# 1AC Standard Version

## Part 1 is the standard

Ideal theory strips away questions of particularities and isolates a universal feature of agents. This normalizes a single experience and epistemologically skews ethical theorizing.

Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,

The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.

Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field; we take steps to correct material injustice.

Thus the standard is minimizing oppression.

## Part 2 is Advocacy

Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that is used to advocate for animals.

## Part 3 is Offense

Universities are cracking down on animal advocacy- faculty are fired for dissenting and students activists are silenced. Multiple empirical examples prove.

Kahn 10 [Kahn, Richard, anarchist educator whose primary interests are in researching the history of social movements as pedagogically generative forces in society, and in critically challenging the role dominant institutions play in blocking the realization of greater planetary freedom, peace, and happiness, "Operation get fired: A chronicle of the academic repression of radical environmentalist and animal rights advocate-scholars." Academic repression: Reflections from the academic industrial complex (2010): 200-215, http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/90383/operationgetfired-kahn.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1488872701&Signature=rIrpnSTWSguRU%2BKYE1qktPrIpCk%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DOperation\_Get\_Fired\_A\_Chronicle\_of\_the\_A.pdf] JW

Cases of University Repression of Radical Environmentalist and Animal Rights AdvocateScholars As evident in the case of Steven Best, the bureaucratic nature of higher education often makes it difficult to prove where clear repression has occurred and who within a labyrinthine administrative system is calling the shots. Still, in the instance of radical environmentalist and animal rights advocate scholars I think there are some contemporary examples of faculty, student, and organizational removal that warrant concern and are representative of the general tenure of what is taking place today within the academy. As Ward Churchill’s suspension and firing from the University of Colorado at Boulder grabbed headlines in 2005, the university’s concurrent removal of Adrienne Anderson – an Environmental Studies faculty member since 1992 who was also known to be one of the nation’s top environmental whistleblowers – took place much more quietly but no less importantly. Anderson has been likened to Erin Brockovich and Karen Silkwood for her work in the university and as the Western Director of the National Toxics Campaign, in which she has assisted labor unions and poor communities in holding corporate polluters like Rockwell International, Martin-Marietta, and ASARCO Metals (as well as corrupt government officials) accountable for their toxic misdeeds against people. An activist professor who brought her struggle for environmental justice into the classroom, a major goal of her pedagogy was to teach students how to file FOIA and Open Records requests in pursuit of uncovering the social and environmental damage done by government and industry. Her particular pet project was to have students investigate the Lowry Coalition, a collection of some 150 companies uncovered by Anderson who spent years dumping unregulated waste into a Denver metro-area landfill and then worked to cover up the presence of radioactive materials found therein, as the landfill sludge was greenlighted for use as agricultural fertilizer. Anderson filed suit on this matter in 1997 and winningly argued that the Coalition’s activities posed significant threats to the public health on numerous levels. Strongly championed by her students and having received nothing short of exceptional job reviews over the course of her teaching career (despite constant friction by certain university forces), Anderson suddenly found that her department had closed her classes without warning in 2005. While she alone had developed and taught a mandatory course for the major, being untenured and without opportunities to teach, the university happily declared Anderson expendable. Those familiar with her story, though, quickly pointed out that many of the companies in the Lowry Coalition are significant university investors. One – Scripps-Howard, the media monopoly in the Denver-area – also funds a faculty member in her department, who the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) alleges worked to undermine Anderson’s reputation with other faculty, as well as to dismantle her appeal for rehiring by leaking confidential and false information about her and her work. 7 As the AAUP statement makes clear, what occurred to Anderson has broad significance and should be properly seen as part and parcel of a current rightwing attempt to use the University of Colorado as a test case for imposing a corporatist model of education that weakens tenure, faculty governance and due process, as well as academic freedom generally. But it also reveals how the academy can work to suppress crucial environmental research and willingly jeopardize sectors of society in order to protect powerful allied interests. Such repression is aimed not only at professors, students also are under unprecedented attack from university administrations, such as happened to Valdosta State University, T. Hayden Barnes. Barnes was expelled in October of 2007 by Valdosta State President Ronald M. Zaccari for publicly protesting Zaccari’s decision to spend $30 million dollars of student fees on constructing an environmentally hazardous set of parking garages. Having learned of the decision from the school newspaper earlier in March, Barnes posted flyers around campus detailing sustainable alternatives and listed the contact information for Zaccari and the Georgia university system Board of Regents should anyone want to send opinions regarding the project (something he did himself). Four days later members of Students Against Violating the Environment contacted Barnes to let him know that Zaccari was angry, and in response Barnes removed the flyers. However, he was hardly finished campaigning and, over the next month, he posted a collage lampooning the parking garage project to his Facebook page, wrote a letter to the editor of the student paper critiquing the proposed garages, and then wrote Zaccari himself to request an exemption from paying the mandatory student fee that was to be contributed toward the construction project. According to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), which ultimately took up his case, on May 7 Barnes found a note from Zaccari slipped under his dormitory door which read “as a result of recent activities directed towards me by you, included [sic] but not limited to the attached threatening document [the Facebook collage], you are considered to present a clear and present danger to this campus”.8 While lawsuits filed by FIRE and Barnes resulted in Zaccari announcing his early retirement and the Board of Regents overturning Barnes’s expulsion, Valdosta State remains notorious for officially quarantining expressed free speech on its 168-acre campus to a small stage area that must be reserved two days in advance and can only be used two hours each afternoon.9 Alarmingly, the university is not unique in this practice. Although the University of California system is not amongst those with designated public free speech zones for political expression, it has moved to enforce a ban on a wave of ongoing protests by both legal and extra-legal animal rights groups against primate vivisection practices taking place on some of its campuses. Though framed as a defense of faculty research and an attempt to preserve academic freedom from direct action militants who targeted the property of specific vivisectors in recent years, flagship campuses like UCLA, UC Berkeley, and UC Santa Cruz are actually involved in deploying repressive tolerance. UCLA, in particular, is considered to play a leading role in developing national academic security strategies. As a member of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board, working in concert with the FBI and other agencies after a supposed ALF hit on a researcher’s home in 2006, UCLA has moved to check animal advocacy on campus by barring student activists from entering university buildings during demonstrations, by coordinating information about student groups with law enforcement, and by increasing its powers of surveillance generally. Moreover, it has sought and won court injunctions against the websites of legal organizations such as the UCLA Primate Freedom Project (founded by a UCLA student), and has suppressed the public speech rights of numerous individuals. Such anti-activist actions as the university are engaged in are now promoted as "Best Practices for Protecting Researchers and Research" by the Society for Neuroscience (Murr, 2008). The demented idea of standardizing protocols which serve to make animals as vulnerable as possible to th**e** unnecessary needles and knives of vivisectors reveals the manner in which corporate science and the security State have come together to set higher education policy, with UCLA presently serving as the principal model for other academic institutions to redraft their policies in similar fashion. While other academic institutions such as the University of Utah have similarly worked with government officials to legislate the criminalization of protests within 100 feet of faculty residences, recent legislation crafted by the UC system related to its lawsuit against animal rights activists has moved beyond the anti-democratic and into the realm of the unconstitutional. Specifically, the measure AB2296, submitted by Assemblyman Gene Mullin (D-San Mateo), was created to forbid political activities targeting corporate researchers on campus; with its initial aim being “to restrict public access to information about academics who do animal research and to make it illegal to post personal information about them online” (Krupnick, 2008), such as their names, addresses and photographs. Although the bill’s language was scaled back slightly when passed into law in October, 2008, it is revealing that as originally drafted it attempted to exempt requests about university research from public records requests, In other words, those in charge of the UC system unabashedly sought to create a non-transparent situation for university research in which it would be legally impossible to have civic oversight over the public university system’s work. While the immediate aim may have been to block the names of laboratory vivisectors from animal advocates, this legislation would have also shielded all manner of military, biotech, and other forms of ethically dubious experimentation from public inquiry. The University of California’s repression of animal rights activists and student groups is therefore an affront that should concern all people, and it is crucial that it be challenged appropriately as such repression serves not only to blunt moral progress but the realization of a more democratic science of the people in the process.

Students are censored from promoting veganism on college campus, even when it’s constitutionally protected.

Rivera 15, Carla, Contact Reporter, Student says Cal Poly Pomona is trying to silence his vegan campaign, 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-college-speech-20150513-story.html>

[Cal Poly](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/california-polytechnic-state-university-OREDU000793-topic.html) Pomona student Nicolas Tomas never thought handing out leaflets promoting a vegan diet would become so controversial. But when college administrators moved to restrict his activities, Tomas sued the university. His case became a flashpoint in the debate over how far universities should go to promote tolerance and civility on their increasingly diverse campuses — and whether some of those policies unfairly restrict constitutionally protected free speech.

Studies prove that exposure to animal advocacy on college campuses changes hearts and minds-that saves thousands of animal lives.

Cooney 13, Nick, The Powerful Impact of College Leafleting (Part 1), 2013, https://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/the-powerful-impact-of-college-leafleting-part-1/

Leafleting — passing out information about factory farming and vegan eating — is one of the most common ways that animal advocates promote vegan eating in the United States. The group [Vegan Outreach](http://www.veganoutreach.org/), which pioneered and popularized vegan leafleting, passed out almost 3 million leaflets last year, and other groups chipped in millions more. Compassionate Communities volunteers have been distributing our [Something Better leaflet](http://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SomethingBetter_V2.pdf), which shares the Farm Sanctuary experience, the realities of factory farming, and info on meat-free eating, to hundreds of thousands of people. But just how effective is leafleting? How many readers actually change their diet, and how many animals are spared a lifetime of misery? Should volunteers prioritize leafleting over other forms of animal advocacy? For the first time ever, we have answers to those questions! In the fall of 2012, Compassionate Communities teamed up with [The Humane League](http://www.thehumaneleague.com/) to measure the true impact of leafleting on a college campus. **How It Was Done** Early in the fall semester, staffers from The Humane League visited the main campuses of two large state schools on the East Coast, the University of Delaware and the University of Maryland. They distributed thousands of leaflets outside the dining halls of each school. The leaflets distributed were an equal mixture of Farm Sanctuary’s [Something Better leaflet](http://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SomethingBetter_V2.pdf) and Vegan Outreach’s popular [Compassionate Choices leaflet](http://www.veganoutreach.org/cc.pdf). About two months later, they returned to campus with surveys to see how much students’ diets had changed. They stood outside the dining halls and asked students passing by if they would take a survey. Students did not know what the survey was about prior to stopping and agreeing to take the survey. After agreeing, only those who actually received a leaflet earlier that semester were allowed to take the survey. Nearly 500 surveys were completed. **Key Results** Quite simply, the results were phenomenal. About 1 out of every 50 students **who received a leaflet** indicated they became vegetarian or pescatarian **as a result**. Just as importantly, 7% of students (1 in 14) said they now eat “a lot less” chicken, a lot fewer eggs, and a lot less dairy as a result of getting the leaflet. 6% eat a lot less fish, and 12% eat a lot less red meat. Furthermore, about 1 in 5 students said they shared the leaflet with someone else who then began to eat less meat. What does all this mean for animals? After accounting for social desirability bias (people over reporting changes in their diet), the results suggest that for every 100 leaflets **you distribute on a college campus,** you’ll spare**,** by **a** conservative calculation, **a minimum of** 50 animals a year a lifetime of misery**. That’s one animal spared for every two leaflets you distribute!** And that’s just in the first year. The number of farm animals spared grows much larger once you factor in the number of years that people maintain their diet. It also grows larger once you count the ripple effects of people persuading their friends and family to change. And we haven’t even begun to count the many hundreds of wild fish who will also be spared. The bottom line is this: With each hour you spend leafleting on a college campus, you will truly spare hundreds of farm animals from a lifetime of daily misery. The data is in. The facts are there. College leafleting is an absurdly effective activity for individuals and for organizations who want to make their community a more compassionate one.

This outweighs a. Outweighs on scope- If an hour saves hundreds of animals- then the plan as a whole across all colleges all year should save billions if not trillions of animal lives annually. b. Factory farms are hell on earth- tens of billions of sentient beings are killed and tortured every year. As long as there is a demand for meat- the slaughterhouse will exist. Harai 15, Yuval Noah, Industrial farming is one of the worst crimes in history, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/sep/25/industrial-farming-one-worst-crimes-history-ethical-question

The fate of industrially farmed animals is one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. Tens of billions of sentient beings, each with complex sensations and emotions, live and die on a production line, Animals are the main victims of history, and the treatment of domesticated animals in industrial farms is perhaps the worst crime in history. The march of human progress is strewn with dead animals. Even tens of thousands of years ago, our stone age ancestors were already responsible for a series of ecological disasters. When the first humans reached Australia about 45,000 years ago, they quickly drove to extinction 90% of its large animals. This was the first significant impact that Homo sapiens had on the planet’s ecosystem. It was not the last.¶ About 15,000 years ago, humans colonised America, wiping out in the process about 75% of its large mammals. Numerous other species disappeared from Africa, from Eurasia and from the myriad islands around their coasts. The archaeological record of country after country tells the same sad story. The tragedy opens with a scene showing a rich and varied population of large animals, without any trace of Homo sapiens. In scene two, humans appear, evidenced by a fossilised bone, a spear point, or perhaps a campfire. Scene three quickly follows, in which men and women occupy centre-stage and most large animals, along with many smaller ones, have gone. Altogether, sapiens drove to extinction about 50% of all the large terrestrial mammals of the planet before they planted the first wheat field, shaped the first metal tool, wrote the first text or struck the first coin. The next major landmark in human-animal relations was the agricultural revolution: the process by which we turned from nomadic hunter-gatherers into farmers living in permanent settlements. It involved the appearance of a completely new life-form on Earth: domesticated animals. Initially, this development might seem to have been of minor importance, as humans only managed to domesticate fewer than 20 species of mammals and birds, compared with the countless thousands of species that remained “wild”. Yet, with the passing of the centuries, this novel life-form became the norm. Today, more than 90% of all large animals are domesticated (“large” denotes animals that weigh at least a few kilograms). Consider the chicken, for example. Ten thousand years ago, it was a rare bird that was confined to small niches of South Asia. Today, billions of chickens live on almost every continent and island, bar Antarctica. The domesticated chicken is probably the most widespread bird in the annals of planet Earth. If you measure success in terms of numbers, chickens, cows and pigs are the most successful animals ever.¶ Alas, domesticated species paid for their unparalleled collective success with unprecedented individual suffering. The animal kingdom has known many types of pain and misery for millions of years. Yet the agricultural revolution created completely new kinds of suffering, ones that only worsened with the passing of the generations.¶ At first sight, domesticated animals may seem much better off than their wild cousins and ancestors. Wild buffaloes spend their days searching for food, water and shelter, and are constantly threatened by lions, parasites, floods and droughts. Domesticated cattle, by contrast, enjoy care and protection from humans. People provide cows and calves with food, water and shelter, they treat their diseases, and protect them from predators and natural disasters. True, most cows and calves sooner or later find themselves in the slaughterhouse. Yet does that make their fate any worse than that of wild buffaloes? Is it better to be devoured by a lion than slaughtered by a man? Are crocodile teeth kinder than steel blades?¶ What makes the existence of domesticated farm animals particularly cruel is not just the way in which they die but above all how they live. Two competing factors have shaped the living conditions of farm animals: on the one hand, humans want meat, milk, eggs, leather, animal muscle-power and amusement; on the other, humans have to ensure the long-term survival and reproduction of farm animals. Theoretically, this should protect animals from extreme cruelty. If a farmer milks his cow without providing her with food and water, milk production will dwindle, and the cow herself will quickly die. Unfortunately, humans can cause tremendous suffering to farm animals in other ways, even while ensuring their survival and reproduction. The root of the problem is that domesticated animals have inherited from their wild ancestors many physical, emotional and social needs that are redundant in farms. Farmers routinely ignore these needs without paying any economic price. They lock animals in tiny cages, mutilate their horns and tails, separate mothers from offspring, and selectively breed monstrosities. The animals suffer greatly, yet they live on and multiply. Doesn’t that contradict the most basic principles of [Darwinian](http://www.theguardian.com/science/charles-darwin) evolution? The theory of evolution maintains that all instincts and drives have evolved in the interest of survival and reproduction. If so, doesn’t the continuous reproduction of farm animals prove that all their real needs are met? How can a cow have a “need” that is not really essential for survival and reproduction?¶ It is certainly true that all instincts and drives evolved in order to meet the evolutionary pressures of survival and reproduction. When these pressures disappear, however, the instincts and drives they had shaped do not evaporate instantly. Even if they are no longer instrumental for survival and reproduction, they continue to mould the subjective experiences of the animal. The physical, emotional and social needs of present-day cows, dogs and humans don’t reflect their current conditions but rather the evolutionary pressures their ancestors encountered tens of thousands of years ago. Why do modern people love sweets so much? Not because in the early 21st century we must gorge on ice cream and chocolate in order to survive. Rather, it is because if our stone age ancestors came across sweet, ripened fruits, the most sensible thing to do was to eat as many of them as they could as quickly as possible. [Why do young men drive recklessly](http://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2013/aug/19/driving-road-neuroscience-psychology), get involved in violent rows, and hack confidential internet sites? Because they are obeying ancient genetic decrees. Seventy thousand years ago, a young hunter who risked his life chasing a mammoth outshone all his competitors and won the hand of the local beauty – and we are now stuck with his macho genes.¶ Exactly the same evolutionary logic shapes the life of cows and calves in our industrial farms. Ancient wild cattle were social animals. In order to survive and reproduce, they needed to communicate, cooperate and compete effectively. Like all social mammals, wild cattle learned the necessary social skills through play. Puppies, kittens, calves and children all love to play because evolution implanted this urge in them. In the wild, they needed to play. If they didn’t, they would not learn the social skills vital for survival and reproduction. If a kitten or calf was born with some rare mutation that made them indifferent to play, they were unlikely to survive or reproduce, just as they would not exist in the first place if their ancestors hadn’t acquired those skills. Similarly, evolution implanted in puppies, kittens, calves and children an overwhelming desire to bond with their mothers. A chance mutation weakening the mother-infant bond was a death sentence.¶ What happens when farmers now take a young calf, separate her from her mother, put her in a tiny cage, vaccinate her against various diseases, provide her with food and water, and then, when she is old enough, artificially inseminate her with bull sperm? From an objective perspective, this calf no longer needs either maternal bonding or playmates in order to survive and reproduce. All her needs are being taken care of by her human masters. But from a subjective perspective, the calf still feels a strong urge to bond with her mother and to play with other calves. If these urges are not fulfilled, the calf suffers greatly.¶ This is the basic lesson of evolutionary psychology: a need shaped thousands of generations ago continues to be felt subjectively even if it is no longer necessary for survival and reproduction in the present. Tragically, the agricultural revolution gave humans the power to ensure the survival and reproduction of domesticated animals while ignoring their subjective needs. In consequence, domesticated animals are collectively the most successful animals in the world, and at the same time they are individually the most miserable animals that have ever existed.¶ The situation has only worsened over the last few centuries, during which time traditional agriculture gave way to industrial farming. In traditional societies such as ancient Egypt, the Roman empire or medieval China, humans had a very partial understanding of biochemistry, genetics, zoology and epidemiology. Consequently, their manipulative powers were limited. In medieval villages, chickens ran free between the houses, pecked seeds and worms from the garbage heap, and built nests in the barn. If an ambitious peasant tried to lock 1,000 chickens inside a crowded coop, a deadly bird-flu epidemic would probably have resulted, wiping out all the chickens, as well as many villagers. No priest, shaman or witch doctor could have prevented it. But once modern science had deciphered the secrets of birds, viruses and antibiotics, humans could begin to subject animals to extreme living conditions. With the help of vaccinations, medications, hormones, pesticides, central air-conditioning systems and automatic feeders, it is now possible to cram tens of thousands of chickens into tiny coops, and produce meat and eggs with unprecedented efficiency.¶ The fate of animals in such industrial installations has become one of the most pressing ethical issues of our time, certainly in terms of the numbers involved. These days, most big animals live on industrial farms. We imagine that our planet is populated by lions, elephants, whales and penguins. That may be true of the National Geographic channel, Disney movies and children’s fairytales, but it is no longer true of the real world. The world contains 40,000 lions but, by way of contrast, there are around 1 billion domesticated pigs; 500,000 elephants and 1.5 billion domesticated cows; 50 million penguins and 20 billion chickens.¶ In 2009, there were 1.6 billion wild birds in Europe, counting all species together. That same year, the European meat and egg industry raised 1.9 billion chickens. Altogether, the domesticated animals of the world weigh about 700m tonnes, compared with 300m tonnes for humans, and fewer than 100m tonnes for large wild animals.¶ This is why the fate of farm animals is not an ethical side issue. It concerns the majority of Earth’s large creatures: tens of billions of sentient beings, each with a complex world of sensations and emotions, but which live and die on an industrial production line. Forty years ago, the moral philosopher [Peter Singer](http://www.theguardian.com/profile/petersinger) published his canonical book *Animal Liberation*, which has done much to change people’s minds on this issue. Singer claimed that industrial farming is responsible for more pain and misery than all the wars of history put together.The scientific study of animals has played a dismal role in this tragedy. The scientific community has used its growing knowledge of animals mainly to manipulate their lives more efficiently in the service of human industry. Yet this same knowledge has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that farm animals are sentient beings, with intricate social relations and sophisticated psychological patterns. They may not be as intelligent as us, but they certainly know pain, fear and loneliness. They too can suffer, and they too can be happy.

