonable to suppose that none of them can miss the target totally, and that each has gotten something or even a lot of things right. 2. Distinctive testimonial status. In expertism, it is claimed that an expert's testimony requires considerable epistemic deference. I can see at least three reasons why would one ascribe a distinctive testimonial status to experts: (i) standing practice about an expert's reliability; (ii) insufficiency of evidence; (iii) epistemic dependence. Firstly, it could be seen that we have an epistemic right to treat an expert's knowledge and sincerity with the utmost credulity because there is a standing practice, social climate or ongoing policy that considers experts to be the most reliable sources of knowledge or that they are fundamental testimonial authorities in society (Pappas, 2000). By assuming such credentials about experts, it could be seen that a hearer may believe what an expert says without assessment, evaluation or additional evidence. Secondly, many philosophers hold that our evidence in favour of other people's testimonies is principally insufficient (Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Coady, 1981; Webb, 1993; Foley, 1994). If it is true, our evidence in favour of an expert's testimony is even more insufficient: when a layperson relies on an expert, that reliance is necessary blind (Hardwig, 1991).3 We, as non-experts in a domain, cannot ever possess enough evidence to evaluate an experts' testimony as credible or non credible. An ordinary cognizer in ordinary epistemic circumstances does not possess, or even can never attain, a high enough level of expertise to evaluate the testimonies of experts. We simply do not have enough knowledge and experience in order to be capable of assessing the truth of an expert's testimony or an expert's reliability. Since our reasons for the acceptance of the content of an expert's report – by definition of them being experts and us as non-experts – cannot be the reasons the experts possess, our evidence about an experts' report cannot be ever sufficient for the justified acceptance of her testimony. If we are not experts in a domain, the relevant defeaters (undefeated defeaters) or certain kinds of experiences, doubts and beliefs that can undermine justified trust simply are not present to us. So, it could be seen that we have no choice other than to blindly trust experts. Thirdly, we are deeply aware of our epistemic dependence on the testimonies of experts. Without other people testimonies "we should have to confess to knowing pitifully little" (Dummet, 1993, 420). But without expert testimonies our knowledge about biology, physics, medicine, geography of the world, history would be devastated. The majority of our beliefs about nature and society that we acquired throughout our lives are based, finally, on what experts 'tell' us (see also in Beanblossom, Lehrer, 1970; Faulkner, 2002). Our judgments of value will be a mass of inconsistent intuitions, **prejudices** and **stereotypes** derived from our subjective and partial interests, understandings of tradition, our temper etc. Behind the majority of testimonies lies extensive research and reports by experts and without these basic experts' testimonies "our lives would be impoverished in startling and debilitating ways" (Lackey, 2006, 1). So, it could be said that such an epistemic dependence on experts entails blind trust as a precondition of the functioning of our reason.

#### No impact – threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

**Kaufman**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **‘9**

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.** Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.** Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

### AT: Endless War

#### No risk of endless war

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, [http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2k Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. **Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war.** For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from **the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war,** but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

### Perms

#### Perm: do the plan as something for the K to rally against. The only way to change peoples minds to be consistent with the alt is if they can see clear examples of violent reps.

#### Perm: do the plan and the alt in all other instances. Either the alt is strong enough to solve or it doesn’t solve which means

### AT: Rejection Alt

#### Rejection of bad things is insufficient to solve for your harms—ideas are not merely metaphysical but also rooted in materiality.

Ng no date Karen Ng (Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University) “From the Critique of Reason to the Critique of Ideology: On the Relation between Life and Consciousness from Hegel to Critical Theory” JW

