# 1NC- Skep- Nirmal

## 1NC

### Linguistic Skep

#### We can never know what a statement means so it is impossible for it to be true

**Kripke 82** [saul. “Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition” 1982. Harvard University Press.] NB

Normally, when we consider a mathematical rule such as addition, we think of ourselves as guided in our application of it to each new instance. Just this is the difference between someone who computes new values of a function and someone who calls out numbers at random. Given my past intentions regarding the symbol ‘+’, one and only one answer is dictated as the one appropriate to ‘68+57'. On the other hand although an intelligence tester may suppose that there is only, one possible continuation to the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8,…, mathematical and philosophical sophisticates know that an indefinite number of rules (even rules stated in terms of mathematical functions as conventional as ordinary polynomials) are compatible with any such finite initial segment. So if the tester urges me to respond, after 2, 4, 6, 8, . . ., with the unique appropriate next number, the proper response is that no such unique number exists, nor is there any unique (rule determined) infinite sequence that continues the given one. The problem can then be put this way: Did I myself, in the directions for the future that I gave myself regarding [plus] ‘+’, really differ from the intelligence tester? True, I may not merely stipulate that [plus] ‘+’ is to be a function instantiated by a finite number of computations. In addition, I may give myself directions for the further computation of [plus] ‘+', stated in terms of other functions and rules. In turn, I may give myself directions for the further computation of these functions and rules, and so on. Eventually, however, the process must stop, with ‘ultimate’ functions and rules that I have stipulated for myself only by a finite number of examples, just as in the intelligence test. If so, is not my procedure as arbitrary as that of the man who guesses the continuation of the intelligence test? In what sense is my actual computation procedure, following an algorithm that yields ‘125’, more justified by my past instructions than an alternative procedure that would have resulted in ‘5'? Am I not simply following an unjustifiable impulse?" Of course, these problems apply throughout language and are not confined to mathematical examples, though it is with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly brought out. I think that I have learned the term 'table' in such a way that it will [to] apply to indefinitely many future items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say when I enter the Eiffel Tower for the first time and see a table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes that by `table' in the past I meant tabair, where a 'tabair' is anything that is a table not found at the base of the Eiffel Tower, or a chair found there? Did I think explicitly of the Eiffel Tower when I first `grasped the concept of' a table, gave myself directions for what I meant by `table'? And even if I did think of the Tower, cannot any directions I gave myself mentioning it be reinterpreted compatibly with the sceptic's hypothesis?

#### This negates since it denies the truth of the resolution- no linguistic statement can ever be true since its impossible to determine its meaning

### Objective Skep

#### No amount of subjective evidence can ever prove objective knowledge

**Searle 2K** [Searle, John R. “Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World” New York. Basic Bofoks. 2000. 27] NB

[Y]ou could have the best possible evidence about some domain and still be radically mistaken. You could have the best possible evidence about other people’s behavior and still be mistaken about their mental states. You could have the best possible evidence about the past and still be mistaken about the future. You could have the best possible evidence about your own perceptual experiences and still be mistaken about the external world. This is so because you could be dreaming, having hallucinations, be a brain in a vat, or be deceieved systematically by an evil demon. Strange situations, yes, but it is impossible to disprove the potentiality for any of these scenarios.”

#### We have positive reason to believe our perceptions of the world are false. This negates because when we make statements about the resolution we assume that colleges and free speech exists

### Determinism

#### Determinism is true

**Inwagen** [Inwagen, Van Peter. “Objectivist Theory of Free Will”.] NB

“Physics teaches us that all physical changes transpire in accordance with the laws of nature. Now my firing of the gun, along with my aunt’s ensuing death, were physical events. So, if the dictates of science are to be accepted, these events were ultimately the outcome of events occurring in (say) 2 million B.C., together with the laws of nature. But it is not up to me what went on 2 million years ago. And it is not up to me what the laws of nature are either. Therefore, the consequences of these things, including my present actions, are not up to me either.”

#### That negates- it’s impossible for agents to be a moral agents because it’s impossible for them to adhere to moral norms in a world where there is no free will or options- and it’s the aff’s burdent o prove a moral obligation

### Motivationalism Double Bind

#### Moral theories must be motivational or non-motivational. Double bind A. they are non-motivational and won’t be followed so morality can’t guide action since guides need to be followed or b) morality is motivational and people will do what it says no matter what so its just descriptive of action, not providing an obligation

### Disagreement Skep

#### Different moral agents are never able to settle ethical conflicts- that means skep

**Leiter** [Brian Leiter"Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement: Developing an Argument from Nietzsche « On the Human," No Publication, <https://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/on-the-human/2010/03/moral-skepticism-and-moral-disagreement-developing-an-argument-from-nietzsche/>] NB