This means

1. vote aff on try or die- billions of animals are tortured right now because almost everyone on earth eats meat. There is literally no way for this to get worse for the animals.
2. The aff outweighs on scale- factory farms inflict torture worse than death.

Aff also fights human oppression- stops abuse of workers, global famine and climate change

Sareen 12, Anjali, Why Don’t Vegans Care About People?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anjali-sareen/vegan-lifestyle\_b\_1771404.html

Many people don’t realize that the animal rights movement is not just about the animals; there’s much to gain for humans, as well. Animal agriculture is among the most dangerous industries worldwide. [One Green Planet](http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/the-human-cost-of-industrial-animal-agriculture/) notes that just in the U.S., [OSHA](http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/agriculturaloperations/index.html) reported the death of 9,003 farm workers from work-related injuries between 1992 and 2009. [Injuries can include](http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/farm/hsus-factory-farming-in-america-the-true-cost-of-animal-agribusiness.pdf) everything from chronic pain to cardiovascular illness and death. [Many of the workers are undocumented](http://www.foodispower.org/factory_farm_workers.htm), leading to a situation in which they are fearful of reporting their illness or injury and therefore do not receive adequate treatment. The [quality of life](http://www.foodispower.org/slaughterhouse_workers.htm) for these workers is often dismal due to the incredible emotional toll that comes from working within a slaughterhouse. Human Rights Watch says that worker conditions in factory farms constitute [“systematic human rights abuses.”](http://www.farmforward.com/farming-forward/factory-farming) Aside from the direct impact on factory farm and slaughterhouse workers, animal agriculture is also inefficient from a world hunger perspective. According to a report done by the Humane Society entitled [“The Impact of Industrialized Animal Agriculture On World Hunger,”](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/animalwelfare/HSI--The%20Impact%20of%20Industrialized%20Animal%20Agriculture%20on%20World%20Hunger.pdf) nearly 80 percent of the world’s soybeans and up to 50 percent of the world’s corn are fed to animals killed for meat instead of directly to humans. Because of this, the meat industry competes with humans for food. And it’s not just food: Resources such as land and water are being wasted for the production of farmed animals. A meat-based diet uses up to [20 times more land](http://awellfedworld.org/issues/environmentalresources) than a vegan diet, contributes to deforestation and degrades the land it does use. Meat production also wastes water: [Nearly 2,400 gallons](http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/facts-on-animal-farming-and-the-environment/) of water go to produce one pound of meat, whereas only 25 gallons would be required to produce one pound of wheat. The statistics on meat production’s impact on climate change are astounding, as well. According to the [United Nations](http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM), the livestock sector contributes 18 percent globally to greenhouse gas emissions.

## Part 4 is Framing

Educational spaces have routinely papered over the suffering and oppression of animals. As a judge, you have an obligation to reject this mode of thought.

Penderson 04, Helena Pederson, Goteborg University, (2004), the Journal of Futures Studies, ([http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/8-4/A01.pdf)](http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/8-4/A01.pdf%29)

The education discipline as we know it today recognises the importance of issues related to class, race, gender, and groups of human minorities, as well as the importance of addressing problems of unequal power relations with regard to these categories. Such approaches are undeniably crucial for the role of education today, but from a critical perspective it can also be argued that they have effects of polarisation and exclusion of yet another category from the education discourse - non-human animals.1 Although education researchers and practitioners are often quick to recognise the relevance and interests of various subordinated groups in society, the problems related to the situation of other species than our own have been largely ignored. This article challenges the current order of anthropocentrism, human-centredness in education, and explores the rationales for an alternative approach to values educational research and practice that is more inclusive in character.

This functions as a pre-fiat uniqueness claim for the aff’s impacts. Other forms of oppression are also terrible, but the 1AC’s discussion is uniquely key.

Speciesism is the original form of oppression, creating the groundwork to other forms of oppression. Other forms of oppression are equally terrible, but overall liberation strategies must include a fight against speciesism.

Best 07, Steven, Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>)

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that *animals* play in human history, as well as how the human *exploitation of animals* is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and historyoverall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over humanhas deep roots in the oppression ofhuman overanimal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a *speciesist* philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson ¶ suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international [and] slave markets, the metaphors, [used] models, and technologies used to exploit animal[s] slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.”

Specieisim is morally bankrupt. The same principles of equality that cause us to reject racism and sexism, motivates us to reject speciesism as well.

Singer 89, Peter, Princeton Philosopher, ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL, 1989, <http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/philosophy/animals/singer-text.html>

We will then see that we would be on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans. When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish to defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed out that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans are equal. Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with differing moral capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. It would be an unjustifiable demand. Still, one might cling to the view that the demand for equality among human beings is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes. Although humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences between the races and sexes as such. From the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it may be said, is what is wrong with racism and sexism. The white racist claims that whites are superior to blacks, but this is false—although there are differences between individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in all of the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be relevant. The opponent of sexism would say the same: a person's sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex. This is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is not, however, the way that someone really concerned about equality would choose, because taking this line could, in some circumstances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian society. The fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes, is a valid reply to someone who defends a hierarchical society like, say, South Africa, in which all whites are superior in status to all blacks. The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of those with I.Q. ratings above 100 be preferred to the interests of those with I.Q.s below 100. Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism. There is a second important reason why we ought not to base our opposition to racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind which asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are spread evenly between the different races and sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be certain measurable differences between both races and sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear in each case, but only when averages are taken. More important still, we do not yet know how much of these differences is really due to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes, and how much is due to environmental differences that are the result of past and continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of the important differences will eventually prove to be environmental rather than genetic. Anyone opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will be so, for it will make the task of ending discrimination a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief that all significant differences are environmental in origin. The opponent of, say, racism who takes this line will be unable to avoid conceding that if differences in ability did after all prove to have some genetic connection with race, racism would in some way be defensible. It would be folly for the opponent of racism to stake his whole case on a dogmatic commitment to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue which is still a long way from being settled. While attempts to prove that differences in certain selected abilities between races and sexes are primarily genetic in origin have certainly not been conclusive, the same must be said of attempts to prove that these differences are largely the result of environment. At this stage of the investigation we cannot be certain which view is correct, however much we may hope it is the latter. Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of this scientific investigation. The appropriate response to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically-based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat [them] animals. Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his utilitarian system of ethics in the formula: [said] "Each to count for one and none for more than one." In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, put the point in this way: "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.''1 More recently, the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement which operates so as to give everyone's interests equal consideration—although they cannot agree on how this requirement is best formulated.2 It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess—although precisely what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do. It is on this basis that the case against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be condemned. If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans? Many philosophers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; but, as we shall see in more detail shortly, not many of them have recognized that this principle applies to members of other species as well as to our own. Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage, written at a time when black slaves in the British dominions were still being treated much as we now treat nonhuman animals, Bentham wrote: The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sarrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reasons nor Can they talk? but, Can their suffer?3 In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity for suffering—or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness—is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark "the insuperable line" that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.

Also proves the framework outweighs on probability- philosophers agree that equality must be the starting point of our ethical theory.

## Part 5 is Theory

1. All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias

Adler 15 brackets for clarity, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg win[s]ning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

3. Spec-ing a type of speech is good-

SCOTUS ruled that “any” implies limits on the object they refer to.

Von Eintel 11 Kai Von Fintel, 7-6-2011, "Justice Breyer, Professor Austin, and the Meaning of 'Any'," Language Log, <http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3248>

When I see the word "any" in a statute, I immediately know it's unlikely to mean "anything" in the universe. "Any" will have a limitation on it, depending on the context. When my wife says, "there isn't any butter," I understand that she's talking about what is in our refrigerator, not worldwide. We look at context over and over, in life and in law. Austin suggests that there is good reason to look beyond text to context. Context is very important when you examine a statement or law. A statement made by Congress, under certain formal conditions, becomes a law. Context helps us interpret language, including the language of a statute. Purpose is often an important part of context. So Austin probably encourages me to put more weight on purpose. It is very interesting that Breyer should choose the word "any" as an example of why context matters. A few years back, there was in fact a Supreme Court decision (Small v. United States) that hinged on the meaning of "any" (pdf of the decision here]). And as it turns out, Justice Breyer wrote the decision for the majority (made up of Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg; ah the good old days). The background: Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1), which forbids "any person … convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm." Small subsequently argued that any court was not meant to encompass foreign courts, only domestic ones. The Supreme Court agreed. The arguments in the decision are a good case study of semantics/pragmatics in the real (well, legal) world. Here are some excerpts: The question before us is whether the statutory reference "convicted in any court" includes a conviction entered in a foreign court. The word "any" considered alone cannot answer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, "I'll see any film," may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase " 'any person' " may or may not mean to include " 'persons' " outside "the jurisdiction of the state." See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) ("[G]eneral words," such as the word "'any,' " must "be limited" in their application "to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them"); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132 (2004) (" 'any' " means "different things depending upon the setting"); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357 (1994) ("[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to 'any' law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute"); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase " 'any statute' " includes the very statute in which the words appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) ("[A]ny sum," while a "catchall" phase, does not "define what it catches"). Thus, even though the word "any" demands a broad interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997), we must look beyond that word itself.

4. Theory Paradigm Issues:

A. Use competiting interps- Reasonability begs the question of what’s reasonable, requiring arbitrary intervention for the judge to evaluate the round. Even if you set a brighltine its arbitrary, allowing you to always set a brightline that lets you get away with abuse.

B. Drop the debater- 1ar is too short to have a fair shot at substance and theory, which means if theory is drop the arg it destroys theory as resource since I lose a time-trade off for checking abuse.

C. No Neg RVI as long as the 1ar does not read more than 2 shells- It stops theory from checking abuse because you can collapse for 6 minutes in the 2nr to the counter-interp and brute force your norm. That is especially true on theory because of its technical focus on the line by line. A split 2nr is key to combat already existing time skew.

5.

3. Theory outweighs the K

a. jurisdiction- theory questions if you can fairly evaluate who is best meeting the role of the ballot, which means it is a prior question.

b. Solves your offense- theory advocates a norm where you read the K, just fairly which means it coopts all your K good arguments and all the theory good args.

## Part 6 is Method

1. The aff deploys a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics and colleges are bad, scenario analysis of policies is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

2. Changing the role of the ballot in the 1NC is bad

A. it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since it uplayers my offense which destroys aff ground.

b. Also means the neg never has to clash and engage with the aff which means they get superficial education. Fairness is a voter since the ballot asks who the better debater is and you cant do that if the round is unfair.

c. Coopts all their offense- they can read their role of the ballot when their aff.

3. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the method debate- key to decision-making, in all other circumstances we use probability times magnitude to evaluate risk, that’s the definition of game theory. It would be inconsistent to do that here as well.

4. invocation of personal identity destroys knowledge production – experience substitutes for evidence, becoming unchallengable, propaging decadence.

Gordon 06**,** Lewis —professor at philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at University of Connecticut Storrs—2006 (*Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times*, p 28-29)

A striking feature (among many) of the contemporary intellectual climate, as I pointed out in the introduction of this book, is the war on evidence. There are many instances of this, but perhaps most memorable are the many "charts" and so-called evidential claims made by Ronald Reagan during his presidency. The so-called evidence he advanced was rarely ever evident. We needn’t blame Reagan for this. It was happening everywhere. Think of the scores of **pseudo-intellectuals** who **have mastered** the **performance** of “academese**” and** the rhetorical advance of **evidence like claims.** Lying beneath all this are, of course, nihilistic forces, and **lying beneath such forces are,** as Friedrich Nietzsche diagnosed little more than a century ago, **decadent ones.** Where truth has collapsed into commonness, **then critical thinking isn't necessary,** which makes the work of assessing evidence superfluous. The effect is the kind of nonthinking activities against which Ortega y Gasset argued. There are two extremes of this. On the one hand, there is oversimplicity that demands no reflection. On the other hand, there IS the **dense,** abstruse **appearance of expertise that conceals** an **absence of thought.** Both don't require thinking because **their** ultimate **appeal is appearance.** Evidence is paradoxically that which has been hidden but revealed as a conduit for the appearance of another hidden reality. In effect, then, It is an appearance that enables appearance, but it is an appearance that requires thinking in order to appear. In short, it is not an appearance that stimulates thought but a form of thought that stimulates appearance. This means that evidence is always symbolic; it always refers beyond Itself. Because whether affirmed or rejected, it always extends itself publicly for assessment, evidence is peculiarly social. And since it is social, evidence is subject to the complex exchange of intersubjective activities. Evidence must, in other words be subject to norms" and "criteria." By norms, I don't here mean normativity or social prejudices but instead an understanding of where an exceptional instance versus a typical instance of a case holds. This requires further understanding of relevance, which, too, requires the value of distinction. All this together provides a clue to the contemporary problem. **When** simply the **performance** of presenting evidence **substitutes for evidence, then anything can count as evidence**. We see this in scholarly texts where the authors announce the importance of looking at a subject and then later argue as though that announcement itself constituted examination. Think, as well, of some texts in literary and cultural studies with long, run-on commentary in end notes and footnotes that serve no role of substantiating the claims they supposedly demarcate. We also see it in cases where pronouncements of past failures of certain social remedies take the form of perennial truths.