It should almost go without saying that just as Hegel’s “Idea” is not something merely in the head, ideology, and especially its effects, are also not to be taken as mere ideas. In fact, the first instance of ideology (the “German” ideology of the young Hegelians) is the conviction that only changing our ideas will thereby suffice to change reality. Marx’s conception of ideology begins with a fairly straightforward presupposition, namely, “the existence of living human individuals [die Existenz lebendiger menschlicher Individuen]” and the material conditions of productive activity through which they reproduce their life.37 To distinguish human life from animal life, Marx again uses the logic of species-being, specifying that taking life activity as an object of volition and consciousness, is, minimally, to actively produce one’s means of subsistence. Recalling Adorno’s Hegelian assessment that to set a limit is also thereby to go beyond it, the material conditions of actual life are both found as given and already existing, and as something that is produced and reproduced by the activities of living human individuals. We can understand the emergence of ideology from these presuppositions in two stages. The first is a very general claim made by Marx that ideas, conceptions, and consciousness itself must be understood as the products or results of the activities of human beings. Far from being a reductionist claim, all Marx is suggesting here is the Hegelian thought that ideas are not in the head, that the ideas and conceptions of consciousness must have some necessary relation to the productive activities of real, living individuals. His simple and straightforward formula for this claim is that “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.”38 Just as Hegel objected to Kant’s purely transcendental critique of reason, Marx is suggesting that we cannot simply attack ideas we don’t like—patriarchy, individualism, private property—as if ideas were entirely self-sufficient, as if ideas could swing entirely free from the material conditions and practices from which they draw their life. More accurately, what constitutes ideology in the first instance is the belief that concepts autonomously control and determine material conditions and practices, rather than the other way around. This is a fairly common way of understanding ideology, and accounts for the use of term when we talk, for example, about political or religious ideologies (religion of course is always the first example of ideology for Marx). The self-sufficiency and transcendence of the products of consciousness also in part accounts for the purportedly eternal or “natural” character of ideologies (so sexist and racist ideas are true, in and of themselves, independent of material conditions, and we must use these ideas to determine and organize reality). However, the matter is little more complicated, for this inversion of the life/selfconsciousness relation in which consciousness and its products come to be falsely viewed as self-sufficient, is only half the story. To cite another famous passage from The German Ideology: If in all ideology human beings and their circumstances [Verhältnisse] appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.39 The other half of the story is this: the illusion that the ideas and conceptions of consciousness autonomously determine and control the material conditions of life, and the inversion of life and self-consciousness that this represents, is itself an idea that arises from a determinate configuration of the material conditions of production, of the practices and institutions that organize a society. That is, the very belief in the uncoupling of self-consciousness from life, the belief in an upside-down or inverted version of that relationship, the belief in the absolute transcendence of consciousness, is itself a product of the material circumstances and relations that obtain in a particular form of life. This is why it is not simply enough to attack ideas qua ideas, and why, instead, critique must navigate the dialectic of immanence and transcendence in which ideologies thrive. To turn to an example that in fact illuminates the entire problematic: when Marx and Adorno criticize idealism as a philosophy, the suggestion is not simply that idealism is a bad idea. Rather, it is no accident that idealism as a philosophy emerges with the development of the bourgeois class, and even while idealism asserts its autonomy from the conditions of life, it is nonetheless a philosophy that is decidedly, perhaps even necessarily, a product of the bourgeois form of life. Insofar as idealism in fact corresponds to the reality of bourgeois life, idealism as a philosophy is very much “true”—precisely because it corresponds with reality. What is wrong or false about idealism is not its status as a mere idea, but that it corresponds to a wrong or false reality, that it is an ideological reflex or echo of a wrong and false form of life.40 The critique of reason must become a critique of ideology, for to criticize ideas without criticizing the form of life that gave rise to them is to simultaneously attack a caput mortuum, and to resurrect that which is, in a sense, already dead. Philosophical critique becomes social critique, as soon as ideas become wedded to reality.

### Action Key

#### Action’s key. Prior questions will never be settled.

Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience**, it is** particularly **important** for feminists **that we proceed with analysis of** both **the material** (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. **Important** ethical/**political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered**. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an **alt**ernative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

### AT: Reps First

#### Weigh the reps of the aff against the K—I’m the only one endorsing a positive action towards disadvantaged groups which is a reason why my discourse is valuable and the perm’s key. This outweighs—my reps prove something’s good in the context of tradeoffs whereas the links are abstract.

#### Excessive focus on reps kills social change.

Chait 15 Jonathan Chait “How the language police are perverting liberalism.” NY Magazine January 275h 2015 <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html> JW

Or maybe not. The p.c. style of politics has one serious, possibly fatal drawback: It is exhausting. Claims of victimhood that are useful within the left-wing subculture may alienate much of America. The movement’s dour puritanism can move people to outrage, but it may [and] prove ill suited to the hopeful mood required of mass politics. Nor does it bode well for the movement’s longevity that many of its allies are worn out. “It seems to me now that the public face of social liberalism has ceased to seem positive, joyful, human, and freeing,” confessed the progressive writer Freddie deBoer. “There are so many ways to step on a land mine now, so many terms that have become forbidden, so many attitudes that will get you cast out if you even appear to hold them. I’m far from alone in feeling that it’s typically not worth it to engage, given the risks.” Goldberg wrote recently about people “who feel emotionally savaged by their involvement in [online feminism] — not because of sexist trolls, but because of the slashing righteousness of other feminists.” Former Feministing editor Samhita Mukhopadhyay told her, “Everyone is so scared to speak right now.” That the new political correctness has bludgeoned even many of its own supporters into despondent silence is a triumph, but one of limited use. Politics in a democracy is still based on getting people to agree with you, not making them afraid to disagree. The historical record of political movements that sought to expand freedom for the oppressed by eliminating it for their enemies is dismal. The historical record of American liberalism, which has extended social freedoms to blacks, Jews, gays, and women, is glorious. And that glory rests in its confidence in the ultimate power of reason, not coercion, to triumph.

#### Reps first focus is bad-making every piece of discourse a possible voter discourages argumentation about politically contentious issues because the cost of messing up is a loss. This causes less advocacies for marginalized groups because people will shy away from controversy and suggesting new ideas.