By “moral skepticism,” I shall mean the view that there are no objective moral ‘facts’ or ‘truths.’ Moral skeptics from Friedrich Nietzsche to Charles Stevenson to John Mackie have appealed to the purported fact of widespread and intractable moral disagreement to support the skeptical conclusion. Typically, such arguments invoke anthropological reports about the moral views of exotic cultures, or even garden-variety conflicting moral intuitions about concrete cases (such as abortion or the death penalty). How, it is claimed, could such disagreements persist if there were really objective moral facts? Nietzsche, I will argue, suggests a different kind of argument from moral disagreement that deserves more attention than it has received to date. Nietzsche calls attention not to “ordinary” or “folk” moral disagreement, but rather to what should be the single most important and embarrassing fact about the history of moral theorizing by philosophers over the last two millennia: namely, that no rational consensus has been secured on any substantive, foundational proposition about morality. Is the criterion of right action the reasons for which it is performed or the consequences it brings about? If the former, is it a matter of the reasons being universalizable, or that they arise from respect for duty, or something else? If the latter, is it the utility it produces or the perfection it makes possible? If the former, is utility a matter of preference-satisfaction (as the economists often believe) or preference satisfaction under idealized circumstances—or is it, rather, unconnected to the preferences of agents, actual or idealized, but instead a matter of realizing the human essence or enjoying some ‘objective’ goods? And perhaps a criterion of right action isn’t even the issue, perhaps the issue is cultivating dispositions of character conducive to living a good life. And here, of course, I have merely canvassed just some of the disagreements that plague Western academic moral theory, not even touching on non-Western traditions, or radical dissenters from the mainstream of academic moral theory, such as Nietzsche himself. Notice, too, that the disagreements of moral philosophers are amazingly intractable. Nowhere do we find lifelong Kantians suddenly (or even gradually) converting to Benthamite utilitarianism, or vice versa. Nietzsche thus locates disagreement at the heart of the most sophisticated moral philosophies of the West, among philosophers who very often share lots of other beliefs and practices. Yet what we find is that these philosophers remain locked in apparently intractable disagreement about the most important, foundational issues about morality. This persistent disagreement on foundational questions, of course, distinguishes moral theory from inquiry in the sciences and mathematics, not, perhaps, in kind, but certainly in degree. In the hard sciences and mathematics, intellectual discourse regularly transcends cultural and geographic boundaries and consensus emerges about at least some central propositions. How to explain the failure of moral theory to achieve anything like this? Let us start with Nietzsche’s version of this argument. This passage is representative: It is a very remarkable moment: the Sophists verge upon the first critique of morality, the first insight into morality:–they juxtapose the multiplicity (the geographical relativity) of the moral value judgments [Moralischen Werthurtheile];–they let it be known that every morality can be dialectically justified; i.e., they divine that all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical—a proposition later proved on the grand scale by the ancient philosophers, from Plato onwards (down to Kant);–they postulate the first truth that a “morality-in-itself” [eine Moral an sich], a “good-in-itself” do not exist, that it is a swindle to talk of “truth” in this field. (WP:428; KSA 13:14[116]). This is a Nachlass passage, but it has many analogues in the published corpus and is consistent with a general picture Nietzsche has of the discursive pretensions of philosophers. Consider his derisive comment in Beyond Good and Evil about Kant’s moral philosophy, which he describes as “[t]he…stiff and decorous Tartuffery of the old Kant, as he lures us on the dialectical bypaths that lead to his ‘categorical imperative’—really lead astray and seduce” (BGE: 5). Kant’s “Tartuffery” and Spinoza’s “hocus-pocus of mathematical form” in his Ethics are simply, Nietzsche says, “the subtle tricks [feinen Tücken] of old moralists and preachers of morals [Moralisten und Moralprediger].” As Nietzsche explains it: They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic…while at bottom it is an assumption, a hunch, a kind of “inspiration”—most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and made abstract—that they defend with reasons sought after the fact. They are all advocates who don’t want to be called by that name, and for the most part even wily spokesman for their prejudices which they baptize “truths.” (BGE 5) Later in the same book, Nietzsche notes that moral philosophers “make one laugh” with their idea of “morality as science,” their pursuit of “a rational foundation for morality,” which “seen clearly in the light of day” is really only a “scholarly form of good faith in the dominant morality, a new way of expressing it.” Pointing at Schopenhauer’s attempt to supply a rational foundation for morality, Nietzsche says “we can draw our conclusions as to how scientific a ‘science’ could be when its ultimate masters still talk like children” (BGE 186). The real significance of the claims of moral philosophers is “what they tell us about those who make them” for they are “a sign-language of the affects” (BGE 187), betraying the psychological needs of those who make them. How do these considerations, elliptical as some of them are, support a skeptical conclusion about the objective existence of moral facts? The Sophists, on Nietzsche’s account, advance two related claims: (1) that “every morality can be dialectically justified” and; (2) that “all attempts to give reasons for morality are necessarily sophistical,” where “sophistical” is obviously meant to have the pejorative connotation that the apparent dialectical justification does not, in fact, secure the truth of the moral propositions so justified. The purported dialectical justification can fail in this way if either it is not a valid argument or some of the premises are false.  But, then, what is the force of the claim that “every morality can be dialectically justified”?  It must obviously be that every morality can have the appearance of being dialectically justified, either because its logical invalidity is not apparent or, more likely in this instance, because its premises, while apparently acceptable, are not true.