#### Turns case – decadence prevents solutions to oppression by embracing just one viewpoint as the solution to ALL oppression.

Gordon 2, Lewis —professor at philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at University of Connecticut Storrs—2006 (*Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times*, p 28-29)

Failure to appreciate reality sometimes takes the form of recoiling from it. An inward path of disciplinary solitude eventually leads to what I call disciplinary **decadence.12** This **is** the phenomenon of **turning away from living thought, which engages reality** and recognises its own limitations, **to a** deontologised or **absolute conception of** disciplinary **life. The discipline becomes**, in solipsistic fashion**, the world.** And in that world, the **main concern is the proper administering of its rules,** regulations, or, as Fanon argued, (self-devouring) methods. Becoming ‘right’ is simply a matter of applying, as fetish, the method correctly. This is a form of decadence because of the set of **considerations** that fall **to the wayside as the discipline** turns into itself and eventually **implodes.** Decay, although a natural process over the course of time for living things, takes on a paradoxical quality in disciplinary formation. A discipline, e.g., could be in decay through a failure to realise that decay is possible. Like empires, the presumption is that the discipline must outlive all, including its own purpose. In more concrete terms, disciplinary **decadence takes the form of one discipline assessing all other disciplines from its** supposedly **complete standpoint**. It is the literary scholar who criticises work in other disciplines as not literary. It is the sociologist who rejects other disciplines as not sociological. It is the historian who asserts history as the foundation of everything. It is the natural scientist that criticises the others for not being scientific. And it is also the philosopher who rejects all for not being properly philosophical. Discipline envy is also a form of disciplinary decadence. It is striking, for instance, how many disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences are now engaged in intellectual history with a focus on the Western philosophical canon. And then there is decadence at methodological levels. Textualism, for example, infects historiography at the level of archival legitimacy. Or worse, in some forms of textualism, the expectation of everything being contained in the text becomes evident in work in the human sciences that announce studying its subject through an analysis exclusively of texts on the subject. There are scholars in race theory, e.g., who seem to think that theorising the subject is a matter of determining what has been said on it by a small set of canonical texts. When appearance is reduced to textuality, what, then, happens to inquiry? What are positivism and certain forms of semiological imitation of mathematical phenomena but science envy? When biologism, sociologism, psychologism, and many others assert themselves, to what, ultimately, are they referring? In the human sciences, the problem becomes particularly acute in the study of problem people. Such people misbehave also in disciplinary terms. The failure to squeeze them into disciplinary dictates, from a disciplinarily decadent perspective, is proof of a problem with the people instead of the discipline. It serves as further proof of the pathological nature of such people.

# Frontlines- Case

# Case extension

### Vs Util

Extend Cooney 13- empirically doing the aff saves thousands of animals lives from a life of suffering.

### Vs K

Extend Cooney 13- empirically doing the aff saves thousands of animals lives from a life of suffering. This also helps resolve human oppression like abuse of workers and food shortages, that’s Sareen 12. Resolving that material violence is prequiste to accessing alt solvency, cant do the alt if you are dying form famine or poverty.

## AT Anthro Answers

### AT No pain

They have the same nervous system as humans they feel pain.

Singer 79, Peter, Princeton Philosopher, Equality for Animals?, https://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1979----.htm

The basis of my belief that animals can feel pain is similar to the basis of my belief that my daughter can feel pain. Animals in pain behave in much the same way as humans do, and their behaviour is sufficient justification for the belief that they feel pain. It is true that, with the exception of those apes who have been taught to communicate by sign language, they cannot actually say that they are feeling pain\_ but then when my daughter was a little younger she could not talk either. She found other ways to make her inner states apparent, however, so demonstrating that we can be sure that a being is feeling pain even if the being cannot use language. To back up our inference from animal behaviour, we can point to the fact that the nervous systems of all vertebrates, and especially of birds and mammals, are fundamentally similar. Those parts of the human nervous system that are concerned with feeling pain are relatively old, in evolutionary terms. Unlike the cerebral cortex, which developed only after our ancestors diverged from other mammals, the basic nervous system evolved in more distant ancestors common to ourselves and the other 'higher' animals. This anatomical parallel makes it likely that the capacity of animals to feel is similar to our own. It is significant that none of the grounds we have for believing that animals feel pain hold for plants. We cannot observe behaviour suggesting pain--sensational claims to the contrary have not been substantiated-- and plants do not have a centrally organized nervous system like ours.

### AT What about Plants

1. Cross apply Sareen- using animal agriculture wastes way more plants than just eating them directly.

2. Plants don’t feel pain

Singer 79, Peter, Princeton Philosopher, Equality for Animals?, https://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1979----.htm

The basis of my belief that animals can feel pain is similar to the basis of my belief that my daughter can feel pain. Animals in pain behave in much the same way as humans do, and their behaviour is sufficient justification for the belief that they feel pain. It is true that, with the exception of those apes who have been taught to communicate by sign language, they cannot actually say that they are feeling pain\_ but then when my daughter was a little younger she could not talk either. She found other ways to make her inner states apparent, however, so demonstrating that we can be sure that a being is feeling pain even if the being cannot use language. To back up our inference from animal behaviour, we can point to the fact that the nervous systems of all vertebrates, and especially of birds and mammals, are fundamentally similar. Those parts of the human nervous system that are concerned with feeling pain are relatively old, in evolutionary terms. Unlike the cerebral cortex, which developed only after our ancestors diverged from other mammals, the basic nervous system evolved in more distant ancestors common to ourselves and the other 'higher' animals. This anatomical parallel makes it likely that the capacity of animals to feel is similar to our own. It is significant that none of the grounds we have for believing that animals feel pain hold for plants. We cannot observe behaviour suggesting pain--sensational claims to the contrary have not been substantiated-- and plants do not have a centrally organized nervous system like ours.

This outweighs their ev- they just prove they react to the world, but that doesn’t prove they have a centralized feature that can experience all the electrical signals that create pain.

## Add ons

### Inherency

Students are censored from promoting veganism on college campus, even when it’s constitutionally protected.

Rivera 15, Carla, Contact Reporter, Student says Cal Poly Pomona is trying to silence his vegan campaign, 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-college-speech-20150513-story.html>

[Cal Poly](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/california-polytechnic-state-university-OREDU000793-topic.html) Pomona student Nicolas Tomas never thought handing out leaflets promoting a vegan diet would become so controversial. But when college administrators moved to restrict his activities, Tomas sued the university. His case became a flashpoint in the debate over how far universities should go to promote tolerance and civility on their increasingly diverse campuses — and whether some of those policies unfairly restrict constitutionally protected free speech.

It’s not just students who are censored- speakers are uninvited because they criticize the meat industry

Holley 10 summarizes, Karri, Patriotic Correctness: Academic Freedom and Its Enemies (review), 2010, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236751217\_Patriotic\_Correctness\_Academic\_Freedom\_and\_Its\_Enemies\_review

In Chapter 5, for example, he briefly outlines how a speaking invitation extended to economist Jeremy Rifkin by the College of Southern Idaho was rescinded after administrators became aware of Rifkin’s critique of the meat industry. Because of the college’s close ties to the agricultural community, the administration felt that Rifkin’s visit would be “in violation” of the public trust placed in the university (p. 140). The range of examples provided throughout the text is a strength of Wilson’s work and will appeal to students and scholars of higher education interested in cases related to academic freedom.

#### Court cases prove that there is vague and broad overreach to enforce censorship of ideas on college campuses

LoMonte 13 [Frank LoMonte, joined SPLC in January 2008 after practicing law with Atlanta-based Sutherland LLP and clerking for federal judges on the Northern District of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, “Arrested for handing out pro-vegetarian leaflets, CUNY protester will get his day in court,” Student Press Law Center, May 27, 2013, <http://www.splc.org/blog/splc/2013/05/arrested-for-handing-out-pro-vegetarian-leaflets-cuny-protester-will-get-his-day-in-court>] JW

A federal court has declined to dismiss the bulk of a civil-rights lawsuit brought by a vegetarian activist arrested while distributing leaflets outside the front gate of a City University of New York campus in the Bronx. Richard Hershey, a St. Louis resident who is not a CUNY student, was arrested by campus police from CUNY's Lehman College in May 2011 after a confrontation over his refusal to stop leafleting. Hershey complied with police instructions to leave Lehman College property. But when campus police also tried to stop him from distributing flyers on a public walkway outside campus, he refused -- and was handcuffed, arrested and charged with trespassing (a charge thrown out in court when the college failed to pursue it). Hershey sued CUNY Chancellor Matthew Goldstein, four Lehman College administrators and four college police officers, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights as well as false arrest, unlawful search, excessive force and multiple other claims. The college moved to dismiss all counts of the complaint, but in an April 9 order, U.S. District Judge Paul A. Engelmayer largely declined to do so. For First Amendment purposes, perhaps most significant was the claim that the judge did dismiss -- Hershey's contention that kicking him off the campus violated his First Amendment rights. Courts have not spoken with optimal clarity on the right to use the public areas of college campuses for expressive activity. Just a year ago, a federal appeals court ruled that a Tennessee college violated the First Amendment by enforcing onerous permit requirements against a visiting preacher, finding that the sidewalks of a public university campus are a "public forum" wide-open for expressive use by anyone. But in Hershey v. Goldstein, the federal court found that Lehman College acted lawfully in completely banning Hershey from distributing flyers on a campus sidewalk. The court did not even require the college to identify any particular justification for its blanket prohibition on leafleting by campus outsiders. The judge simply assumed that a reasonable justification must exist: There are many possible justifications for such a policy—e.g., reducing campus congestion, maintaining a quiet environment for study, or giving students more space to hand out flyers for their student groups—but the Court need not inquire as to Lehman's specific reasons for it: The manner in which Lehman decides to limit outsider access to campus areas deserves appropriate deference. This is an exceptionally deferential review of an exceptionally broad prohibition -- a broader ban than the permitting system struck down as unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals last year. The judge did, however, allow Hershey to proceed with most of his legal theories, including a First Amendment claim based on his subsequent arrest when he relocated his leafleting from the campus to an adjoining public sidewalk. The judge found sufficient indication of selective enforcement -- other pedestrians were allowed to freely traverse the driveway where Hershey was arrested for "trespassing" -- to allow Hershey's claim to go forward. Significantly, the judge also allowed Hershey to proceed with a claim for individual liability against Lehman College's director of public safety, although not against higher-level administrators. Evidence that a police officer told Hershey he was "just complying with his supervisor's directives" was enough to sustain a claim of supervisory liability for violation of Hershey's constitutional rights -- but only against the officer's direct-line supervisor, not against upper-level administrators with no personal involvement in the decision to arrest.

In the status quo, members of college campuses are fired or pressured if they criticize the meat industry, chilling discussions. Multiple empirical examples Prove

Pasour 04, E. C., Agricultural Economists and the State, 2004, https://econjwatch.org/file\_download/26/2004-04-pasour-tyranny\_statquo.pdf

Academic freedom, also, is likely to be compromised where research criticizes or fails to support the programs of narrowly-focused groups. The Iowa margarine incident is the most notorious example of the danger to academic freedom when it adversely affects a powerful clientele. As I have previously noted: In 1943, an agricultural economist at Iowa State College wrote a pamphlet on dairy policy. The study concluded that margarine “compared favorably” with butter in nutrition and palatability and argued for changes in federal and state legislation that impeded consumption of margarine. Following attacks on the pamphlet by groups of dairy farmers and the subsequent recommendation by a review committee that the pamphlet be retracted and revised, Professor (later Nobel Laureate) Theodore Schultz and several other agricultural economists resigned (Pasour 1988, 40). More recently, cases have occurred in which agricultural economists who have questioned—or even failed to defend—restrictions on competition in milk, tobacco, and other products have faced political pressure from within agriculture (Pasour 1988, 40). In 1984, agricultural economists at North Carolina State University published a report analyzing the effects of eliminating the “tobacco program”—a governmentally enforced producer cartel (Sumner and Alston 1984). The study merely discussed the effects of deregulation and did not explicitly attack the tobacco cartel. Yet, it created outrage among tobacco interests. The university and the authors were forced to hold a news conference to “clear the air.” In contrast to the Iowa State incident, however, university officials defended the research that was under attack. It is interesting to speculate, however, whether the university would have supported the authors if the study had explicitly gone after the tobacco cartel! B. Delworth Gardner, former Director of the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, at the University of California, states that agricultural producer interests have exerted political pressure in cases involving subsidized irrigation water in agriculture in the western United States.8 In one such case, a report by agricultural economists criticized the Bureau of Reclamation for not enforcing the 160-acre limitation for receiving subsidized federal water on agriculture in the Central Valley of California. In response, agricultural interests demanded a meeting with the economists and the director of the Giannini Foundation and demanded that the report be suppressed. Although the report was not suppressed, the threat of such pressures against academic freedom is enough to make agricultural economists wary of opposing producer interests. And the pressures on the researcher are intensified when those affected can influence the policy economists’ source of funding. Thus, social and economic pressures from college officials and funding agencies may make agricultural policy economists “pull their punches” in criticizing restrictions on competition in agricultural production and marketing. 9 A free-market tobacco economist may merely engage in “positive analysis” of the tobacco program, without explicitly arguing for reform or elimination of the producer cartel. Similarly, free-market policy economists may lend support to an anti-liberal farm policy by failing to analyze it—by taking it as a given. In my experience, social and economic pressures are more likely to lead agricultural policy economists to refrain from expressing what they believe rather than to falsely represent what they do believe.

### Util Adv Underview

Continuing meat eating will lead to mass extinction of animal species

Morell 15 [Virginia Morell, writer at Science Mag, “Meat-eaters may speed worldwide species extinction, study warns,” Science Magazine, August 11, 2015, <http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/08/meat-eaters-may-speed-worldwide-species-extinction-study-warns>] JW

Diets rich in beef and other red meat can be bad for a person’s health. And the practice is equally bad for Earth’s biodiversity, according to a team of scientists who have fingered human carnivory—and its impact on land use—as the single biggest threat to much of the world’s flora and fauna. Already a major cause of extinction, our meat habit will take a growing toll as people clear more land for livestock and crops to feed these animals, a study in the current issue of Science of the Total Environment predicts. “It’s a colossally important paper,” says Gidon Eshel, a geophysicist at Bard College in Annandale-On-Hudson, New York, who studies how human diets affect the environment, and who was not part of the study. Researchers have struggled to determine the full impacts of meat consumption on biodiversity, Eshel says. “Now we can say, only slightly fancifully: You eat a steak, you kill a lemur in Madagascar. You eat a chicken, you kill an Amazonian parrot.” That’s because species-rich habitats are being converted to pasture and feed crops as the human appetite for meat swells. But others disagree that livestock production is the leading cause of habitat loss. “They’ve created [a] st

ickman to be knocked down,” says Clayton Marlow, a grassland ecologist at Montana State University, Bozeman, “without accomplishing anything for either the ecosystem or the poor.” Previous studies have explored links between modern livestock production and climate change, water pollution, and the loss of some herbivores and top predators such as wolves and lions. “But how is it impacting other species?” asks Brian Machovina, an ecologist at Florida International University in Miami, and the paper’s lead author. To find out, he and his colleagues looked at studies that identified the world’s biodiversity hotspots—those areas that contain the highest percentage of endemic plant and animal species. Most are located in tropical nations. Then, the researchers picked out countries that are most likely to expand their industrial livestock operations, and determined where and how much land will be lost to grazing and growing crops to feed livestock. Using data from the Food and Agriculture Organization and other studies about the production of cattle, pigs, and chickens in these countries from 1985 to 2013 and the amount of land the livestock required, they extrapolated the likely future expansion of agricultural lands. Finally, they created maps of overlap. Many of the places expected to see the greatest shift in land use from forest to livestock are in 15 “megadiverse” countries, which harbor the largest number of species, Machovina says. “By 2050, given current trends, these countries will likely increase the lands used for livestock production by 30% to 50%”—some 3,000,000 square kilometers—the researchers estimate. The habitat loss is so great that it will cause more extinctions than any other factor, the study notes, particularly when coupled with other deleterious effects of livestock production, including climate change and pollution. “These changes will have major, negative impacts on biodiversity,” Machovina says. “Many, many species will be lost.” The trend toward meat-eating is already having an impact, the scientists say. Citing other studies, they note that more than three-quarters of the land previously cleared in the Amazon region is now used either as pasture for livestock or to raise feed crops for domestic and international markets. And the rapid deforestation there continues: Another 1898 square kilometers of forest were removed over the last year. Further, more than half of the Amazon’s Cerrado, a woodland savanna ecosystem known for its rare species, has also been cleared for raising cattle and soy. Habitats have also been—and continue to be—lost throughout Central and Latin America for the same reasons, the scientists say, who see a similar future for Africa. By revealing where the most flora and fauna will disappear as lands are converted to agriculture for meat production, “the study equips us with a means to quantify the costs of our dietary choices in terms of species loss,” Eshel says. The study also “suggests potential solutions that merit serious consideration,” notes ecologist David Tilman from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, who was not part of the work. To stop the loss of biodiversity, Machovina and his colleagues recommend that people limit meat consumption to 10% of their calories; eat more fruits and vegetables; replace beef—the most land-hungry meat—with pork, chicken, and fish; and change livestock production practices. But Tilman warns this won’t be easily done. “The challenge is to find solutions that meet human needs and simultaneously protect remaining natural habitats.” Meeting the challenge of “feeding the world’s growing population with a shrinking land base” can’t be done without “intensive animal and crop production,” says Marlow, who argues that the real problem facing biodiversity is the loss of arable land to development such as urban and slum sprawl. He adds that developing countries are adopting industrialized livestock production because it’s efficient and “the only way we can feed the world’s growing population.” If eating meat means consuming habitat, the world might consider food writer Michael Pollan’s advice: “Eat food. Not too much. Mostly plants.” It could save a lemur and a parrot.