### AT: Method/Epist/Onto

#### My methodology and epistemology is good and self-reflexive- the alt fails and the perm solves best

Caprioli 4(Mary Caprioli, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, International Studies Review, June 2004 pp.256-8

The purported language difference between feminist and IR scholars appears to be methodological. In general, feminist IR scholars 2 are skeptical of empiricist methodologies and "have never been satisfied with the boundary constraints of conventional IR" (Tickner 2001:2). As noted above, conventional international relations is defined on the basis of methodology as a commitment "to empiricism and data-based methods of testing" (Tickner 2001:149). Ironically, some feminist IR scholars place boundary constraints on feminist IR scholarship by limiting its definition to a critical-interpretive methodology (see Carpenter 2003:ftn. 1). Rather than pushing methodological boundaries to expand the field and to promote inclusiveness, conventional IR feminists appear to discriminate against quantitative research. If conventional feminists are willing to embrace multicultural approaches to feminism, why restrict research tools? There would seem to be a lack of consistency between rhetoric and practice. Especially at the global level, there need not be only one way to achieve feminist goals. Hence, conventional feminist IR scholars might benefit from participating in mainstream IR scholars' evolving embrace of methodological pluralism and epistemological opportunism (Bueno de Mesquita 2002; Chan 2002; Fearon and Wendt 2002). One must assume that feminist IR scholars support the pursuit of research that broadens our understanding of international relations. Such a research agenda must include both evidence and logic (Bueno de Mesquita 2002; Chan 2002). Theorizing, case study evidence (specific details), and external validity (generality) are all necessary components of research—only through a combination of all three modes of inquiry can we begin to gain confidence in our understanding. "And still we debate what seems to have been obvious to our predecessors: to gain understanding, we need to integrate careful empirical analysis with the equally careful application of the power of reason" (Bueno de Mesquita 2002:2). Different types of scholarship "make different contributions that can be mutually beneficial, as when historical studies isolate immediate causes that act as catalysts for the general tendencies identified in aggregate analyses" (Chan 2002:754). Without logic and theory, the general tendencies identified through quantitative analysis are incomplete. "In the absence of guidance from such logic, the data exercises degenerate into mindless fishing expeditions and are vulnerable to spurious interpretations" (Chan 2002:750). Most scholars concerned with gender certainly owe a debt to Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987), Cynthia Enloe (1989), and Ann Tickner (1992). These IR feminists shattered the publishing boundary for feminist IR scholarship and tackled the difficult task of deconstructing IR theory, including its founding myths, thereby creating the logic to guide feminist quantitative research. It is only through exposure to feminist literature that one can begin to scientifically question the sexist assumptions inherent in the dominant paradigms of international relations. Feminist theory is rife with testable hypotheses that can only strengthen feminist IR scholarship by identifying false leads and logical errors or by identifying general tendencies that deserve further inquiry. Without the solid body of feminist literature that exists, quantitative feminist IR scholarship would be meaningless. The existing feminist literature based on critical-interpretive epistemologies forms the rationale for quantitative testing. No one methodology is superior to the others. So, why create a dichotomy if none exists? **All methodologies contribute to our knowledge**, and, **when put together** like pieces of a puzzle, **they offer a clearer picture**. **The idea is to build a bridge of knowledge, not parallel walls that are equally inadequate** in their understanding of one another and in explaining international relations. Further **undermining the false dichotomization** between positivist and interpretivist methodologies **is the lack of proof that quantitative methodologies cannot challenge established paradigms** **or, more important**, **that a critical-interpretive epistemology is unbiased or more likely to uncover some truth** that is supposedly obscured by quantitative inquiry. Part of the rationale for the perpetuation of the dichotomy between methodologies and for the critique of quantitative methodology as a valid type of feminist inquiry involves confusing theory and practice. On a theoretical level, quantitative research is idealized as value-free and objective, which of course it is not—particularly when applied to the social sciences. Feminists opposed to quantitative methodologies imagine that other scholars necessarily assume such scholarship to be objective (see Brown 1988). **Few social scientists using quantitative methodologies,** however**, would suggest that this methodology is value-free, which is why so much emphasis is placed on defining measures**. This procedure leaves room for debate and provides space for feminist inquiry. For example, feminists might wish to study the effect of varying definitions of democracy and of security on the democratic peace thesis, ultimately combining methodologies to provide a more thorough understanding of the social matrix underlying state behavior.

#### Their epistemic/ontological arguments don’t disprove the aff—pragmatic reasoning is good and the alt cripples action.

Kratochwil 8 IR Prof @ Columbia, 8 [Friedrich Kratochwil is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, Pragmatism in International Relations “Ten points to ponder about pragmatism” p11-25]

Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with** objects or “things” (**ontology**), **or** with **reason** and method (epistemology), **but with** “**acting”** ( prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings** placed **in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act** and must do so always **under time pressures** and **in the face of incomplete information**. Precisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, **what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear** ex ante, **because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and** the multiple **possibilities are rife with** incentives for (**dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts** informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of relying on** certainty and **universal validity** gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to **detail**, **rather than** to **generality**, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since **acting in the social world** often **involves acting “for” someone,** special **responsibilities arise** that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since **we owe** special **care to those entrusted to us**, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot** just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot ***refuse* to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient knowledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sciences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

#### Our knowledge claims are accurate- epistemology and ontology shouldn’t come first

**Owen ‘2** (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that **it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise** issues of **ontology and epistemology over explanatory** and/or interpretive **power as if the latter** two **were merely a** simple **function of the former**. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a **philosophical weakness**—but this **does not undermine the point that,** for a certain class of problems, **rational choice theory may provide the best account available** to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and **prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one** theoretical **approach which gets things right**, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Method focus causes paralysis.