### Regress Skep

#### All statements can be justified either non-inferentially or inferentially- both methods fail which results in skep

**Sinnott- Armstrong 02** [Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 6-14-2002, "Moral Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/>] NB

The next argument develops a skeptical regress. This form of argument, which derives from Sextus Empiricus (2000), is sometimes used to support the more general skeptical claim that no belief about any topic is justified. Nonetheless, it might seem to have special force within morality if supposedly foundational moral beliefs are especially problematic in some way. The argument's goal is to rule out all of the ways in which a person might be justified in believing something. It starts with a definition: A person S is inferentially justified in believing a claim that p if and only if what makes S justified is (at least in part) S's ability to infer p from some belief of S. There are, then, only two ways to be justified: (1) If any person S is justified in believing any moral claim that p, then Smust be justified either inferentially or non-inferentially. The moral skeptic denies both possibilities in turn. First: (2) No person S is ever non-inferentially justified in believing any moral claim that p. Moral intuitionists and some moral contextualists deny premise (2), but moral skeptics argue that too many beliefs would be justified if people did not need any reason or inference to support their moral beliefs. If Thelma could be non-inferentially justified in believing that eating meat is morally wrong, then Louise could also be non-inferentially justified in believing that eating meat is notmorally wrong, and Nick could be non-inferentially justified in believing that it is morally wrong to eat vegetables. Conflicting beliefs can sometimes both be justified, but it seems less plausible to hold that such conflicting moral beliefs are all justified without any inference when each believer knows that other people disagree. If such conflicting beliefs are not justified in the absence of a reason, and if such conflicts are pervasive enough to undermine all non-inferential justification, then premise (2) is true. Another way to argue for premise (2) invokes science. Psychologists have found that many moral judgments are subject to a variety of distorting influences, including framing effects and certain misleading emotions. Biologists then suggest that moral judgments evolved in ways that seem independent of their truth. Such indications of unreliability are supposed to show that moral judgments are not justified without inference (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, Chapter 9, pp. 184-219; but see replies by Beaulieu 2009 and van Roojen 2013). That would support premise (2). Premises (1) and (2) together imply an intermediate conclusion: (3) If any person S is justified in believing any moral claim that p, then Smust be justified inferentially. This means that, to be justified, S must be able to infer p from some other beliefs held by S. But which other beliefs? There are three main possibilities: (4) If any person S is inferentially justified in believing any moral claim that p, then S must be justified by an inference with either (a) no normative premises or (b) some normative premises but no moral premises or (c) some moral premises. To the first possibility, moral skeptics respond with a variation on the maxim that you can't get “ought” from “is”: (5) No person S is ever justified in believing any moral claim that p by an inference with no normative premises. Naturalists in moral epistemology deny (5) when they try to derive a conclusion that an act is morally wrong from purely non-normative features of the act. However, moral skeptics retort that such derivations always depend on a suppressed premise that all acts with those features are morally wrong. Such a suppressed premise seems moral and, hence, normative. If so, the naturalist's inference does not really work without any normative premises. Naturalists still might invoke inferences to the best moral explanation, but then moral skeptics can deny that any moral hypothesis provides the best explanation independently of prior moral assumptions. The next possibility is to justify a moral conclusion with an inference whose premises are not moral but are normative in another way. This approach, which is adopted by contractarians among others, can be called normativism. Normativists usually start with premises about rationality and impartiality that are each supposed to be normative but morally neutral. If rational impartial people under relevant circumstances would agree to certain moral standards, this is supposed to show that the corresponding moral beliefs are true or justified. One problem for this general approach is that different theories of rationality, impartiality, and relevant circumstances are all questionable and lead to contrary moral beliefs. This suggests that such theories are not morally neutral, so these derivations do not avoid moral premises. Other arguments from non-moral norms to moral conclusions run into similar problems. Moral skeptics conclude that: (6) No person S is ever justified in believing any moral claim that p by an inference with some normative premises but no moral premises. Premises (4)-(6) imply another intermediate conclusion: (7) If any person S is justified in believing any moral claim that p, then Smust be justified by an inference with some moral premise. In short, moral beliefs must be justified by moral beliefs. This creates a problem. Although the justifying beliefs must include some moral beliefs, not just any moral beliefs will do:

## 2NC

### AT: Theory

Theory isn’t a voter:

1. Epistemological skep denies that you can ever know whether statements are true which means that