### SV Impact

Biodiversity loss rises exponentially and harms the bottom rungs of the global economy the worst

Diaz et al 06 [Sandra Díaz, Joseph Fargione, F. Stuart Chapin III, David Tilman, “Biodiversity Loss Threatens Human Well-Being,” PLOS Biology August 15, 2006, <http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.0040277>] JW

What We Do Not Know: Cascades, Surprises, and Megadiversity Hot-Spots Some ecosystem services show a saturating relationship to species number—that is, the ecosystem-service response to additional species is large at low number of species and becomes asymptotic beyond a certain number of species. We seldom know what this threshold number is, but we suspect it differs among ecosystems, trophic levels, and services. The experimental evidence indicates that, in the case of primary production (e.g., for plant-based agricultural products), nutrient retention (which can reduce nutrient pollution and sustain production in the long term), and resistance to invasions (which incur damage and control costs in agricultural and other settings) by temperate, herbaceous communities, responses often do not show further significant increases beyond about ten plant species per square meter [3, 13]. But in order to achieve this number in a single square meter, a much higher number of species is needed at the landscape level [14]. What about slow-growing natural communities, or communities that consist of plant species with more contrasting biology? What about communities that typically include many more species—for example, the megadiverse forest hot-spots of the Amazon and Borneo, where species number can exceed 100 tree species per hectare [15]? To what extent are all those species essential for the maintenance of different ecosystem processes and services? Ecological theory [16] and traditional knowledge [17, 18] suggest that a large number of resident species per functional group, including those species that are rare, may act as ‘insurance” that buffers ecosystem processes and their derived services in the face of changes in the physical and biological environment (e.g., precipitation, temperature, pathogens), but these ideas have yet to be tested experimentally, and no manipulative experiment has been performed in any megadiversity hot-spot. Most of the links between biodiversity and ecosystem services summarized in Table 1 emerged from theory and manipulative experiments, involved biodiversity within a single trophic level (usually plants), and operated mostly at the level of local communities. However, the most dramatic examples of effects of small changes in biodiversity on ecosystem services have occurred at the landscape level and have involved alterations of food-web diversity through indirect interactions and trophic cascades. Most of these have been “natural experiments,” that is, the unintended consequence of intentional or accidental removal or addition of certain predator, pathogen, herbivore, or plant species to ecosystems. These “ecological surprises” usually involve disproportionately large, unexpected, irreversible, and negative alterations of ecosystem processes, often with repercussions at the level of ecosystem services, with large environmental, economic, and cultural losses. Examples include the cascading effects of decreases in sea otter population that led to coastal erosion in the North Pacific [19], and a marked decrease in grassland productivity and nutritional quality in the Aleutian islands as a consequence of decreased nutrient flux from the sea by the introduction of Arctic foxes [20] (see [3] for a comprehensive list of examples). The vast literature on biological invasions and their ecological and socio-economic impacts [21] further illustrates this point. Ecological surprises are difficult to predict, since they usually involve novel interactions among species. They most often result from introductions of predators, herbivores, pathogens and diseases, although cases involving introduced plants are also known. They do not depend linearly on species number or on well-established links between the functional traits of the species in question and putative ecosystem processes or services [3, 22]. Uneven Impacts: Biodiversity and Vulnerable Peoples People who rely most directly on ecosystem services, such as subsistence farmers, the rural poor, and traditional societies, face the most serious and immediate risks from biodiversity loss. First, they are the ones who rely the most on the “safety net” provided by the biodiversity of natural ecosystems in terms of food security and sustained access to medicinal products, fuel, construction materials, and protection from natural hazards such as storms and floods [4]. In many cases the provision of services to the most privileged sectors of society is subsidized but leaves the most vulnerable to pay most of the cost of biodiversity losses. These include, for example, subsistence farmers in the face of industrial agriculture [23] and subsistence fishermen in the face of intensive commercial fishing and aquaculture [24]. Second, because of their low economic and political power, the less privileged sectors cannot substitute purchased goods and services for the lost ecosystem benefits and they typically have little influence on national policy. When the quality of water deteriorates as a result of fertilizer and pesticide loading by industrial agriculture, the poor are unable to purchase safe water. When protein and vitamins from local sources, such as hunting and fruit, decrease as a result of habitat loss, the rich can still purchase them, whereas the poor cannot. When the capacity of natural ecosystems to buffer the effects of storms and floods is lost because of coastal development [25], it is usually the people who cannot flee—for example, subsistence fishermen—who suffer the most. In summary, the loss of biodiversity-dependent ecosystem services is likely to accentuate inequality and marginalization of the most vulnerable sectors of society, by decreasing their access to basic materials for a healthy life and by reducing their freedom of choice and action. Economic development that does not consider effects on these ecosystem services may decrease the quality of life of these vulnerable populations, even if other segments of society benefit. Biodiversity change is therefore inextricably linked to poverty, the largest threat to the future of humanity identified by the United Nations. This is a sobering conclusion for those who argue that biodiversity is simply an intellectual preoccupation of those whose basic needs and aspirations are fulfilled.

### Extinction

Biodiversity loss leads to extinction

Torres 16 [Phil Torres, author, Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, and founder of the X-Risks Institute. He has published widely on emerging technologies, terrorism, and existential risks, with articles appearing in Skeptic, Free Inquiry, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Salon, Truthout, Erkenntnis, Metaphilosophy, Foresight, Journal of Future Studies, and the Journal of Evolution and Technology, “Biodiversity Loss: An Existential Risk Comparable to Climate Change,” Future of Life Institute, May 20, 2016, https://futureoflife.org/2016/05/20/biodiversity-loss/ ] JW

According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the two greatest existential threats to human civilization stem from climate change and nuclear weapons. Both pose clear and present dangers to the perpetuation of our species, and the increasingly dire climate situation and nuclear arsenal modernizations in the United States and Russia were the most significant reasons why the Bulletin decided to keep the Doomsday Clock set at three minutes before midnight earlier this year.y 20, But there is another existential threat that the Bulletin overlooked in its Doomsday Clock announcement: biodiversity loss. This phenomenon is often identified as one of the many consequences of climate change, and this is of course correct. But biodiversity loss is also a contributing factor behind climate change. For example, deforestation in the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere reduces the amount of carbon dioxide removed from the atmosphere by plants, a natural process that mitigates the effects of climate change. So the causal relation between climate change and biodiversity loss is bidirectional. Furthermore, there are myriad phenomena that are driving biodiversity loss in addition to climate change. Other causes include ecosystem fragmentation, invasive species, pollution, oxygen depletion caused by fertilizers running off into ponds and streams, overfishing, human overpopulation, and overconsumption. All of these phenomena have a direct impact on the health of the biosphere, and all would conceivably persist even if the problem of climate change were somehow immediately solved. Such considerations warrant decoupling biodiversity loss from climate change, because the former has been consistently subsumed by the latter as a mere effect. Biodiversity loss is a distinct environmental crisis with its own unique syndrome of causes, consequences, and solutions—such as restoring habitats, creating protected areas (“biodiversity parks”), and practicing sustainable agriculture. The repercussions of biodiversity loss are potentially as severe as those anticipated from climate change, or even a nuclear conflict. For example, according to a 2015 study published in Science Advances, the best available evidence reveals “an exceptionally rapid loss of biodiversity over the last few centuries, indicating that a sixth mass extinction is already under way.” This conclusion holds, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the background rate of species losses and the current rate of vertebrate extinctions. The group classified as “vertebrates” includes mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, and all other creatures with a backbone. The article argues that, using its conservative figures, the average loss of vertebrate species was 100 times higher in the past century relative to the background rate of extinction. (Other scientists have suggested that the current extinction rate could be as much as 10,000 times higher than normal.) As the authors write, “The evidence is incontrovertible that recent extinction rates are unprecedented in human history and highly unusual in Earth’s history.” Perhaps the term “Big Six” should enter the popular lexicon—to add the current extinction to the previous “Big Five,” the last of which wiped out the dinosaurs 66 million years ago. But the concept of biodiversity encompasses more than just the total number of species on the planet. It also refers to the size of different populations of species. With respect to this phenomenon, multiple studies have confirmed that wild populations around the world are dwindling and disappearing at an alarming rate. For example, the 2010 Global Biodiversity Outlook report found that the population of wild vertebrates living in the tropics dropped by 59 percent between 1970 and 2006. The report also found that the population of farmland birds in Europe has dropped by 50 percent since 1980; bird populations in the grasslands of North America declined by almost 40 percent between 1968 and 2003; and the population of birds in North American arid lands has fallen by almost 30 percent since the 1960s. Similarly, 42 percent of all amphibian species (a type of vertebrate that is sometimes called an “ecological indicator”) are undergoing population declines, and 23 percent of all plant species “are estimated to be threatened with extinction.” Other studies have found that some 20 percent of all reptile species, 48 percent of the world’s primates, and 50 percent of freshwater turtles are threatened. Underwater, about 10 percent of all coral reefs are now dead, and another 60 percent are in danger of dying. Consistent with these data, the 2014 Living Planet Report shows that the global population of wild vertebrates dropped by 52 percent in only four decades—from 1970 to 2010. While biologists often avoid projecting historical trends into the future because of the complexity of ecological systems, it’s tempting to extrapolate this figure to, say, the year 2050, which is four decades from 2010. As it happens, a 2006 study published in Science does precisely this: It projects past trends of marine biodiversity loss into the 21st century, concluding that, unless significant changes are made to patterns of human activity, there will be virtually no more wild-caught seafood by 2048. The consequences of this rapid pruning of the evolutionary tree of life extend beyond the obvious. There could be surprising effects of biodiversity loss that scientists are unable to fully anticipate in advance. For example, prior research has shown that localized ecosystems can undergo abrupt and irreversible shifts when they reach a tipping point. According to a 2012 paper published in Nature, there are reasons for thinking that we may be approaching a tipping point of this sort in the global ecosystem, beyond which the consequences could be catastrophic for civilization. As the authors write, a planetary-scale transition could precipitate “substantial losses of ecosystem services required to sustain the human population.” An ecosystem service is any ecological process that benefits humanity, such as food production and crop pollination. If the global ecosystem were to cross a tipping point and substantial ecosystem services were lost, the results could be “widespread social unrest, economic instability, and loss of human life.” According to Missouri Botanical Garden ecologist Adam Smith, one of the paper’s co-authors, this could occur in a matter of decades—far more quickly than most of the expected consequences of climate change, yet equally destructive. Biodiversity loss is a “threat multiplier” that, by pushing societies to the brink of collapse, will exacerbate existing conflicts and introduce entirely new struggles between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it could even fuel the rise of terrorism. (After all, climate change has been linked to the emergence of ISIS in Syria, and multiple high-ranking US officials, such as former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and CIA director John Brennan, have affirmed that climate change and terrorism are connected.) The reality is that we are entering the sixth mass extinction in the 3.8-billion-year history of life on Earth, and the impact of this event could be felt by civilization “in as little as three human lifetimes,” as the aforementioned 2012 Nature paper notes. Furthermore, the widespread decline of biological populations could plausibly initiate a dramatic transformation of the global ecosystem on an even faster timescale: perhaps a single human lifetime. The unavoidable conclusion is that biodiversity loss constitutes an existential threat in its own right. As such, it ought to be considered alongside climate change and nuclear weapons as one of the most significant contemporary risks to human prosperity and survival.

### Solvency

Analytics and studies prove solvency

Ace 14 summarizes,Animal Charity Evalutor, Effective Altruism Group, HUMANE EDUCATION, https://animalcharityevaluators.org/research/interventions/humane-education/

Currently, ACE does not have enough information to rigorously evaluate the impact or cost-effectiveness of humane education as an intervention. Holistically, we feel that humane education is a promising intervention and worth further investigation. It targets young people, who are more receptive to new ideas and have longer to act on and spread them if they are persuaded. Humane education interventions may also benefit from the respectability of being conducted with teacher or school approval, and from peer group effects if groups of students undergo belief change together and can support each other in maintaining and acting on new beliefs. Humane educators spend more time per student than leafleters do and are more highly trained, but if their message is more likely to be internalized, this intervention could prove worthwhile. Existing academic studies of humane education programs mostly focus on programs delivered to elementary age children. The studies are in general at small scales and have limited-term follow-up (one year maximum), and many date from the 1980s or 1990s and may not reflect impacts of current programs or curricula.[2](https://animalcharityevaluators.org/research/interventions/humane-education/#fn2-75) More studies on the impacts of modern programs are needed. The most relevant data we have comes from a survey conducted in Spring 2013 by Justice For Animals. This survey, best treated as an internal program evaluation, was given to 2200 high school and college students immediately following the presentation, and they knew it came from the group giving the presentation. Few (114) of the students filled out the survey, and of those who did, 16 self-reported having become vegetarian or vegan due to seeing a lecture. While this was 14% of the students who filled out the survey, we assume that whether a student took the survey was correlated with whether they became vegetarian, and that some students might have reported becoming vegetarian who intended to do so but did not in fact follow through. Thus 14% is an upper bound for the percentage of students who became vegetarian or vegan; until we obtain further data, 16/2200 or about 0.7% might be a suitable lower bound. These bounds are currently too wide to admit a reasonable attempt at cost-effectiveness comparison with leafleting or online ads.

# Different 1AC Versions

## Vs FWK Debaters

## Part 1 is the standard

Ideal theory strips away questions of particularities and isolates a universal feature of agents. This normalizes a single experience and epistemologically skews ethical theorizing.

Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,

The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that all theorizing, both moral and nonmoral, takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by concepts, assumptions, norms, values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience and group interests of the privileged group (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that dominant concepts will obscure certain crucial realities, blocking them from sight, or naturalizing them, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. In its ignoring of oppression, ideal theory also ignores the consequences of oppression. If societies are not oppressive, or if in modeling them we can abstract away from oppression and assume moral cognizers of roughly equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group. By contrast, nonideal theory recognizes that people will typically be cognitively affected by their social location, so that on both the macro and the more local level, the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.

Non-ideal theory necessitates consequentialism since instead of following rules that assume an already equal playing field; we take steps to correct material injustice.

Thus the standard is minimizing oppression.

Prefer

1. Means based theories collapses into consequentialism in order to explain necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Sinnott- Armstrong, Walter. “An Argument For Consequentialism” Dartmouth College. Philosophical Perspectives, 6, Ethics, 1992.]

The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that when someone promises to do something. ‘This we consider obligatory in its own nature just because it is a fulfillment of a promise and not because of its consequences."2 Such deontologists claim in effect that if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass then even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass it still would not follow that l have any moral reason to start my mower since I did not promise to start my mower and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability ii it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons. Of course this argument is too simple to be conclusive by itself since deontologists will have many responses. The question is whether any response is adequate. I will argue that no response can meet the basic challenge. A deontologist might respond that his moral theory includes not only the principle that there is a moral reason to keep one's promises but also another principle that there is a moral reason to do whatever is a necessary enabler for what there is a moral reason to do. This other principle just is the principle of moral substitutability. So of course. I agree that it is true. However, the question is why it is true. This new principle is very different from the substantive principles in a deontological theory. So it cries out for an explanation. ii a deontologist simply adds this new principle to the substantive principles in his theory. he has done nothing to explain why the new principle is true. It would be ad hoc to tack it on solely in order to yield moral reasons like the moral reason to start the mower. in order to explain or justify moral substitutability. A deontologist needs to show how this principle coheres in some deeper way with the substantive principles of the theory. That is what deontologists cannot do. A second response is that l misdescribed the property that provides the moral reason. Deontologists might admit that the reason to mow the lawn is not that this fulfills a promise. but they can claim instead that the moral reason to mow the lawn is that this is a necessary enabler for keeping a promise. They can then claim that there is a moral reason to start the mower. because starting the mower is also a necessary enabler for keeping my promise. Again. I agree that these reasons exist. But the question is why. This deontologist needs to explain why the moral reason has to be that the act is a necessary enabler for fulfilling a promise instead of just that the act does fulfill a promise. Ii there is no moral reason to keep a promise. it is hard to understand why there is any moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler for keeping a promise. Furthermore, deontologists claim that the crucial act is not about consequences but directly about promises. My moral reason is supposed to arise from what I said before my act and not from consequences alter my act. However, what I said was “I promise to mow the grass'. I did not say. ‘l promise to do what is a necessary enabler for mowing the grass.’ Thus I did not promise to do what is a necessary enabler for keeping the promise. What I promised was only to keep the promise. Because of this deontologists who base moral reasons directly on promises cannot explain why there is not only a moral reason to do what I promised to do (mow the grass) but also a moral reason to do what i did not promise to do (start the mower). Deontologists might try to defend the claim that moral reasons are based on promises by claiming that promise keeping is intrinsically good and there is a moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler of what is intrinsically good. However, this response runs into two problems. First, on this theory, the reason to keep a promise is a reason to do what is itself intrinsically good, but the reason to start the mower is not a reason to do what is intrinsically good. Since these reasons are so different, they are derived in different ways. This creates an incoherence or lack of unity, which is avoided in other theories. Second, this response conflicts with a basic theme in deontological theories. If my promise keeping is intrinsically good, your promise keeping is just as intrinsically good. But then, if what gives me a moral reason to keep my promise is that I have a moral reason to do whatever is intrinsically good, I have just as much moral reason to do what is a necessary enabler for you to keep your promise. And, if my breaking my promise is a necessary enabler for two other people to keep their promises, then my moral reason to break my promise is stronger than my moral reason to keep it (other things being equal). This undermines the basic deontological claim that my reasons derive in a special way from my promises.13 So this response explains moral sub- stitutability at the expense of giving up deontology.