Jackson 11, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, ’11 (Patrick Thadeus, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. **Hirschman** (1970b, 338) **noted this very danger**, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the **focus on** producing internally **consistent** packages of **assumptions instead of** actually examining **complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus **we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress**, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a **firmer scientific footing** by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but **only after the fundamentals have been** soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

### AT: Ontology 1st

#### Ontology focus is useless and quells action.

Shirky 5 Clay Shirky, teacher of NYU's graduate Interactive Telecommunications Program, 03/15/05 <http://www.itconversations.com/shows/detail470.html> I hold a joint appointment at NYU, as an Associate Arts Professor at the Interactive Telecommunications Program (ITP) and as a Distinguished Writer in Residence in the Journalism Department. I am also a Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society, and was the Edward R. Murrow Visiting Lecturer at Harvard's Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy in 2010

There are many ways to organize data: labels, lists, categories, taxonomies, **ontologies.** Of these, ontology -- assertions about essence and relations among a group of items -- seems to be the highest-order method of organization. Indeed, the predicted value of the Semantic Web assumes that ontological successes such as the Library of Congress's classification scheme are easily replicable. Those successes are not easily replicable. Ontology, far from being an ideal high-order tool, is a **300-year-old hack**, now nearing the end of its useful life. **The problem ontology solves is not how to organize ideas but how to organize things** -- the Library of Congress's classification scheme exists not because concepts require consistent hierarchical placement, **but because books do**. The LC scheme, when examined closely, is riddled with inconsistencies, bias, and gaps. Top level geographic categories, for example, include "The Balkan Penninsula" and "Asia." The primary medical categories don't include oncology, defaulting to the older and now discredited notion that cancers were more related to specific organs than to common processes. And the list of such oddities goes on. The reason the LC scheme is accumulating these errors faster than they can correct them is the physical fact of the book, which makes a card catalog scheme necessary, and constant re-shelving impossible. Likewise, it enforces **cookie-cutter categorization** that doesn't reflect the polyphony of its contents--there is a literature of creativity, for example, made up of books about art, science, engineering, and so on, and yet those books are not categorized (which is to say shelved) together, because the LC scheme doesn't recognize creativity as an organizing principle. For a reader interested in creativity, the LC **ontology destroys value rather than creating it.** As we have learned from the Web, when data is decoupled from physical presence, it is fluid enough to be grouped differently by different readers, and on different days. The Web's main virtue, in handling data, is to transmute organization from an a priori, content-based judgment to one that can be ad hoc, context-based, socially embedded, and constantly altered. The Web frees us from needing to argue about whether The Book of 5 Rings "is" a business book or a primer on war -- it is plainly both, and not only are we freed from making that judgment firmly or in advance, we are freed from needing to make it explicit at all. This talk begins by exploring the rise of ontological classification. In the period after the invention of the printing press but before the invention of the search engine, intellectual production was vested in books, objects that were numerous but opaque. When you have more than a few hundred books, categorization becomes a forced move, even if the categories are somewhat arbitrary, because without categories, you can no longer locate individual books.

## AT: Nuclear Imperialism K

### 1AR Block

#### 1. NO LINK. Armenia has zero plans to acquire nuclear weapons and they don’t even make weapons domestically anyways.

NTI 15 Nuclear Threat Initiative “Armenia” http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/armenia/ JW

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia did not have any weapons of mass destruction on its territory, nor did Soviet-era industry manufacture any key components for weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery on Armenian territory. Armenia possesses some conventional weapons production capabilities, mostly as a result of its long-standing conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan over a primarily Armenian-populated region, Nagorno-Karabakh. [1] Nuclear Armenia is a party to the NPT, has an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). There are two known nuclear research facilities in Armenia: the Yerevan Institute of Physics and the Analitsark Research Facility in Gyumri. [2] Neither houses fissile material. Armenia has one nuclear power plant, Metsamor, (also known as the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant), which contains two VVER-440 reactor units and produces approximately 40% of the country's electricity. [3] Unit 1 went critical in 1976 and Unit 2 in 1980. [4] Both units were shut down after the 1988 earthquake. Unit 1 is permanently out of operation, while Unit 2 was re-commissioned in 1995. [5] The re-opening of Unit 2 played a crucial role during the period of economic recovery following Armenia's independence by providing Armenia with surplus power capacity. [6] While the government had planned to close the unit by 2017, it decided in October 2012 to extend the life of the old reactor for another ten years. [7] In March 2014, the Armenian government approved a plan to extend the plant's operational lifespan further until 2026 with repairs to be made beginning in 2017. [8] These repairs will be funded by the Russian Federation, which has offered Armenia a grant of $30 million and a loan of $270 million to complete the necessary work. [9] The Russian Federation supplies the nuclear fuel necessary for Metsamor's operation under a 2003 agreement between Moscow and Yerevan that ceded management of the plant to Russia's electricity monopoly Unified Energy Systems (UES). [10] In response to the proposed extension of Metsamor's operational lifespan, expert bodies and representatives from the region expressed concerns about the potential for accidents at the site, given the age of the reactor and a history of seismic activity in the area. [11] A 2015 staff working document prepared by the office of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Commission states that, "since the power plant cannot be upgraded to meet current internationally recognized nuclear safety standards; it should be closed as soon as possible." [12] While noting that closure of the plant remains a key objective for the European Union under the European Neighborhood Policy action plan, the drafters of the report also indicate that the European Commission plans to peer review a stress test report on the plant in 2015 conducted by Armenia as part of its promotion of the highest nuclear safety standards worldwide. Turkey and Azerbaijan have been similarly vocal in expressing their concerns about the nuclear power plant, though some of these critiques may also reflect longstanding political and historical tensions between these countries and Armenia: In a statement before the UN Security Council in 2012, the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations voiced reservations regarding the security of the Metsamor plant in the context of a discussion on preventing nuclear trafficking. [13] At the May 2015 International Energy and Environment Fair and Conference, the Turkish Energy Minister called on environmentalists to march in protest of the plant as outdated and unsafe. [14] Armenia has worked closely with the IAEA, the United States, and other states to improve the physical security of Metsamor, investing millions of dollars in security enhancements. [15] In spite of Yerevan's commitment to security at the plant, officials have refused to export its spent nuclear fuel to be stored or recycled, and have moved forward with plans to construct a third storage facility for the material. The 2003 management agreement with Russia stipulates that spent fuel be transferred to Russia. [16] In fall 2014, the power plant was taken offline for 53 days, during which time new security measures were introduced and annual maintenance was performed. [17] Armenia does not export its spent nuclear fuel, and has expressed plans to embark on a third phase of spent fuel dry storage construction in conjunction with French company TN international in 2014. [18] In August 2010, Russia and Armenia signed a cooperation agreement for the construction of at least one 1,000 MW, $5 billion unit at Metsamor to be owned by Metzamorenergoatom, a Russian-Armenian joint stock company. [19] While construction on the new power unit was originally slated to begin in 2011, Russia's Rosatom and the Armenian government repeatedly announced delays, citing financial concerns. [20] Subsequently, on the sidelines of the 2015 Atomexpo forum in Moscow, Rosatom's Director for International Business explained in an interview that upgrading Metsamor's second power unit was more cost effective than constructing a new one. [21] Nevertheless, in a press release dated February 2015, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources indicated that construction on a new power unit at Metsamor is now slated to begin in 2018 in the hopes that it will be operational in 2027. [22] The press release did not enumerate the countries who would invest in the new unit. Subsequently, at a meeting with the Premier of the People's Republic of China's State Council in March 2015, Armenian president Serge Sargsyan reportedly discussed the potential for Chinese involvement in the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Armenia. [23] In May 2015, a second press release from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources cited that agency's Minister as indicating that negotiations with potential investors for the construction of a new power plant were ongoing, including with the China National Nuclear Corporation. [24] Armenia is a participant in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Committee on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy. [25] Armenia has also joined the International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk, Russia. [26] The United States has provided ongoing assistance to Armenia for improving its export control system and border security. [27] In May 2012 Armenia and the United States concluded a bilateral agreement to curb the trafficking of Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) materials through Armenian territory, where in recent years a number of Armenian citizens have been caught trying to sell radioactive materials. [28] With U.S. assistance, Armenia opened a new nuclear forensics lab in January 2013 to enable the government to investigate and prosecute smugglers more effectively. [29] On May 13, 2013, Armenia and Belarus signed an agreement on information exchange and cooperation in nuclear safety and radiation protection. As a result, Armenia is expected to send about a dozen nuclear experts to assist Belarus in operating its first nuclear plant, currently under construction. [30] Biological Armenia acceded to the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 7 June 1994. There is no evidence that Armenia possesses or is pursuing biological weapons. During the Soviet era, the Armenian Center for Prophylaxis of Especially Dangerous Diseases (formerly known as the Armenian Anti-Plague Station) was part of the Soviet anti-plague system. The role of this facility was to control endemic diseases and prevent the importation of exotic pathogens that could threaten crops, animals, and humans. [31] In the late 1960s, the system also was tasked with defending the USSR against biological attacks. The center's present goal is to protect against infectious outbreaks of deadly diseases and to study domestic zoonotic pathogens. Additionally, a special facility to research prions was established in 2001. [32] Chemical On 15 May 1992, Armenia signed the Tashkent Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States, according to which Russia was acknowledged as the legal inheritor of Soviet chemical weapons. In signing the agreement, Armenia agreed to comply with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to abide by the Soviet moratorium of 1987 on the production of chemical weapons, to coordinate its policy with a view to achieving the speedy conclusion of a multilateral and verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and to coordinate its policy in regards to controlling the export of dual-use chemicals. Armenia is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention and a founding member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Missile Armenia possesses a limited arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles. Between 1993 and 1996, Russia secretly transferred a number of short-range ballistic missiles to Armenia. [33] As of 2005 the country possessed 32 operational R-17 Elbrus missiles (NATO designation SS-1-C Scud-B) and eight launchers, with a range of 300 km. [34] In 2010, the Armenian defense ministry confirmed that it had an unspecified number of Russian-made S-300 (NATO designation SA-10 Grumble) surface-to-air missiles. [35] At a military parade in Yerevan in September 2011, the Armenian military for the first time publicly displayed its tactical ballistic missiles, which included several short-range OTR-21-U Tochka missiles (NATO designation SS-21 Scarab C). [36] The Russian military, which operates bases in the country through a joint defense agreement, has also deployed several Iskander-M (NATO designation SS-26 Stone) systems in Armenia, which have an operational range of 400 km and are designed to evade theater missile defense systems. [37] The Iskander is under Russian control and the missile would not play any role in an Armenian conflict. Armenia is dependent on Russia as its primary source of missile technology, and does not produce ballistic missiles domestically.