## Part 2 is Advocacy

Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that advocates for animals.

## Part 3 is Offense

Universities are cracking down on animal advocacy- faculty are fired for dissenting and students activists are silenced. Multiple empirical examples prove.

Kahn 10 [Kahn, Richard, anarchist educator whose primary interests are in researching the history of social movements as pedagogically generative forces in society, and in critically challenging the role dominant institutions play in blocking the realization of greater planetary freedom, peace, and happiness, "Operation get fired: A chronicle of the academic repression of radical environmentalist and animal rights advocate-scholars." Academic repression: Reflections from the academic industrial complex (2010): 200-215, http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/90383/operationgetfired-kahn.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1488872701&Signature=rIrpnSTWSguRU%2BKYE1qktPrIpCk%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DOperation\_Get\_Fired\_A\_Chronicle\_of\_the\_A.pdf] JW

Cases of University Repression of Radical Environmentalist and Animal Rights AdvocateScholars As evident in the case of Steven Best, the bureaucratic nature of higher education often makes it difficult to prove where clear repression has occurred and who within a labyrinthine administrative system is calling the shots. Still, in the instance of radical environmentalist and animal rights advocate scholars I think there are some contemporary examples of faculty, student, and organizational removal that warrant concern and are representative of the general tenure of what is taking place today within the academy. As Ward Churchill’s suspension and firing from the University of Colorado at Boulder grabbed headlines in 2005, the university’s concurrent removal of Adrienne Anderson – an Environmental Studies faculty member since 1992 who was also known to be one of the nation’s top environmental whistleblowers – took place much more quietly but no less importantly. Anderson has been likened to Erin Brockovich and Karen Silkwood for her work in the university and as the Western Director of the National Toxics Campaign, in which she has assisted labor unions and poor communities in holding corporate polluters like Rockwell International, Martin-Marietta, and ASARCO Metals (as well as corrupt government officials) accountable for their toxic misdeeds against people. An activist professor who brought her struggle for environmental justice into the classroom, a major goal of her pedagogy was to teach students how to file FOIA and Open Records requests in pursuit of uncovering the social and environmental damage done by government and industry. Her particular pet project was to have students investigate the Lowry Coalition, a collection of some 150 companies uncovered by Anderson who spent years dumping unregulated waste into a Denver metro-area landfill and then worked to cover up the presence of radioactive materials found therein, as the landfill sludge was greenlighted for use as agricultural fertilizer. Anderson filed suit on this matter in 1997 and winningly argued that the Coalition’s activities posed significant threats to the public health on numerous levels. Strongly championed by her students and having received nothing short of exceptional job reviews over the course of her teaching career (despite constant friction by certain university forces), Anderson suddenly found that her department had closed her classes without warning in 2005. While she alone had developed and taught a mandatory course for the major, being untenured and without opportunities to teach, the university happily declared Anderson expendable. Those familiar with her story, though, quickly pointed out that many of the companies in the Lowry Coalition are significant university investors. One – Scripps-Howard, the media monopoly in the Denver-area – also funds a faculty member in her department, who the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) alleges worked to undermine Anderson’s reputation with other faculty, as well as to dismantle her appeal for rehiring by leaking confidential and false information about her and her work. 7 As the AAUP statement makes clear, what occurred to Anderson has broad significance and should be properly seen as part and parcel of a current rightwing attempt to use the University of Colorado as a test case for imposing a corporatist model of education that weakens tenure, faculty governance and due process, as well as academic freedom generally. But it also reveals how the academy can work to suppress crucial environmental research and willingly jeopardize sectors of society in order to protect powerful allied interests. Such repression is aimed not only at professors, students also are under unprecedented attack from university administrations, such as happened to Valdosta State University, T. Hayden Barnes. Barnes was expelled in October of 2007 by Valdosta State President Ronald M. Zaccari for publicly protesting Zaccari’s decision to spend $30 million dollars of student fees on constructing an environmentally hazardous set of parking garages. Having learned of the decision from the school newspaper earlier in March, Barnes posted flyers around campus detailing sustainable alternatives and listed the contact information for Zaccari and the Georgia university system Board of Regents should anyone want to send opinions regarding the project (something he did himself). Four days later members of Students Against Violating the Environment contacted Barnes to let him know that Zaccari was angry, and in response Barnes removed the flyers. However, he was hardly finished campaigning and, over the next month, he posted a collage lampooning the parking garage project to his Facebook page, wrote a letter to the editor of the student paper critiquing the proposed garages, and then wrote Zaccari himself to request an exemption from paying the mandatory student fee that was to be contributed toward the construction project. According to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), which ultimately took up his case, on May 7 Barnes found a note from Zaccari slipped under his dormitory door which read “as a result of recent activities directed towards me by you, included [sic] but not limited to the attached threatening document [the Facebook collage], you are considered to present a clear and present danger to this campus”.8 While lawsuits filed by FIRE and Barnes resulted in Zaccari announcing his early retirement and the Board of Regents overturning Barnes’s expulsion, Valdosta State remains notorious for officially quarantining expressed free speech on its 168-acre campus to a small stage area that must be reserved two days in advance and can only be used two hours each afternoon.9 Alarmingly, the university is not unique in this practice. Although the University of California system is not amongst those with designated public free speech zones for political expression, it has moved to enforce a ban on a wave of ongoing protests by both legal and extra-legal animal rights groups against primate vivisection practices taking place on some of its campuses. Though framed as a defense of faculty research and an attempt to preserve academic freedom from direct action militants who targeted the property of specific vivisectors in recent years, flagship campuses like UCLA, UC Berkeley, and UC Santa Cruz are actually involved in deploying repressive tolerance. UCLA, in particular, is considered to play a leading role in developing national academic security strategies. As a member of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board, working in concert with the FBI and other agencies after a supposed ALF hit on a researcher’s home in 2006, UCLA has moved to check animal advocacy on campus by barring student activists from entering university buildings during demonstrations, by coordinating information about student groups with law enforcement, and by increasing its powers of surveillance generally. Moreover, it has sought and won court injunctions against the websites of legal organizations such as the UCLA Primate Freedom Project (founded by a UCLA student), and has suppressed the public speech rights of numerous individuals. Such anti-activist actions as the university are engaged in are now promoted as "Best Practices for Protecting Researchers and Research" by the Society for Neuroscience (Murr, 2008). The demented idea of standardizing protocols which serve to make animals as vulnerable as possible to th**e** unnecessary needles and knives of vivisectors reveals the manner in which corporate science and the security State have come together to set higher education policy, with UCLA presently serving as the principal model for other academic institutions to redraft their policies in similar fashion. While other academic institutions such as the University of Utah have similarly worked with government officials to legislate the criminalization of protests within 100 feet of faculty residences, recent legislation crafted by the UC system related to its lawsuit against animal rights activists has moved beyond the anti-democratic and into the realm of the unconstitutional. Specifically, the measure AB2296, submitted by Assemblyman Gene Mullin (D-San Mateo), was created to forbid political activities targeting corporate researchers on campus; with its initial aim being “to restrict public access to information about academics who do animal research and to make it illegal to post personal information about them online” (Krupnick, 2008), such as their names, addresses and photographs. Although the bill’s language was scaled back slightly when passed into law in October, 2008, it is revealing that as originally drafted it attempted to exempt requests about university research from public records requests, In other words, those in charge of the UC system unabashedly sought to create a non-transparent situation for university research in which it would be legally impossible to have civic oversight over the public university system’s work. While the immediate aim may have been to block the names of laboratory vivisectors from animal advocates, this legislation would have also shielded all manner of military, biotech, and other forms of ethically dubious experimentation from public inquiry. The University of California’s repression of animal rights activists and student groups is therefore an affront that should concern all people, and it is crucial that it be challenged appropriately as such repression serves not only to blunt moral progress but the realization of a more democratic science of the people in the process.

Students are censored from promoting veganism on college campus, even when it’s constitutionally protected.

Rivera 15, Carla, Contact Reporter, Student says Cal Poly Pomona is trying to silence his vegan campaign, 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-college-speech-20150513-story.html>

[Cal Poly](http://www.latimes.com/topic/education/colleges-universities/california-polytechnic-state-university-OREDU000793-topic.html) Pomona student Nicolas Tomas never thought handing out leaflets promoting a vegan diet would become so controversial. But when college administrators moved to restrict his activities, Tomas sued the university. His case became a flashpoint in the debate over how far universities should go to promote tolerance and civility on their increasingly diverse campuses — and whether some of those policies unfairly restrict constitutionally protected free speech.

Studies prove that exposure to animal advocacy on college campuses changes hearts and minds-that saves thousands of animal lives.

Cooney 13, Nick, The Powerful Impact of College Leafleting (Part 1), 2013, https://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/the-powerful-impact-of-college-leafleting-part-1/

Leafleting — passing out information about factory farming and vegan eating — is one of the most common ways that animal advocates promote vegan eating in the United States. The group [Vegan Outreach](http://www.veganoutreach.org/), which pioneered and popularized vegan leafleting, passed out almost 3 million leaflets last year, and other groups chipped in millions more. Compassionate Communities volunteers have been distributing our [Something Better leaflet](http://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SomethingBetter_V2.pdf), which shares the Farm Sanctuary experience, the realities of factory farming, and info on meat-free eating, to hundreds of thousands of people. But just how effective is leafleting? How many readers actually change their diet, and how many animals are spared a lifetime of misery? Should volunteers prioritize leafleting over other forms of animal advocacy? For the first time ever, we have answers to those questions! In the fall of 2012, Compassionate Communities teamed up with [The Humane League](http://www.thehumaneleague.com/) to measure the true impact of leafleting on a college campus. **How It Was Done** Early in the fall semester, staffers from The Humane League visited the main campuses of two large state schools on the East Coast, the University of Delaware and the University of Maryland. They distributed thousands of leaflets outside the dining halls of each school. The leaflets distributed were an equal mixture of Farm Sanctuary’s [Something Better leaflet](http://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SomethingBetter_V2.pdf) and Vegan Outreach’s popular [Compassionate Choices leaflet](http://www.veganoutreach.org/cc.pdf). About two months later, they returned to campus with surveys to see how much students’ diets had changed. They stood outside the dining halls and asked students passing by if they would take a survey. Students did not know what the survey was about prior to stopping and agreeing to take the survey. After agreeing, only those who actually received a leaflet earlier that semester were allowed to take the survey. Nearly 500 surveys were completed. **Key Results** Quite simply, the results were phenomenal. About 1 out of every 50 students **who received a leaflet** indicated they became vegetarian or pescatarian **as a result**. Just as importantly, 7% of students (1 in 14) said they now eat “a lot less” chicken, a lot fewer eggs, and a lot less dairy as a result of getting the leaflet. 6% eat a lot less fish, and 12% eat a lot less red meat. Furthermore, about 1 in 5 students said they shared the leaflet with someone else who then began to eat less meat. What does all this mean for animals? After accounting for social desirability bias (people over reporting changes in their diet), the results suggest that for every 100 leaflets **you distribute on a college campus,** you’ll spare**,** by **a** conservative calculation, **a minimum of** 50 animals a year a lifetime of misery**. That’s one animal spared for every two leaflets you distribute!** And that’s just in the first year. The number of farm animals spared grows much larger once you factor in the number of years that people maintain their diet. It also grows larger once you count the ripple effects of people persuading their friends and family to change. And we haven’t even begun to count the many hundreds of wild fish who will also be spared. The bottom line is this: With each hour you spend leafleting on a college campus, you will truly spare hundreds of farm animals from a lifetime of daily misery. The data is in. The facts are there. College leafleting is an absurdly effective activity for individuals and for organizations who want to make their community a more compassionate one.

This outweighs a. Outweighs on scope- If an hour saves hundreds of animals- then the plan as a whole across all colleges all year should save billions if not trillions of animal lives annually. b. Factory farms are hell on earth- tens of billions of sentient beings are killed and tortured every year. As long as there is a demand for meat- the slaughterhouse will exist. Harai 15, Yuval Noah, Industrial farming is one of the worst crimes in history, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/sep/25/industrial-farming-one-worst-crimes-history-ethical-question