#### 2. Weigh the aff against the K—captures the benefits of both models of debate, you should lose if you don’t prove the reps of the aff are worse than the benefits of the aff since you haven’t won my speech act is bad. Massive poverty’s worse than bad reps since it precludes the possibility of having good speech in the first place.

3. No link. The plan text specifically doesn’t have imperialist language – it’s only the advantages. Proves the K only links to the discourse of the cards. Two implications:

#### A. Not a reason to drop me—the judge has the option to vote aff for any reason, just like I can kick out of one advantage but win another one, you can choose to vote for parts of the AC that don’t link to the K.

#### B. Justifies K’s that link to only one word in one card, makes debate vacuous and not about substantive issues, also crushes discussion about the overall legitimacy of our speech acts.

#### 4. No link – Armenia can still have nuclear weapons – it can make them without nuclear power plants or get them from Russia who are close regional allies. The aff is purely about the risk of meltdown. ALL OF THEIR CARDS are about prolif.

#### 5. Perm: do the plan as something for the K to rally against. The only way to change peoples minds to be consistent with the alt is if they can see clear examples of violent reps.

#### 6. Perm: do the plan and the alt in all other instances. Either the alt is strong enough to solve or it doesn’t solve which means it’s too weak to overcome the aff.

#### 7. Reps first focus is bad-making every piece of discourse a possible voter discourages argumentation about politically contentious issues because the cost of messing up is a loss. This causes less advocacies for marginalized groups because people will shy away from controversy and suggesting new ideas.

### AT: Link Ev

#### 1. No link between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. You don’t have aff specific evidence that Armenia doesn’t want to be a have-not.

#### 2. Not competitive – I also agree the US and other superpowers should abandon nuclear tech, it’s just beyond the scope of the aff.

### AT: Reject Colonialism 1st

#### 1. Making debate oriented towards a single goal is bad – instrumentalizes education and ensures we only learn about one thing. Aff method solves best because we can discuss policy impacts in ranges of literally everything.

#### 2. No reason why it’s a voter – we can still critique colonialism in the aff, no reason why it needs to be a reason to vote neg.

# T Frontlines

## AT: Plans Bad

### Counter Interps

#### Counter interp: the aff may *only* read a plan that prohibits the production of nuclear power in Armenia. Solves the limits standard—there’s only one aff to prep against.

#### Second counter interp: the aff may read a plan that prohibits the production of nuclear power in a specific country if they have evidence that says nuclear power in that country is bad, and the plan is disclosed on the wiki a week before the tournament. I meet. Net benefits:

#### 1. Policymaking – spec lets us focus the debate on a single implementable policy. There’s no international agent that prohibits nuclear power in every single country. Without spec, we’re not talking about real policies and what we learn is useless.

#### 2. Resolvability – since energy policies are context specific and different for each country, it’s impossible to have generalized debates about the effects of a whole res plan. Independent voter and outweighs – we can’t even have a debate if the round’s irresolvable.

#### 3. Stratskew – whole res means the neg can PIC out of any country, kills fairness since you can scoop the entirety of the aff. Also, moots your standards – if people read PICs then you’ll have to do prep on specific countries in both worlds.

#### 4. Stable advocacy—without spec the aff can shift out of disads by saying specific harms don’t link to general principle—kills fairness since if arguments can be shifted the neg has no shot of winning. This turns predictability and outweighs because the aff can make unpredictable shifts in the 1AR.

### Reasonability

#### Use reasonability on T with a brightline of the aff prohibiting use of nuclear power and cards in the literature. You still have link and impact turn ground and generics check which means you could have engaged, I’m in the direction of the topic. Key to substantive education because there’s less unnecessary theory which trades off with topical debate. It’s not arbitrary since I have a justified brightline.

### AT: Textuality

#### 1. Bare plurals can be topical with an existential reading.

Carlson 77 brackets for clarity, Carlson, Greg N. "A unified analysis of the English bare plural." Linguistics and philosophy 1.3 (1977): 413-457.

Now that we have determined that X cannot be the plural of u, its relationship to the rest of the grammar becomes much less clear. We must ask once again what it is related to, and how this relationship is represented in the grammar. A certain amount of evidence indicates that the indefinite plural use of XNP is not to be distinguished from its generic uses. Let us for the moment consider the hypothesis that there are at least two distinct determiner elements of English, both of which just happen to be pronounced ‘X’. The first is like an existential quantifier (but not quite), and accounts for the ‘indefinite plural’; the second is like a universal (but not quite) and accounts for at least one of the ‘generic’ uses of XNP (there may be a number of generic determiners, all pronunced X, so we let the one posited represent possibly a whole class of determiner elements).13 This hypothesis carries with it the claim that XNP is systematically ambiguous. However, in most cases this is not borne out by the facts (as has been noted previously, for example in Dahl(1975)). Consider the following sentences: ￼(65) Smokers are rude. (66) Dogs bark. (67) Elephants are easily trained. ￼ ￼These sentences exhibit the generic, or ‘universal’ reading.14 But what is missing is the indefinite plural, or ‘existential’ reading. Why don’t [Dogs bark] (65-67) mean (65’-67’) as well, if X is really systematically ambiguous? ￼￼Some smokers are rude. W’J Some dogs bark. Some elephants are easily trained. 65’) (67’) ￼These readings are clearly plausible pragmatically, some reason. Again, why don’t we judge the italicized XNP’s of the following sentences to be ambiguous? Either reading should be possible, but only the ‘universal’ emerges. but they are ruled out for ￼￼(68) (69) (70) Mark really loves puppies. Kris hates small ugly creatures. The man over there believes Texans to be friendly. ￼

#### 2. Multiple grammatically correct interps of the topics means you have to weigh fairness and education first – nuke power could also mean states with nuclear weapons which is a very semantically plausible interp.