The fate of industrially farmed animals is one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. Tens of billions of sentient beings, each with complex sensations and emotions, live and die on a production line, Animals are the main victims of history, and the treatment of domesticated animals in industrial farms is perhaps the worst crime in history. The march of human progress is strewn with dead animals. Even tens of thousands of years ago, our stone age ancestors were already responsible for a series of ecological disasters. When the first humans reached Australia about 45,000 years ago, they quickly drove to extinction 90% of its large animals. This was the first significant impact that Homo sapiens had on the planet’s ecosystem. It was not the last.¶ About 15,000 years ago, humans colonised America, wiping out in the process about 75% of its large mammals. Numerous other species disappeared from Africa, from Eurasia and from the myriad islands around their coasts. The archaeological record of country after country tells the same sad story. The tragedy opens with a scene showing a rich and varied population of large animals, without any trace of Homo sapiens. In scene two, humans appear, evidenced by a fossilised bone, a spear point, or perhaps a campfire. Scene three quickly follows, in which men and women occupy centre-stage and most large animals, along with many smaller ones, have gone. Altogether, sapiens drove to extinction about 50% of all the large terrestrial mammals of the planet before they planted the first wheat field, shaped the first metal tool, wrote the first text or struck the first coin. The next major landmark in human-animal relations was the agricultural revolution: the process by which we turned from nomadic hunter-gatherers into farmers living in permanent settlements. It involved the appearance of a completely new life-form on Earth: domesticated animals. Initially, this development might seem to have been of minor importance, as humans only managed to domesticate fewer than 20 species of mammals and birds, compared with the countless thousands of species that remained “wild”. Yet, with the passing of the centuries, this novel life-form became the norm. Today, more than 90% of all large animals are domesticated (“large” denotes animals that weigh at least a few kilograms). Consider the chicken, for example. Ten thousand years ago, it was a rare bird that was confined to small niches of South Asia. Today, billions of chickens live on almost every continent and island, bar Antarctica. The domesticated chicken is probably the most widespread bird in the annals of planet Earth. If you measure success in terms of numbers, chickens, cows and pigs are the most successful animals ever.¶ Alas, domesticated species paid for their unparalleled collective success with unprecedented individual suffering. The animal kingdom has known many types of pain and misery for millions of years. Yet the agricultural revolution created completely new kinds of suffering, ones that only worsened with the passing of the generations.¶ At first sight, domesticated animals may seem much better off than their wild cousins and ancestors. Wild buffaloes spend their days searching for food, water and shelter, and are constantly threatened by lions, parasites, floods and droughts. Domesticated cattle, by contrast, enjoy care and protection from humans. People provide cows and calves with food, water and shelter, they treat their diseases, and protect them from predators and natural disasters. True, most cows and calves sooner or later find themselves in the slaughterhouse. Yet does that make their fate any worse than that of wild buffaloes? Is it better to be devoured by a lion than slaughtered by a man? Are crocodile teeth kinder than steel blades?¶ What makes the existence of domesticated farm animals particularly cruel is not just the way in which they die but above all how they live. Two competing factors have shaped the living conditions of farm animals: on the one hand, humans want meat, milk, eggs, leather, animal muscle-power and amusement; on the other, humans have to ensure the long-term survival and reproduction of farm animals. Theoretically, this should protect animals from extreme cruelty. If a farmer milks his cow without providing her with food and water, milk production will dwindle, and the cow herself will quickly die. Unfortunately, humans can cause tremendous suffering to farm animals in other ways, even while ensuring their survival and reproduction. The root of the problem is that domesticated animals have inherited from their wild ancestors many physical, emotional and social needs that are redundant in farms. Farmers routinely ignore these needs without paying any economic price. They lock animals in tiny cages, mutilate their horns and tails, separate mothers from offspring, and selectively breed monstrosities. The animals suffer greatly, yet they live on and multiply. Doesn’t that contradict the most basic principles of [Darwinian](http://www.theguardian.com/science/charles-darwin) evolution? The theory of evolution maintains that all instincts and drives have evolved in the interest of survival and reproduction. If so, doesn’t the continuous reproduction of farm animals prove that all their real needs are met? How can a cow have a “need” that is not really essential for survival and reproduction?¶ It is certainly true that all instincts and drives evolved in order to meet the evolutionary pressures of survival and reproduction. When these pressures disappear, however, the instincts and drives they had shaped do not evaporate instantly. Even if they are no longer instrumental for survival and reproduction, they continue to mould the subjective experiences of the animal. The physical, emotional and social needs of present-day cows, dogs and humans don’t reflect their current conditions but rather the evolutionary pressures their ancestors encountered tens of thousands of years ago. Why do modern people love sweets so much? Not because in the early 21st century we must gorge on ice cream and chocolate in order to survive. Rather, it is because if our stone age ancestors came across sweet, ripened fruits, the most sensible thing to do was to eat as many of them as they could as quickly as possible. [Why do young men drive recklessly](http://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2013/aug/19/driving-road-neuroscience-psychology), get involved in violent rows, and hack confidential internet sites? Because they are obeying ancient genetic decrees. Seventy thousand years ago, a young hunter who risked his life chasing a mammoth outshone all his competitors and won the hand of the local beauty – and we are now stuck with his macho genes.¶ Exactly the same evolutionary logic shapes the life of cows and calves in our industrial farms. Ancient wild cattle were social animals. In order to survive and reproduce, they needed to communicate, cooperate and compete effectively. Like all social mammals, wild cattle learned the necessary social skills through play. Puppies, kittens, calves and children all love to play because evolution implanted this urge in them. In the wild, they needed to play. If they didn’t, they would not learn the social skills vital for survival and reproduction. If a kitten or calf was born with some rare mutation that made them indifferent to play, they were unlikely to survive or reproduce, just as they would not exist in the first place if their ancestors hadn’t acquired those skills. Similarly, evolution implanted in puppies, kittens, calves and children an overwhelming desire to bond with their mothers. A chance mutation weakening the mother-infant bond was a death sentence.¶ What happens when farmers now take a young calf, separate her from her mother, put her in a tiny cage, vaccinate her against various diseases, provide her with food and water, and then, when she is old enough, artificially inseminate her with bull sperm? From an objective perspective, this calf no longer needs either maternal bonding or playmates in order to survive and reproduce. All her needs are being taken care of by her human masters. But from a subjective perspective, the calf still feels a strong urge to bond with her mother and to play with other calves. If these urges are not fulfilled, the calf suffers greatly.¶ This is the basic lesson of evolutionary psychology: a need shaped thousands of generations ago continues to be felt subjectively even if it is no longer necessary for survival and reproduction in the present. Tragically, the agricultural revolution gave humans the power to ensure the survival and reproduction of domesticated animals while ignoring their subjective needs. In consequence, domesticated animals are collectively the most successful animals in the world, and at the same time they are individually the most miserable animals that have ever existed.¶ The situation has only worsened over the last few centuries, during which time traditional agriculture gave way to industrial farming. In traditional societies such as ancient Egypt, the Roman empire or medieval China, humans had a very partial understanding of biochemistry, genetics, zoology and epidemiology. Consequently, their manipulative powers were limited. In medieval villages, chickens ran free between the houses, pecked seeds and worms from the garbage heap, and built nests in the barn. If an ambitious peasant tried to lock 1,000 chickens inside a crowded coop, a deadly bird-flu epidemic would probably have resulted, wiping out all the chickens, as well as many villagers. No priest, shaman or witch doctor could have prevented it. But once modern science had deciphered the secrets of birds, viruses and antibiotics, humans could begin to subject animals to extreme living conditions. With the help of vaccinations, medications, hormones, pesticides, central air-conditioning systems and automatic feeders, it is now possible to cram tens of thousands of chickens into tiny coops, and produce meat and eggs with unprecedented efficiency.¶ The fate of animals in such industrial installations has become one of the most pressing ethical issues of our time, certainly in terms of the numbers involved. These days, most big animals live on industrial farms. We imagine that our planet is populated by lions, elephants, whales and penguins. That may be true of the National Geographic channel, Disney movies and children’s fairytales, but it is no longer true of the real world. The world contains 40,000 lions but, by way of contrast, there are around 1 billion domesticated pigs; 500,000 elephants and 1.5 billion domesticated cows; 50 million penguins and 20 billion chickens.¶ In 2009, there were 1.6 billion wild birds in Europe, counting all species together. That same year, the European meat and egg industry raised 1.9 billion chickens. Altogether, the domesticated animals of the world weigh about 700m tonnes, compared with 300m tonnes for humans, and fewer than 100m tonnes for large wild animals.¶ This is why the fate of farm animals is not an ethical side issue. It concerns the majority of Earth’s large creatures: tens of billions of sentient beings, each with a complex world of sensations and emotions, but which live and die on an industrial production line. Forty years ago, the moral philosopher [Peter Singer](http://www.theguardian.com/profile/petersinger) published his canonical book *Animal Liberation*, which has done much to change people’s minds on this issue. Singer claimed that industrial farming is responsible for more pain and misery than all the wars of history put together.The scientific study of animals has played a dismal role in this tragedy. The scientific community has used its growing knowledge of animals mainly to manipulate their lives more efficiently in the service of human industry. Yet this same knowledge has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that farm animals are sentient beings, with intricate social relations and sophisticated psychological patterns. They may not be as intelligent as us, but they certainly know pain, fear and loneliness. They too can suffer, and they too can be happy.

This means

1. vote aff on try or die- billions of animals are tortured right now because almost everyone on earth eats meat. There is literally no way for this to get worse for the animals.
2. The aff outweighs on scale- factory farms inflict torture worse than death.

Aff also fights human oppression- stops abuse of workers, global famine and climate change

Sareen 12, Anjali, Why Don’t Vegans Care About People?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anjali-sareen/vegan-lifestyle\_b\_1771404.html

Many people don’t realize that the animal rights movement is not just about the animals; there’s much to gain for humans, as well. Animal agriculture is among the most dangerous industries worldwide. [One Green Planet](http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/the-human-cost-of-industrial-animal-agriculture/) notes that just in the U.S., [OSHA](http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/agriculturaloperations/index.html) reported the death of 9,003 farm workers from work-related injuries between 1992 and 2009. [Injuries can include](http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/farm/hsus-factory-farming-in-america-the-true-cost-of-animal-agribusiness.pdf) everything from chronic pain to cardiovascular illness and death. [Many of the workers are undocumented](http://www.foodispower.org/factory_farm_workers.htm), leading to a situation in which they are fearful of reporting their illness or injury and therefore do not receive adequate treatment. The [quality of life](http://www.foodispower.org/slaughterhouse_workers.htm) for these workers is often dismal due to the incredible emotional toll that comes from working within a slaughterhouse. Human Rights Watch says that worker conditions in factory farms constitute [“systematic human rights abuses.”](http://www.farmforward.com/farming-forward/factory-farming) Aside from the direct impact on factory farm and slaughterhouse workers, animal agriculture is also inefficient from a world hunger perspective. According to a report done by the Humane Society entitled [“The Impact of Industrialized Animal Agriculture On World Hunger,”](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/animalwelfare/HSI--The%20Impact%20of%20Industrialized%20Animal%20Agriculture%20on%20World%20Hunger.pdf) nearly 80 percent of the world’s soybeans and up to 50 percent of the world’s corn are fed to animals killed for meat instead of directly to humans. Because of this, the meat industry competes with humans for food. And it’s not just food: Resources such as land and water are being wasted for the production of farmed animals. A meat-based diet uses up to [20 times more land](http://awellfedworld.org/issues/environmentalresources) than a vegan diet, contributes to deforestation and degrades the land it does use. Meat production also wastes water: [Nearly 2,400 gallons](http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/facts-on-animal-farming-and-the-environment/) of water go to produce one pound of meat, whereas only 25 gallons would be required to produce one pound of wheat. The statistics on meat production’s impact on climate change are astounding, as well. According to the [United Nations](http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM), the livestock sector contributes 18 percent globally to greenhouse gas emissions.

## Part 4 is Framing

Educational spaces have routinely papered over the suffering and oppression of animals. As a judge, you have an obligation to reject this mode of thought.

Penderson 04, Helena Pederson, Goteborg University, (2004), the Journal of Futures Studies, ([http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/8-4/A01.pdf)](http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/8-4/A01.pdf%29)

The education discipline as we know it today recognises the importance of issues related to class, race, gender, and groups of human minorities, as well as the importance of addressing problems of unequal power relations with regard to these categories. Such approaches are undeniably crucial for the role of education today, but from a critical perspective it can also be argued that they have effects of polarisation and exclusion of yet another category from the education discourse - non-human animals.1 Although education researchers and practitioners are often quick to recognise the relevance and interests of various subordinated groups in society, the problems related to the situation of other species than our own have been largely ignored. This article challenges the current order of anthropocentrism, human-centredness in education, and explores the rationales for an alternative approach to values educational research and practice that is more inclusive in character.

This functions as a pre-fiat uniqueness claim for the aff’s impacts. Other forms of oppression are also terrible, but the 1AC’s discussion is uniquely key.

Speciesism is the original form of oppression, creating the groundwork to other forms of oppression. Other forms of oppression are equally terrible, but overall liberation strategies must include a fight against speciesism.

Best 07, Steven, Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>)

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that *animals* play in human history, as well as how the human *exploitation of animals* is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and historyoverall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over humanhas deep roots in the oppression ofhuman overanimal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a *speciesist* philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson ¶ suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international [and] slave markets, the metaphors, [used] models, and technologies used to exploit animal[s] slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.”

Specieisim is morally bankrupt. The same principles of equality that cause us to reject racism and sexism, motivates us to reject speciesism as well.

Singer 89, Peter, Princeton Philosopher, ALL ANIMALS ARE EQUAL, 1989, <http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/philosophy/animals/singer-text.html>

We will then see that we would be on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans. When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish to defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed out that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans are equal. Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with differing moral capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. It would be an unjustifiable demand. Still, one might cling to the view that the demand for equality among human beings is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes. Although humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences between the races and sexes as such. From the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it may be said, is what is wrong with racism and sexism. The white racist claims that whites are superior to blacks, but this is false—although there are differences between individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in all of the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be relevant. The opponent of sexism would say the same: a person's sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex. This is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is not, however, the way that someone really concerned about equality would choose, because taking this line could, in some circumstances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian society. The fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes, is a valid reply to someone who defends a hierarchical society like, say, South Africa, in which all whites are superior in status to all blacks. The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of those with I.Q. ratings above 100 be preferred to the interests of those with I.Q.s below 100. Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism. There is a second important reason why we ought not to base our opposition to racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind which asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are spread evenly between the different races and sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be certain measurable differences between both races and sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear in each case, but only when averages are taken. More important still, we do not yet know how much of these differences is really due to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes, and how much is due to environmental differences that are the result of past and continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of the important differences will eventually prove to be environmental rather than genetic. Anyone opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will be so, for it will make the task of ending discrimination a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief that all significant differences are environmental in origin. The opponent of, say, racism who takes this line will be unable to avoid conceding that if differences in ability did after all prove to have some genetic connection with race, racism would in some way be defensible. It would be folly for the opponent of racism to stake his whole case on a dogmatic commitment to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue which is still a long way from being settled. While attempts to prove that differences in certain selected abilities between races and sexes are primarily genetic in origin have certainly not been conclusive, the same must be said of attempts to prove that these differences are largely the result of environment. At this stage of the investigation we cannot be certain which view is correct, however much we may hope it is the latter. Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of this scientific investigation. The appropriate response to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically-based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat [them] animals. Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his utilitarian system of ethics in the formula: [said] "Each to count for one and none for more than one." In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, put the point in this way: "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.''1 More recently, the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement which operates so as to give everyone's interests equal consideration—although they cannot agree on how this requirement is best formulated.2 It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess—although precisely what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do. It is on this basis that the case against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be condemned. If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans? Many philosophers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; but, as we shall see in more detail shortly, not many of them have recognized that this principle applies to members of other species as well as to our own. Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage, written at a time when black slaves in the British dominions were still being treated much as we now treat nonhuman animals, Bentham wrote: The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sarrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reasons nor Can they talk? but, Can their suffer?3 In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity for suffering—or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness—is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark "the insuperable line" that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.

Also proves the framework outweighs on probability- philosophers agree that equality must be the starting point of our ethical theory.

## Part 5 is Theory

1. All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias

Adler 15, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

Also means presumption and permissibility flow aff- I did the better debating if the round is tied. But nothing in the case triggers presumption.

2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

3. Spec-ing a type of speech is good-

SCOTUS ruled that “any” implies limits on the object they refer to.

Von Eintel 11 Kai Von Fintel, 7-6-2011, "Justice Breyer, Professor Austin, and the Meaning of 'Any'," Language Log, <http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3248>

When I see the word "any" in a statute, I immediately know it's unlikely to mean "anything" in the universe. "Any" will have a limitation on it, depending on the context. When my wife says, "there isn't any butter," I understand that she's talking about what is in our refrigerator, not worldwide. We look at context over and over, in life and in law. Austin suggests that there is good reason to look beyond text to context. Context is very important when you examine a statement or law. A statement made by Congress, under certain formal conditions, becomes a law. Context helps us interpret language, including the language of a statute. Purpose is often an important part of context. So Austin probably encourages me to put more weight on purpose. It is very interesting that Breyer should choose the word "any" as an example of why context matters. A few years back, there was in fact a Supreme Court decision (Small v. United States) that hinged on the meaning of "any" (pdf of the decision here]). And as it turns out, Justice Breyer wrote the decision for the majority (made up of Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg; ah the good old days). The background: Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1), which forbids "any person … convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm." Small subsequently argued that any court was not meant to encompass foreign courts, only domestic ones. The Supreme Court agreed. The arguments in the decision are a good case study of semantics/pragmatics in the real (well, legal) world. Here are some excerpts: The question before us is whether the statutory reference "convicted in any court" includes a conviction entered in a foreign court. The word "any" considered alone cannot answer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, "I'll see any film," may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase " 'any person' " may or may not mean to include " 'persons' " outside "the jurisdiction of the state." See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) ("[G]eneral words," such as the word "'any,' " must "be limited" in their application "to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them"); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132 (2004) (" 'any' " means "different things depending upon the setting"); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357 (1994) ("[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to 'any' law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute"); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase " 'any statute' " includes the very statute in which the words appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) ("[A]ny sum," while a "catchall" phase, does not "define what it catches"). Thus, even though the word "any" demands a broad interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997), we must look beyond that word itself.

Net benefits

a. advocacy shift- without spec the aff can shift out of disads by saying specific harms don’t link to general principle or by claiming something isn’t CPS-kills fairness since if arguments can be shifted the neg has no shot of winning.

b. Resolvability – the benefits and harms of different speech codes change depending on what the type of speech is—you can’t compare a Zionism advantage to a hate speech DA because they’re about completely different things. Key to fairness- ensures judge fairly picks the better debater.

c. Impact turn limits, Research overload is good- Gives us the skills to shift through massive data in the information era

McCandless 10, David, award-winning writer, designer and author August 2010, David McCandless: The beauty of data visualization, http://www.ted.com/talks/david\_mccandless\_the\_beauty\_of\_data\_visualization.html#

**It feels like we're** all **suffering** from information overloador data glut. And the good news is there might be an easy solution to that, and that's using our eyes more. So, visualizing information, so that we can **see the patterns and connections that matter** and then designing that information so it makes more sense, or it tells a story, or **allows us to focus** only **on** the **info**rmation **that's important**. Failing that, visualized information can just look really cool.

## Part 6 is Method

1. The aff deploys a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics and colleges are bad, scenario analysis of policies is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

2. We should focus on particular circumstances which best tackle material violence.

Pappas 16, Gregory Fernando, The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

# 1AC vs K debaters

## Part 1 is Framing

Welcome to the 9th circle of hell, in factory farms animals are lined up and killed by the billions. Educational spaces have routinely papered over the suffering and oppression of animals. As a judge, you have an obligation to reject this mode of thought.

Penderson 04, Helena Pederson, Goteborg University, (2004), the Journal of Futures Studies, ([http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/8-4/A01.pdf)](http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/8-4/A01.pdf%29)

The education discipline as we know it today recognises the importance of issues related to class, race, gender, and groups of human minorities, as well as the importance of addressing problems of unequal power relations with regard to these categories. Such approaches are undeniably crucial for the role of education today, but from a critical perspective it can also be argued that they have effects of polarisation and exclusion of yet another category from the education discourse - non-human animals.1 Although education researchers and practitioners are often quick to recognise the relevance and interests of various subordinated groups in society, the problems related to the situation of other species than our own have been largely ignored. This article challenges the current order of anthropocentrism, human-centredness in education, and explores the rationales for an alternative approach to values educational research and practice that is more inclusive in character.

This functions as a pre-fiat uniqueness claim for the aff’s impacts. Other forms of oppression are also terrible, but the 1AC’s discussion is uniquely key.

Thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the advocacy that best minimizes oppression against non-human animals.