#### 3. The only reason text is good is because of predictability, but that assumes you’re winning a limits standard.

#### 4. Adhering to the strict resolution text doesn’t produce good debates—topics are written by traditional old lay coaches so modification is key to nat circuit competition.

#### 5. The “topicality” rule is nonsense – you could also treat my standards like that. The “policymaking” and “stratskew” rules will also produce good debates.

#### 6. Textuality assumes truth testing but you’ve conceded comparing worlds from the aff – my burden isn’t to prove the res true, just to present a good advocacy.

### AT: Jurisdiction

#### 1. Empirically denied – judges vote on non-topical affs all the time and don’t get their contracts rescinded.

#### 2. The tournament rules don’t stipulate this is what we have to debate about, they just list it as a resolution with no external requirements.

### AT: Ground

#### 1. Side bias impact turns—more aff ground’s good since it compensates for short 1AR and neg reactivity that make it harder to affirm.

#### 2. Generics solve: NCs, Ks, and impact turns still answer the aff.

#### 3. T-the fact that the plan isn’t happening now proves you have qualitative ground.

#### 4. Lots of great ground against this aff – energy market disads, US/Armenian relations disad, Russian heg disad. People have read these all against me which proves you’re just too lazy.

### AT: Limits

#### 1. Wiki solves. It’s been online for two weeks – you could have done prep.

#### 2. Generics solve - NCs, Ks, and impact turns still answer the aff.

#### 3. Lit solves – there are only 31 countries with nuclear power according to Wikipedia and even less of those will have viable lit ground.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear\_power\_by\_country

#### 4. T-the whole res is unpredictable based on the topic lit. No solvency advocates talk about international rejection of nuke power – they refer to it on a country by country basis.

#### 5. T- you overlimit because there’s only one aff under your interp. Even if my interp is slightly too large, yours is way too small.

### AT: Breadth

#### 1. T-plans are key to breadth—they let us explore different areas of the topic instead of focusing on the same aff every round.

#### 2. Not everyone reads plans—other rounds solve.

#### 3. Depth is more important—spreading ourselves thin on many issues can be done with articles—only nuanced debates with specific evidence comparison about one policy are educational.

### RVI

#### Give the aff an RVI on counter interps to T:

#### A. Reciprocity—otherwise the neg gets T and theory but the aff only gets theory, kills fairness since you have more outs to the ballot, that’s a structural skew that outweighs substantive abuse which can be overcome by better debating.

#### B. Timeskew—the 2ARs too short to prove I’m T and adequately cover substance in 3 minutes; effective 2NRs will split their time and make affirming impossible.

### Reject the Arg

#### Reject the argument on T—if they win I’ll defend whole res. A. Substantive education—theory layer goes away and we get to debate the aff advantages which still apply—outweighs since education is the only reason people join the debate. B. Aff strat—dropping the debater makes affirming impossible because there’s always some interp that the aff violates.

## AT: T-Plural

### I Meets

#### 1. I meet. Country is defined as “a nation with its own government[[1]](#footnote-1), occupying a particular territory:” and durable fiat means that multiple governments will implement the plan and carry out implementation over time as new leaders are replaced and elected.

#### 2. I meet. Reductionism is true – that’s Olson from the aff. That means the government in each instance is different from the past instance so I implement the plan in infinite countries.

### C/I

#### Counter interp: Merriam Wesbter defines country as

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/country

an indefinite usually extended expanse of land

#### I meet this definition, there are hundreds of expnases of land per country.

Net benefit: Merriam Webster’s the most accurate.

Merriam Webster no date <http://www.merriam-webster.com/info/>

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#### Second counter interp: the aff can either defend whole res, or specify a single specific country in the plan text. I meet. Prefer:

#### 1. Limits – if affs can specify a couple of countries then there are literally millions of plans because you can defend any combination of actors. If I defend only one, then there’s a limited caselist. Limits are key to fairness and education because they ensure negs can engage with affs and have prep.

#### 2. Policymaking – countries never act in unison in energy policies because they have different infrastructures and legislation. Your interp forces debates about advocacies that are made up which kills education since we’re not learning about anything real.

### Reasonability

#### Use reasonability on T with a brightline of the aff prohibiting use of nuclear power and cards in the literature. You still have link and impact turn ground and generics check which means you could have engaged, I’m in the direction of the topic. Key to substantive education because there’s less unnecessary theory which trades off with topical debate. It’s not arbitrary since I have a justified brightline.

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### AT: Pragmatic Standards

#### You don’t solve any of your standards – under your interp people will just read 2 or 3 countries because it is technically plural.