Prefer

1. Speciesism is the original form of oppression, creating the groundwork to other forms of oppression. Other forms of oppression are equally terrible, but overall liberation strategies must include a fight against speciesism.

Best 07, Steven, Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>)

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that *animals* play in human history, as well as how the human *exploitation of animals* is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and historyoverall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over humanhas deep roots in the oppression ofhuman overanimal. In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a *speciesist* philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson ¶ suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international [and] slave markets, the metaphors, [used] models, and technologies used to exploit animal[s] slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom. For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.”

## Part 2 is Advocacy

Plan text, Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict constitutionally protected speech that is used to advocate for animals.

## Part 3 is Offense

Universities are cracking down on animal advocacy- faculty are fired for dissenting and students activists are silenced. Multiple empirical examples prove.

Kahn 10 [Kahn, Richard, anarchist educator whose primary interests are in researching the history of social movements as pedagogically generative forces in society, and in critically challenging the role dominant institutions play in blocking the realization of greater planetary freedom, peace, and happiness, "Operation get fired: A chronicle of the academic repression of radical environmentalist and animal rights advocate-scholars." Academic repression: Reflections from the academic industrial complex (2010): 200-215, http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/90383/operationgetfired-kahn.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1488872701&Signature=rIrpnSTWSguRU%2BKYE1qktPrIpCk%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DOperation\_Get\_Fired\_A\_Chronicle\_of\_the\_A.pdf] JW

Cases of University Repression of Radical Environmentalist and Animal Rights AdvocateScholars As evident in the case of Steven Best, the bureaucratic nature of higher education often makes it difficult to prove where clear repression has occurred and who within a labyrinthine administrative system is calling the shots. Still, in the instance of radical environmentalist and animal rights advocate scholars I think there are some contemporary examples of faculty, student, and organizational removal that warrant concern and are representative of the general tenure of what is taking place today within the academy. As Ward Churchill’s suspension and firing from the University of Colorado at Boulder grabbed headlines in 2005, the university’s concurrent removal of Adrienne Anderson – an Environmental Studies faculty member since 1992 who was also known to be one of the nation’s top environmental whistleblowers – took place much more quietly but no less importantly. Anderson has been likened to Erin Brockovich and Karen Silkwood for her work in the university and as the Western Director of the National Toxics Campaign, in which she has assisted labor unions and poor communities in holding corporate polluters like Rockwell International, Martin-Marietta, and ASARCO Metals (as well as corrupt government officials) accountable for their toxic misdeeds against people. An activist professor who brought her struggle for environmental justice into the classroom, a major goal of her pedagogy was to teach students how to file FOIA and Open Records requests in pursuit of uncovering the social and environmental damage done by government and industry. Her particular pet project was to have students investigate the Lowry Coalition, a collection of some 150 companies uncovered by Anderson who spent years dumping unregulated waste into a Denver metro-area landfill and then worked to cover up the presence of radioactive materials found therein, as the landfill sludge was greenlighted for use as agricultural fertilizer. Anderson filed suit on this matter in 1997 and winningly argued that the Coalition’s activities posed significant threats to the public health on numerous levels. Strongly championed by her students and having received nothing short of exceptional job reviews over the course of her teaching career (despite constant friction by certain university forces), Anderson suddenly found that her department had closed her classes without warning in 2005. While she alone had developed and taught a mandatory course for the major, being untenured and without opportunities to teach, the university happily declared Anderson expendable. Those familiar with her story, though, quickly pointed out that many of the companies in the Lowry Coalition are significant university investors. One – Scripps-Howard, the media monopoly in the Denver-area – also funds a faculty member in her department, who the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) alleges worked to undermine Anderson’s reputation with other faculty, as well as to dismantle her appeal for rehiring by leaking confidential and false information about her and her work. 7 As the AAUP statement makes clear, what occurred to Anderson has broad significance and should be properly seen as part and parcel of a current rightwing attempt to use the University of Colorado as a test case for imposing a corporatist model of education that weakens tenure, faculty governance and due process, as well as academic freedom generally. But it also reveals how the academy can work to suppress crucial environmental research and willingly jeopardize sectors of society in order to protect powerful allied interests. Such repression is aimed not only at professors, students also are under unprecedented attack from university administrations, such as happened to Valdosta State University, T. Hayden Barnes. Barnes was expelled in October of 2007 by Valdosta State President Ronald M. Zaccari for publicly protesting Zaccari’s decision to spend $30 million dollars of student fees on constructing an environmentally hazardous set of parking garages. Having learned of the decision from the school newspaper earlier in March, Barnes posted flyers around campus detailing sustainable alternatives and listed the contact information for Zaccari and the Georgia university system Board of Regents should anyone want to send opinions regarding the project (something he did himself). Four days later members of Students Against Violating the Environment contacted Barnes to let him know that Zaccari was angry, and in response Barnes removed the flyers. However, he was hardly finished campaigning and, over the next month, he posted a collage lampooning the parking garage project to his Facebook page, wrote a letter to the editor of the student paper critiquing the proposed garages, and then wrote Zaccari himself to request an exemption from paying the mandatory student fee that was to be contributed toward the construction project. According to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), which ultimately took up his case, on May 7 Barnes found a note from Zaccari slipped under his dormitory door which read “as a result of recent activities directed towards me by you, included [sic] but not limited to the attached threatening document [the Facebook collage], you are considered to present a clear and present danger to this campus”.8 While lawsuits filed by FIRE and Barnes resulted in Zaccari announcing his early retirement and the Board of Regents overturning Barnes’s expulsion, Valdosta State remains notorious for officially quarantining expressed free speech on its 168-acre campus to a small stage area that must be reserved two days in advance and can only be used two hours each afternoon.9 Alarmingly, the university is not unique in this practice. Although the University of California system is not amongst those with designated public free speech zones for political expression, it has moved to enforce a ban on a wave of ongoing protests by both legal and extra-legal animal rights groups against primate vivisection practices taking place on some of its campuses. Though framed as a defense of faculty research and an attempt to preserve academic freedom from direct action militants who targeted the property of specific vivisectors in recent years, flagship campuses like UCLA, UC Berkeley, and UC Santa Cruz are actually involved in deploying repressive tolerance. UCLA, in particular, is considered to play a leading role in developing national academic security strategies. As a member of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board, working in concert with the FBI and other agencies after a supposed ALF hit on a researcher’s home in 2006, UCLA has moved to check animal advocacy on campus by barring student activists from entering university buildings during demonstrations, by coordinating information about student groups with law enforcement, and by increasing its powers of surveillance generally. Moreover, it has sought and won court injunctions against the websites of legal organizations such as the UCLA Primate Freedom Project (founded by a UCLA student), and has suppressed the public speech rights of numerous individuals. Such anti-activist actions as the university are engaged in are now promoted as "Best Practices for Protecting Researchers and Research" by the Society for Neuroscience (Murr, 2008). The demented idea of standardizing protocols which serve to make animals as vulnerable as possible to th**e** unnecessary needles and knives of vivisectors reveals the manner in which corporate science and the security State have come together to set higher education policy, with UCLA presently serving as the principal model for other academic institutions to redraft their policies in similar fashion. While other academic institutions such as the University of Utah have similarly worked with government officials to legislate the criminalization of protests within 100 feet of faculty residences, recent legislation crafted by the UC system related to its lawsuit against animal rights activists has moved beyond the anti-democratic and into the realm of the unconstitutional. Specifically, the measure AB2296, submitted by Assemblyman Gene Mullin (D-San Mateo), was created to forbid political activities targeting corporate researchers on campus; with its initial aim being “to restrict public access to information about academics who do animal research and to make it illegal to post personal information about them online” (Krupnick, 2008), such as their names, addresses and photographs. Although the bill’s language was scaled back slightly when passed into law in October, 2008, it is revealing that as originally drafted it attempted to exempt requests about university research from public records requests, In other words, those in charge of the UC system unabashedly sought to create a non-transparent situation for university research in which it would be legally impossible to have civic oversight over the public university system’s work. While the immediate aim may have been to block the names of laboratory vivisectors from animal advocates, this legislation would have also shielded all manner of military, biotech, and other forms of ethically dubious experimentation from public inquiry. The University of California’s repression of animal rights activists and student groups is therefore an affront that should concern all people, and it is crucial that it be challenged appropriately as such repression serves not only to blunt moral progress but the realization of a more democratic science of the people in the process.

Studies prove that exposure to animal advocacy on college campuses changes hearts and minds-that saves thousands of animal lives.

Cooney 13, Nick, The Powerful Impact of College Leafleting (Part 1), 2013, https://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/the-powerful-impact-of-college-leafleting-part-1/

Leafleting — passing out information about factory farming and vegan eating — is one of the most common ways that animal advocates promote vegan eating in the United States. The group [Vegan Outreach](http://www.veganoutreach.org/), which pioneered and popularized vegan leafleting, passed out almost 3 million leaflets last year, and other groups chipped in millions more. Compassionate Communities volunteers have been distributing our [Something Better leaflet](http://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SomethingBetter_V2.pdf), which shares the Farm Sanctuary experience, the realities of factory farming, and info on meat-free eating, to hundreds of thousands of people. But just how effective is leafleting? How many readers actually change their diet, and how many animals are spared a lifetime of misery? Should volunteers prioritize leafleting over other forms of animal advocacy? For the first time ever, we have answers to those questions! In the fall of 2012, Compassionate Communities teamed up with [The Humane League](http://www.thehumaneleague.com/) to measure the true impact of leafleting on a college campus. **How It Was Done** Early in the fall semester, staffers from The Humane League visited the main campuses of two large state schools on the East Coast, the University of Delaware and the University of Maryland. They distributed thousands of leaflets outside the dining halls of each school. The leaflets distributed were an equal mixture of Farm Sanctuary’s [Something Better leaflet](http://ccc.farmsanctuary.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SomethingBetter_V2.pdf) and Vegan Outreach’s popular [Compassionate Choices leaflet](http://www.veganoutreach.org/cc.pdf). About two months later, they returned to campus with surveys to see how much students’ diets had changed. They stood outside the dining halls and asked students passing by if they would take a survey. Students did not know what the survey was about prior to stopping and agreeing to take the survey. After agreeing, only those who actually received a leaflet earlier that semester were allowed to take the survey. Nearly 500 surveys were completed. **Key Results** Quite simply, the results were phenomenal. About 1 out of every 50 students **who received a leaflet** indicated they became vegetarian or pescatarian **as a result**. Just as importantly, 7% of students (1 in 14) said they now eat “a lot less” chicken, a lot fewer eggs, and a lot less dairy as a result of getting the leaflet. 6% eat a lot less fish, and 12% eat a lot less red meat. Furthermore, about 1 in 5 students said they shared the leaflet with someone else who then began to eat less meat. What does all this mean for animals? After accounting for social desirability bias (people over reporting changes in their diet), the results suggest that for every 100 leaflets **you distribute on a college campus,** you’ll spare**,** by **a** conservative calculation, **a minimum of** 50 animals a year a lifetime of misery**. That’s one animal spared for every two leaflets you distribute!** And that’s just in the first year. The number of farm animals spared grows much larger once you factor in the number of years that people maintain their diet. It also grows larger once you count the ripple effects of people persuading their friends and family to change. And we haven’t even begun to count the many hundreds of wild fish who will also be spared. The bottom line is this: With each hour you spend leafleting on a college campus, you will truly spare hundreds of farm animals from a lifetime of daily misery. The data is in. The facts are there. College leafleting is an absurdly effective activity for individuals and for organizations who want to make their community a more compassionate one.

This outweighs

a. Outweighs on scope- If an hour saves hundreds of animals- then the plan as a whole across all colleges all year should save billions if not trillions of animal lives annually.

b. Factory farms are hell on earth- tens of billions of sentient beings are killed and tortured every year. As long as there is a demand for meat- the slaughterhouse will exist.

Harai 15, Yuval Noah, Industrial farming is one of the worst crimes in history, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/sep/25/industrial-farming-one-worst-crimes-history-ethical-question

The fate of industrially farmed animals is one of the most pressing ethical questions of our time. Tens of billions of sentient beings, each with complex sensations and emotions, live and die on a production line, Animals are the main victims of history, and the treatment of domesticated animals in industrial farms is perhaps the worst crime in history. The march of human progress is strewn with dead animals. Even tens of thousands of years ago, our stone age ancestors were already responsible for a series of ecological disasters. When the first humans reached Australia about 45,000 years ago, they quickly drove to extinction 90% of its large animals. This was the first significant impact that Homo sapiens had on the planet’s ecosystem. It was not the last.¶ About 15,000 years ago, humans colonised America, wiping out in the process about 75% of its large mammals. Numerous other species disappeared from Africa, from Eurasia and from the myriad islands around their coasts. The archaeological record of country after country tells the same sad story. The tragedy opens with a scene showing a rich and varied population of large animals, without any trace of Homo sapiens. In scene two, humans appear, evidenced by a fossilised bone, a spear point, or perhaps a campfire. Scene three quickly follows, in which men and women occupy centre-stage and most large animals, along with many smaller ones, have gone. Altogether, sapiens drove to extinction about 50% of all the large terrestrial mammals of the planet before they planted the first wheat field, shaped the first metal tool, wrote the first text or struck the first coin. The next major landmark in human-animal relations was the agricultural revolution: the process by which we turned from nomadic hunter-gatherers into farmers living in permanent settlements. It involved the appearance of a completely new life-form on Earth: domesticated animals. Initially, this development might seem to have been of minor importance, as humans only managed to domesticate fewer than 20 species of mammals and birds, compared with the countless thousands of species that remained “wild”. Yet, with the passing of the centuries, this novel life-form became the norm. Today, more than 90% of all large animals are domesticated (“large” denotes animals that weigh at least a few kilograms). Consider the chicken, for example. Ten thousand years ago, it was a rare bird that was confined to small niches of South Asia. Today, billions of chickens live on almost every continent and island, bar Antarctica. The domesticated chicken is probably the most widespread bird in the annals of planet Earth. If you measure success in terms of numbers, chickens, cows and pigs are the most successful animals ever.¶ Alas, domesticated species paid for their unparalleled collective success with unprecedented individual suffering. The animal kingdom has known many types of pain and misery for millions of years. Yet the agricultural revolution created completely new kinds of suffering, ones that only worsened with the passing of the generations.¶ At first sight, domesticated animals may seem much better off than their wild cousins and ancestors. Wild buffaloes spend their days searching for food, water and shelter, and are constantly threatened by lions, parasites, floods and droughts. Domesticated cattle, by contrast, enjoy care and protection from humans. People provide cows and calves with food, water and shelter, they treat their diseases, and protect them from predators and natural disasters. True, most cows and calves sooner or later find themselves in the slaughterhouse. Yet does that make their fate any worse than that of wild buffaloes? Is it better to be devoured by a lion than slaughtered by a man? Are crocodile teeth kinder than steel blades?¶ What makes the existence of domesticated farm animals particularly cruel is not just the way in which they die but above all how they live. Two competing factors have shaped the living conditions of farm animals: on the one hand, humans want meat, milk, eggs, leather, animal muscle-power and amusement; on the other, humans have to ensure the long-term survival and reproduction of farm animals. Theoretically, this should protect animals from extreme cruelty. If a farmer milks his cow without providing her with food and water, milk production will dwindle, and the cow herself will quickly die. Unfortunately, humans can cause tremendous suffering to farm animals in other ways, even while ensuring their survival and reproduction. The root of the problem is that domesticated animals have inherited from their wild ancestors many physical, emotional and social needs that are redundant in farms. Farmers routinely ignore these needs without paying any economic price. They lock animals in tiny cages, mutilate their horns and tails, separate mothers from offspring, and selectively breed monstrosities. The animals suffer greatly, yet they live on and multiply. Doesn’t that contradict the most basic principles of [Darwinian](http://www.theguardian.com/science/charles-darwin) evolution? The theory of evolution maintains that all instincts and drives have evolved in the interest of survival and reproduction. If so, doesn’t the continuous reproduction of farm animals prove that all their real needs are met? How can a cow have a “need” that is not really essential for survival and reproduction?¶ It is certainly true that all instincts and drives evolved in order to meet the evolutionary pressures of survival and reproduction. When these pressures disappear, however, the instincts and drives they had shaped do not evaporate instantly. Even if they are no longer instrumental for survival and reproduction, they continue to mould the subjective experiences of the animal. The physical, emotional and social needs of present-day cows, dogs and humans don’t reflect their current conditions but rather the evolutionary pressures their ancestors encountered tens of thousands of years ago. Why do modern people love sweets so much? Not because in the early 21st century we must gorge on ice cream and chocolate in order to survive. Rather, it is because if our stone age ancestors came across sweet, ripened fruits, the most sensible thing to do was to eat as many of them as they could as quickly as possible. [Why do young men drive recklessly](http://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2013/aug/19/driving-road-neuroscience-psychology), get involved in violent rows, and hack confidential internet sites? Because they are obeying ancient genetic decrees. Seventy thousand years ago, a young hunter who risked his life chasing a mammoth outshone all his competitors and won the hand of the local beauty – and we are now stuck with his macho genes.¶ Exactly the same evolutionary logic shapes the life of cows and calves in our industrial farms. Ancient wild cattle were social animals. In order to survive and reproduce, they needed to communicate, cooperate and compete effectively. Like all social mammals, wild cattle learned the necessary social skills through play. Puppies, kittens, calves and children all love to play because evolution implanted this urge in them. In the wild, they needed to play. If they didn’t, they would not learn the social skills vital for survival and reproduction. If a kitten or calf was born with some rare mutation that made them indifferent to play, they were unlikely to survive or reproduce, just as they would not exist in the first place if their ancestors hadn’t acquired those skills. Similarly, evolution implanted in puppies, kittens, calves and children an overwhelming desire to bond with their mothers. A chance mutation weakening the mother-infant bond was a death sentence.¶ What happens when farmers now take a young calf, separate her from her mother, put her in a tiny cage, vaccinate her against various diseases, provide her with food and water, and then, when she is old enough, artificially inseminate her with bull sperm? From an objective perspective, this calf no longer needs either maternal bonding or playmates in order to survive and reproduce. All her needs are being taken care of by her human masters. But from a subjective perspective, the calf still feels a strong urge to bond with her mother and to play with other calves. If these urges are not fulfilled, the calf suffers greatly.¶ This is the basic lesson of evolutionary psychology: a need shaped thousands of generations ago continues to be felt subjectively even if it is no longer necessary for survival and reproduction in the present. Tragically, the agricultural revolution gave humans the power to ensure the survival and reproduction of domesticated animals while ignoring their subjective needs. In consequence, domesticated animals are collectively the most successful animals in the world, and at the same time they are individually the most miserable animals that have ever existed.¶ The situation has only worsened over the last few centuries, during which time traditional agriculture gave way to industrial farming. In traditional societies such as ancient Egypt, the Roman empire or medieval China, humans had a very partial understanding of biochemistry, genetics, zoology and epidemiology. Consequently, their manipulative powers were limited. In medieval villages, chickens ran free between the houses, pecked seeds and worms from the garbage heap, and built nests in the barn. If an ambitious peasant tried to lock 1,000 chickens inside a crowded coop, a deadly bird-flu epidemic would probably have resulted, wiping out all the chickens, as well as many villagers. No priest, shaman or witch doctor could have prevented it. But once modern science had deciphered the secrets of birds, viruses and antibiotics, humans could begin to subject animals to extreme living conditions. With the help of vaccinations, medications, hormones, pesticides, central air-conditioning systems and automatic feeders, it is now possible to cram tens of thousands of chickens into tiny coops, and produce meat and eggs with unprecedented efficiency.¶ The fate of animals in such industrial installations has become one of the most pressing ethical issues of our time, certainly in terms of the numbers involved. These days, most big animals live on industrial farms. We imagine that our planet is populated by lions, elephants, whales and penguins. That may be true of the National Geographic channel, Disney movies and children’s fairytales, but it is no longer true of the real world. The world contains 40,000 lions but, by way of contrast, there are around 1 billion domesticated pigs; 500,000 elephants and 1.5 billion domesticated cows; 50 million penguins and 20 billion chickens.¶ In 2009, there were 1.6 billion wild birds in Europe, counting all species together. That same year, the European meat and egg industry raised 1.9 billion chickens. Altogether, the domesticated animals of the world weigh about 700m tonnes, compared with 300m tonnes for humans, and fewer than 100m tonnes for large wild animals.¶ This is why the fate of farm animals is not an ethical side issue. It concerns the majority of Earth’s large creatures: tens of billions of sentient beings, each with a complex world of sensations and emotions, but which live and die on an industrial production line. Forty years ago, the moral philosopher [Peter Singer](http://www.theguardian.com/profile/petersinger) published his canonical book *Animal Liberation*, which has done much to change people’s minds on this issue. Singer claimed that industrial farming is responsible for more pain and misery than all the wars of history put together.The scientific study of animals has played a dismal role in this tragedy. The scientific community has used its growing knowledge of animals mainly to manipulate their lives more efficiently in the service of human industry. Yet this same knowledge has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that farm animals are sentient beings, with intricate social relations and sophisticated psychological patterns. They may not be as intelligent as us, but they certainly know pain, fear and loneliness. They too can suffer, and they too can be happy.

This means

1. vote aff on try or die- billions of animals are tortured right now because almost everyone on earth eats meat. There is literally no way for this to get worse for the animals.
2. The aff outweighs on scale- factory farms inflict torture worse than death.

Aff also fights human oppression- stops abuse of workers, global famine and climate change

Sareen 12, Anjali, Why Don’t Vegans Care About People?, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anjali-sareen/vegan-lifestyle\_b\_1771404.html

Many people don’t realize that the animal rights movement is not just about the animals; there’s much to gain for humans, as well. Animal agriculture is among the most dangerous industries worldwide. [One Green Planet](http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/the-human-cost-of-industrial-animal-agriculture/) notes that just in the U.S., [OSHA](http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/agriculturaloperations/index.html) reported the death of 9,003 farm workers from work-related injuries between 1992 and 2009. [Injuries can include](http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/farm/hsus-factory-farming-in-america-the-true-cost-of-animal-agribusiness.pdf) everything from chronic pain to cardiovascular illness and death. [Many of the workers are undocumented](http://www.foodispower.org/factory_farm_workers.htm), leading to a situation in which they are fearful of reporting their illness or injury and therefore do not receive adequate treatment. The [quality of life](http://www.foodispower.org/slaughterhouse_workers.htm) for these workers is often dismal due to the incredible emotional toll that comes from working within a slaughterhouse. Human Rights Watch says that worker conditions in factory farms constitute [“systematic human rights abuses.”](http://www.farmforward.com/farming-forward/factory-farming) Aside from the direct impact on factory farm and slaughterhouse workers, animal agriculture is also inefficient from a world hunger perspective. According to a report done by the Humane Society entitled [“The Impact of Industrialized Animal Agriculture On World Hunger,”](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/animalwelfare/HSI--The%20Impact%20of%20Industrialized%20Animal%20Agriculture%20on%20World%20Hunger.pdf) nearly 80 percent of the world’s soybeans and up to 50 percent of the world’s corn are fed to animals killed for meat instead of directly to humans. Because of this, the meat industry competes with humans for food. And it’s not just food: Resources such as land and water are being wasted for the production of farmed animals. A meat-based diet uses up to [20 times more land](http://awellfedworld.org/issues/environmentalresources) than a vegan diet, contributes to deforestation and degrades the land it does use. Meat production also wastes water: [Nearly 2,400 gallons](http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/facts-on-animal-farming-and-the-environment/) of water go to produce one pound of meat, whereas only 25 gallons would be required to produce one pound of wheat. The statistics on meat production’s impact on climate change are astounding, as well. According to the [United Nations](http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM), the livestock sector contributes 18 percent globally to greenhouse gas emissions.

## Part 4 is Theory

1. Education is a voter, it’s the main value we get from debate and the reason schools fund debate.

2. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

3. Spec-ing a type of speech is good-

SCOTUS ruled that “any” implies limits on the object they refer to.

Von Eintel 11 Kai Von Fintel, 7-6-2011, "Justice Breyer, Professor Austin, and the Meaning of 'Any'," Language Log, <http://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=3248>

When I see the word "any" in a statute, I immediately know it's unlikely to mean "anything" in the universe. "Any" will have a limitation on it, depending on the context. When my wife says, "there isn't any butter," I understand that she's talking about what is in our refrigerator, not worldwide. We look at context over and over, in life and in law. Austin suggests that there is good reason to look beyond text to context. Context is very important when you examine a statement or law. A statement made by Congress, under certain formal conditions, becomes a law. Context helps us interpret language, including the language of a statute. Purpose is often an important part of context. So Austin probably encourages me to put more weight on purpose. It is very interesting that Breyer should choose the word "any" as an example of why context matters. A few years back, there was in fact a Supreme Court decision (Small v. United States) that hinged on the meaning of "any" (pdf of the decision here]). And as it turns out, Justice Breyer wrote the decision for the majority (made up of Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg; ah the good old days). The background: Petitioner Small was convicted in a Japanese Court of trying to smuggle firearms and ammunition into that country. He served five years in prison and then returned to the United States, where he bought a gun. Federal authorities subsequently charged Small under 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(1), which forbids "any person … convicted in any court … of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm." Small subsequently argued that any court was not meant to encompass foreign courts, only domestic ones. The Supreme Court agreed. The arguments in the decision are a good case study of semantics/pragmatics in the real (well, legal) world. Here are some excerpts: The question before us is whether the statutory reference "convicted in any court" includes a conviction entered in a foreign court. The word "any" considered alone cannot answer this question. In ordinary life, a speaker who says, "I'll see any film," may or may not mean to include films shown in another city. In law, a legislature that uses the statutory phrase " 'any person' " may or may not mean to include " 'persons' " outside "the jurisdiction of the state." See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) ("[G]eneral words," such as the word "'any,' " must "be limited" in their application "to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them"); Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132 (2004) (" 'any' " means "different things depending upon the setting"); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357 (1994) ("[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to 'any' law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute"); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (it is doubtful that the phrase " 'any statute' " includes the very statute in which the words appear); Flora v. United States, 362 U. S. 145, 149 (1960) ("[A]ny sum," while a "catchall" phase, does not "define what it catches"). Thus, even though the word "any" demands a broad interpretation, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997), we must look beyond that word itself.

## Part 5 is Method

1. The aff deploys a heuristic to learn scenario planning- even if politics and colleges are bad, scenario analysis of policies is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

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What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

2. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the method debate- that’s probability of the framework being true times the magnitude of the offense underneath it. That’s key to decision-making, in all other circumstances we use probability times magnitude to evaluate risk, that’s the definition of game theory. It would be inconsistent to do that here as well.

3. Contesting the policy focus on the AC is bad, prefer the AC framework as long as it is theoretically legitimate.

A: it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since it uplayers my offense, which destroys aff, ground.

B: Also means the neg never has to clash and engage with the aff which means they get superficial education.

C: Coopts all their offense- they can read their role of the ballot when their aff.

4. Oppression is a concrete problem that demands a concrete solution.

Cone 10, James. [Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary]. A Black Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010

Participation in divine liberation places the church squarely in the context of the world. It s existence is inseparable from worldly involvement. Black theology cannot say that the “church is the world” or “the world is the church” (as implied in some secular theologies), but it does affirm that the church cannot be the church in isolation from the concrete realities of human suffering**.** The world is earthly existence, the place where human beings are enslaved. It is where laws are passed against the oppressed, and where the oppressed fight back even though their efforts seem futile. The world is where white and black persons live, encountering each other, the latter striving for a little more room to breathe and the former doing everything possible to destroy black reality.¶ The world is not a metaphysical entity or an ontological problem, as some philosophers and theologians would have us believe it is very concrete. It is punching clocks, taking orders, fighting rats, and being kicked around by police officers.it is where the oppressed live. Jews encountered it in concentration camps, Amerindians on reservations, and blacks on slave ships, in cotton fields, and in “dark” ghettos. The world is white persons, the degrading rules they make are for the “underprivileged”, and their guilt dispelling recourse to political and theological slogans about the welfare of society “ as a whole”. In short, the world is where the brutal reality of inhumanity makes its ungodly appearance, turning persons into animals**.**

5. narrative of “no progress” is affectively appealing but historically imprecise. Political access proves.

**Winant 15**– (2015, Howard, Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Barbara, “The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 2015, Vol. 41(2) 313–324).

The World-Historical Shitpile of Race Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome. Yet That’s Not the Whole Story We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap,people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: • Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet • The destruction of the old European empires • The coming and going of the Cold War • The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Not only does it continue as a matter of course in everyday life, but in intellectual, artistic and scientific (both social and natural) life race continues to command attention.6 ‘Colorblind’ ideologies of race today serve to impede the recognition of racial difference or racial inequality based on claims that race is an archaic concept, that racial inclusion is already an accomplished fact, and so on. Just so, persistent race-consciousness highlights racial differences and particularities. ‘Noticing’ race can be linked to despotic or democratic motives, framed either in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or invoked to support inclusion, human rights, and social justice (Carbado and Harris, 2008; see also Brown et al., 2003). Obama Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, ‘the one’? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century US politics. This is the territory in which, as Sam Rayburn famously said, ‘There comes a time in the life of every politician when he [sic] must rise above principle.’ Yet Barack Obama has transformed the US presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How many community meetings, how many movement meetings did Obama attend before entering electoral politics? But he is no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the US system of rule, by the US racial regime, by structural racism. In addition he is constrained by racism as no other US president has ever been. No other president has experienced racism directly: Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience – and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure – I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it’s like to have people tell me I can’t do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb – from TV and music and friends and the streets – about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be. (Obama, 2006: 233) On the other hand: he has a ‘kill list’. All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first systematically and publicly to take charge of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2004 [1922]). The drones, the surveillance, and the numerous right turns of his administration all stand in sharp contradiction not only to his campaign rhetoric, but to the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in US history, the ‘great recession’ of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched. Though modernized and ‘moderated’, structural racism has been fortified, not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Reframing the Discussion What should we be studying and teaching now? The list of themes I have highlighted here is partial of course, and perhaps impressionistic as well. If the argument I have proposed has any validity, then the ‘dark matter’ of race, which is even more invisible now than it was in the past – in its present ‘post-civil rights’, ‘colorblind’, and even ‘presidential’ forms – continues to exercise its gravitational pull on our politics. It continues to shape what is called (and improperly deprecated as) ‘identity politics’. The ‘dark matter’ takes on new significance as a central feature of neoliberalism, which is enacted today through the deployment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, ‘states of exception’, state violence, and exclusionary politics – all political practices that rely on racism. Yet the legacy of centuries of resistance to these depredations, the undeniable achievements of anti-racist and ant-imperialist struggles, the extension of democracy – often tortuous and always incomplete

o/w

1. verifiability
2. tests analytics

6. Aff isn’t roleplaying- I’m not pretending that I am the state, I am merely forming an opinion about what the state should do. For example, I can say that criminal ought not murder people without thinking that I am that criminal. Avoids the link and non-unique your offense, everyone forms opinions about the government.

7. Imaging state solutions is key to getting students into politics and prevent a ceding of power to political elites, empirics confirm.

Giroux 06, Henry, Sociologist, “The abandoned generation: The urban debate league and the politics of possibility,” 2006

The decline of democratic values and informed citizenship can be seen in research studies done by The Justice Project in 2001 in which a substantial number of teenagers and young people were asked what they thought democracy meant. The answers testified to a growing depoliticization of American life and largely consisted of statements along the following lines: "Nothing," "I don't know," or "My rights, just like, pride, I guess, to some extent, and paying taxes," or "I just think, like, what does it really mean? I know its our, like, our government, but I don't know what it 6 technically is." The transition from being ignorant about democracy to actually sup- porting antidemocratic Tendencies can be seen in a number of youth surveys that have been taken since 2000. For instance, a survey released by the University of California, Berkeley, revealed that 69 percent of students support school prayer and 44 percent of young people aged fifteen to twenty-two support government restric- tions on abortions. A 2004 survey of 112,003 high school students on First Amendment rights showed that one third of students surveyed believed that the First Amendment went too far in the rights it guarantees and 36 percent believed that the press enjoyed too much freedom. This suggests not just a failing of education, but a crisis of citizenship and democracy. ￼One consequence of the decline in democratic values and citizenship literacy is that all levels of government are being hollowed our, their role reduced to dismantling the gains of the welfare state as they increasingly construct policies that ￼criminalize social problems and prioritize penal methods over social investments. When citizenship is reduced to consumerism, it should come as no surprise that people develop[ an indifference to civic engagement and participation in democratic public life. Unlike some theorists who suggest that politics as critical exchange and social engagement is either dead or in a state of terminal arrest, I believe that the current depressing state of politics points to an urgent challenge: reformulating the crisis of democracy as a fundamental crisis of vision, meaning, education, and political agency. Central to my argument is the assumption that politics is not simply about power, but also, as Cornelius Castoriadis points out, "has to do with political judgments and value choices," meaning that questions of civic education—learning how 8 to become a skilled citizen—afe central to democracy itself. ￼Educators at all levels need to challenge the assumption that politics is dead, or the nature of politics will be determined exclusively by government leaders and experts m the heat of moral frenzy. Educators need to take a more critical position, arguing that knowledge, debate, and dialogue about pressing social problems offer individuals and groups some hope in shaping the conditions that bear down on their lives. Public civic engagement is essential if the concepts of social life and the public sphere are to be used to revitalize the language of civic education and democratization as part of a broader discourse of political agency and critical citizenship in a global world. Linking the social to democratic public values represents an attempt, however incom- plete, to link democracy to public action, as part of a comprehensive attempt to revitalize civic activism and citizen access to decision-making while simultaneously addressing basic problems of social justice and global democracy. ￼Educators within public schools need to find ways to engage political issues by making social problems visible and by debating them in the political sphere. They also need to be at the forefront of the defense of the most progressive historical advances and gains of the state. 1-rcnch sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is right when he calls for collective work by educators to prevent those who arc mobilized against the welfare state from destroying the most precious democratic conquests in labor legis- lation, health, social protection, and education.'' At the very least, this would suggest that educators should defend schools as democratic public spheres, struggle against the de-skilling of teachers and students that has accompanied the emphasis on teach- ing for test-taking, and argue for pedagogy grounded in democratic values rather than testing schemes that severely limit the creative, ethical, and liberatory potential of education.