### RVI

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# Homeless Cards

### Angarsk

#### Armenia sends uranium to Angarsk for processing.

Sarukhanyan 10 Sevak (Ph.D. in Political Sciences, expert of energy and regional security in the South Caucasus, deputy director of “Noravank” Foundation, the editor-in-chief of “Globus: Energy and Regional Security” bulletin (in Armenian).) “The Prospects of Nuclear Energy in Armenia” 21st Century No. 1 (7) 2010 JW

One of the most sensitive problems related to this issue is the transportation of uranium from Armenia to Angarsk for further processing. The absence of railway communication between Armenia and the external world (other than Georgia) hampers any large-scale uranium exports. Theoretically, the Georgian seaports could used, but the Russian-Georgian relations may negatively affect this option. In future, building a railway from Armenia to Iran may create another option for the export of uranium, but there have been no specific agreements signed for that so far. On the other hand, the export of radioactive materials suitable for military purposes through the territory of Iran is something that is hard to know when it will be acceptable for the international community.

### Azerbaijan War Adv.

#### Building new reactors risks Azerbaijan war.

McGinnity 15 Ian “Risky Business – Roadblocks to Building Armenia’s New Nuclear Power Plant” Regional Studies Center May 25th 2015 <http://regional-studies.org/blog/445-250515#_edn4> JW

Secondly, Armenia remains locked in a frozen conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh. While there has largely been a cessation of full-scale hostilities over the past twenty years, cross-border incursions, sniper fire, and deaths occur regularly.[iii] As the downing of an Armenian military helicopter on the Azerbaijan-Karabagh border in November 2014 demonstrated, the ghostly prospect of renewed war, either by intent or by accident, looms heavily over the geopolitical landscape and increases the risk of undertaking any multi-billion dollar project.[iv]

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/armenia-azerbaijan-the-brink-war-11035

### Russian Econ Adv.

#### The plan benefits Russian econ.

McGinnity 15 Ian “Risky Business – Roadblocks to Building Armenia’s New Nuclear Power Plant” Regional Studies Center May 25th 2015 <http://regional-studies.org/blog/445-250515#_edn4> JW

Likewise, a new nuclear plant would curtail Armenian dependence on Russian natural gas. Armenia imports 100% of the natural gas it consumes, the vast majority of which originates in Russia. If a nuclear plant fails to materialize, Armenia will likely need to double its natural gas consumption to prevent a supply gap once Metsamor has been decommissioned. Clearly, this would be in Russia’s interest financially, and would provide a means to continue asserting its political and economic leverage.

### Armenian Econ Adv.

#### Plan helps Armenian econ

McGinnity 15 Ian “Risky Business – Roadblocks to Building Armenia’s New Nuclear Power Plant” Regional Studies Center May 25th 2015 <http://regional-studies.org/blog/445-250515#_edn4> JW

Most importantly, Armenia faces feeble prospects for long-term GDP growth and short term economic crisis as blowback from a weakened Russian economy sweeps into the Southern Caucasus.[v] Armenia is particularly susceptible to changes in the Russian economy, as Russian and Armenian economies are intricately linked. Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner and investor, and Armenia relies on remittances sent from Armenians living and working in Russia for a staggering 21% of its GDP.[vi] To put the direness of the current economic situation into some perspective, remittances from Russia dropped by as much as 56% from January 2014 to January 2015.[vii] Corresponding with downgraded credit ratings for Russian banking institutions, international credit agency Moody’s in January 2015 downgraded Armenia’s credit, bond, and currency ratings.[viii] While this development more severely impacts specific investment portfolios more than the broader economy, it does negatively contribute to Armenia’s overall uncertain economic outlook, creating a bleak investment environment. Of course, changes in the international political environment could shift Armenia’s economic outlook, revealing more positive economic indicators that would likely restore a healthier credit rating. However, the current economic situation, complemented by geological and geopolitical factors, signals heightened risk to international investors. Even if Armenia was able to attract the estimated $3.4 – 6 billion investment necessary to finance construction of the nuclear plant, it faces additional domestic hurdles. A $6 billion dollar loan would double Armenia’s sovereign debt, requiring the National Assembly, the legislative body of the Armenian government, to amend the Armenian Constitution and raise the debt ceiling.This may not be as difficult as it sounds. Almost all members of the Armenian government support construction of a nuclear plant and a constitutional amendment could be expected to move quickly and pass easily. From there it gets more complicated. The Armenian government would have to provide a sovereign guarantee to potential investors. Such guarantees are common in costly nuclear projects, and ensure financers return of investment even in the event of project failure. Often, governments that do not have the financial resources to repay the loan outright offer public assets as collateral.[ix] It will be difficult for the Armenian government to make such an offer worthwhile for investors. Over the past 15 years, the Armenian government has systematically relinquished control of state assets – mostly to Russian state-owned companies, and mostly as a means of debt repayment.[x] Russian companies manage and operate Metsamor and own outright the power distribution grid, Hrazdan Thermal Plant, and Armenia’s natural gas transit pipelines.[xi], [xii]Russian ownership does not extend merely to the energy sector. Most of the banking, telecommunication, and transport sector also lies under Russian control.[xiii] Simply put, the Armenian government lacks the sort of substantial assets that would satisfactorily pad potential investors against risk of failure.

#### This decision is KEY to econ future.

http://regional-studies.org/blog/443-010415

1. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/country [↑](#footnote-ref-1)